
















Qualche lettore si chiederà a cosa servano queste ricerche: un ani-
mo religioso potrebbe rispondere che anche in una pulce si rispecchia
l’armonia del creato; uno spirito laico preferisce osservare che la do-
manda non è pertinente, e che un mondo in cui si studiassero solo
le cose che servono sarebbe più triste, più povero, e forse anche più
violento del mondo che ci è toccato in sorte. In sostanza, la seconda
risposta non è molto diversa dalla prima.
Some readers will ask what is the use of this research: a religious mind
might reply that the harmony of creation is mirrored even in a flea; a
secular mind prefers to state that the question is not relevant, and that
a world where only useful things are studied would be sadder, poorer
and possibly more violent than the world which fate has allotted us.
Basically, the second reply is not all that different from the first.
(Primo Levi, Il Salto della Pulce)
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Introduction
A new interest in modal logic
Abelard shares with many other philosophers and logicians of the twelfth
century a particular interest in investigating the notions of possibility and
necessity and in providing them with a crucial role in philosophy, theology
and logic. The development of such an interest in the twelfth century is
motivated mainly by two reasons.1 First, a logical consideration of modal
terms was required for the commentary on some texts of the logica vetus,
and particularly on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione. Aristotle dedicates two
chapters of his Periermeneias to the study of modal claims, the twelfth
and thirteenth. There, he addresses several problems concerning the defi-
nitions and the meaning of modal terms and discusses the syntactical and
grammatical structure of modal propositions. He is especially interested in
how the negative particle should be applied in modal claims and in how
propositions about possibility, contingency, impossibility and necessity are
logically related to one another. The notions of possibility and necessity
also play a crucial role in the Aristotelian discussion of future contingents,
to which the ninth chapter of the De Interpretatione is dedicated. There,
Aristotle addresses the problem of whether there are future events and
propositions that are genuinely contingent, and whether indeterminism is
compatible with some basic logical principles, such as the principle of biva-
lence and the law of excluded middle. The consideration of Aristotle’s logic
for modal propositions, to which early medieval authors were acquainted
through Boethius’ translations and commentaries, is then the first motiva-
tion that leads Abelard and his contemporaries to undertake a new study
of modalities.
Moreover, the interest of twelfth-century philosophers in the logic of pos-
1See (Martin, 2004a) on this point.
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sibility and necessity is also motivated by their will to take a stance in the
theological debates concerning the omnipotence and omniscience of God. In
particular, these debates aimed to define the extension and limitations of
God’s powers, and to establish whether or not God also has the power of
creating a different world and a different history than the one he actually
created. Also, they tried to demonstrate that there is no incompatibility
between God’s complete and infallible knowledge of all events and the ex-
istence of contingent and indeterminate states of affairs. These debates –
the roots of which are to be found in the Christian Patristic tradition as
well as in some theological discussions from the eleventh century – raise
new problems concerning the notion of potentiality and possibility, prob-
lems that are reflected in Abelard’s discussions of the powers of God and
creatures. This background encouraged twelfth-century logicians to address
a number of new issues: what is the definition of modes and how should
we account for their grammatical and semantical role in categorical predi-
cations? What is the relation between simple categorical claims and modal
ones? Is it possible to organize possibility and necessity statements into a
valid system of inferences; and could the same be done for propositions in
which modal terms and temporal quantifications are combined? How can
we expound the meanings of possibility and necessity, and how could we
account for unrealized and for unrealizable possibilities? And finally, is it
really the case that things might have been different than they actually are;
and should contingency be referred only to future events or also to present
and past states of affairs?
Texts
Abelard discusses his theory of necessity and possibility both in his logi-
cal and in his theological works. The present study is limited to the con-
sideration of Abelard’s use of modal terms in his two main logical works:
the Dialectica and the Logica Ingredientibus. Within the Dialectica, modal
propositions and their logical properties are discussed as a part of Abelard’s
theory of categorical propositions. This discussion is carried out in the trea-
tise labelled by De Rijk «De Modalibus», which is part of the second book
of the Dialectica (Dial. 191-210, in de Rijk’s edition). In this part of the
Dialectica Abelard sketches a logical system for modal claims. He first ana-
lyzes the notion of mode and distinguishes between different sorts of modal
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terms and of modal propositions. He then considers some morphological and
syntactical features of modal claims (insisting in particular on the correct
attribution of negation and quantifiers in claims of this sort). Finally, he pro-
vides a scheme of the logical relationships that occur between propositions
containing modes, defining in this way a sort of modal square of opposi-
tion and equipollence between modal claims. Furthermore, in this treatise
on modalities Abelard devotes various passages to the investigation of the
nature and the meaning of modes, and he tries to give a definition of the
two primitive modal terms of his logical system: possibility and necessity.
Abelard also considers some semantical ambiguities concerning the scope
of the modal term when applied in nominal propositions, and he discusses
the combination of modal “operators” with other sort of qualifications that
might be added to categorical predications, such as the temporal qualifica-
tions “dum”; “quamdiu” and “in omni tempore”.
Another part of the Dialectica that is dedicated to the investigation of
modal notions is Dial. 210-221, where Abelard focuses on the connection
between modalities and time, and in particular asks how necessity and pos-
sibility are referred to past and future claims. Here, Abelard defends the
compatibility between indeterminism and unqualified bivalence, and also
the compatibility between indeterminism and God’s complete knowledge of
all events that happen in time. There are also various other places in the
Dialectica where Abelard’s discussion involves the modal notions of possi-
bility and necessity. For instance, he discusses the concept of “potency” at
lenght within his treatise on qualities, in the third book of the first treatise
(Dial. 93-99). The notion of necessity has instead a crucial role in Abelard’s
discussion of topical inferences in Dial. 253-413.
As for the Logica Ingredientibus, the investigation of modal terms and
modal propositions is carried out in the glosses on Aristotle’s De Interpre-
tatione, in particular within the quite extensive introduction that Abelard
places before the literal commentary on chapter twelve and thirteen of the
Aristotelian work (LI De Int. 391-433). In this text, Abelard defines the
notion of mode and investigates the syntax and semantics for modal propo-
sitions. We may find a detailed treatment of the notions of contingency
and necessity also within the glosses on the ninth chapter of the De In-
terpretatione, where Abelard addresses the issue of future contingents and
advances a defense of indeterminism (LI De Int. 243-268). It is interesting
ix
to look at these two discussions together for in the latter Abelard applies
many of the logical devices and inferential rules that he had established
as valid for modal claims in the former. These two discussions from the
glosses on De Interpretatione 9 and 12-13 have many teminological and con-
ceptual similarities with the parallel investigations developed in Dialectica
191-210 and 210-221. Indeed, despite a few differences and disagreements
between the Dialectica and the Logica Ingredientibus, the two works offer a
quite consistent theory of modal propositions and of their logical properties.
The main discrepancies between the two concern the following issues: the
de rebus-de sensu distinction, which is presented in quite different terms in
the two works, in particular with respect to the problem of how de rebus
and de sensu propositions are logically related to one another;2 the study
of impersonal nominal predications, which is discussed at lenght in LI but
not in the Dialectica, and the question about what is the lexical category to
which modal terms belong, issue that again is raised in LI and not in the
former logical work. The two works also diverge in how Abelard answers to
the question whether modal propositions carry an implicit presupposition
of the existence of their subject’s referent(s); and in the way he accounts for
the equipollence between possibillity predications and necessity predications.
Nevertheless, with the exceptions of these discrepancies the two works are
very similar, and they present a theory of modalities and a logic for modal
claims that are the same in their fundamental traits. This similarity seems
to confirm the idea that the two works were written a few years apart from
one another, probably in the second decade of the twelfth century, although
they could have been subject to revision or extension in the years from 1121
to 1127, when Abelard lived and gave lectures on logic in the “Paraclete”
Oratorium.3
Apart from the glosses on De Interpretatione, other places of the LI
that are concerned with modal notions are Abelard’s glosses on Porphyry’s
Isagoge, where the investigation of the notion of possibility is particularly
important for Abelard’s discussion of substantial forms and propria (LI Isag.
2For a detailed comparison between the two works with respect to this point see 1.3.3
below.
3The LI is usually considered as written, or at least revised, a few years later than
the Dialectica. On the chronology of these two works see in particular (Mews, 1985, p.
73-134); (Marenbon, 1997, p. 36-53); (Brower and Guilfoy, 2004, p. 6-8); (Jacobi and
Strub, 2010, p. 63-64).
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88-92); as well as his glosses on Aristotle’s Categories, where Abelard defines
the notions of “potentia” and “impotentia” (LI Cat. 122-139; 223-251; 259-
285; this discussion is at least in part parallel to the investigation carried
out in Dial. 96-99).
Sources
The discussion of modalities that is put forward in Aristotle’s De interpreta-
tione is certainly a major source for Abelard’s logical reflection on possibility
and necessity. As pointed out in Jacobi and Strub’s introduction to their
edition of Abelard’s glosses, Abelard certainly had two texts at hand when
he wrote his commentary on the Aristotelian work: Boethius’ Latin transla-
tion of Aristotle’s On Interpretation (probably in the version reproduced by
Thierry of Chartres in his Heptateuchon) and Boethius’ second commentary
on this text (Jacobi and Strub, 2010, p. 37-38). There are not many other
Aristotelian sources available to him that might have contributed to shape
his modal thinking. It is still uncertain to what extent Abelard knew the
Prior Analytics, and where he got acquainted with it. If any, his knowledge
of this work was very limited: Abelard must have seen it, but he cannot
have had access to a copy himself, and did not know it in any detail (Lager-
lund, 2016). In the glosses on De Interpretatione, he also makes reference
to some passages of the Sophistical Refutations, that he cites as authority
when he introduces his distinction between the compound and divided in-
terpretations of modal propositions. However, he did not have access to
the other Aristotelian works devoted to modalities, such as his modal syllo-
gistic (subject of chapters 8-22 of the first book of the Prior Analytics) or
the extensive definition of the notion of possibility proposed by Aristotle in
Prior Analytics I.13. Nor did Abelard have to chance to consider Aristotle’s
definitions of modal terms in the Metaphysics (in particular, in Met. Δ 5
and Δ 12, and also Θ 3-4) or his modal discussions in the De Caelo and De
Generatione et Corruptione, unavailable at the time.
Apart from Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione, the other
sources on which Abelard relied for his logical thinking were Porphyry’s
Isagoge, Boethius’ commentaries on Aristotle’s works and Boethius’ inde-
pendent treatises De topicis differentiis, De divisione, De syllogismis cat-
egoricis and De syllogismis hypotheticis. Among these, particularly im-
portant for shaping Abelard’s modal thought are the Isagoge, which con-
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tributed to stimulate Abelard’s thoughts on the nature of substances and
on the modal relations between an individual substance and its properties,
and Boethius’ De syllogismis hypotheticis, where Boethius distinguishes be-
tween different kinds of possibility and necessity propositions. Similarly
important for Abelard’s discussion of modal propositions is Priscian’s In-
stitutiones grammaticae, a text that was the subject of several glosses and
commentaries in the eleventh and twelfth century, commonly known as the
Glosulae (Marenbon, 2004b). The relevance of this grammatical background
is particularly evident in Abelard’s texts on modalities, in which the author
devotes a considerable amount of time to discuss modal terms and propo-
sitions from a grammatical and linguistical point of view, questioning for
instance which is the lexical category to which modal terms belong and the
relation between the grammatical form and the semantical form of modal
propositions.4 Indeed, the influence of Priscian and of the grammatici tra-
dition is more evident in Abelard’s glosses on De Interpretatione 12-13 than
in the Dialectica, and this point constitutes one of the few dissimilarities
between the two works. In the former text, for instance, Abelard includes
both a long discussion of impersonal constructions and about their corre-
spondent logical form (LI De Int. 404.326-408.437), and he advances the
idea that alethic modal terms should be considered as belonging to the lexi-
cal category of indefinites, i.e., as words that do not have a signification per
se but merely “consignify” (LI De Int. 407.412-408.425). Both discussions
have no correspondent in the Dialectica.
Although our knowledge of eleventh and twelfth century logical sources
is still far from complete, it is certain that a debate on modalities and on the
logic of modal claims was already underway at the time in which Abelard
wrote the Dialectica and the LI. As Martin has recently shown in (Mar-
tin, 2016), many of the issues addressed in Abelard’s texts on modalities
– such as the question about how the negative particle should be applied
in modal claims, or about the combination of modal terms with temporal
qualifications in categorical predications – are present in Garlandus Com-
potista’s Dialectica, datable to the end of the eleventh century, and in two
twelfth-century anonymous treatises, designated by Iwakuma asM1 andM3,
4For the grammatical background of Abelard’s logic see in particular (Rosier-Catach,
1999); (Rosier-Catach, 2003). For the «infiltration» of grammatical issues and problems
into the dialectic of the twelfth century see also (Pinzani, 2003).
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preserved in manuscript Orléans 266 and in Paris BN Lat 13368,5 which re-
port the opinions of Masters W., Gos., and Gosl, presumably William of
Champeaux and Goselin of Soissons (Martin, 2016, p. 117). Both Garlan-
dus’ Dialectica and the two Orléans treatises employ an understanding of
possibility in terms of compatibility with nature, which is also at the base of
Abelard’s modal semantics.
An almost totally different group of sources seems to have stimulated
Abelard’s debate on the nature of contingency and his attack to logical and
theological determinism. The issue of future contingents and the puzzle of
logical determinism is addressed by Abelard on the basis of the Aristotelian
discussion of the topic in De interpretatione 9 and on Boethius’ commen-
taries on it. From Boethius, Abelard takes the analysis of the different kinds
of contingency and the distinction between determinate and indeterminate
truth values (that Boethius had in turn inherited from some Hellenistic
source, now lost). By means of this distinction, both Boethius and Abelard
try to reconcile an indeterminist theory of reality with the validity of the
principle of bivalence for all propositions, including future contingent ones.
For what concerns his discussion of theological determinism, Abelard’s main
sources are Boethius’ commentaries of the Aristotelian texts and Boethius’
Consolation of Philosophy, together with some Augustinian works, in par-
ticular his De civitate Dei, De dono perseverantiae and De praedestinatione.
Following Augustine and Boethius, Abelard attempts to reconcile the idea
that some events that happen in time are the outcome of human beings’
free will and deliberation with the Christian dogma stating that God has a
complete and invariable knowledge of all events that happen in time. Apart
from these ancient sources, Abelard probably based his discussion of future
contingents also on some eleventh and twelfth century debates. An extensive
discussion of the topic is testified by many texts of the eleventh century, such
as Peter Damian’s De divina omnipotentia or Anselm’s Cur Deus homo and
De concordia. Another author writing in the late eleventh and early twelfth
century who is interested in the question of theological determinism and
whose work probably constituted a source for Abelard’s discussion of the
topic is William of Champeaux (ca. 1070-1122). Exactly as Abelard will
do in the Dialectica, in his Sententiae William considers the following puz-
5M1 = Orléans, Bibl. Municipale, 266: 166a-169a; Paris, Bibl. Nationale, lat. 13368,
175va-177ra. M3 = Orléans, Bibl. Municipale, 266: 252b-257b.
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zling inferences: (i) if God’s foreknowledge is infallible, then future events
– including the actions of human beings – all happen of necessity; on the
other hand, (ii) if future events, including the actions of human beings, could
occur otherwise, then God’s foreknowledge is fallible. As Guilfoy notes in
(Guilfoy, 2012) the proposition which says that “if future events could occur
otherwise, then God’s foreknowledge is fallible” was interpreted in several
ways by William’s contemporaries. In order to save the infallibility of God’s
knowledge, some rejected that things can in fact be otherwise than they
are. Others held that because the events might occur otherwise than they
actually do, God has no complete knowledge of everything that happen in
time, and thus they dismissed God’s infallibility arguing that rather he is
just very lucky epistemically (Guilfoy, 2012). William rejects both views, by
claiming that the inferences stated in (i) and (ii) are not valid (Sententiae
§237.68). However, he does not make exlicit in what exactly their invalidity
lies. Abelard considers inferences (i) and (ii) both in the Dialectica and in
the Logica Ingredientibus, and he justifies their invalidity by saying that they
are based on a confusion between the de rebus and de sensu interpretation
of modal claims.
Content and structure of the work
In what follows, I give a systematic account of Abelard’s modal logic and
theory of modalities in the Dialectica and in the Logica Ingredientibus. The
first two chapters are especially concerned with the syntactical and logi-
cal aspects of this theory. In the first, I consider Abelard’s definition of
mode and his distinction between proper and improper modal terms. I then
present the definitions of the six modal terms on which Abelard bases his
logical system – i.e., the terms “necesse”, “possibile”, “contingens”, “impos-
sibile”, “verum” and “falsum” – which according to Abelard belong to the
linguistic category of indefinites and, as all other modes, might have either
an adverbial or a nominal form (section 1.1). In the same chapter, I also
focus on Abelard’s investigation of the morphology and syntax of modal
propositions, and on his discussion about which are the terms of modal
propositions and how the negative particle and the signs of quantity must
be applied in them (section 1.2). Finally, in the last section of chapter one,
I discuss Abelard’s famous distinction between the de rebus and de sensu
interpretation of modal proposition, and I compare the way in which this
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distinction is expounded in the Dialectica and in LI (section 1.3).
In the second chapter I take into consideration the core of Abelard’s
modal logic, i.e., the system of relations of opposition and equipollence
that he establishes as holding among possibility, impossibility and neces-
sity propositions (see 2.2). Abelard considers both the logical properties of
propositions having the same mode, and the mutual relations holding for
propositions with different modes. These rules of inference are represented
by means of different squares of opposition, that are proposed first for singu-
lar propositions and then for quantified ones. Before considering Abelard’s
modal squares, I discuss Abelard’s position on the existential presupposition
and the presence of non-referring terms in his non-modal and modal logic
(section 2.1). In particular, I argue that Abelard interprets all de rebus af-
firmative modal propositions as having an implicit existential import, the
satisfaction of which is a necessary condition for their truth. I then address
a number of difficulties that are related to existential import and empty
terms, and I suggest that Abelard was aware of these complications and
because of them decided to restrict the validity of his modal system only
to those propositions whose subjects actually refer. According to Abelard,
the standard laws of equipollences, as well as many logical relations be-
tween modal propositions, only hold under the condition that the terms in-
cluded in these propositions are not empty. Finally, in section 2.3 I consider
Abelard’s discussion of the logic of modal claims that contain temporal qual-
ifications. Abelard refers to these claims as “determinate” or “composite”
modal propositions, as opposed to “simple” modal ones. Although Abelard’s
interest is mainly directed to temporal determinations, introduced by the
adverbs “while” (dum, cum), “as long as” (quando, quamdiu, quotiens); “in
every time” (omni tempore), “before” (ante) and “after” (postea), in the
Logica Ingredientibus he also considers other sorts of qualifications, such
as the spatial qualification “where” (ubi), or the exclusive determination
“only” (solum, tantum). Abelard is particularly interested in those modal
claims that contain a “dum” qualification, as for example “It is necessary for
Socrates to read while he reads”, or “It is possible for Socrates to sit while
he stands”. To them, he devotes a long and intricate discussion both in the
Dialectica (206.7-210.180) and in the glosses on De Interpretatione (LI De
Int. 422.778-432.1085).
The third chapter focuses on Abelard’s understanding of possibility in
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terms of compatibility with nature, and provides an analysis of the notions of
repugnancy, requirement and nature, which ground Abelard’s definitions of
possibility and necessity (section 3.1). With this modal paradigm, that he
did not invent but inherited from the eleventh– and twelfth-century debates
on modalities, Abelard tries to account for the existence of unrealized possi-
bilities, i.e., possibilities that are never actualized in time, such as Socrates’
possibility of being a bishop (section 3.2). He even tries to account for the
existence of unrealizable possibilities, such as human beings’ possibility of
being unable to laugh, that cannot be actualized in any realizable situation
(section 3.3), or the possibility that a blind man has to see, or an amputee to
walk, that cannot be realized given the actual circumstances of the subjects
under consideration (section 3.4).
The existence of contingent events – i.e., of events that are equally apt
to happen or not to happen in time – is taken by Abelard as an evident and
indubitable feature of the way things are. According to him, contingency
characterizes both the natural world, inasmuch as some natural events are
not the outcome of a chain of natural causes but happen by chance, and
the human world, in the sense that some events that take place are the re-
sult of human free will and unconstrained deliberation. Generally speaking,
Abelard holds that it is possible for things to be otherwise than they actu-
ally are, and that there are many alternative ways in which things might
be. As every indeterminist, however, Abelard has to deal with several fa-
talist arguments, that aim to prove either that the existence of contingent
events is per se untenable or that it is incompatible with some fundamen-
tal and irrevocable principles of logic or theology. In the fourth chapter, I
examine the arguments that Abelard considers for logical determinism (4.1)
and for theological determinism (4.2), and the various ways in which he at-
tempts to answer them. In the last section of the chapter, I compare the
theory of contingency that Abelard maintains in the Dialectica and in the
Logica Ingredientibus with the one he embraces in his theological works, in
order to specify more clearly in what sense and to what extent Abelard’s





Abelard’s modal logic is an investigation of the logical properties of proposi-
tions that contain the modal terms “possibly”, “necessarily”, “impossibly”,
“contingently”, “truly” and “falsely”,1 as well as the correspondent nominal
modes (“possible”, “necessary”, “impossible”, etc.). These six modes – that
we may label as “alethic modalities” - are not the only modal terms that
Abelard acknowledges. However, he explicitly restricts his logical treatment
of modes to these six modalities, excluding all the others, for he claims that
they are the only modal terms that can be put in a system of logical re-
lations of opposition and equipollence. The investigation of modes and of
modal claims is carried out as a part of Abelard’s analysis of categorical
propositions, in the second book of the Dialectica (Dial. 190-210). A par-
1These last two modes, that are not usually counted among modal operators in con-
temporary logic, are nevertheless considered as modes by Abelard, both in the Dialectica
and in a few passages of the Logica Ingredientibus. Abelard follows on this point Aris-
totle who, in De Interpretatione 12, lists among modal expressions also the terms “true”
(ἀληθές) and its negation “not true” (οὐκ ἀληθές). Given that for Abelard a mode is
what modifies a simple categorical sentence, it makes sense that he would include also
“truly” and “falsely” among the other modal terms. Abelard’s consideration of these two
modes’ logical behavior is rather limited, for he only states a few inferences that relate
these modes to the other alethic modalities: for example, he says that the modal propo-
sition (a) “Socrates is truly a bishop” entails (b) “Socrates is possibly a bishop” (stating
in this way a form of the ab esse ad posse principle) and that the same proposition (a)
logically follows from (c) “Socrates is necessarily a bishop” (ab necesse ad esse). He also
says that proposition (d) “Socrates is impossibly a bishop” entails (e) “Socrates is falsely
a bishop”. Apart from stating these logical inferences, Abelard dedicates some passages of
the Dialectica to the examination of the meaning of this two modes (Dial. 204.18-206.6).
This discussion has no counterpart in the glossae.
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allel discussion of modal propositions is to be found in Abelard’s glossae to
chapters 12 and 13 of Aristotle’s De Interpretatione (LI De Int. 391-433),
that are included in the Logica Ingredientibus. In these two texts – the Di-
alectica and the glossae – the discussion of the syntactical structure and the
logical behavior of modal propositions is intertwined with a philosophical
investigation of the nature of modalities, that is an inquiry about the mean-
ing of the modal terms “necessity” and “possibility” and about their role in
metaphysics and epistemology.
In section 1.1 of this chapter, I first try to provide a characterization of
what counts as a mode and as a modal proposition according to Abelard. I
then present two distinctions that are drawn by Abelard in his discussion of
modal terms:
(i) the grammatical distinction between adverbial and nominal modes; and
(ii) the semantical distinction between terms that are modes according to
their meaning (in sensu) and terms that are modes only according to
their grammatical position (secundum positionem constructionis). We
may also characterize this distinction as dividing proper modes from
improper ones).
The second distinction reflects a strategy often employed by Abelard in
his logical works, that consists in differentiating the grammatical structure
(constructio) of a linguistic item from its “real”, semantical structure, that is,
what we would call its “logical form”, and what Abelard calls its meaning, or
sensus. The identification of these two levels of language is a crucial feature
of Abelard’s logic, that enables him to distinguish two different kinds of
well-formedness (congruitas) – i.e., grammatical and sematical – and that is
responsible for some of the more interesting novelties of his modal system,
such as the distinction between the de rebus and de sensu interpretation of
modal claims. In section 1.1 I also dedicate some space to discuss Abelard’s
definitions of modal terms and particularly his understanding of the concepts
of “possibility” and “necessity”, although a more complete analysis of this
topic will be carried out in chapter 3 below. Finally, in the end of the section
I provide a justification for Abelard’s choosing to restrict his investigation
of modal terms only to alethic modalities and to use the two modal terms
“possibly” and “necessarily” as the basic, primitive terms of his modal logic.
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In section 1.2, I focus on Abelard’s investigation of the morphology and
syntax of modal propositions. I consider three issues that Abelard faces in
his treatment of modal propositions:
(i) which are the terms (i.e., the subject and the predicate) of modal propo-
sitions;
(ii) how do we determine the quality (affirmative or negative) of modal
propositions; and
(iii) how do we determine their quantity (whether they are singular, par-
ticular or universal).
The first question is related to the problem of determining how modal propo-
sitions relate to simple, non-modal ones. Abelard tries to characterise the
relationship between simple and modal caims in terms of the modals ‘de-
scending’ from the simple propositions, where descent is the operation of
modification, and the question to be answered is what gets modified and
how. Abelard claims that modal propositions and the corresponding simple
ones (for example, “Socrates runs” and “Socrates possibly runs”) have the
same terms, and therefore they do not differ with respect to their subject
or predicate, but only with respect to the way in which the two terms are
related: unqualifiedly in the case of simple predications and cum modo in
the case of modal ones. The second question, that concerns the quality
of modal propositions, is stimulated by what Aristotle says in the twelfth
chapter of De Interpretatione, where he considers the many possible ways
in which a negative particle may be placed in a modal proposition and in-
quires which is the proper way to place negation in order to obtain, from a
certain modal proposition, its proper contradictory. The question of nega-
tion is decisive in medieval debates on modal logic in Abelard’s times and
already before him (Martin, 2016, p. 115-125). Also the question concerning
the inter-relations between quantifiers and modal terms was already present
in the logical debates of Abelard’s predecessors. In this respect, eleventh
and twelfth century discussions on modalities go far beyond Aristotle’s and
Boethius’ modal logic, that only considered modal systems with non quan-
tified modal propositions. Abelard’s analysis of the various ways in which
modes, negation and quantifiers may be combined and how the resulting
propositions are logically related to one another is a sign of the level of
sophistication he was able to reach in his modal logic.
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Section 1.3 addresses the problem of interpreting Abelard’s distinction
between a de rebus or a de sensu interpretation of modal propositions.
Abelard is usually credited with the identification, or at least with the first
explicit exposition, of such a distinction, the ancestor of the well known
de re-de dicto distinction.2 The distinction points out an ambiguity in the
interpretation of modal propositions, that may have a different truth value
depending on the scope that is attributed to the modal term. A modal term
can be interpreted either as being applied to an entire proposition and to
the meaning (sensus) of such proposition, or it can be interpreted as being
applied to the relationship between the proposition’s subject and predicate,
and consequently between the things (res) that are signified by these terms.
In the first case, the modal proposition is interpreted de sensu (or de dicto),
in the second it is interpreted de rebus (or de re). According to Abelard,
modality is a mode of being, and as such it is primarily applied to things and
their properties. He thinks then that modalities are fundamentally de re,
and only indirectly they apply to propositions and to their sensus. Both the
Dialectica and the glossae on De Interpretatione offer an account of the de
rebus-de sensu distinction, although on this issue the two logical works seem
to differ significantly. I first provide an account of the de rebus-de sensu dis-
tinction as Abelard presents it in the Dialectica and then an account of the
same distinction as it is presented in the Logica Ingredientibus (sections 1.3.1
and 1.3.2). Only then, will I offer a comparison between the accounts given
in the two works, highlighting the differences and the similarities between
the two treatments (section 1.3.3).
2See for example (Kneale, 1962), (Knuuttila, 1993), (Dutilh Novaes, 2004) for the
attribution of the distinction to Abelard. Before Abelard’s logical texts started to be
systematically studied, other medieval authors were thought to be the “inventors” of
the de rebus-de dicto distinction. Von Wright, for example, attributes this invention to
Aquinas. See (von Wright, 1951, p. 1), and (Uckelman, 2008, p. 392, n. 10) on this.
4
1.1 Modes and Alethic Modalities
1.1.1 Proper and improper modes
The general characterization of modes, advanced by Abelard both in the
Dialectica and in the Logica Ingredientibus, is the following: all those words
are said to be modes that qualify (determinant) a simple predication, i.e.,
that qualify the way in which what is signified by the predicate term is
conjoined to (or separated from) what is signified by the subject term (Dial.
191.5-9; LI De Int. 392.22-27). If, for example, by means of the categorical
proposition “Socrates reads” someone affirms that the property of reading
is unqualifiedly (simpliciter) conjoined to Socrates, in stating the modal
propositions “Socrates reads well” or “Socrates reads rapidly” he does not
only affirm that the predicate is conjoined to the subject, but he also specifies
in which way it is the case that the two things are conjoined. The adverbs
“well’ and “rapidly” are modes. Such words, Abelard says, are the ones that
could be proper answers to a “quomodo?” question, a question by means
of which we ask how or in what way the conjunction or separation between
subject and predicated holds:
Modi autem, unde “modales” dicuntur propositiones, proprie aduerbia
sunt quaecumque in “quomodo?” responderi possunt. Ut, si quaeratur:
“Quomodo legit?” licet responderi, quantum ad uim interrogationis
pertinet: “Bene”, “Male”, “Celeriter”; haec itaque aduerbia quae uerbi
inhaerentiam modificando determinant, proprie modi sunt. (LI De Int.
392.22-27)
Every mode is therefore a qualification (determinatio) of a certain predi-
cation3 and modal assertions are contrasted with simple predications, that
are usually said by Abelard to be de puro inesse.4 This definition of modes
is presented by Abelard as a traditional characterization (Dial. 194.9-11).
3The converse is not the case, that is not every qualification is also a mode. There
are many sorts of qualifications (e.g. temporal determinationes) the role of which is not
to qualify the way in which the predicate is said of the subject, and therefore are not
modes: «Non autem, sicut omnes modi determinationes sunt, ita e conuerso quaelibet
determinationes sunt modi; cum enim dico: “Legi heri” (uel: “Lucanum”) (uel: “homo
albus”) suppositae uoces determinationes sunt praecedentium sed non sunt modi, cum
in: “Quomodo?” non possint reddi, quae uidelicet interrogatio generalis est ad omnes
dictiones quae proprie modi sunt, sicut bene, male, celeriter, necessario» (LI De Int.
392.27-33).
4On the relation between simple and modal propositions see section 1.2.1 below.
5
However, the author acknowledges that this definition is satisfied only by
some of the terms that are traditionally regarded as “modes”. In particular,
it is only satisfied by those modes that Abelard calls proper modes, or modes
in sensu. Proper modes may have an adverbial form (such as “necessarily”,
“rapidly”, “well”), or they can have a nominal form (“necessary”, “good”).
I consider this distinction between adverbial and nominal modes in section
1.1.2 below.
Not all the terms that Abelard considers as modal terms satisfy this
definition. Of the six alethic modalities that have been listed above (“nec-
essarily”, “possibly”, “impossibly”, “contingently”, “truly”, “falsely”) only
the first one – the mode “necessarily” – is said by Abelard to conform to
this characterization. All the other alethic modal terms (such as “possibly”,
“impossibly”, etc.) are said to be modes only improperly. They are called
modes because, when they are included in a categorical proposition, they
have the same grammatical position that proper modes usually have, that is
they are attached to a verb, if they have an adverbial form (as in “Socrates
est episcopus possibiliter”) or they introduce an accusative infinitive clause,
if they have a nominal form (as in “Possibile est Socratem esse episcopum”).
Although from a grammatical point of view improper modes do not differ
from proper ones, from the semantical point of view the two sorts of modes
do not have the same role, for improper modes are not qualifiers of a predica-
tions, and they do not specify in which way the predicate term is conjoined
to the subject term. Abelard says therefore that these terms are modes only
quantum ad enuntiationem, or secundum positionem constructionis (or also
modes in voce, as opposed to modes in sensu):
Cum autem nec “uere” nec “possibiliter” quantum ad sensum modi
sint, secundum tamen positionem constructionis Aristoteles modos ea
appellat quia eundem locum in constructione possident, uerbo adiecta,
quem obtinent proprii modi. Quia, sicut dicimus: “Currit celeriter”
(uel: “necessario”) ita etiam dicimus: “Currit possibiliter” (uel: “uere”)
nil tamen in sensu modificantes, ut ostendimus. (LI De Int. 394.74-79)
Another way to distinguish proper modes from improper ones is the follow-
ing: proper modes are the ones that, once they are attached to a certain
verb, constitute a qualified predicate whose meaning is a part of the same
predicate taken unqualifiedly. This is the case for instance for the proper
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mode “rapidly”: when it is attached to a verb like “run” it constitutes a qual-
ified verb “to run rapidly” the meaning of which is included in the meaning
of “run”. By saying that the qualified verb “is a part” of the unqualified one,
Abelard intends that the addition of a proper mode restricts the extension
of the predicate to which it is applied (Martin, 2016, p. 118). Since the
predicate with a proper mode applied signifies a “part” of the correspond-
ing predicate taken unqualifiedly, in virtue of the locus from a part, from
the fact that a certain inherence holds in a qualified way, it follows that
the same inherence also holds unqualifiedly, i.e., from the fact that “S is P
cum modo” it follows that “S is P”. Abelard maintains the validity of this
rule of inference both in the Dialectica (Dial. 194.15-20)5 and in the Logica
Ingredientibus (LI De Int. 392.39-46),6 citing Boethius as an authority for
the use of the rule.
Note that, if the qualified verb entails the verb taken simpliciter in virtue
of being a part of it, the converse inference (from the whole to the part)
cannot generally hold, because any part is for Abelard (and Boethius) a
proper part, which means it can not coincide with the whole. Therefore,
I should be able to infer the unqualified verb from the verb cum modo,
but I should not be able to infer the qualified verb from its unqualified
form. The idea that the relationship between a modalized predicate and
the corresponding unqualified predicate is a sort of part-whole relation was
already present in some eleventh and twelfth century debates on modal
propositions antedeting to Abelard’s Dialectica. We may find the same idea,
for example, both in Garlandus’s Dialectica and in other twelfth century
debates on modalities, in which Boethius is again credited with being the
source of the principle (Martin, 2016, p. 117). I refer below to this rule of
inference as the “Boethius’s Rule”. Only proper modes satisfy this rule, while
improper ones do not. Let us consider for example the mode “possibly”,
that, according to Abelard, is improper. Abelard says that from the fact
5«Ait in Topicis Boethius quod aliquid cum modo propositum pars accipiatur, et sim-
pliciter acceptum totum intelligatur, ut: “cito currere” et “currere”: “currere” enim totum
est, “cito currere”, autem pars; unde et dicitur quod “si cito currit, currit” sed non conuer-
titur».
6«Unde etiam Boethius in Topicis, cum est modus in sensu, uult ex aliquo modificato
ipsum simpliciter inferri, ut, si anima mouetur irascibiliter uel aliquo alio modo, utique et
simpliciter mouetur, quippe modus appositus – qui uerbum determinat – quasi partem in
modo facit, ut sit irascibiliter moueri quasi pars moueri, quae uidelicet ipsum ponat sed
ab ipso non ponatur».
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that Socrates is possibly a bishop it does not follow that Socrates is a bishop
unqualifiedly. Also the two modes “falsely” and “impossibly” clearly do
not conform to Boethius’ rule, for from the fact that Socrates falsely runs
or that Socrates impossibly runs I am never allowed to infer that Socrates
runs (see Dial. 194.37-195.3 and LI De Int. 392.33-37). These three terms
must be considered modes only improperly, in voce or secundum positionem
costructionis.
This is also the case for the term “truly”, which is not considered by
Abelard to be a proper mode. For even if it is true that from the fact
that Socrates truly runs it correctly follows that Socrates runs simpliciter,
nevertheless, this is not enough to be considered a proper mode, because
proper modes must also satisfy the condition that the converse inference,
from the unqualified verb to the verb taken as qualified by the mode, must
not generally hold. But Abelard shows that from any verb that is qualified
by the mode “truly” we can infer the corresponding unqualified verb. For
this reason, the verb taken with the adverb “truly” is not a part of the verb
taken unqualifiedly, and it does not conform to Boethius’ rule (see Dial.
194.34-37; LI De Int. 393.63-394.73)
Nec fortasse “uere” aduerbium proprie modus est in sensu, licet in
Primo Hypotheticorum Boethius dicat in hac propositione: Socrates
uere philosophus est “uere” modum esse propositionis; non enim “uere”
inhaerentiam philosophi uel alicuius determinare uel modificare uide-
tur, cum quicquid inhaeret uere inhaereat et e conuerso. Nisi forte
“uere” per quandam expressionem et excellentiam accipiatur, ac si
dicatur: Philosophus est uere id est: Indubitanter uel multum in
philosophia habundans; si autem apponatur “uere” simpliciter pro rei
ueritate, nulla est in sensu modificatio uel determinatio, quia idem est
esse philosophum quod est in ueritate esse philosophum.
The adverbial mode “necessarily”, on the contrary, does qualify the simple
inherence to which it applies, and it is by all means a mode according to
meaning, not only according to its grammatical position. For from the verb
qualified by “necessarily”, I can always infer the corresponding unqualified
verb, while the converse inference is not generally valid:
“Necessario” autem proprie modus uideri potest, cum partem in natura
faciat, ut scilicet “necessario esse hominem” pars sit in natura “esse
hominem”. Unde si necessario est homo, consequitur ut sit homo;
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sed non conuertitur. In natura autem partem diximus, eoquod, si
actum rei consideremus, nihil esse hominem necessario inueniemus. Est
itaque “necessario” quantum ad sensus proprietatem recte modus, cum
uidelicet esse necessario sit esse aliquo modo. (Dial. 195.4-10)
I have spoken so far only of proper and improper adverbial modes, but
Abelard makes clear that this distinction between proper and improper
modes applies to nominal modes as well:
Et ita habemus quosdam modos aduerbiales, quosdam casuales; et de
utrisque quosdam proprie modos secundum sensum, quosdam quantum
ad constructionem solam; nam “necesse” uel “necessario” proprie modi
sunt, “possibile” uel “uerum”’ siue eorum aduerbia non ita. (LI De Int.
394.86-90)
In the following section, I present Abelard’s distinction between adverbial
and nominal modes.
1.1.2 Adverbial and nominal modes
As I said above, all adverbs that qualify the way in which a predicate is con-
joined to (or separated from) a subject are proper modes. Adverbs of this
sort are for example “well” (bene) or “necessarily” (necessario). Also other
sorts of adverbs can be called modes, if they have the same grammatical
position that proper modes have, like “possibly” (possibiliter), “impossi-
bly” (impossibiliter), “truly” (vere). Many of these adverbs also have a
corresponding nominal form, in our example respectively the names “good”
(bonus), “necessary” (necesse), “possible” (possibile), “impossible” (impossi-
bile), “true” (verus). Although adverbs and names have a different function
grammatically, according to Abelard they both count as modes, insofar as
they perform the same semantical role of qualifying a predication, either
properly or improperly (Dial. 191.1-5; 9-11). From a semantical point of
view, then, different grammatical expressions like “It is possible for Socrates
to be a bishop” and “Socrates is possibly a bishop” are the same (Dial.
191.15-16), and are both considered by Abelard to be modal propositions.
Just as modes can be of two kinds, adverbial and nominal, so modal
propositions might have an adverbial grammatical construction or a nominal
one. Note that the distinction between adverbial and nominal modes – and
adverbial and nominal modal propositions – is again a distinction operating
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at the level of grammar, and not at the semantical level. It is important to
separate the grammatical, “superficial” structure of a sentence, that may be
adverbial or nominal, from its semantical structure, that can be de rebus or
de sensu, depending on the scope the modal term is given (this semantical
distinction will be analyzed in section 1.3 on page 48 below). Abelard thinks
that (almost) every modal proposition – independently of the adverbial or
nominal grammatical form in which it is expressed – could be understood in a
de rebus interpretation or in a de sensu interpretation. The semantical form,
however, is not totally unrelated to the linguistic form, because Abelard
seems to think that an adverbial structure somehow “mirrors” a de rebus
semantical structure, while a nominal and impersonal form suggests that
the modal claim should be read de sensu. However, in this work he also
thinks that we can unproblematically translate every adverbial form into a
nominal one and viceversa. In the Logica Ingredientibus, Abelard advances
instead the idea that there are exceptions to this, for he says that there
are nominal propositions which cannot be translated into a corresponding
adverbial form, and that they are only interpretable as being de sensu, not
de rebus. One such a proposition is for example “Id quod non est possibile est
esse” (LI De Int. 408.415). These nominal constructions are the ones that,
according to Abelard, are impersonal both with respect to their grammatical
form and with respect to their meaning (see section 1.3.2 on page 67). The
majority of nominal modal propositions, on the contrary, are impersonal in
grammar but personal in meaning. With the exclusion of few exceptions,
Abelard thinks that every modal proposition can be understood as being
de rebus or de sensu with respect to its meaning, and can be expressed
unproblematically by means of an adverbial and a nominal grammatical
form.
Consistently with the fact that he takes the de rebus interpretation as
being more fundamental than the de sensu one, at least in the Dialectica,
Abelard explicitly gives to adverbial forms a sort of priority among modes
and among modal propositions, while he suggests that nominal constructions
are said modal only derivatively:
Resoluuntur enim huiusmodi nomina in aduerbia, quae uidelicet aduer-
bia proprie modos dicimus et inde aduerbia uocamus quia uerbis ad-
posita eorum determinant significationem, sicut adiectiua nomina sub-
stantiuis adiuncta, ut cum dicitur: “homo albus”. (Dial. 191.11-15)
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Abelard is not alone in assigning a sort of priority to adverbial modes and ad-
verbial modal propositions. Also Garlandus, in his Dialectica, distinguishes
between adverbial and nominal modal claims and assigns to the first ones
a sort of priority among modal propositions, saying that all nominal modal
propositions can be rephrased, or reduced, to the corresponding adverbial
ones (Martin, 2016, p. 116 ff.). Other sources of the time testify that a de-
bate about the priority of the adverbial construction over the nominal one
was quite widespread at the end of the eleventh and beginning of the twelfth
century. It seems that William of Champeaux, for instance, maintained that
all nominal modal claims could and should be reduced to their correspond-
ing adverbial forms, while Goselin of Soissons rejected this opinion and did
not think that adverbial modes were more fundamental than nominal ones
(Martin, 2016, p. 118 ff.). Despite the quite widespread preference for the
adverbial form, logical sources of the time are usually based on the study of
modal propositions that have a nominal form, because the logical structure
of such sentences is more problematic. The standard structure of Abelard’s
modal sentences, for instance, is one in which the mode is a noun and it is
followed by an infinitive clause in the accusative, in this way:
(i) “Possibile est Socratem esse episcopum”.
Even more often, Abelard places the subject, in the accusative case, as
preceding both the mode and the infinitive clause, as in this proposition:
(ii)“Socratem possibile est esse episcopum”.
More rarely we find modal propositions that have an adverbial structure,
such as:
(iii) “Socrates possibiliter est episcopus”.
While the translation of latin adverbial modal proposition is quite unprob-
lematic, for proposition (iii) is easily translated in “Socrates is possibly a
bishop”, the question of how we should render into English the first two nom-
inal Latin expressions is not uncontroversial. A natural translation would
be to render them with the mode in a nominal form followed by a that
clause, in this way: “It is possible that Socrates is a bishop”. This trans-
lation, however, suggests that the modal proposition must be interpreted
with a de sensu reading of the modal term, so that the mode is applied to
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the whole meaning of the proposition that is introduced by the conjunc-
tion “that”. Such a translation would be misleading, because Abelard uses
nominal forms like the ones listed above without committing himself to a
de rebus or a de sensu interpretation of the modal term. Our English trans-
lation should then attempt to maintain this neutrality with respect to the
semantic form of the proposition. The translation I propose of such latin
forms is the following:
(i) “It is possible for Socrates to be a bishop”; and
(ii) “For Socrates it is possible to be a bishop”.
This English translation of Abelard’s nominal propositions is introduced
by Martin in (Martin, 2016).7 I think that this translation has the merit
of being almost as flexible as Abelard’s latin expression, for it allows to
change the order of the words, placing, for example, the subject or the mode
at the beginning, in the middle or at the end of the sentence. Moreover,
this translation avoids the use of the conjunction “that”, which is naturally
associated with a de dicto interpretation of modes and to which nothing
corresponds in the latin structure.8 Perhaps, the same objection might be
directed to preposition “for” used in this translation, since one could claim
that the use of particle “for”, followed by the subject term, naturally suggests
that the mode is interpreted de rebus. Furthermore, a translation that uses
a “for” form would be unsuitable to render those propositions that are,
according to Abelard, impersonal not only with respect to grammar but also
with respect to their meaning, and that cannot be interpreted in a personal
way, such as “Id quod non est possibile est esse” (LI De Int. 408.415).
Unfortunately, neither alternative is perfectly suitable to render the latin,
and if we want to translate Abelard’s propositions in English we must keep
7Martin also chooses to place the preposition “for” in parenthesis, with the result of
having a more literal translation of the latin, and maybe also of weakening the natural
tendency to interpret these English propositions in a de rebus way.
8Another reason to avoid using “that” in the English traslation is that in later times
some medieval logicians make a distinction between the meaning of modal propositions
formulated with an accusative infinitive construction and the meaning of the corresponding
claims containing a “quod” clause, e.g. “Possibile est Socratem sedere” and “Possibile est
quod Socrates sedeat”. This idea is advanced for instance in the logic of the Meludinenses.
Because latin claims containing a “quod” construction would be naturally translated in
English with a “that”-clause, it is important to use a different transation for latin claims
containing an accusative infinitive structure. I thank Christopher Martin for bringing the
example of Meludinenses’ logic to my attention.
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in mind that the grammatical structure is generally neutral with respect to
the semantical level, and that the nominal form of propositions does not
necessarily imply a de rebus interpretation, nor a de sensu one. In the next
section I investigate Abelard’s reasons for limiting his treatment of modal
terms to alethic modalities, and I suggest that the two terms “necessarily”
and “possibly” are the only primitive modal terms of his system, inasmuch
as all the other alethic modes are reduced by Abelard to them. I shall also
consider briefly Abelard’s theory on the nature of possibility and necessity,
since it will be useful to understand this when we come to some parts of his
modal logic. I will however return to this topic in more detail in chapter 3
below.
1.1.3 Alethic modalities
Many sorts of adverbs and names satisfy the characterizations Abelard gives
of modes, either in virtue of being qualifiers of an inherence, or in virtue
of occuring in a certain grammatical position in categorical propositions.
Terms like “rapidly”, “well”, “it is useful”, “it is right” are modes and,
when added to simple predications, transform them into modal predica-
tions. However, in the logical discussion of modal propositions, Abelard
limits himself to considering only a few modal terms: “possibly” “contin-
gently”, “impossibly”, “necessarily”, “truly” and “falsely”, together with
the corresponding nominal forms. In this choice, the author follows Aris-
totle, who restricts his treatment of modalities in the De Interpretatione
12-13 to the modal terms “δυνατόν” (possibile), “ἐνδεχόμενον” (contingens),
“ἀναγκαῖον” (necesse) and “αδύνατον” (impossibile). Aristotle also includes
“ἀληθές” (verus) and its negation as modal terms in some passages of his
De Interpretatione. Abelard follows Aristotle also in justifying this restric-
tion: the reason is that these modes, differently from the other modal terms,
maintain a relation of equipollence, and therefore their logical behavior can
be put down in a logical system.9 Abelard holds this view both in the
Dialectica and in the Logica Ingredientibus:
Cum autem plures sint modi qui modales faciunt propositiones, horum
naturam tractare sufficiat quorum propositiones ad se aequipollentiam
9Abelard seems to assume, albeit not explicitly, that there cannot be modal logical
systems whose operators are different than alethic modalities, inasmuch all other modal
terms cannot be put in a system of reciprocal inferences.
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habent, ut sunt: “possibile”, “contingens”, “impossibile”, “necesse”,
quorum propositiones Aristoteles inde ad tractandum elegit quod ad
se habeant aequipollentiam. (Dial. 191.37-192.3)
Cum autem multi sint modi tam aduerbiales quam casuales, hic tan-
tum Aristoteles quatuor modorum propositiones diligenter exsequitur,
contingentis scilicet, possibilis, impossibilis, necessarii, quae ad inuicem
maxime sunt affines et per omnes modos aequipollentes, siue de sensu
siue de rebus expositae. (LI De Int. 408.438-442)
On closer inspection, we may also say that, excluding the two modes “truly”
and “falsely”, Abelard’s modal system relies only on two primitive modal
terms: “possibly” and “necessarily”. For the other two modal terms – “con-
tingently” and “impossibly” – are both defined by Abelard in terms of pos-
sibility: the first is said to have entirely the same meaning as “possibly”
(Dial. 193.31), the second is said to be the negative term (abnegativum) of
possibility, and to mean nothing else than “not possibly” (see Dial. 194.5-6;
LI De Int. 395.97-99). This interdefinability between “possible”, “impossi-
ble” and “contingent” is explicitly acknowledged by Abelard, who says, at
least once, that Aristotelian modal logic consisted of only two modalities
(necessity and possibility) because his other two modal expressions could be
defined in terms of possibility:
Hic Aristoteles circa duos tantum, “possibile” scilicet et “necesse” qui
ad se aequipollentiam habent, maxime uersatur. Cum enim “contin-
gens” et “impossibile” ponat, utrique modi ad sensum “possibilis” re-
ducuntur, quippe “contingens” idem est quod “possibile”. (LI De Int.
394.92-395.95)
There are therefore only two primitive modes in Abelard’s system. But it
would be wrong to go further and suggest that also these two modes may be
interdefined, so to have a single primitive modal term, to which the meaning
of all the others are reduced. For the two modal terms “possible” and
“necessary” are not interdefinable, according to Abelard. Although these two
modes can be put in a mutual relation of equipollence, saying for example
that “necessarily φ” is equipollent to “not possibly not-φ”, or conversely
that “possibly φ” is equipollent to “not necessarily not-φ”,10the relation
10Abelard himself traces this relation of equipollence among necessity and possibility
(see section 2.2 below).
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occurring between these two modalities is not conceived by Abelard as a
sort of interdefinability, as the relation between possibility and contingency,
or possibility and impossibility, is. While in fact the expression “possibly φ”
has for Abelard the same meaning as “contingently φ”, and the expression
“impossibly φ” has the same meaning as “not possibly φ”,11 the relation
of equipollence between possibility and necessity is not a relation of having
the same meaning. Furthermore, the equipollence between possibility and
necessity is not taken by Abelard as generally valid, but it is maintained only
under certain conditions, in particular, under the condition that all terms
making up modal propositions are not empty (I advance this interpretation
in section 2.1 below). It would be wrong, then, to interpret Abelard’s system
as having one single primitive mode and to define all other modalities in
terms of it. To represent his modal system, we need at least two primitive
modal terms, possibility and necessity. Let us now briefly consider what is
the meaning that Abelard assigns to these two modal terms. This will be of
help to understand some parts of Abelard’s modal logic. A more extensive
treatment of the nature and meaning of Abelard’s concepts of possibility
and necessity, and of their role in Abelard’s philosophy, will be object of
chapter 3 of this work.
Both in the Dialectica and the Logica Ingredientibus, Abelard interprets
possibility in terms of compatibility with nature. He says for example that
what is possible for a certain individual is what is compatible with (i.e.,
not repugnant to) the nature of that individual. Another formulation he
uses is that possible is what is “allowed” or “permitted” by the nature of
something. Abelard is always careful in distinguishing what is possible from
what is actual at some moment of time, and says that “possible” or “contin-
gent” must not be taken to mean what actually is the case but what might
be the case. Indeed, there are many possible things (that is, many things
that are compatible with nature) which were never actualized in time and
will never be. In a well-known passage of the Dialectica, Abelard refers to
the possibility that Socrates has of being a bishop, which he takes as a real
possibility for Socrates, even if it is never realized in time, in so far that it
is not repugnant to the nature of Socrates (nor to the nature of any other
human being) to be a bishop (See Dial. 193.31-194.5). This understanding
of possibility as “compatibility with nature”, as well as the example affirm-
11I defend this idea in section 2.1.3 below.
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ing the possibility for the layman Socrates to be a bishop, is not invented by
Abelard, but can be found in other logical works of the eleventh and twelfth
century, for example in Garlandus Compotista’s Dialectica and in the two
anonymous Orléans treatises, designated by Iwakuma as M1 and M3, pre-
served in manuscript Orléans 266 and in Paris BN Lat 1336812 (Martin,
2016, p. 117). Martin suggested that such an exposition of possibility was
indeed a standard characterization in twelfth century modal logic.
Abelard’s definition of possibility rests then on the two basic concepts of
repugnancy and nature. In section 3.1 below I try to provide an extensive
characterization of these two concepts, on which a great part of Abelard’s
theory of modalities is based. I give here only a short account of how we
should understand these two concepts, for they will come into view already
in some parts of this chapter, and a basic understanding of them will be
important for understanding Abelard’s semantics for de rebus possibility
propositions. The relation of repugnancy, which may hold between two
predicates, between two propositions or between a predicate and an indi-
vidual’s nature, is defined as a relation of opposition (i.e., contrariness or
contradictoriness) between two items: two terms are repugnant if they can-
not be simultaneously predicated of the same subject, two propositions are
repugnant if they cannot be simultaneously true. The two predicates “ra-
tional” and “irrational”, for example, are repugnant to one another, since
there is no possible situation in which they both simultaneously inhere in the
same thing. A certain predicate is repugnant to the nature of a thing if it is
in opposition with at least one of the essential feaures (i.e., the substantial
forms) of that thing.
Every existing substance has, according to Abelard, a nature (see 3.1.1
below). It is exactly in virtue of having a nature that things can be sorted
out into natural kinds or categories. Abelard says in some passages of the
Dialectica that distinct individuals belonging to the same natural kind, say
Socrates and Plato, have the same nature. This claim could sound prob-
lematic when considered together with Abelard’s nominalism, for natures
would turn out to be something that distinct individuals actually share or
have in common. However, we could still interpret Abelard’s idea that many
individuals have a same nature consistently with his nominalism if we con-
12M1 = Orléans, Bibl. Municipale, 266: 166a-169a; Paris, Bibl. Nationale, lat. 13368,
175va-177ra. M3 = Orléans, Bibl. Municipale, 266: 252b-257b.
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sider the nature of each individual as being numerically different from the
natures of all other individual substances of the same kind (insofar as it
is constituted by individual properties that belong exclusively to one sub-
stance) while being simultaneously the same nature (in the sense that these
individual natures are all instances of the same set or bundle of substantial
tropes).13 The nature of Socrates will be then represented as the set:
NatSocrates: {Socrates’ animality, Socrates’ rationality, Socrates’ mortality,
Socrates’ bipedality...},
and it would be numerically different from, say, the nature of Plato:
NatP lato: { Plato’s animality, Plato’s rationality, Plato’s mortality, Plato’s
bipedality...},
even if they are both instances of the “same” nature
Nathomo: {animality, rationality, mortality, bipedality...}.
In order to properly represent Abelard’s natures, these “sets” must be con-
sidered as having a definite structure, i.e., as being hierarchically ordered
so to contain the generic form of the individual sustance and then all its
differentiae. The exemplifications of natures given here are only indicative,
and do not fully represent what the nature of Socrates, Plato, or human
beings actually consists in. To give a full characterization of these natures
would be much more complicated and, Abelard thinks, mostly inaccessible
to our epistemic capacities. Indeed, Abelard insists that we are largely ig-
norant about what does constitute the nature of human beings, and of all
other substances, and so these natures contain many substantial forms that
we are unaware of.
The concept of possibility is conceived by Abelard in terms of what
is not repugnant to the nature of something: it is possible to predicate
of a certain individual everything that is not opposite to the predicates
constituting its nature. So, for example, it is true to say that Socrates
is possibly a bishop, for there is nothing in the nature of Socrates that is
opposite to that predicate. On the contrary, it is not possible for Socrates
to be irrational, for the predicate “irrational” is contrary to the predicate
13For the interpretation of Abelard’s ontology in terms of trope antirealism see in par-
ticular (Martin, 1992). I will return in more detail on this interpretation in section 3.1.1
below.
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“rational”, that constitutes Socrates’ nature (being irrational is repugnant
to the nature of Socrates). Several interesting consequences follow from this
definition of possibility. First, the possibilities of an individual are always
the same and they are not varying through time: since the nature of a thing
does not vary during this individual’s lifetime, also its possibilities (that
are only dependent on such a nature) do not vary. An individual then has
the same set of possibilities and necessities in any moment of its life, and
the possibilities he had in the past are just the same as the possibilities he
will have in the future. Second, the external circumstances have no role
in determining the possibilities of a certain individual. What is possible
for a thing is not influenced by anything that is external to its own nature.
Third, given that all individuals belonging to the same natural kind have the
same nature, they all have the same possibilities. Furthermore, Abelard’s
possibilities have nothing to do with what is potential – that is, what is
actualizable or realizable – for an individual. There are many things that
are possible, according to Abelard, without being realized or actualized in
any possible situation. It is possible, for example, that a man is unable
to laugh, although in no possible situation is there something which is a
man but not able to laugh. It is also possible that a blind man sees, or
that an amputee walks, for the predicates “to see” and “to walk” are not
incompatible with any of the predicates constituting the nature of human
beings. The possibilities captured by Abelard’s definition are not then the
potentialities or the powers of individual, for they do not represent what an
individual is able to do, or to be, but only what its nature allows that is
predicated of it.
Nevertheless, Abelard also provides other characterizations of possibility,
with which he aims to capture a stricter – and perhaps more philosophically
relevant – sense of the word: for example, he talks at times of an individual’s
possibilities as what is actually realizable for that individual, or he distin-
guishes what is possible for something in the actual situation from what
might be possible for the same thing in different counterfactual situations.
Some of the various senses that Abelard attributes to possibility are explored
in (Martin, 2004a): Martin distinguishes for example a sense of “possible”
pointing out at the set of possibilities that are open to an individual in the
future, given its history up to a certain moment of time; another sense of
“possible” indicating what was compatible with the nature of a certain indi-
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vidual in its past, but it is not anymore realizable for him; again, a sense of
“possible” attributed to what is not realizable by the individual in itself but
which the individual may come to have thanks to some extrinsic (probably
divine) intervention. I list here some of the senses of Abelard’s “possibility”
that will be explored at lenght in sections 3.1-3.5 below.
(i) that which is possible is everything that is compatible (not repugnant)
with the nature of an individual (e.g. it is possible for Socrates to be
unable to laugh);14
(ii) the possible is what is actually realizable for an individual, given its
physical constitution or the external circumstances (e.g. it is possible
for Socrates to fight well, it is possible for Milo to run easily);15
(iii) the possible is what is true in some counterfactual possible situation,
even if it is not true in any time of the actual history (e.g. it is possible
for Socrates to be a bishop);16
(iv) the possible is what is actually realizable for an individual in the future,
as opposed to what was actually realizable for it in the past and it is
not anymore (it is possible for a blind man to see, it is possible for a
crippled man to fight);17
(v) the possible is what may be brought to effect by God, although it is not
compatible with the actual and future circumstances (e.g. it is possible
for an amputee to walk in the future, thank to some miraculous act
that gives him his feet back);18
(vi) the possible is what is compatible with the body or the corporeal
substantia of a certain individual (e.g., it is possible for Socrates – qua
body – to be dead, or it is possible for the substance of this man to be
irrational).19
14Abelard considers this example in his glosses on Porphyry’s definition of propria. See
sections 3.2 and 3.3 below.
15This is what Abelard calls possibilities cum determinationes, see sections 3.4.
16See section 3.2 below.
17These examples of Abelardian possibilities were considered by (Knuuttila, 1993, p. 90-
1) and (Martin, 2004a, p. 226-235).
18This sense of possibility is examined in (Martin, 2004a, p. 233).
19See 3.5 on page 188.
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All the various senses of possible listed here are reducible according to
Abelard to the first broad sense of possibility as compatibility with nature,
which is consistently held by Abelard to be the proper interpretation of
possibility. The sets of possibilities defined by senses (ii)-(vi) are all proper
subsets of the set of possibilities defined by (i).20
While Abelard is quite consistent in conceiving possibility as compati-
bility with nature, the concept of “necessity” does not have such univocal
definition in Abelard’s logical works. I think we could come up with (at
least) three different characterizations of the concept of necessity given by
Abelard in the Dialectica and in the Logica Ingredientibus. These are the
three characterizations:
(i) necessary is what is required by the nature of a thing;
(ii) necessary is what is always true, or what the contradictory of which is
always false;
(iii) necessary is what is in a certain way and cannot be otherwise.
Let us examine the three definitions one by one.
(i) At times, “necessary” is said to refer to what is required (exigitur)
by the nature of something. This definition corresponds to the definition of
possibility given so far, which is in terms of the nature of a thing.21
Sed, ut superius dictum est, per “possibile” id demonstratur quod
natura patiatur, per “necesse” quod [dicit] exigat et constringat”.
Along the characterization I proposed of nature above, what is required
by the nature of a thing are the predicates that refer to this thing’s sub-
stantial properties. If the nature of Socrates is representable by the set
20Let us note that the sense of possibility expressed in (v) – the possible is what could
be brought about by God in the future – is also included in the first sense of possibility,
as what is generally compatible with the nature of things: even if the cause of these
possible events would be supernatural, in fact, what is said to be possible (e.g., that feet
are restored by God in the body of the amputee) is still something that is allowed by
the nature of the amputee. Although Abelard does not say this explicitly, all things that
God can bring about miraculously in the world might be against the usual natural and
physical laws but not against the natures of things, i.e., against their essential features.
Indeed, since God cannot cause contraries to exist in the same thing, the only way He
could have of acting against the nature of something – i.e., of causing an individual to have
different substantial features than the ones it actually has – would be by replacing these
features with different ones. But the result of this act would not be a same individual
with a different nature, but rather a different individual, belonging to a different species
specialissima and perhaps a different species and genus.
21Sometime Abelard does not speak of the nature of a thing but of nature in general.
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NatSocrates: {Socrates’ animality, Socrates’ rationality, Socrates’ mortality,
Socrates’ bipedality...}, as was suggested, we have that what is required by
the nature of Socrates is that he is animal, rational, mortal, and that he has
many other properties that we are unaware of. Because each individual has,
according to Abelard, a certain nature, for any individual substance there is
a determined (though usually unknown by us) set of forms that constitute
its nature. Therefore, according to this definition of necessity we would have
that every substance, whether it be a contingent or a sempiternal subtance,
has at least some properties of necessity.22
(ii) In other passages of the Dialectica, “being necessarily φ” is defined as
what is true in all times: an individual S is necessarily φ if the proposition
“S is φ” is always the case, or if its contradictory proposition “It is not the
case that S is φ” is always false. The connection between necessity and time
is often used by Abelard in the Dialectica, both in the treatise on modalities
and in the treatise on topics, where he explicitly says that being necessarily
means to be sempiternally, or to be sempiternally true.23 This connection
between modality and time is, on the other hand, much less frequent in
the glosses on De Interpretatione. There are however a few passages in LI
where Abelard uses this idea. For instance, he refers to it once within his
literal commentary to the Aristotelian text, where he says that those things
of which necessary propositions are true are prior both in nature and status
to other things, for certainly things which are necessary are sempiternal and
they are the principles of other things:
Disposuit superius ita ordines modalium quod propositiones de “nec-
essario” ultimas collocauit. Nunc autem ostendit eas naturaliter de-
22Abelard insists however in many places, especially in the Dialectica, that necessary
properties can only be properly predicated of sempiternal beings. On this point, see in
particular Dial. 193.26-29; Dial. 195.7-8; Dial. 201.2-9.
23See in particular Dial. 272.10 -15: «Necesse autem hic quod inevitabile dicitur ac-
cipimus, cuius quidem sempiternus est actus, sive circa esse sive circa non esse, id est
cum sit, non potest non esse, vel cum non sit, non potest esse, nec in esse vel in non esse
principium habuit, sed semper vel est ita vel non est», 278.20-22: «Necessitas autem de-
terminata et incommutabilis veritas eius consistit»; 279.10-13: «Cum ita per “est” verbum
“animal” “homini” copulatur, actus tantum inhaerentiae demonstratur; cum vero per “si”
conditionem idem eidem coniungitur, incommutabilis consecutionis necessitas ostenditur.
Quod autem necessarium est, sempiternum est nec principium novit», 282.25-33: «Patet
itaque ex suprapositis omnes consequentias veras ab aeterno veras esse [...] Unde et earum
necessitas est manifesta, quae nulla rerum praesentia vel absentia potest immutari [...] illa
[consequentia] necessitatem consecutionis ostendere quae quidem, ut diximus, ipsis quoque
rebus destructis incommutabilis consistit».
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bere praeponi caeteris propositionibus, quia scilicet res de quibus uerae
sunt propositiones necessarii, priores sunt tam natura quam dignitate
caeteris rebus; quippe res, quae necessariae sunt, sempiterne sunt et
principia aliarum rerum, ut Deus et mens ex ipso nata, quae eterna
sunt (LI De Int. 472.620-30).24
He also makes use of the same idea in LI De Int. 428.962-963, where he says
that if something is necessary, then it is immutable («si enim necesse est,
incommutabiliter verum est»).
(iii) In some passages of Abelard’s work, the term “necessary” is said to
refer to what is “inevitable”, i.e., to what “is actually in a certain way and
cannot be otherwise”. This sense is said in the Dialectica to be the proper
meaning of necessity:
“Necessarium” autem id dicit quod ita sit et aliter esse non possit. Hoc
loco “necessarium” idem accipiatur quod “ineuitabile”; quae quidem
consueta et propria significatio est “necessarii”. (Dial. 194.7-9)
According to this definition, we have it that a subject S is necessarily φ iff S
is actually φ and S cannot be otherwise, that is, it is not possible for S not
to be φ.
It is important to note that both the second and third characterizations
of necessity makes it impossible to formulate true necessary statements about
contingent beings. Any proposition of the form “S is φ” where “S” refers
to a contingent, non sempiternal being (i.e., any created individual, who
came into existence at some moment of time and will cease to exist at
some time) will turn out to be false in those situations in which the subject
does not exists, and therefore it would not be sempiternally true. Also,
any proposition of the form “It is not the case that S is φ”, where “S”
is a contingent being, would be true in some possible situations, i.e., those
situations in which the thing signified by “S” does not exist. On the contrary,
the first characterization of necessity allows us to formulate true necessity
propositions about non sempiternal beings, for along that definition it would
be true to say, for instance, that it is necessary for Socrates to be rational,
for being rational is required by his nature. The three characterizations of
necessity are then inconsistent in this respect.25 It seems that Abelard was
24I thank Martin for pointing this passage to my attention.
25This problem does not arise if we take only omnitemporal beings into consideration.
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aware of the inconsistency among characterizations (i)-(iii) above, and tried
to provide a solution to it by saying that propositions about necessity could
only be true if their subject is a sempiternal being, and that since the proper
meaning of necessity is the one spelled out in definitions (ii) and (iii) it is
either improper or false to state that also contingent beings have some of
their properties necessarily. This idea is rehearsed in several passages of the
Dialectica:
Aut qualiter “necessario” inhaerentiam hominis determinat, cum nul-
lam habeat ad aliud ex necessitate inhaerentiam [. . . ]? Nulla enim res
homo est ex necessitate.(Dial. 193.26-29)
Si actum rei consideremus, nihil esse hominem necessario inue-
niemus. (Dial. 195.7-8)
In his enim quae sempiterna sunt, solis necessitas ista contingit.
[...] Videtur itaque mihi sic exponendum “necessarium” quod illud ex
necessitate est <illud> quod ita est illud quod non potest aliter esse,
id est non potest non esse, ut Deus necessario immortalis est; sic enim
est immortalis quod non potest aliter esse, id est non potest contingere
ut non sit immortalis. (Dial. 201.2-9)
If we speak properly, then, we must limit ourselves to predicate necessary
properties only of those things that eternally exist, or, as Abelard says, the
existence of which is not preceded by potency:
In his itaque solis necessitas contingit quorum existentiam uel actum
potestas non praecessit, ut in Deo [...] Quaecumque igitur uel ali-
quando non fuerunt aliquod uel aliquando non erunt, non sunt ex ne-
cessitate illud. Si enim umquam fuerunt uel erunt sine eo, non exigit
illud ex necessitate natura. (Dial. 201.12-17)
In the LI, Abelard attempts to provide another solution to the problem of
characterizing necessity and to account for its equipollence with possibility.
Let us in fact consider a sempiternal being, as God, and one of his necessary properties, for
example the property of being immortal. According to the second and third definition of
necessity, God necessarily has this property if the proposition “God is immortal” is always
true and if it there is no possible situation in which the proposition “It is not the case
that God is immortal” is true. Because these two conditions are satisfied, both because
whenever God exists the property of immortality belongs to him and because there is no
possible situation in which God does not exist, the proposition “It is necessary for God to
be immortal” is true.
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There, he maintains that a proposition of the form (a) “It is necessary for S
to be φ” is equipollent to the proposition (b) “It is not possible for S not to
be φ”. However, he explicitly chooses to restrict this equipollence between
possibility propositions and necessity propositions to only those situations
in which the subject term refers to something that exists (see section 2.1.3
below). In those situations in which Socrates does not exist, then, the
two propositions (a) and (b) are not equipollent, according to the position
endorsed in the Logica Ingredientibus (LI De Int. 420.733-421.751).26 In
order to solve the inconsistency raised by definitions (i)-(iii) of necessity
Abelard attempts then two ways out: the first, which I think prevails in
the Dialectica, consists in saying that only sempiternal substances are the
proper subjects of true necessity propositions; the second, which I think is
the one to which Abelard propends in the LI, consists in maintaining that
contingent beings could also be the subjects of true necessity propositions
and in establishing that there could be an equipollence between possibility
and necessity propositions only under the condition that all terms included
in these propositions actually refer, i.e., that there are no empty terms. This
last point will be argued in detail in section 2.1 below.
1.1.4 Modal terms as “indefinite” terms
Before turning to the investigation of Abelard’s modal propositions, I shall
here address another problem concerning alethic modal terms: to which cat-
egory of words do these modes belong? As it is known, Abelard distinguishes
three different categories to which all words belong: the category of names
(see Dial. 121-129), the category of verbs (Dial. 129-142) and the category
26«Sed uidentur nobis huiusmodi aequipollentiae modalium propositionum tantum ae-
quipollentiam custodire re subiecti termini permanente, uelut tantum dum Socrates per-
manet, sicut et illae quarum aequipollentiam superius ascripsit praedicato per finitum
et infinitum uariato. Quamdiu itaque Socrate permanente uera est: “Non possibile est
Socratem esse albedinem” (uel: “Impossibile est”) uera est etiam quae ait: “Necesse est
Socratem non esse albedinem” et e conuerso. Cum enim uelimus in ui affirmatiuae cat-
egoricae accipere: “Necesse est Socratem non esse albedinem” oportet ad hoc ut uerum
sit rem manere sub subiecto uocabulo, ut supra meminimus. Si uero in sensu aliarum
accipiamus, ut quidam uolunt, erit negatiua in sensu: “Necesse est Socratem non esse
albedinem” sicut illae et ita semper uera est cum illis. Sunt enim quidam qui omnes
propositiones eiusdem ordinis in eodem sensu accipi uolunt ut mutuas ad inuicem conse-
quentias habeant, alioquin ex negatiua in sensu sequeretur saepe affirmatiua, quippe in
eodem ordine negatiuae affirmatiuis adiunguntur. Nos uero in diuerso sensu eas quoque
concedimus aequipollere ita ut rebus permanentibus nulla possit esse uera uel falsa sine
aliis».
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of indefinites (Dial. 118-120). This last category includes terms that do not
have a meaning on their own, but that signify only when taken in a context
(they merely “consignify”).27 The category of indefinites includes conjuc-
tions (such as “si” or “et”) and prepositions (“de”, “ad”)28 Other notable
words that are included in this category are the copula “est” (at least in
some of its uses) and the negative particle “non”. Adjectives are included in
the category of names, and so are pronouns, adverbs and interjections.29
As we have seen above, modal terms like “necessarily”, “usefully” or
“rapidly” are primarily adverbs (even though they could be also formulated
in a nominal form), and therefore they should belong to the category of
names. The fact that Abelard also establishes a similarity between adverbial
modes and adjectives (modes are applied to verbs just as adjectives are to
names, Abelard says in Dial. 191.11-15) strengthens this interpretation, for
27In the Dialectica, Abelard attributes this terminology to other people: «quas indefini-
tas dicunt» (Dial. 118.11).
28In Dial. 118-120, Abelard takes first into consideration three positions on the signifi-
cation of indefinite words, discarding the first two positions and eventually suggesting his
positions for which these words do not have any signification when taken per se. The first
hypothesis, suggested by some people, claims that conjunctions and prepositions also have
a certain signification even when uttered per se, that is, out of a context. Otherwise, these
people argue, they would not be words, but they would instead be syllables or letters. The
per se signification of these indefinite words would still be different from the per se signi-
fications of names and verbs, insofar as it is a confused and uncertain signification. The
signification is uncertain in the sense that a person who hears an indefinite word (such
as “and” or “about” (“de”), would not be satisfied by hearing it separated and he would
crave to hear more: «At vero (cum) per se etiam significativae sint huiusmodi dictiones,
confusa per se et incerta earum significatio videtur. Nam ‘et’ vel ‘de’ (per) se prolata ad
omnia aeque se habent ac suspensum tenent animum auditoris, ut aliud exspectet cui illa
coniungantur; quae non tam pro sua demonstratione inventae sunt quam pro appositione
vel coniunctione ad alia». (Dial. 118.12-17). The addition of other definite words, or of
a context (as when I say “man and stone”, or “about man”), transforms the signification
of indefinite words from being confused and uncertain to being determinate and similar
to those of names and verbs. The second position on the meaning of indefinite words
suggests that these words have a meaning in so far that they generate an understanding,
but they lack a meaning in the sense of denotation, for they lack the ability to refer to
things (just as propositions do). Against those views, Abelard maintains that indefinite
words, contrary to names and verbs, do not have any signification when taken in isolation
from a context. They only consignify, when they are adjoined to other words. See (Wilks,
1998b, p. 94 ff.) for a discussion of Abelard’s categories of words. On the distinction
between significative and consignificative words see also (Jacobi, 1986, p. 146 ff.).
29«In “nomine” autem (tam) nomina quam pronomina cum adverbiis et quibusdam in-
teriectionibus incluserunt, his videlicet quas non natura docuit, sed inventio nostra com-
posuit. Sunt enim quaedam interiectionum naturales ut: “vah”, “ah”, “heu”, quae nec
dictiones nec proprie partes orationis dicuntur, quippe impositae non sunt; quaedam vero
compositae et ad placitum designativae, ut: “papae”, “attat”, “proh”, quae et nomini,
sicut adverbia supponuntur». (Dial. 121.8-14).
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all adjectives belong to the category of names, and if adverbs are interpreted
adjectivally they also should belong to the same category. However, at
least in the Logica Ingredientibus (but a similar position is held also in the
Dialectica, though less explicitly), Abelard treats some modal adverbs – in
particular, the alethic modes “necessarily”, “possibly”, “impossibly” – as
belonging not to the category of names but to the category of indefinites,
just as the conjunction “si” and other non per se significant terms. He says
that these adverbial modes (and their corresponding nominal forms) do not
have a meaning on their own, as isolated from a context, in so far as they
do not per se signify either things or accidents (that is, they do not have a
signification in essentia nor in adiacentia)30 but that they merely consignify:
At uero cum “possibile” uel “necessarium” sumpta31 non sint nec res
aliquas nominando contineant nec formas determinent, quid significent
quaerendum est; non enim, cum dicitur: Id quod non est possibile est
esse uel: Deum necesse est esse uel: Chimaeram necesse est non esse
quasi formas aliquas in rebus accipimus. Dicimus itaque necessarium
siue possibile in huiusmodi enuntiationibus magis consignificare quam
per se significationem habere; nil quippe in eis est intelligendum nisi
subiectae orationi applicentur, et tunc modum concipiendi faciunt circa
res subiectae orationis sicut facit uerbum interpositum uel coniunctio
si, quae ad necessitatem copulat; ac, sicut in istis nulla imagine nititur
intellectus sed quendam concipiendi modum anima capit per uerbum
uel per coniunctionem circa res earum uocum quibus adiunguntur, ita
per possibile et necessarium. (LI De Int. 407.412-408.425)
In the passage quoted from the Logica Ingredientibus, the characterisation
of the meaning of modalities is explicitly juxtaposed with the meaning of
conjunction “if”, which we know was considered by Abelard an indefinite
word. Also, Abelard explicitly uses the term “consignificare” to account for
modal terms’ semantic role. In the Dialectica, Abelard never clearly says
that modal terms are indefinite words, nor are there any references to their
con-signicative role. However, in a few passages Abelard argues, against the
30Names that signify in essentia are those words that signify something as subsisting (for
example “Socrates” or “whiteness”), whereas names that signify in adiacentia are those
that signify something as existing in a subsisting thing (for example, “white”). On this
distinction between signification in essentia and in adiacentia see (Jacobi, 2004, p. 139 ff.).
31Abelard’s nomina sumpta are those concrete names that are taken or derivate from
the abstract corresponding name, as “white” from “whiteness”. On Abelard’s treatment
of sumpta names and on the translation of this technical term see (Jolivet, 2000, p. 107-8);
(Marenbon, 1997, p. 140-1); (Kang, 1999, p. 234).
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opinion of “some people”, that terms like “possibly” and “necessarily” do
not signify qualities or forms, and there is no attribution of any sort when
I say that something is necessarily or possibly the case:
Nunc autem utrum aliqua proprietas per modalia nomina, ut quidam
uolunt, praedic[ar]etur, persequamur. Aiunt enim per <possibile>
possibilitatem praedicari, per ’necesse’ necessitatem, ut, cum dicimus:
“possibile est Socratem esse uel necesse”, possibilitatem aut necessi-
tatem ei attribuimus. Sed falso est. Multae uerae sunt affirmationes
huiusmodi etiam de non-existentibus rebus, quae, cum non sint, nullo-
rum accidentium proprietates recipiunt. Quod enim non est, id quod
est sustentare non potest. Sunt itaque huiusmodi uerae: “filium futu-
rum possibile est esse”, “chimaeram possibile est non esse”, uel “necesse
est non esse hominem”; nihil tamen attribui per ista his quae non sunt,
intelligitur, sed, ut superius dictum est, per “possibile” id demonstratur
quod natura patiatur, per “necesse” quod [dicit] exigat et constringat.
(Dial. 204.1-12)
Given, presumably, that terms as “possibly” and “necessarily” do not signify
things, the affirmation that they do not signify forms or properties either
seems to convey the idea that they have no per se signification whatsoever,
but they instead have the semantic role of expressing a way in which things
are (though the terminology of modus concipiendi is not present in the
Dialectica).
This passage from the Dialectica should be compared to the passage
from the Logica Ingredientibus (LI 407.412-408.425) as evidence that Abelard
took the semantic role of modal terms (at least of alethic modalities) to be
similar to that of conjunctions and prepositions, and modal terms should be
classifiable then as indefinite words.
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1.2 Modal Propositions
Those propositions that contain modes (that may be modes either in sensu
or in voce) are modal propositions. They are classified by Abelard among
categorical propositions, and differ from non-modal categorical ones – that
Abelard also calls simple propositions or propositions de puro inesse – in
so far as they state a predication cum modo, whereas simple proposition
state unqualifiedly (simpliciter). Modal propositions deserve a careful ex-
amination because they present more difficulties than simple propositions
do: given that they are categorical propositions it is difficult to locate their
subject and predicate terms, to state how they may vary in quality and
quantity, and finally to establish the rules of equipollence and of other log-
ical inferences they maintain reciprocally and with simple propositions. As
seen in section 1.1 above, modal propositions may have an adverbial or a
nominal form, depending on the adverbial or nominal form of the mode they
contain. An adverbial modal proposition has the following structure:
(a) “S is possibly – necessarily – impossibly P”
while a nominal modal proposition has the structure:
(b) “It is possible – necessary – impossible for S to be P”.
The adverbial form (a) is the translation of a latin proposition like “Socrates
est episcopus possibiliter-necessario-impossibiliter”. The nominal form (b)
has two possible latin constructions: either we say (i) “Possibile est Socratem
esse episcopum”, using the nominal mode followed by the copula and an
infinite-accusative clause, or we say (ii) “Socratem possibile est esse epis-
copum”, where again we have the mode in a nominal form plus an infinite
clause, but the subject of the infinitive clause (in accusative) is placed before
the mode. This last latin structure is the one that more frequently occurs
in Abelard’s texts. Let us keep in mind that the grammatical structure of
a modal proposition is not generally indicative of its semantic structure, so
that both grammatical structures (a) and (b) could be read as being de rebus
or as being de sensu.
Abelard’s focus will be mainly on nominal modal propositions, for, as
he says both in the Dialectica and in the Logica Ingredientibus, they raise
more perplexities and uncertainties with respect to their syntactical form,
with respect to their mutual logical relationships, and, generally speaking,
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their nature is more obscure than the nature of simple and adverbial modal
predications. However, Abelard considers the adverbial structure as more
appropriate and more basic than the nominal one, because he thinks, at
least in the Dialectica, that the adverbial form more closely mirrors the real,
logical form of modal claims, which is fundamentally de rebus, not de sensu.
Just as he said that only adverbial modes are, properly speaking, modes,
and all nominal modes can be reduced to an adverbial form, so he wishes
to say that also nominal modal propositions are always reducible to the
corresponding adverbial proposition. However, whether it is in fact possible
that all nominal propositions are translatable into an adverbial form must be
object of further enquiry, which I will carry on in section 1.3. First, I address
the question of how the relation between simple and modal propositions is
accounted for by Abelard, and how modal propositions are derived from
simple ones. This problem will be the object of section 1.2.1, where I will
also consider the problem of identifying the terms (that is, the subject and
the predicate) in adverbial and nominal modal propositions. Section 1.2.2
concerns the quality of modal predications, and asks what is the proper
way of negating a modal proposition, in order to obtain its corresponding
negative and contradictory proposition. Section 1.2.3 addresses the problem
of establishing the quantity of modal propositions that have a nominal form.
Both problems of assigning the quality and quantity to modal propositions
are of great relevance for Abelard’s determination of the rules of inferences
and equipollences among them.
1.2.1 The relation between modal and simple propositions
There are two points that Abelard insistently states in the Dialectica con-
cerning the relation between simple and modal propositions: first, modal
propositions derive from simple ones, and second, they differ from sim-
ple propositions only with respect to the way in which the inherence is
asserted: while simple propositions state an inherence unqualifiedly (sim-
pliciter), modal propositions state an inherence cum modo. This means that
modal propositions do not differ from simple ones with respect to the things
they deal with, for simple and modal propositions are used to refer to the
same things. Concerning the first point, Abelard says that propositions de
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puro inesse are prior and more basic than modal ones,32 and that modal
claims are derived from them:
Unde simplices ipsis modalibus, quasi compositis, priores sunt: ex ip-
sis modales descendunt et ipsarum modificant enuntiationem; in qua
quidem modificatione tantum ab ipsis abundant et discrepant. (Dial.
191.23-26)
Another passage in which Abelard refers to this priority of simple proposi-
tions over modal ones is Dial. 200.20-22, where he says:
Et sunt quidem simplices natura priores quasi simplicia compositis;
oportet enim prius inhaerentiam considerare quam modificare.
The other point Abelard insists on at length in the Dialectica is that sim-
ple and modal propositions deal with the same things, and involve the same
subject and the same predicate. The relation between simple and modal
statements is located in the Dialectica exactly in this sharing of the same
terms. This position is clear from the very beginning of Abelard’s De Modal-
ibus:
Idem enim de eodem modales debent enuntiare modaliter, id est cum
determinatione, quod illae de puro inesse simpliciter, et de his oportet
fieri determinationem de quibus simplicem facimus enuntiationem. (Dial.
191.20-23)
This idea is presented as an alternative to another position one may main-
tain about the relation between simple and modal propositions. According
to this alternative position, modal propositions are related to simple ones
because they deal with their meaning, or content (sensus). This is a position
that Abelard attributes to his Master,33 and it is discarded by Abelard as
32The priority of simple claims with respect to modal ones must be interpreted both as
a syntactical priority (i.e., the grammatical structure of modal claims is “composed out”
of a simple predication to which a certain modal term is adjoined) and as a semantical
priority (i.e., simple predication is semantically the most primitive form of predication,
and modal predication is derivated from it).
33The “magister noster” Abelard is referring to in the Dialectica as the main proponent
of this position is commonly taken to be William of Champeaux. Martin challenges
however this attribution in (Martin, 2016), showing that in the Orléans treatises M1 and
M3 the position on the relation between simple and modal claims attributed to “Master
W.” is very similar to the one held by Abelard in the Dialectica, while the position affirming
that modal claims deal with the sensus of simple propositions is attributed in treatise M1
to Goselin of Soissons. See (Martin, 2016, p. 126).
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being problematic, for reasons that we will see in section 1.3.1 below. The
two alternative solutions one may have on the relationship between simple
and modal propositions are then so described: either one says that (i) modal
propositions deal with the same things simple propositions do, and they dif-
fer from simple ones only inasmuch as the inherence they express is qualified
by a mode and not stated unqualifiedly; or one says that (ii) modal propo-
sitions deal with the content (sensus) of simple propositions, and predicate
something about such a content.
In the Dialectica Abelard is quite consistent in his commitment to the
first option, arguing against his Master’s opinion in favor of the second (with
arguments which one may object are not entirely conclusive, see section 1.3.1
below). Modal propositions, whatever grammatical form they have, are then
said to always share their terms with simple ones. This position also implies
that, for any nominal modal proposition, we are able to translate it into an
adverbial proposition which has the same terms: given any proposition of
the form “It is possible for S to be P”, it is the case that the relation between
the three propositions:
(a) “S is P”,
(b) “S is possibly P”, and
(c) “it is possible for S to be P”
is such that proposition (c) is reducible to proposition (b) and that both
(b) and (c) involve the same subject and the same predicate as proposition
(a). Propositions (b) and (c) modify the predication of (a) in qualifying
(properly or improperly) the inherence between the two terms “S” and “P”.
This is what Abelard endorses in Dial. 193.11-17. Also in the LI Abelard
affirms at times that nominal modal propositions have the same subject
and the same predicate as adverbial ones, and also as propositions de puro
inesse from which they are derived (LI De Int.396.127-130). However, in
the glosses on De Interpretatione, we do not find the same confidence in the
fact that all nominal modal propositions could be reduced to adverbial ones
(that is, that propositions of form (c) are always reducible to propositions
of form (b)). There seem in fact to be exceptions to this rule, for we may
find nominal propositions that cannot be reformulated in an adverbial form.
If this reducibility is not generally possible, one has to give up the idea
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that all modal propositions share their subject and predicate with simple
propositions, and that the relation between simple and modal is governed
by the fact that they talk about the same things.
A problem that is related to this is the one of determining which term
is the subject and which term is the predicate in modal predications, es-
pecially in those that have a nominal grammatical structure. In order to
answer this question, Abelard draws a distinction between two levels: the
level the grammatical structure of a proposition, and the level of its logical
structure. Such a distinction is needed because the terms that are subject
and predicate according to grammar are often different from the ones that
are subject and predicate according to the semantical form (in Abelard’s
terminology, the “meaning”) of a proposition. Abelard proposes then a dis-
tinction between terms according to meaning (in sensu) and terms according
to the grammatical structure (quantum ad constructionis materiam). At the
level of the grammatical structure, these two propositions (a) “Socrates is
possibly a bishop” (Socrates est episcopus possibiliter) and (b) “It is possible
for Socrates to be a bishop” (Possibile est Socratem esse episcopum) do not
have the same subject and predicate terms. For in proposition (a) the terms
according to the grammatical structure are “Socrates”, which is the subject,
and “bishop”, which is the predicate. In proposition (b), on the contrary,
Abelard follows Aristotle in considering the mode “possible” (possibile) as
the predicate (Dial. 191.34-36), the verb “to be” (esse) of the infinitive
clause as the subject, and finally the subject in accusative of the infinitive
form (“Socratem”) as a qualification (determinatio) of the subject. Abelard
also argues that ‘Socratem” cannot be the subject with respect to grammar,
inasmuch as it has an oblique case (Dial. 191.31-32). Nevertheless, Abelard
says that if we consider not the grammar but the meaning of propositions
(a) and (b), the terms will result to be the same, because in both “Socrates”
is the subject and “bishop” is the predicate with respect to the meaning:
Cum autem in sensu modales cum simplicibus eosdem retineant ter-
minos, in his tamen modalibus quae casuales habent modos, quantum
ad constructionis materiam alii considerantur termini, ut cum dicimus:
“possibile est Socratem episcopum esse”, “esse” quidem subicitur, et
modus ipse, id est “possibile”, praedicatur. (Dial. 191.26-30).
The same position is endorsed by Abelard in the Logica Ingredientibus, where
again he outlines a distinction between terms according to meaning and
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terms according to grammar (here the distinction is stated in latin as being
between termini secundum sensum and termini secundum constructionem),
and he says that nominal modal propositions have two subjects and two
predicates: some are the terms with respect to the proposition’s meaning
(which are the same as the terms in the corresponding adverbial modal
proposition, and consequently the same as the terms in the corresponding
simple proposition), and some with respect to their grammatical form. The
example Abelard takes here is “It is necessary for Socrates to run” (Necesse
est Socratem currere). With respect to grammar, the mode “necesse” is
again considered to be the predicate, the verb of the infinitive clause “cur-
rere” is the subject, while the subject of the infinitive clause “Socratem” is
said to be a sort of determination of the subject. According to meaning,
on the contrary, “currit” is the predicate, “Socrates” is the subject, and the
mode “necesse” is said to be a qualification (determinatio) of the predicate
(LI De Int. 396.124-142).34
1.2.2 On determining the quality of modal propositions
After having determined which terms are the subject and the predicate in
modal propositions, we need to consider the problem of how modal proposi-
tions should be properly negated, that is how the negative particle should be
applied in order to obtain, from an affirmative modal proposition, the cor-
responding negative (and contradictory) modal proposition. The problem
of assigning negation to modal propositions is taken by Abelard from Aris-
totle’s De interpretatione (12.21a39-22a3), and indeed Abelard’s solution
to this particular problem follows quite closely the Aristotelian proposal,
that was also adopted by Boethius in his commentaries of the same work.
34«Necnon etiam ideo bene casuales elegit, non aduerbiales, quia maxime dubitabatur
de negationibus casualium modorum et eorum constructionibus, in quibus alii sunt ter-
mini secundum constructionem, alii secundum sensum. Quippe, cum dicitur: Necesse
est Socratem currere haec, quae proprie modalis est in sensu, idem in sensu praedicatum
habet et subiectum quae habet illa de puro inesse a qua descendit: Socrates currit quia
“Socrates” subicitur et “currit” praedicatur et “necesse” in sensu determinatio est praed-
icati, sicut in eius aequipollente de aduerbiali modo quae ait: Socrates currit necessario
aliud uero praedicatum et subiectum secundum constructionem habet quia infinitiuus
modus, currere scilicet, subicitur et Socrates quasi determinatio subiecti ponitur, modus
uero ipse, id est necesse, praedicatur. Est enim uerbum Socratem qui obliquus est regere
non potest, ideoque currere secundum constructionem subiectum loco nominatiui ponitur
cui est uerbum societur, ut sit in talibus, quae casuales habent modos, duplex praedicatum
et duplex subiectum, unum quidem secundum constructionem, aliud secundum sensum;
ex quo magis differunt a propositionibus de puro inesse» (LI De Int. 396.124-142).
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Aristotle argues in the De Interpretatione that the usual way of assigning
negation in a proposition consists in applying the negative particle to the
term that is the predicate. If modal propositions have an adverbial form –
like in “Socrates is possibly white” or “necessarily white”, the issue of nega-
tion is easily solved by saying that the negative particle must be applied to
the copula that connects subject and predicate, in this way: “Socrates is not
possibly (necessarily) white”. This is also Abelard’s position, as claimed in
the following quote from LI:
Cum aduerbialem modum ponimus dicentes: “Socrates currit neces-
sario” una tantum fit affirmatio et negatio sicut in simplicibus; sicut
enim dicimus: “Socrates currit” (uel: “non currit”) ita: “<Socrates>
currit necessario” (uel: “non currit necessario”). (LI De Int. 395.106-
109)
If we consider instead modal propositions that have a nominal form, Aris-
totle and Abelard say, some difficulties arise. Because in nominal modal
propositions like “It is possible for Socrates to be white” or “It is necessary
for Socrates to be white” there are two different predicates, there are two
different ways of assigning negation in them. Either we apply negation to the
term of the infinitive clause, that is for Abelard the predicate with respect to
the meaning, in this way: “It is possible for Socrates not to be white” or “It
is necessary for Socrates not to be white”; or we apply negation to the modal
term, i.e., to what Abelard calls the predicate with respect to the grammar,
in this way: “It is not possible for Socrates to be white” or “It is not nec-
essary for Socrates to be white”. Aristotle argues that if we apply negation
in the first way, the proposition that we obtain is not the contradictory of
the corresponding affirmative proposition, for indeed it is possible for the
two propositions “It is possible for Socrates to be white” and “It is possible
for Socrates not to be white” to be simultaneously true; and it is possible
for the two propositions “It is necessary for Socrates to be white” and “It
is necessary for Socrates not to be white” to be simultaneously false (Dial.
192.11-16). The proper way of assigning negation cannot be applying the
negative particle to the predicate of the infinitive clause, because whenever
we negate a proposition we expect to obtain the corresponding contradic-
tory proposition. Therefore, we are left with the second option, i.e., with the
idea that the proper way to assign negation in nominal modal propositions
is applying the negative particle to the mode itself, that is the predicate
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according to the grammatical structure. From the affirmative proposition
“It is possible for Socrates to be white” I obtain then “It is not possible for
Socrates to be white”; similarly, from the proposition “It is necessary for
Socrates to be white” I obtain “It is not necessary for Socrates to be white”
(Dial. 192.16-28). This is exactly what Aristotle has already said in De Int.
12.21a38-22a13. The nominal modal propositions where negation is applied
to the predicate in sensu, e.g. “It is possible (necessary) for Socrates not to
run”, are considered by Abelard affirmative claims de non esse, and we may
obtain their proper corresponding negative claims by applying the negation
to the predicate secundum constructionem, in this way: “It is not possible
(necessary) for Socrates not to run”. For each mode and any couple of terms
we have then four modal nominal propositions (not considering, for now,
a possible variation in quantity): two affirmative propositions (one de esse





de esse It is possible for Socrates to be
white
It is not possible for Socrates to
be white
Possibile est Socratem esse album Non possibile est Socratem esse
album
de non esse It is possible for Socrates not to
be white
It is not possible for Socrates not
to be white
Possibile est Socratem non esse
album
Non possibile est Socratem non
esse album
Although Abelard’s answer is not per se original, it is still interesting to
compare his approach to the problem of negating modal proposition with
his general theory of negation, which he deals with in Dial. 173-184.35 What
Abelard says about negation in modal claims seems in fact to contrast with
the main idea he advances in his theory of negation, i.e., the idea that in or-
der to properly negate any sort of proposition so to obtain its corresponding
35For a general interpretation of Abelard’s theory of negation and a comparison with
Boethius’ theory see (Martin, 2004b, p.158-192).
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contradictory proposition one must apply the negative particle not to the
predicate or to the copula, but to the whole content of the affirmative claim.
In what follows I try to recall the main points of the theory of negation
Abelard advances in Dial. 173-184 and I then consider whether is there any
inconsistency with what he says about negating modal claims.
Abelard’s theory of negation
The place where Abelard discusses the question of negation in more detail is
within his treatise on categorical propositions, contained in the Dialectica.
Following the Aristotelian tradition, Abelard defines affirmation as «enun-
tiatio alicuius de aliquo», i.e., as the sort of proposition in which two terms
– subject and predicate – are conjoined by means of the copula est, so that
what is signified by the predicate is said to inhere in (or to be identical
to) what is signified by the subject. The two claims “Every man is an ani-
mal” or “Socrates is Plato” express propositions of this sort. A negation is
instead defined as «enuntiatio alicuius ab aliquo», i.e., as an expression in
which what is signified by the predicate is separated or removed from what
is signified by the subject. Starting from an affirmative proposition of any
kind – be it simple or modal, categorical or hypothetical – it is possible to
obtain its corresponding negative proposition by including in it the nega-
tive particle “non”.36 From a grammatical point of view, the term “non” is
considered by Abelard as an adverb, and it can be applied either to verbs
or to other components of a sentence.37 In particular, Abelard thinks that
there are three different syntactical positions that the adverb “non” might
assume within a categorical proposition. First, it can be applied to a term,
as in the case for instance of the expression “non-white”. Following the tra-
36And in the case of quantified propositions by modifying the signs of quantity.
37According to Abelard, it is not the case that the particle “non”, being an adverb,
must necessarily precede verbs, because he thinks that there are many adverbs – such
as the adverb “magis” – which are applied not only to verbs but also to nouns or other
linguistic items. See on this Dial. 478.3-23: «Quae quidem quibusdam nimium gram-
maticae adhaerentibus negationes categoricae, non hypotheticae, videntur. Aiunt namque
adverbium aliter non posse construi, nisi verbo adiungatur; inde enim adverbium dicitur,
quod verbo adiungitur. Unde negativum adverbium in negatione facienda verbo semper
oportet apponi [. . . ] Sed haec quidem mihi firma ratio videtur. Quamvis enim ex hoc
quod adverbium est verbo habeat adiungi, non semper id necesse est fieri, quod ex aliis
clarum est adverbiis. Nam “magis” adverbium cum sit, modo verbo adiungitur, modo
vero nomini, cum dicitur “magis album”, id est “albior” [. . . ] Sicut autem “magis”, cum
adverbium sit, modo verbo construitur, modo non, sic etiam negatio».
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dition, Abelard classifies expressions of this sort as infinite terms. Second,
the negative particle can be applied to the copula (or to the predicate) of an
affirmative claim, as in the propositions “Socrates does not run” (Socrates
non currit) or “Every man is not white” (Omnis homo albus non est) .
Abelard refers to this second type of negation as “negatio separativa” or
“remotiva”, and says that it has the semantic role of “separating” the sub-
ject from the predicate, and therefore of affirming that what is signified by
the predicate does not inhere in what is signified by the subject. Finally,
Abelard distinguishes a third way in which the negative particle can be ap-
plied in propositions, which consists in placing negation before an entire
affirmative claim, as for instance in these cases: “Not every man is an an-
imal” (Non omnis homo est animal), or “It is not the case that Socrates
runs” (Non Socrates currit). Abelard refers to this last sort of negation
as “negatio exstinctiva” or “destructiva”, because it has the semantic role
of “destroying” or “extinguishing” the entire meaning of the proposition to
which it is applied.
According to Abelard, to properly negate a proposition means to obtain
its corresponding contradictory proposition, i.e., to obtain another proposi-
tion that is never simulateously true or false together with the former one.
Contradictory propositions are also said “dividentes”, inasmuch as they “di-
vide” the two truth values true and false between them. He also thinks that
for any proposition there is always one and only one proposition that is its
proper dividens.38 His aim in the Dialectica is then to establish in which way
the negative particle must be applied so to obtain, starting from an affirma-
tive claim, its corresponding contradictory claim. The logical tradition that
Abelard draws upon – constituted mainly by Aristotle’s and Boethius’ logi-
cal works – maintained that in order to obtain a pair of contradictory claims
the negative particle should be applied to the copula or to the predicate of
the affirmative proposition. The contradictory proposition of “Socrates is
a man” would then be “Socrates is not a man” (Socrates homo non est).
This position, held by Boethius in his commentary of Aristotle’s De In-
terpretatione (Boethius, 1880, p. 151), was probably the usual position on
negation during the eleventh century and early twelfth century, as witnessed
for instance in Garlandus’ Dialectica, where the author often repeats that a
38See Dial. 173.23-25: «Habet autem omnis affirmatio unam tantum propriam nega-
tionem secundum contradictionis oppositionem».
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negative claim is obtained by negating the verb, or the copula, of the cor-
responding affirmation.39 In opposition with this tradition, Abelard claims
in the Dialectica that the only correct way to obtain a pair of contradictory
statements is by means of extinctive negation, and that only this one, not
negatio separativa, must be considered as negation in the proper sense. Ex-
tinctive negation has as its scope the whole content of the proposition to
which it is applied, and it negates this content simpliciter, so that this whole
content is said not to be the case (non esse in re):«[negatio] praeposita to-
tam eius sententiam perimit» (Dial. 178.30); «ea sola propria est negatio
quae simpliciter id aufert quod illa dicebat» (Dial. 180.2-3). The proper
way to negate a proposition like “Socrates is a man” is then by saying: “It
is not the case that Socrates is a man” (Non Socrates est homo), as Abelard
states in Dial. 178.28-32:
Manifestum est autem ex suprapositis omni affirmationi eam in con-
tradictionem recte opponi negationem tamquam propriam dividentem
quae negatione praeposita totam eius sententiam perimit, ut ei quae
est: “Socrates est homo” ea quae est: “non Socrates est homo”, non
ea quae dicit “Socrates non est homo”
and the same is the case for quantified propositions like “Omnis homo est
albus”, the proper contradictory of which is “Non omnis homo est albus”:
Propriae ergo illae sunt negationes quae affirmationis sententiam sim-
pliciter auferunt, ut scilicet non plus aut minus in eis denegetur quam
affirmatio proponebat. Cum enim de eodem subiecto universali di-
versis modis enuntiatio multae fiant affirmationes et negationes hoc
modo: ‘omnis homo est albus’, ‘nullus est albus’, ‘quidam est albus’,
‘quidam non est albus’ vel ‘non omnis homo est albus’, eius quae est:
39See in particular 50.19-30: «Rursus videndum est quod omnis cathegorica propositio
aut constat ex finito subiecto et finito predicato, ut ‘homo iustus est’; aut ex infinito
subiecto et infinito predicato, ut ‘non-homo non-iustus est’; aut ex finito subiecto et infinito
predicato, ut ‘homo non-iustus est’; aut ex infinito subiecto et finito predicato, ut ‘non-
homo iustus est’. Que omnes affirmative esse considerande sunt. Semper enim negativa
particula ponenda est ad verbum, quando volumus facere negativa propositionem [. . . ] Illa
namque que ex finito subiecto et finito predicato constat, ut ‘homo iustus est’, hanc habet
negationem: ‘homo iustus non est’; illa vero que ex infinito subiecto et infinito predicato
constat ut: ‘non-homo non-iustus est’, hanc habet negativam: ‘non-homo noniustus non
est’». That a debate on negation was underway in between the eleventh and twelfth
century is testified by many sources of the time. Martin has showed in (Martin, 2016)
that the treatises on modal claims included in manuscripts M1 and M3 debate at lengh
the question of how to negate propositions containing modes.
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‘omnis homo est albus’, ea sola propria est et recta negatio <quae>
simpliciter id aufert quod illa dicebat, hoc modo: ‘non omnis homo
est albus’ [. . . ] Unde ea sola est: ‘non omnis homo est albus’ proprie
dividens et recta negatio eius quae dicebat: ‘omnis homo est albus’
(Dial. 179.34-180.13).
The theory of negation developed by Abelard in the Dialectica has the aim
of providing a system of logical relationships between categorical non-modal
propositions that maintains its validity also when empty terms are taken into
consideration. The pairs of propositions “Omnis homo est albus” and “Non
omnis homo est albus” are in fact taken by Abelard to be proper dividentes
both in those situations in which men exist, and in those situations in which
the term “man” is empty, i.e., when it fails to refer.40 This is not the case
for the pair of propositions “Omnis homo est albus” and “Quidam homo
non est albus”, that for Abelard turn out to be both false when men do not
exist, and cannot therefore be considered in a relation of contradiction to
one another.
How to interpret negation in modal claims?
According to Abelard, the extinctive use of the negative particle is not to
be applied only to simple categorical claims, but to all claims of any sort,
and therefore, we would suppose, also to modal ones. However, Abelard is
not always consistent in applying this theory, and in particular he seems
not to apply it within his discussion about how to negate modal claims.
Within this discussion he never mentions the distinction between separative
and extinctive negation, and indeed he says that in order to obtain the con-
tradictory proposition of claims like “Possibile est Socratem esse album” or
“Necesse est Socratem esse album”, one should apply the negative particle
to the mode itself, i.e., to the predicate in voce of the proposition. This may
lead us to think that when we consider propositions like “Non possibile est
Socratem esse album” the negative particle must be conceived as a separa-
tive negation, not as an extinctive one. Evidence for this interpretation is
provided by passage Dial. 192.26-28 of the Dialectica, where Abelard says
that in propositions of this sort the particle “non” separates the predicate,
i.e., the mode, from the subject, i.e., the verb of the infinitive clause:
40This positions will be explained in more detail in section 2.1 below.
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Oportet enim ut in istis negatio praedicatum removeat, modum scilicet,
ab eodem subiecto, sive scilicet ‘esse’ sive ‘non esse’
Another passage which leads us to think that Abelard conceived negation in
modal claims as separative and not as extinctive is Dial. 199.13-14, where
Abelard claims that «Si enim non est possibile Socratem non esse album,
possibile est esse album, sed non conuertitur». The validity of the inference
given here is easily explained if we take negation as being separative, while
the same inference should turn out to be invalid if we take negation as being
extinctive, because if Socrates does not exist the antecedent would be true
and the consequent false.41
Nevertheless, the interpretation of Abelard’s use of negation in modal
claims is complicated by the fact that there is some evidence that Abelard
developed his theory of extinctive negation before writing his treatises on
modalities. In both the Dialectica and the glosses he makes at times use
of the terminology connected to separative and extinctive negation. Espe-
cially when he considers modal claims that contain temporal qualifications,
Abelard says that when the negative particle is placed before an affirmative
proposition in this way “Non possibile est Socratem esse lapidem dum est
lapis”, the negation could (and should, if we want the modal square of op-
position to be valid) be applied to the whole sense of the proposition that
it precedes, so to “extinguish” it:42
Sed contra dico quia, si aequipollentias servare volumus, oportet in
negativis non modum, sed <praedicatum> cum determinatione ipsa
removeri. Cum ergo dicimus: ‘si falsa est Socratem esse lapidem dum
est lapis, tunc vera est non possibile est Socratem esse lapidem dum
est lapis’, per negativam particulam totum propositionis sensum exstin-
guimus, idest ipsum praedicatum cum determinatione ipsa removemus.
(Dial. 208.30-209.11, my emphasis)
A similar position is taken by Abelard in LI 432 1073-1083, where again he
says that in determinate modal claims the preposed negation could be taken
so to remove the entire proposition to which it is applied (totum auferat):
Si vero sit negatio modalis determinatae, poterit etiam cum determi-
natione aequipollentia custodiri: Et cum dicitur “Non est possibile esse
41I thank Christopher Martin for having brought these passages to my attention.
42For the interpretation of Abelard’s negation as extinctive negation in Abelard’s de-
terminate modal claims see (Martin, 2016).
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lapidem dum est lapis”, id est “Non potest contingere id totum ‘dum
est lapis, est lapis”’, similiter hoc totum impossibile dicamus, ut scil-
icet negatio quae intelligitur in “impossibili” totum similiter auferat; et
cum dicitur “Necesse est non esse lapidem dum est lapis”, illud “non”
praepositum ad “esse” simul determinationem excludit, ac si dicere-
tur id totum “Necesse est ut non sit lapis dum est lapis”. Atque ideo
quoniam determinationem quoque negatio intercipit non potest per se
inferri propositio posita in determinatione.43
It seems then likely that Abelard had already developed his theory of ex-
tinctive negation before writing both his treatises on modalities. If it is so,
why does he not consistently make use of this idea in his logic for modal
claims?
The fact that Abelard says that in modal claims negation must be applied
to the predicate, so to separate it from the subject, might depend on the
fact that he wants to remain faithful to the Aristotelian position in De
Int. 12, where Aristotle says that the negative particle must always be
attached to the predicate of the proposition. Another possible answer could
be that, while presenting his logical system for modal claims, Abelard was
not interested in distinguishing between separative and extinctive negation
because at least at first he did not take into consideration cases in which
non-referring terms are included into modal propositions. It was indeed the
problem of empty terms, and of providing a system of logical relationships
between propositions that include empty terms, that led him to develop
his theory of extinctive negation in the first place (see section 2.1 below.)
One might suppose that since Abelard is not interested in empty terms and
existential import here, he also does not feel the need to distinguish between
separative and extinctive negation.
However, as we will see in section 2.1.2 below, at least in the Logica
Ingredientibus Abelard does take into consideration modal claims includ-
ing non referring terms, and he seems to think that also affirmative modal
propositions, just as non-modal ones, contain an implicit existential import,
so that it is a necessary condition for the truth of a proposition like (*)
43Note that however the terminology used by Abelard here is confusing, for on the one
hand he says that the negative particle should be interpreted as “extinguishing the whole
sense of the proposition”, and this leads us to think that it is extinctive; on the other hand
he says that negation is applied “to the predicate and to the temporal determination” so
that by using it we remove both predicate and determination. But “removing the predicate”
is for Abelard the task of separative (or remotive) negation, not of the extinctive one.
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“It is possible for my son to be alive” (Possibile est filium meum vivere)
that the subject term’s referent exists. If Abelard does ideed think so, as
seems to be the case given what he says in LI 417.639-652, then in order
to obtain the contradictory of proposition (*) one must apply a negative
particle extinctively, so that this negation extinguishes the whole content
of (*), in this way: “It is not the case that: it is possible for my future
son to be alive” (Non: possible est filium meum vivere). Only if we apply
negation in this way we obtain a negative proposition that is never simul-
taneously true or false with (*). Given Abelard’s interest for empty terms
and his position about the existential import in affirmative modal claims in
the Logica Ingredientibus, the logical relationships of contradiction that he
establishes as valid between modal claims could only be valid if negation is
interpreted extinctively. A further sign that Abelard interprets negation in
modal claims as being extinctive and that he relates the question of negation
to the question of empty terms in the LI may be found in passage 420.733-
421.751. There, Abelard says if we want to establish equipollence relation-
ships between modal propositions of different quality, e.g. between the pair
of propositions “Non possibile est Socratem esse album” and “Necesse est
Socratem non esse album”, some problems may arise, and these problems
are connected to the fact that whereas affirmative propositions require the
existence of the subject term’s referent in order to be true, negative proposi-
tions do not (I defend this interpretation in section 2.1.3 below). This is why
Abelard concludes there that such pairs of propositions are only equipollent
if the thing to which the subject term refers exist, i.e., if no empty terms
are included in them.
In conclusion, although Abelard never explicitly says whether the nega-
tive particle that is applied to modal claims is separative or extinctive, and
although evidence from the texts is controversial on this point, if we want
to interpret Abelard charitably, so to make his discussion about negation
of modal claims consistent with his general theory of negation and if we
want his logical relationships between modal propositions to be valid, we
should interpret propositions like “Non possibile est Socratem esse album”
and “Non necesse est Socratem esse album” as if negation were applied ex-
tinctively.44 The proposition “It is not possible for Socrates to run” must
44A different issue is the one concerning whether the negation in modal propositions de
non esse like “Possibile (Necesse) est Socratem non esse album” is separative or extinctive.
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then be read as saying: “It is not the case that: it is possible for Socrates to
run”. Similarly, the proposition “it is not possible for Socrates not to run”
means “It is not the case that: it is possible for Socrates not to run”, and
the same happens for all other negative modal propositions. We will see in
the next section how quantified modal propositions should be negated.
1.2.3 On determining the quantity of modal propositions
Just as nominal modal propositions present more difficulties than adverbial
ones for the individuation of their terms, so it is the case for the determina-
tion of their quantity. According to Abelard, the quantity of a categorical
proposition always depends on its subject term, and so, in order to assign
the quantity to a modal proposition such as “It is possible for some (every)
man to be an animal” (Possibile est quendam (omnem) hominem esse ani-
mal) we need to look at its subject. However, as we said above, any nominal
modal claim has two subjects, one with respect to its grammatical structure
and one with respect to its meaning (see 1.2.1 on page 32). If we look at
the term that is the subject with respect to the grammatical structure (that
was said above is the verb “esse” of the infinitive clause), we would conclude
that a nominal modal proposition has no quantity whatsoever, for the term
“esse” is not quantified:
Si quis autem ad subiectum constructionis respiciat, secundum ip-
sum nec uniuersales nec particulares nec indefinitas nec singulares
huiusmodi enuntiationes iudicabit, quippe subiectum constructionis
nec uniuersaliter nec particulariter enuntiatur. Sed nec indefinitam
facit propositionem quae particularem non habet aequipollentem, nec
singularem facit cum ipsum subiectum uox singularis non sit.(LI De
Int. 397.168-398.174)
It follows then that we have to assign the quantity of a modal proposition
looking to the term which is the subject with respect to meaning (see LI De
Int. 398.174-188, Dial. 193.6-13). With respect to the subject secundum
sensum modal nominal claims vary in quantity being either universal (e.g.
“It is possible for every man to run”), particular (“It is possible for some
Again, Abelard never makes his opinion clear about this point in the Dialectica or in LI.
Wciòrka argues in (Wciòrka, 2012, p. 70-89) that also in this case negation should be
interpreted extinctively.
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man to run”), indefinite (“It is possible for man to run’)’45 and singular
(“It is possible for Socrates to run”).46 The variation of modal propositions
according to their quantity and their quality provides us for each mode
with a list of four singular modal propositions and of eight quantified modal
propositions. The table representing the list of singular affirmative and
negative propositions about possibility has been shown above (see 1.2.2 on
page 35). The following table shows instead the list of quantified possibility
propositions, varied by quantity and quality:47
Affirmative propositions Negative modal proposi-
tions
Universal de esse (1) For every man it is possi-
ble to be white
(2) Not for every man it is
possible to be white (or: for




Quendam hominem non pos-
sibile est esse album
Particular de esse (3) For some man it is possi-
ble to be white






Universal de non esse (5) For every man it is possi-
ble not to be white
(6) Not for every man it is
possible not to be white (or:
for some man it is not possi-
ble to be white)
Omnem hominem possibile
est non esse album
Quendam hominem non pos-
sibile est non esse album
Particular de non esse (7) For some man it is possi-
ble not to be white
(8) For no man it is possible
not to be white
Quendam hominem possibile
est non esse album
Nullum hominem possibile
est non esse album
Propositions (1) and (5) are affirmative universal propositions, de esse and
de non esse respectively; propositions (2) and (6) are negative particular
45Abelard will later say that all indefinite propositions are equivalent to particular ones,
so that we can ignore them when dealing with quantified modal logic.
46See Dial. 192.31-33; LI De Int. 398.174-177. In the latin texts, Abelard uses here the
nominal structure of modal propositions which has the subject in the accusative case as
preposed to the mode and the infinitive clause, in this way: “Omnem hominem – Quendam
hominem – Hominem – Socratem possibile est currere”.
47For the lists of singular and quantified modal propositions see Dial. 198.18-25; LI De
Int. 412.518-413.538.
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propositions; (3) and (7) are affirmative particulars; (4) and (8) are negative
universal propositions de esse and de non esse.
Abelard gives a semantics for these quantified modal propositions, in
which again what is possible is defined in terms of what is compatible with the
nature of the subject, and what is necessary is defined as what is required by
the nature of the subject. The universal proposition “It is possible for every
man to be white” (Omnem hominem possibile est esse album) is interpreted
as: “Every man has a nature such that being white is compatible with this
nature”; the particular proposition “It is possible for some man to be white”
means: “Some men have a nature such that being white is compatible with
this nature”. Again, the universal proposition de non esse “It is possible
for every man not to be white”(Omnem hominem possibile est non esse
album) is interpreted as: “Every man has a nature such that not being white
is compatible with this nature”; the particular proposition “It is possible
for some man not to be white” means: “Some man have a nature such
that not being white is compatible with this nature”. If we understand the
propositions in the lists above as being de rebus, the propositions on each
line are contradictories to one another.
Abelard devotes a particular attention to the exposition of the negative
particular claim “For some man it is not possible to be white” (Quendam
hominem non possibile est esse album). Abelard argues both in the Dialec-
tica and in the LI that, in order to negate a universal modal proposition such
as (i) “It is possible for every man to be white” (Omnem hominem possibile
est esse album), we have two choices: either we prepose the negative particle
to the sign of universal quantification saying (ii) “Not for every man is it
possible to be white” (Non omnem hominem possibile est esse album), or we
use the sign of particularity combined with negation, saying that (iii) “For
some man it is not possible to be white” (Quendam hominem non possibile
est esse album). Both readings are taken by Abelard to be proper negations
of the corresponding universal affirmative proposition. Abelard argues for
this position against the opinion of his “magister” who claimed instead that
since modal propositions must be read de sensu the only possible way to
negate proposition (i) was by means of (ii):
Nostra tamen sententia, memini, prohibere solet non ita in modal-
ibus sicut in simplicibus particulares fieri negativas dupliciter, idest
vel (si) signum particularitatis apponatur vel signum universalitatis
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exstinguatur. Non enim sicut has simplices: “non omnis homo est
albus” et “quidam homo non est albus” particulares utrasque conce-
dunt, sic etiam istas modales: “non omnem hominem possibile est esse
album” et “quemdam hominem non est possibile esse album”. Haec
enim: “quemdam hominem non est possibile esse album” secundum
Magistri praedictam expositionem; quae de sensu simplicis agit, sic:
“non est possibile quod dicit haec propositio: quidam homo est albus”
in universalem redigitur sensum. Qui enim particularem destruit, uni-
versalem ponit, et qui universalem tollit, particularem relinquit. At qui
dicit: “non omnis homo est albus” vel “quidam homo non est albus”, in
illa quidem particulariter, in ista removet universaliter. Sed, ut quidem
praediximus, non placet nobis ita modales ex simplicibus descendere
propositionibus, quod de sensu ipsarum agant, sed de rebus ipsis de
quibus illae simplices, sicut et illae faciunt modales quae adverbiales
habent modos, in quas istae quae casuales habent, resolvuntur. (Dial.
199.35-200.16)
Abelard endorses a similar view also in LI De Int. 414.558-415.571, but on
both occasions he underlines that the two forms are equivalent only when
we consider modal propositions as being de rebus. Proposition (ii), taken
de rebus says that not every man has a nature that is compatible with being
white; proposition (iii) says that some man has a nature that is incompatible
with being white. If the same propositions were taken de sensu they would
instead not be equivalent, but rather proposition (ii) “Non omnem hominem
possibile est esse album” would be equipollent to (iv) “omnem rem esse
hominem non est possible”, and both would have a different truth value
than (iii). Abelard’s choice of taking here the two ways of negating – the
one that uses “some not” and the one that uses “not every” – as being
equivalent may sound strange to someone familiar with Abelard’s theory of
negation. For as was said above, when Abelard deals with simple categorical
propositions and their square of oppositions, he repeatedly says that the two
propositions“Not every man is white” and “Some man is not white” are not
equivalent, and that only the first is the proper negation of “Every man
is white” 1.2.2 on page 36. However, in virtue of his modal semantics, he
thinks that the two claims (ii) and (iii) do turn out to be equipollent, and
are both properly said to be negative particulars. Rather than being a point
concerning the quality and quantity of modal propositions, or the semantics
of negation, what Abelard insists on in these passages is the distinction
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between the de rebus and de sensu interpretation of modal propositions.
This distinction is the object of the following section.
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1.3 De Sensu and De Rebus Modal Propositions
An account of Abelard’s achievements in the field of modal logic must in-
clude some discussion of his distinction between the de rebus and de sensu
interpretation of modal propositions. Just as the later de re-de dicto distinc-
tion, Abelard’s distinction points out an ambiguity concerning all modal sen-
tences and aims to clarify which scope is assigned to the modal term within
a proposition. One of the main features of Abelard’s approach to logic is
precisely this sensitivity to the ambiguity of some linguistic constructions,
and particularly to the ambiguities concerning the scope of linguistic expres-
sions and of logical connectives. Abelard’s texts on modalities are rich in
discussions concerning the scope of different logical elements, such as the
negative particle, the temporal determination “dum”, the quantifiers, and
modes themselves. The identification of the de rebus-de sensu distinction is
certainly one of Abelard’s major logical results, and probably the one that
had the greatest impact in history of logic. As far as we know, Abelard is
the first to explicitly draw this distinction. However, the fact that he in-
troduces his discussion in the first place to argue against a position held by
“his master” about the proper understanding of the role of modes48 is a sign
that a debate about the correct scope of modal terms was underway already
before Abelard. As it was said in many occasions in the previous sections
(see for example 1.1.2 on page 9), the de rebus-de sensu distinction is a se-
mantic distinction. The same modal proposition is taken to have a different
meaning (and consequently a different truth value) depending on which one
of the two interpretations is chosen to understand it. The identification of
this semantic ambiguity is brought up by Abelard in both the Dialectica
and the glosses on De Interpretatione. With respect to this topic, though,
the two logical works differ in some relevant aspects. For example, there is
no trace in the Dialectica of the parallel Abelard draws in the LI between
the de rebus-de sensu distinction and the per divisionem-per compositionem
distinction. Also, although in both works Abelard has an inclination to
consider the de rebus interpretation as the correct and basic understanding
of modal propositions, in the Dialectica the de sensu reading is entirely re-
jected and said to be an incorrect interpretation of modalities, whereas in
48Abelard’s master is usually identified as William of Champeaux, although there are
some doubts on this identification. See on this section 1.2.1 on page 30 on this point.
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the glosses the de sensu interpretation is not cast aside but only presented as
a different interpretation of modal propositions. For this reason, it may be
better to first consider Abelard’s presentation of the semantic distinction in
the two works separately, and then to compare the two in order to underline
their similarities and discrepancies. I first begin with the discussion of the
de rebus-de sensu distinction as it is presented in the Dialectica.
Before going into the details of the two discussions, it may be worth say-
ing something on how in general Abelard conceived the de rebus-de sensu dis-
tinction and on how this is related to another semantic distinction Abelard
locates concerning the scope of modal operators, that is the per divisionem-
per compositionem distinction. Let us say something briefly on the first
distinction. Abelard characterizes the de rebus-de sensu interpretations in
the following way. A proposition like “It is possible for every man to be
white” (Omnem hominem possibile est esse album) is interpreted de rebus
if the possibility to be white is referred to the things themselves (de rebus
ipsis) that are signified by the subject term, in this case, every individual
man. If it is possible to predicate whiteness of each one of these things
(and this is the case if being white is not repugnant to the nature of each
of them) the proposition is true de rebus. The same proposition is on the
other hand true de sensu if the possibility is attributed to the whole content
(sensus) of the simple proposition “Every man is white”, i.e, if the sensus or
dictum expressed by this simple proposition is possible. In the first case, the
modal term has a narrow scope, in the second case it has a wide scope and
it is applied to the whole content of a sentence. Another characterization
Abelard uses, particularly in the Dialectica, to define this semantic distinc-
tion refers to the way modal propositions are related to the corresponding
simple ones. De rebus modal propositions are related to the corresponding
simple propositions in virtue of sharing the same terms with them, so that
the two propositions “Every man is white” and “It is possible for every man
to be white” have the same subject and the same predicate. On the contrary,
de sensu propositions are related to the corresponding simple ones in virtue
of saying something about their content, so that the de sensu proposition
“It is possible for every man to be white” says something about the content
of the simple claim “every man is white”.
At times, Abelard associates the de rebus and the de sensu interpreta-
tions with the distinction between a divided (per divisionem) and a com-
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pound (per compositionem) interpretation of modal propositions. This sec-
ond distinction is not explicitly used by Abelard in the Dialectica, although
there is some evidence that already there Abelard conceived the de sensu
interpretation as a sort of compound interpretation of modal propositions.
An explicit use of the per divisionem-per compositionem terminology is to
be found only in the LI,49 where Abelard attributes the distinction to Aris-
totle. In the Sophistical Refutations, Abelard says, Aristotle considered a
proposition like “It is possible for he who stands to sit” (Possibile est stan-
tem sedere) and distinguished between a divided and a compound reading
of such a proposition. In the compound reading, the proposition would turn
out to be true if the two predicates “to sit” and “to stand” were so that
they could be simultaneously predicated of the same subject, so that it were
possible to say “He who stands sits”. Since this is not the case, the propo-
sition is false in the compound reading. In the divided interpretation, on
the contrary, the proposition is true when the predicate “to sit” is possibly
predicated of the thing that is actually standing, independently from which
are the actual (non substantial) predications of this thing. Let us assume
that the thing Abelard is referring to with “stantem” is a man. Because
there is no predicate in the nature of man that is repugnant to the predicate
“sit”, even if the man to which the subject refers is now standing (and even
if he will be standing for his whole life) it is true to say that this thing that
is a man possibly sits.
Characterized in this way, the two distinctions de rebus-de sensu and
per divisionem-per compositionem seem to overlap, and indeed they are at
times treated by Abelard as if they were pointing out to the same semantic
ambiguity in modal propositions. However, this identification is problem-
atic: as Paul Thom noted, the two distinctions seem to have a different
fundamentum divisionis, and indeed seem not to entirely coincide one with
the other (Thom, 2003b, p. 45-7). Martin as well argues for the fact that
the de sensu is not exactly coincident with the per compositionem reading
(Martin, 2016, p. 130 ff.). Even if he introduces the per coniunctionem
reading in LI identifying it as “secundum sensum” interpretation, Abelard
himself is pretty clear in the following discussion that there is a difference
between the “secundum sensum” reading in terms of the possible and the
49In particular, the divided-compound distinction is introduced by Abelard in LI De
Int. 401.250-264. For an analysis of this passage see 1.3.2 on page 65.
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“per coniunctionem” reading in terms of the possibility of a conjoined predi-
cate applying to the subject. We might then distinguish two different senses
of the “compound” or per compositionem interpretation. The first sense –
which is called here “simple de sensu” or “secundum sensum” interpretation
– requires, for a proposition being true, that there is a relation of compati-
bility between the two terms of the modal proposition, i.e., it requires that
the predicate and the subject of the proposition are not repugnant to one
another, and can therefore be simultaneously predicated of something. Ac-
cording to this criterion, a proposition like “It is possible for he who stands
to sit” (Possibile est stantem sedere) will turn out to be false, because “be-
ing standing” and “being sitting” are incompatibles. A proposition like “it
is possible for every substance to be a spirit” (Possibile est omnem substan-
tiam esse spiritum) will instead turn out to be true, for there seem to be no
incompatibility between the nature of substances and the predicate “spirit”.
The second sense – which is called the “de sensu per coniunctionem”
interpretation – requires something more, i.e., not only that the predicate
term is compatible with the subject term, but also that it is compatible with
the nature of the things that are “S” in the actual situation. According to
this second sense of the compound reading, the proposition “it is possible for
every substance to be a spirit” turns out to be false, because although there
is in principle no incompatibility between the predicates “substance” and
“spirit”, there is indeed an incompatibility between the predicate “being a
spirit” and the nature of (at least) some of the things that are substances in
the actual situation.50 The proposition “it is possible for every substance to
be a spirit” is then true in a “simple secundum sensum” reading but false in
a “de sensu per coniunctionem” reading.51 We then have it that the simple
de sensu interpretation only requires, for a possibility proposition’s truth, a
pure compatibility between the predicate and the subject of the proposition,
independently of the nature of the things to which the subject term refers in
the actual situation; while the “per coniunctionem” reading also takes into
account the nature of the things that are actually signified by the terms.
If we take per compositionem in the second sense, as “de sensu per coni-
unctionem”, the compound interpretation is subsumed under the de rebus
50This is what Abelard claims in LI De Int. 417.634-652.
51For the distinction between these two senses of Abelard’ de sensu reading see also
(Wciòrka, 2012, p. 49-64 and p. 245-267) and (Martin, 2016, p. 130 ff.).
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or divided interpretation, for it requires the same criterion that the de rebus
interpretation requires (the compatibility between the predicate and the na-
ture of the subject) plus some further condition (the compatibility between
the predicate and a certain feature that the subject is described as actually
having). All per coniunctionem possibilities are therefore a subset of the de
rebus possibilities. In the Dialectica Abelard tends to use the compound
reading in the first sense, as simple de sensu. In the LI, on the other hand,
Abelard uses the compound reading mainly in the second sense. There, he
still uses sometimes “per compositionem” and “de sensu” as if they were
synonymous, but actually this sense of the per compositionem reading re-
quires something more than the simple de sensu one. Understanding per
compositionem in this second way allows Abelard to establish in the LI a
logical inference between compound and divided modal propositions, and to
claim that any per coniunctionem proposition about possibility entails the
corresponding per divisionem proposition, while the contrary is not given
(see 3.4.2 on page 184 on this). This can not the case if the per composi-
tionem is understood in the first sense.
To sum up this general account of the de rebus-de sensu and per divisionem-
per compositionem distinctions, I consider that for any proposition such as
“It is possible for an S to be P” there are three ways in which the proposition
might be interpreted, listed in the following scheme. Under each interpre-
tation, I try to specify which are the conditions Abelard requires for the
proposition being true in such an interpretation (see also 1.1 on the facing
page).
“It is possible for an S to be P”
1. de rebus:
(i) de rebus or per divisionem: the nature of the thing that is actually
S is compatible with being P;
2. de sensu:
(ii.a) simple de sensu: what this proposition says is possible: “S is P”,
i.e., being S is compatible with being P.
(ii.b) de sensu per coniunctionem:: S is possibly P while-being-S, i.e.,
being S is compatible with being P and the nature of the thing that is




























de rebus interpretation 
It is possible for Socrates to be P 
Nat Socrates  : {X, Y, Z} 
de sensu per coniunctionem interpretation 
It is possible for Socrates, that is Q to be P 
Nat Socrates  : {X, Y, Z} 
simple de sensu interpretation 
It is possible for Socrates, that is Q to be P 
Nat Socrates  : {X, Y, Z} 
Figure 1.1: The three interpretations of modal claims.
53
1.3.1 The de sensu-de rebus distinction in the Dialectica
In the Dialectica, the distinction between the de re and de sensu reading of
modal propositions is already developed and discussed, even if in a less ex-
plicit way than it is in the Logica Ingredientibus. The distinction arises from
Abelard’s reflection on the problem of how propositions with nominal modes
are derived from simple ones, and which sort of relation there is between a
proposition cum modo and the corresponding unqualified proposition. Let
us consider the modal proposition (a) “It is possible for Socrates to be a
bishop” and its corresponding simple proposition (b) “Socrates is a bishop”.
Abelard individuates two possible answers to the question of how the two
are related, and of how proposition (a) is derived from (b): either the modal
proposition deals with the same things that proposition (b) deals with, for
both (a) and (b) affirm something about the same subject and the same
predicate; or the modal proposition (a) deals with the content of (b), i.e., it
affirms something concerning proposition (b) itself and its sensus, and not
something about Socrates or being a bishop. In the first case, propositions
(a) and (b) are related inasmuch as they share the same terms and they
are about the same things; in the second case (a) is related to (b) because
it affirms something about the content of (b): it affirms that its content is
“possible”. The two alternatives Abelard identifies to address the problem of
how (a) and (b) relate are nothing other than the two interpretations modal
proposition (a) can be given: an interpretation de rebus and an interpreta-
tion de sensu. The first alternative corresponds to interpretation de rebus for
in that case the modal term “possible” is a qualification of the conjunction
of the predicate “bishop” with the subject “Socrates”. The second alterna-
tive corresponds instead to the de sensu reading of modal propositions, and
in this case the modal term “possible” has a wide scope and is applied to
the whole proposition “Socrates is a bishop”. In this second interpretation,
proposition (a) is read as if it said: “It is possible what is signified by this
proposition ‘Socrates is a bishop’ ”. Abelard is consistent in the Dialectica
in saying that only the first interpretation – the interpretation de rebus –
is a correct reading of modal propositions, and that a proposition like (a)
is related to its simple corresponding proposition (b) insofar as they have
the same terms in meaning, and they then deal about the same things. The
alternative de sensu reading of modal propositions is presented as an opin-
ion which was maintained by Abelard’s Magister, but that Abelard aims to
54
discard as incorrect:
Restat autem nunc qualiter modales propositiones ex simplicibus de-
scendant confiteri. Est autem Magistri nostri sententia eas ita ex sim-
plicibus descendere, quod de sensu earum agant, ut cum dicimus: “pos-
sibile est Socratem currere uel necesse”, id dicimus quod possibile est
uel necesse quod dicit ista propositio: “Socrates currit”. (Dial. 195.11-
15)
In the discussion that follows, Abelard does not present the de sensu inter-
pretation held by his Master as a different, but sound, alternative to the first
interpretation de rebus. On the contrary, he tries to prove that his Master’s
opinion on modal propositions is problematic, and that the de sensu inter-
pretation has to be discarded in favor of a de re one. Whether Abelard does
in fact succeed in proving the inconsistency of the de sensu interpretation
is questionable, and I will return to this issue below. Before, I would like
to go through the different arguments Abelard raises against his Master’s
opinion. There are five objections against the de sensu interpretation, that
are at first listed altogether in Dial. 195.15-26 and then more extensively
explained one by one in Dial. 195.26-198.11. All of the arguments especially
concern modal propositions with nominal modes (adverbial modal proposi-
tions have been already set aside at this point of the Dialectica). These are
the objections in brief:
(1) If modal propositions are interpreted as being de sensu, then all the
rules of conversion – both simple and by contraposition – must be valid
for modal propositions. However, it is opinion of Abelard’s Master that
conversions are not to be maintained in modal propositions as they are
in simple ones. But the two opinions – that modal propositions are to
be read de sensu and that conversions are invalid – are incompatible.
The Master’s position is then inconsistent.
(2) If modal propositions are taken to be de sensu, some propositions
that must be true turn out to be false. For example this proposi-
tion: “For every man it is possible to be a non-man” (possibile est
omnem hominem esse non hominem) should be considered true, ac-
cording to Abelard, but it turns out to be false when it is read de
sensu. Another example Abelard gives is the proposition “For every
man it is possible to be dead” (omnen hominem possibile est mortuum
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esse), which is again a true proposition, but it turns out to be false
if we interpret it de sensu.52 There are therefore some propositions
which Abelard maintains to be true but turn out to be false in the de
sensu interpretation. Such interpretation leads then to an incorrect
attribution of the truth values in modal propositions.
(3) On the other hand, if modal propositions are taken to be de sensu, some
propositions that should, according to Abelard, be false turn out to
be true. Abelard seems to think here that there are some propositions
which are false when taken de rebus and true when taken de sensu.53
The example Abelard gives for this objection is the following: the
modal proposition “Nullum hominem possibile est esse album” turns
out to be false when interpreted de rebus, as saying that the nature
of no man is compatible with being white, whereas it is true when
interpreted de sensu, as saying that what is said by this proposition
“No man is white” is possible, for there is a possible situation in which
the proposition “No man is white” is true.
(4) If modal propositions are read de sensu, some propositions that are neg-
ative result to be affirmative. The example is again this proposition:
“For no man it is possible to be white”, which is a negative universal
proposition de rebus and an affirmative proposition de non esse if we
consider it de sensu.
(5) If a modal proposition such as “For Socrates it is possible to be a bishop”
is read de sensu, as saying that “it is possible what this proposition
says: ‘Socrate is a bishop”’, then it is not anymore a modal proposi-
tion, but it becomes a simple de puro inesse proposition, for it affirms
that a certain predicate (“possible”) attaches unqualifiedly to a certain
subject (the content of this proposition: “Socrates is a bishop”).
52We should however note that the proposition “For every man it is possible to be dead”
is true, according to Abelard, only if by means of the subject “every man” we refer not
to invidual men qua men, but we take them qua individual bodies. Abelard does indeed
specify that the proper subject of the sentence is not “man” but “the thing that is a
man” (id quod est homo), and he points out that although there is an incompatibility
between being dead and being a man, there is no incompatibility between being dead and
being a body («Aliud est enim corporis simplicem attendere in eo naturam, aliud hominis
proprietatem in eodem considerare»). See 3.5 on page 188 on this point.
53It is interesting to note this because it is contrary to what Abelard states in the Logica
Ingredientibus, where he affirms that if a proposition about possibility is true when stated
de sensu, its corresponding de rebus must be true as well. See 1.3.2 on page 70.
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Let us go through these objections one by one. The first objection concerns
the validity of conversions. Abelard argues that if someone wants to read
modal propositions de sensu, he also must consent to the validity of simple
conversion and conversion per contrapositionem in modal logic. But since
Abelard’s Master does not want to admit that these conversions are valid
in modal propositions, his position is inconsistent. Note that Abelard’s first
objection is not against the de sensu interpretation in itself, but only against
the incompatibility between such de sensu interpretation and the denial of
the validity of conversions. Abelard has an argument to show that all modal
propositions are convertible, if they are read de sensu. More precisely, the
argument shows that conversions are valid for modal propositions anytime
they are also valid for their corresponding simple propositions. This is the
argument: let us suppose that there is a pair of propositions “p” and “q”,
where “q” is obtained by conversion from “p” (the fact that “p” and “q” are
equivalent by means of simple conversion or conversion by contraposition
is not relevant). Propositions “p” and “q” are then equipollent. Abelard
states then a principle in virtue of which anytime it is possible what is said
by one of two equipollent propositions, it is also possible what is said by the
other one, and the same works for impossibility and necessity: «Cum enim
possibile sit esse quod dicit una aequipollentium, possibile est esse et quod
alia proponit; et de impossibili similiter, et necessario» (Dial. 195.35-37).54
The principle may be represented as saying:
p ⇔ q ⇒ 3 p ⇔ 3 q
p ⇔ q ⇒ 2 p ⇔ 2 q
p ⇔ q ⇒ ¬3 p ⇔ ¬3 q
It seems then that, whenever we have a pair of simple propositions which
are equipollent, and Abelard’s premise is that they are equipollent in virtue
of conversion, also their corresponding modal propositions are equipollent.
So, for example, the following are valid:
(i) Every man is an animal ⇔ Every non-animal is a non-man ⇒
3 (Every man is an animal) ⇔ 3 (Every non-animal is a non-man)
54This principle is used by Abelard also in his discussion of future contingents and of
theological determinism, see below 4.2 and 4.2.3.
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(ii) No man is a stone ⇔ No stone is a man ⇒
3 (No man is a stone) ⇔ 3 (No stone is a man)
Abelard takes this as a proof that conversions are valid also for modal propo-
sitions, when interpreted de sensu, for whenever their corresponding simple
propositions are equivalent in virtue of conversions, also the modal proposi-
tions de sensu are equipollent.55 Abelard says that therefore his Master is
wrong in rejecting the validity of conversions for de sensu propositions:
Miror, inquam, cum modales de sensu simplicium agere faciat, non
de rebus ipsis de quibus simplex agit, cur non in istis, sicut in sim-
plicibus, conuersiones omnes recipiant. Neque enim secundum eorum
expositionem conuersiones in istis magis deficiunt quam in illis nec, si
sensum suae expositionis attendant, unam ueram in conuersionibus et
aliam falsam, sicut aestimant, inuenient; quod tam in conuersione sim-
plici quam in conuersione per contrapositionem licet inspicere. (Dial.
195.28-196.1)
Abelard goes on to examine some counterexamples to the validity of conver-
sion in de sensu modal claims. Presumably, these were the counterexamples
his Master brought to argue against such validity. In all examples we have a
pair of (supposedly) converse propositions in which, according to Abelard’s
Master, one side is true and the other is false. If this is the case, they are
not equivalent.56 The first example (Dial. 196.1-15) considers the following
pair of propositions (Martin, 2016, p. 127 ff.):
(a) “For every man it is possible to be a stone”
55Let us note however that even if the two propositions (p) “Every man is a animal” and
(q)“Every non-animal is a non-man” are equipollent in virtue of conversion, this does not
entail that the corresponding de sensu claims (p*) “It is possible for every man to be an
animal” and (q*) “It is possible for every non-animal to be a non-man” are in a relation of
conversion to one another. Given Abelard’s idea that alethic modalities construed de sensu
allow substitution of equipollent salva veritate, (p*) and (q*) are indeed equipollent, but
not in virtue of conversion. Therefore, when Abelard in the Dialectica speaks of the rules
of conversions for modal de sensu propositions, he is actually referring to the principles
according to which de sensu claims allow substitution of equipollent salva veritate. In the
LI, Abelard will indeed notice this ambiguity and he will say that, even if two propositions
like (p*) and (q*) are equipollent, they are not in a relation of conversion to one another.
56We are not able to establish which was in fact the position held by Abelard’s master
on the validity of conversions and on the scope of the modal term. Abelard’s objections
against him suggest that he used to make some logical mistakes in treating modal claims,
and that his de sensu interpretation was inconsistent with other parts of his modal logic.
Indeed, it might also be the case that Abelard’s master, although proposing in general
a de sensu interpretation of modal claims, used at other times a de rebus interpretation,
which would explain why he considered some of the propositions in question here as true.
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(b) “For every non-stone it is possible to be a non-man”.
Propositions (a) and (b) should be equivalent in virtue of contraposition (in
virtue of the implicit premise stated before), but Abelard’s Master thinks
that (a) is false and that (b) is true. Abelard says that those who propose
this counterexample do not doubt that proposition (a) is false, for it is
not possible what this proposition says: “every man is a stone”. However,
they think that proposition (b) is true, and they justify such truth with an
argument a partibus:
Quia omnem hominem et omnem non-hominem possibile est esse non-
hominem. De non-homine autem patet, cum scilicet iam sit non-homo;
de homine etiam patet quia non-homo erit. Quod enim futurum est,
possibile est; aliter enim futurum non esset, nisi scilicet possibile esset;
neque enim futurum est quod natura non patitur. (Dial. 196.5-9)
Abelard replies this counterexample simply saying that, if we understand
modal propositions de sensu, also proposition (b) must be false, for it is not
possible that it happens what this proposition says: “Every non-stone is a
non-man”. He also maintains that the only case in which the two proposi-
tions are not equipollent is when one or more of the terms included in (a)
or (b) are empty terms, i.e., when they fail to refer, or “universal” terms,
i.e., when they refer to everything that exists. However, the same failure
of conversion is to be detected also for propositions de puro inesse, and it
is not specific to modal propositions. For example, also in the case of the
two simple propositions “Every man is a stone” and “Every non-stone is a
non-man”, conversion fails in a situation in which there are no men, and in
which the subject term of the first proposition is empty. As a consequence,
Abelard claims that when we consider the validity of conversions, both in
simple and modal propositions, we have to posit the condition that all the
terms present in converted propositions are neither empty terms not “univer-
sal terms”. If this condition is granted, the two propositions (a) and (b) are
equivalent and both false, and so they do not constitute a counterexample
to the validity of conversions (see on this LI De Int. 400.240-401.249).57
57«Sed profecto non recte convertitur, immo ita dicendum fuit “Omne quod non possibile
est esse non-hominem est lapis” quam et si quis dicat falsam esse, verum dicit; sed haec
fallacia conversionis eadem de causa contingit in propositionibus simplicibus qua contingit
in istis modalibus, quia scilicet termini admiscentur qui omnia continent. Ut si dicam
destructa rosa “Omnis non-homo est non-rosa”, “non rosa” omnia continet nec potest
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Abelard also considers other counterexamples, which are proposed to
undermine the validity of simple conversion in modal propositions. In the
following four pairs of propositions, it is the opinion of Abelard’s Master
that one side is true and the other false (Dial. 196.22-24). Abelard answers
that, if we read modal propositions de sensu, in all pairs the two propositions
have the same truth value, and are then equipollent to one another:
(1.a) “For no blind man it is possible to see”
(1.b) “For no one who sees it is possible to be blind”
(2.a) “For no dead [thing] it is possible to be a man”
(2.b) “For no man it is possible to be dead”
(3.a) “For every men it is possible to be dead”
(3.b) “For some dead [thing] it is possible to be a man”
(4.a) “For no body it is necessary to be a man”
(4.b) “For no man it is necessary to be a body”
Having responded to all counterexamples Abelard thinks he has shown that
conversions are no less valid in modal propositions than they are in simple
ones, if modal propositions are taken to be de sensu. Therefore, he can
accuse his Master of being wrong – or at least inconsistent – in endorsing
a de sensu interpretation of modalities together with the thesis that modal
propositions do not universally admit conversions. Let us note again that
this objection is not effective in refuting the de sensu reading per se, but
only the incompatibility between endorsing the de sensu interpretation as
the all-encompassing way of construing modal propositions with nominal
modes and the refusal of their convertibility.
I turn now to the consideration of Abelard’s second objection against
those who, like his Master, take the de sensu interpretation as the correct
and proper understanding of modal propositions. The second objection says
ideo servari conversio; similiter, cum dicitur “Omnem non-lapidem possibile est esse non-
hominem” ac si diceretur “Omnis non-lapis potest esse non-homo”, “posse esse non-homo”,
quod in sensu predicatur, omnes singulas res continet, ideoque perit conversio. Ex quo
apparet conversionem in modalibus non minus teneri quam in simplicibus, si quis diligenter
sensus earum diiudicet».
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that, if modal propositions are taken to be de sensu, some propositions that
according to Abelard should be considered true turn out to be false. Abelard
gives as an example the proposition (*) “It is possible for a man to be dead”.
This proposition, Abelard says, is true when taken de rebus, but false when
taken de sensu:58
Restat autem nunc post conuersiones ut ostendamus secundum eorum
expositionem eas falsas quas ueras aestimant, ut istam: “possibile est
hominem mortuum esse”, sic scilicet expositam: “possibile est quod
haec propositio dicit: homo est mortuus”. (Dial. 196.29-32)
The falsity of proposition (*) taken de sensu is easily proved by Abelard:
if one interprets (*) de sensu, he is saying that the content (sensus) of this
proposition “A man is dead” is one among all the things or events that are
possible, or, in other words, that the two predicates “man” and “dead” may
simultaneously attach to the same subject, so that the same thing possibly
is a man and dead at the same time. This is certainly false, for being a man
requires being alive, and it is therefore impossible for someone who is a man
to be also dead at the same time. The predicates “man” and “dead” are
opposite terms, and are never predicable simultaneously of the same subject.
Si enim possibile est quod illa dicit propositio, possibile simul mortuum
et hominem cohaerere, quod quidem falsum est, cum ex natura opposi-
tionis alterum non possit pati alterum. Neque enim homine[m] uiuente
in eodem existere possunt, quippe cum “mortuum” “uitam” non per-
ferat, nec homine[m] mortuo, quippe cum “hominem” “mors” non pa-
tiatur. Quia ergo nec homine uiuente nec mortuo nec etiam antequam
homo crearetur, natura hominem et mortuum patiatur, numquam simul
ea patitur. Nullo itaque modo uidetur uera haec propositio: “possi-
bile hominem mortuum esse”, ut scilicet de sensu simplicis exponatur.
(Dial. 196.32-197.2)
Abelard’s objection here consists in saying that proposition (*), which is
supposed to be false in the de sensu reading, is instead a true proposition if
we consider it according to the proper de rebus intepretation. Abelard has
58One may wonder how Abelard justifies the truth of (*) when understood de rebus,
for it seems that also when taken de rebus this proposition turns out to be false. It is
indeed repugnant to the nature of man to be dead, for the nature of man requires being
an animal, and therefore being alive. There is however, according to Abelard, a sense in
which (*) is true de rebus, i.e., a sense for which it is true that a man (or better, that the
thing which is a man) is possibly not alive. See 3.5 on page 188 on this.
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some difficulties in trying to justify the truth of proposition (*) “For a man
it is possible to be dead” when taken de rebus. It seems in fact that “being
dead” is repugnant to the nature of any individual who is actually a man.
In the final analysis, however, Abelard holds that there is a sense in which
proposition (*) is true de rebus. Abelard’s argumentation rests on the idea
that, although it is true that a subject, say Socrates, cannot be dead while
he is a man, we can also consider the thing that Socrates is (id quod est
Socrates) not as being a man but only as being a body. If we consider this
substance (Socrates) merely as a body, there is no incompatibility between
its being a body and its being dead, for being dead is not repugnant to the
nature of the corporeal substance that is actually Socrates (Dial. 196.29-
197.31, see 3.5 on page 188).
The third objection against the de sensu interpretation says that if
modal propositions are taken de sensu some propositions that, according
to Abelard, should be considered false turn out to be true. This objection
is proposed in pair with the fourth objection, that says that, along with the
de sensu interpretation, some propositions that should be negative turns
out to be affirmative. The two objections are considered in Dial. 197.32
and in the discussion that follows. Abaleard takes as example the modal
proposition (**) “For no man it is possible to be white” (Nullum hominem
possibile est esse album). Proposition (**), interpreted de rebus, says that
no man is possibly white, meaning that the nature of no man is compatible
with being white. When read in this way, proposition (**) is a negative and
false proposition. If (**) is instead interpreted de sensu it is an affirmative
proposition de non esse, which states the possibility of what is said by this
proposition “No man is white”. Also, when interpreted in this way proposi-
tion, (**) is a true proposition, for the property of being white belongs to
human beings only contingently, and not necessarily, and there is therefore
a possible situation in which “No man is white” is true:
Nunc autem monstremus eas quae falsae sunt, ueras esse, uel quae
negatiuae sunt, affirmatiuas esse secundum supradictam expositionem,
ut istam: “nullum hominem possibile est esse album”. Haec enim
secundum eos ex ista descendit: “nullus homo est albus”, et de sensu
illius agit, ita scilicet quod dicit: “possibile est esse illud quod ipsa
dicit”. Sed iam uera est, si i[s]ta exponatur, et affirmatiua de non
esse. Posset enim omni homini contingere albedo, sicut et omni animali
sanitas. (Dial. 197.32-38)
62
Not only do we have it that some propositions that are true de rebus turn out
to be false when taken de sensu, but we also have that some propositions
that are false de rebus become true on a de sensu interpretation.59 The
last objection Abelard poses to his Master’s opinion on the interpretation of
modal propositions consists in saying that, if modal propositions are taken
de sensu, they are not anymore modal propositions, but they turn out to
be simple propositions. In order for a proposition to be considered modal,
it must not only express the inherence of a predicate to a subject, but it
has to state in which way the predicate term is conjoined to the subject
term. In other words, a modal claim must assert a qualified predication,
and not a predication de puro inesse. But if we intend the proposition (**)
“For no man it is possible to be white” to mean that “What is said by this
proposition is possible: ‘no man is white’ ”, what we do is to assert the
simple conjunction of the predicate “possible” to a subject, which is the
sensus of this proposition “no man is white”.
Nec iam etiam modalis appellari potest, sed simplex, quia simpliciter
possibile attribuit subiectae propositionis essentiae. Unde nec ulla est
ibi modificatio rerum inhaerentiae, quippe nec de rebus agitur, sed de
sensu propositionis. Quare, quoniam in ui modi non est ‘possibile’,
modalem non facit propositionem. (Dial. 198.3-8)
From the analysis of these five objections, we may try to draw some con-
clusions about Abelard’s investigation of the de rebus-de sensu distinction
in the Dialectica. The distinction is introduced to account for the problem
of how a modal proposition like “Socrates is possibly white” relates to its
corresponding simple proposition “Socrates is white”. Two alternative opin-
59This is a discrepancy with what Abelard endorses in the Logica Ingredientibus. In the
LI, where Abelard understands the de sensu reading as a per coniunctionem reading –
requiring not only a compatibility between subject and predicate but also a compatibility
between the predicate and the nature of the thing that is the subject in the actual situation
– he claims that if a proposition about possibility is true de sensu it is also always true de
rebus, while the converse inference is not given. In LI Abelard claims then that de sensu
possibilities are a proper subset of de rebus possibilities, while in the Dialectica he assumes
that there are some possibility propositions that are true de sensu but not de rebus. He
provides at least two examples of that in the Dialectica: the first is the proposition just
examined, “For no man it is possible to be white”, the second is the proposition “For
a future son it is possible to be alive”. In LI, Abelard takes into consideration this last
proposition, arguing that it is false not only de rebus but also de sensu, and that there is
no proposition that is true de sensu unless it is also true de rebus. These discrepancies
reveal that Abelard’s idea of what it means for a proposition to be de sensu changes over
time.
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ions are contrasted by Abelard as possible answers to this problem: either
the modal proposition relates to the simple one in so far as it deals with
the same terms and it concerns the same things, or the modal proposition
relates to the corresponding simple proposition in so far as it concerns its
content (sensus). The first option is associated with a de rebus understand-
ing of modal propositions, the second with a de sensu one. It is pretty clear
in the Dialectica that Abelard gives priority to the de rebus understanding
of modalities, which he takes to be the more fundamental understanding
of modal claims. Modal propositions relate to their corresponding simple
propositions in virtue of having the same terms (i.e., the same subject and
the same predicate), and not in virtue of dealing with the content of simple
propositions. Although Abelard does not use the same terminology as he
uses in the Logica Ingredientibus, also in the Dialectica he conceives the de
sensu reading of proposition (*) as a compound reading, that says: it is
possible that the subject is P while being S, or that it is possible for a sub-
ject to be both S and P simultaneously. Abelard argues that the de rebus
interpretation is not only preferable, but is the only proper understanding
of modalities. This argumentation is supposed to go against the opinion of
Abelard’sMagister, who defended instead a de sensu interpretation of modal
propositions. Abelard sets out several objections against his Master. First,
the de sensu interpretation is incompatible with Abelard’s Master’s refusal
to admit the validity of conversions in modal propositions. This means that
if we want to read modal propositions de sensu we must also admit their
convertibility according to the same rules that are valid for simple propo-
sitions. Second, the de sensu reading makes some true modal propositions
false which should instead taken as true, as in the case of proposition “For
a man it is possible to be dead”. Third, the de sensu reading makes some
false modal propositions true, as in the case of proposition “For no man it
is possible to be white”. Fourth, the de sensu reading makes some negative
modal propositions affirmative. The example provided is again the proposi-
tion “For no man it is possible to be white”, which is affirmative de rebus and
negative de sensu. Fifth, if modal propositions are read de sensu they are
not modal propositions anymore, but they are simple propositions, for they
unqualifiedly state the inherence of a simple predicate to a subject, without
adding any mode to qualify such inherence. Of those objections, only the
last one is repeated by Abelard in the Logica Ingredientibus. This fifth ob-
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jection seems to be indeed the strongest objection Abelard has against the
de sensu interpretation, because it questions their very status of “modal”
claims. However, Abelard’s argument is hardly compelling, since it is only
effective if one assumes that Abelard’s account of modality is correct, i.e.,
if one accepts that modalities are modifications of simple predications.
1.3.2 The de sensu-de rebus distinction in the Logica Ingre-
dientibus
The passage with which Abelard introduces the de rebus-de sensu distinction
in his glosses on De Interpretatione is one of the most famous and quoted
passages of all Abelard’s logical works. There, Abelard explicitly presents
this distinction as a semantic distinction between two different possible in-
terpretations modal propositions can be given. Furthermore, he establishes
the conditions for the truth of a same proposition – “It is possible for he
who stands to sit” (Possibile est stantem sedere) – when evaluated as being
de rebus and when evaluated as being de sensu. As far as we know, Abelard
is the first logician to locate this scope ambiguity in the use of modal terms.
Nevertheless, he does not present the distinction as his own, but he refers
it back to Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations, where the Philosopher talked
about a compound and a divided reading of modal propositions:
Videntur autem duobus modis exponi posse, ueluti si dicam: Possibile
est stantem sedere. Ut enim docet Aristoteles in Sophisticis Elenchis,
alius est sensus per diuisionem alius per compositionem: per composi-
tionem uero est si stare et sedere simul in eodem subiecto coniungat, ac
si dicamus: “Possibile est stantem sedere manentem stantem” id est:
sedere simul et stare, ac si dicamus: “Possibile est ita contingere ut
haec propositio dicit ‘Stans sedet’ ” quod est omnino falsum quia iam
duo opposita simul inesse eidem possent; et tunc quidem possibile quasi
ad integrum sensum propositionis applicatur, ac si dicatur: “Possibile
est euenire ut haec propositio dicit ‘Stans sedet’ ”. Si uero ita accip-
iatur quod is qui stat possit sedere quandoque, non coniungimus tunc
opposita, et ad rem ipsam, non ad propositionem, possibile referimus
dicentes rem quae stat posse quandoque sedere, non posse contingere
ut dicit propositio Stans sedet. (LI De Int. 401.250-264)
From what Abelard says in this passage, it seems that the two distinctions
de rebus – de sensu and per divisionem – per compositionem are only two
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different terminologies that point out at the same ambiguity.60 The read-
ing per compositionem as used in this passage seems to require that for a
proposition to be true there must be a relation of compatibility between the
subject and the predicate, and perhaps, although Abelard is not explicit here
on this point, also a relation of compatibility between the predicate and the
nature of the thing to which the subject term refers in the actual situation.
Differently from what he does in the Dialectica, in the Logica Ingredientibus
Abelard does not argue against the validity of the de sensu interpretation
per se, nor to prove that it is an incorrect understanding of modalities, but
he only wants to underline the difference of the two alternative evaluations
of modal propositions, so that the reader can carefully avoid those sophis-
mata which are due to the ambiguous scope of the modal term. Although
the de sensu reading is not rejected as incorrect, Abelard still points out
that the de rebus reading is the proper and fundamental understanding of
modal propositions. There are three arguments for the priority of the de
rebus reading over the de sensu one:
(i) first, propositions understood de sensu are not strictly speaking modal
propositions, but they are predications de puro inesse. This is the
same claim Abelard makes in the Dialectica and that we listed above
as the fifth objection against Abelard’s Master (see 1.3.1 on page 63);
(ii) second, de sensu modal propositions do not have any quantity, i.e.,
they are not universal nor particular nor singular nor indefinite;
(iii) third, de sensu modal propositions are impersonal constructions, and
therefore they lack the possibility to convert. This third point may
sound odd as in the Dialectica Abelard argues exacltly for the op-
posite claim, saying that de sensu modal propositions allow for the
same conversion rules which are allowed among simple propositions
(see 1.3.1 on page 57).
All three objections are briefly sketched in the following passage:
At uero, cum de sensu propositionis exponuntur, proprie modales non
sunt, nec uniuersales uel particulares uel indefinitae uel singulares, nec
60The issue of the alleged coincidence between the two distinctions has been already
discussed in 1.3 on page 49.
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ideo simplicium conuersiones retinent; tunc enim quasi totius proposi-
tionis sensus subiectum est et modus simpliciter praedicatur; nec est
personalis enuntiatio ullo modo sed impersonalis, ideoque conuersione
caret proprietas constructionis. (LI De Int. 402.273-278)
The first objection is the same that Abelard proposes against his Master
in the Dialectica, and I already considered it in 1.3.1 on page 63. The
second and third objections are worth being analysed to some extent, for
they point out a difference (and maybe a development) in Abelard’s thought
about modal propositions. Both the second and third objections rest on the
fact that these sorts of propositions are considered in the Logica Ingredien-
tibus as being impersonal constructions. It may be convenient to consider
some elements of Abelard’s theory of personal and impersonal linguistic con-
structions, for it is related in many respects to his theory of de sensu modal
propositions. A quite extensive part of the commentary on De interpreta-
tione 12 is dedicated to this theory (LI De Int. 404.326-408.437), while there
is no trace of it in the Dialectica’s discussion of modalities.
For a sentence, to have a personal construction, or a personal intent,
means that the sentence’s terms have a personal signification, i.e., they are
suitable to refer to something that exists.61 Not all propositions seem to
be personal in this sense. There are some propositions, as “Euenit currere
Socratem” or “Ventum est ecclesiam”,62 the terms of which seem not to
have a personal signification. They are therefore considered as impersonal
constructions. Of this sort are also modal proposition which are grammati-
cally expressed by nominal modes and an infinitive clause, like “It is oblig-
atory for Socrates to read” (Oportet Socratem legere) or “It is necessary for
Socrates to read” (Necesse est Socratem legere). As he often does, Abelard
distinguishes two ways in which propositions are said to be impersonal: a
proposition may be impersonal only according to its grammatical structure
or it may be impersonal both in grammar and in meaning. There are in-
deed some propositions which have an impersonal construction according to
their linguistic form, but that are still personal in meaning (see LI De Int.
61For this characterization see (Wilks, 2008, p. 107); for a presentation of Abelard’s
theory of personal and impersonal construction and its background see also (Tweedale,
1976) and (Mews, 1992, p. 14-6).
62If we were to translate these sentences into English we should say something like: “It
happens that Socrates runs” and “There was an arrival at church”. However, especially
for what concerns the second proposition, there is no proper equivalent English sentence,
for the impersonal construction is not used in English in this way.
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402.273-286). Their impersonality is merely a matter of their syntactical
construction, which does not reflect the real intent of the sentence, that is
personal. We can recognize these propositions from the fact that they can
be reduced or rephrased in a grammatically personal form. The grammati-
cally impersonal proposition “It is obligatory that Socrates reads” (Oportet
Socratem legere), for example, could be reformulated in the personal proposi-
tion: “Socrates must read” (Socrates est opportunus ad legendum).63 Again,
the grammatically impersonal proposition “There was an arrival at church”
(Ventum est ad ecclesiam), may be taken as having an implicit subject that
can be explicitated (“There was an arrival to the church by some people”)
and consequently reduced to the personal construction “Some people arrived
to the church” (Wilks, 2008, p. 107). Also many modal nominal proposi-
tions, like “For Socrates it is possible to read” (Socratem possibile est legere),
have an impersonal grammatical form but are personal in meaning, for they
can be reduced to a personal construction, like “Socrates possibly reads”
(Socrates legit possibiliter), or “Socrates can read” (Socrates potest legere),
where the subject terms of the proposition maintains a personal signification
and is suited to referring to something. Once the grammatically impersonal
propositions have been rephrased, we can consider them as having a certain
quantity and also they become suitable for being converted.
In the Dialectica, Abelard claims that all modal propositions with a
nominal structure are reducible to a corresponding adverbial proposition,
and therefore they are personal in meaning, even if impersonal grammati-
cally. In the glosses on the De Interpretatione 12, however, Abelard suggests
that there are exceptions to this general rule, for not every nominal modal
proposition is personal in meaning and suited to being reformulated with
a personal construction. There are propositions that are “entirely imper-
sonal”, i.e., that are impersonal both with respect to grammar and with
respect to meaning. These propositions, among which there are also some
nominal modal claims, differ from personal propositions in so far as they
have no quantity and in that they completely lack conversions. Abelard’s
examples in the Logica Ingredientibus are the following:
(a) It is necessary for a chimera not to be a quality (Necesse est chimaeram
non esse qualitatem);
63See on this LI De Int. 403.301-304.
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(b) It is necessary for a chimera to be/not to be (Necesse est chimaeram
esse/non esse);
(c) It is possible for that which is not to be (Id quod non est possibile est
esse).
Examples (a) and (b) may be found in LI De Int. 403.299-302 and 403.312-
313; example (c) is mentioned by Abelard in LI De Int. 405.361.64 All those
propositions that are impersonal according to meaning fail to convert, and
both the rules of simple conversion and the rules of conversion by contrapo-
sition are not valid for them. Also, they have no quantity at all, since their
subject is neither universal nor singular. Also, modal propositions that are
essentially impersonal are suitable to be interpreted only as being de sensu
and not in the divided sense or in the de rebus sense.65
It is interesting to note that whereas Abelard in the Dialectica suggested
that de sensu propositions admitted all kinds of conversions that were ad-
mitted in simple propositions, in the Logica Ingredientibus he denies that de
sensu propositions are convertible at all, unless they are reduced to a per-
sonal grammatical form. As we said in the previous section, in the Dialectica
Abelard argues that if modal claims are taken de sensu, conversions must
hold for them, and he suggested that, for any pair of equipollent proposi-
tions “p” and “q” where “q” is obtained from “p” by conversion, also their
de sensu modal counterparts “It is possible that p” and “It is possible that
q” are equipollent (see 1.3.1 on page 57). If for example (p) is proposition
“Every man is a stone” and (q) is “Every non-stone is a non-man”, Abelard
claims in the Dialectica that the two de sensu propositions (p*) “For every
man it is possible to be a stone” and (q*) “For every non-stone it is possible
to be a non-man” are equipollent, given his idea that alethic modalities con-
strued de sensu allow substitution of equipollent salva veritate. In the Logica
Ingredientibus, however, he states the same principle for which (p*) and (q*)
are equipollent, but he argues against the idea that (q*) is the converse of
(p*). Even if they are equipollent, they are not such in virtue of conversion.
In conversions, in fact, there need to be a change in the predicate, while
64Abelard explicitly says there that propositions of this sort cannot be rephrased as
being personal (“nullam personalem resolutionem habent”) because their terms do not
have a personal intent and they do not name any thing personally (LI De Int. 403.313-
318).
65See 1.3 on page 52 for a definition of these interpretations.
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(p*) and (q*) have both the same predicate, i.e., “possible”:
Notandum tamen quod si huiusmodi impersonales enuntiationes de
sensu, non de rebus, ut dictum est, accipiuntur, secundum aequipollen-
tiam conuersionis simplicium propositionum quae tamquam subiectae
sunt potest aequipollentia quoque earum custodiri, ut uidelicet idem
modus ad praedicationem utriusque propositionis applicetur. Quippe
sicut possibile est omnem hominem esse album, id est euenire ut haec
propositio dicit “Omnis homo est albus”, ita possibile est omnem non
album esse non hominem. Cum enim aequipollentes esse concedantur
propositiones aliquae, quotiens possibile est esse uel necesse uel impos-
sibile ut una dicit, ita etiam [non] dicit alia. Sed haec aequipollentia
ad conuersionem non fit totius modalis propositionis sed secundum ter-
minos subiectae orationis; idem enim praedicatum ad diuersa subiecta
ponitur, modus scilicet qui ad pares per conuersionem enuntiationes
applicatur. (LI De Int. 404.326-339)
The Logica Ingredientibus disagrees then with the Dialectica both in thinking
that there are some de sensu modal propositions which are entirely imper-
sonal and cannot be reduced to a personal, adverbial structure (the whole
discussion of impersonality is missing in the Dialectica) and in defending the
idea that conversions are invalid for de sensu modal propositions, unless for
those that are reformulated in a personal construction.
Another element which distinguishes the Logica Ingredientibus from the
Dialectica is Abelard’s attempt in the first work to establish a logical relation
of inference between de sensu propositions and their de rebus counterparts.
This topic is developed in LI De Int. 416.618-421.751. The main thesis
Abelard defends there is that if an affirmative modal proposition about pos-
sibility is true when interpreted de sensu or per compositionem, then it is
also true when interpreted per divisionem or de rebus, while the opposite
inference is not always valid. Although Abelard uses the de sensu and the
compound (here, per coniunctionem) interpretations as being synonymous,
here he is evidently applying the sense that we called de sensu per coni-
unctionem (see 1.1 on page 53 above). According to this interpretation, a
proposition like “It is possible for an S to be P” is true per compositionem
if two criteria are satisfied: that being S is compatible with being P, and
if being P is compatible with the nature of the thing that is the subject in
the actual situation. If we take the compound interpretation in this sense,
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Abelard says, anytime we have it that a de sensu proposition like “It is pos-
sible for an S to be P” is true per compositionem, its corresponding de rebus
proposition “An S can be P” must also be true. On the contrary, if such a
proposition is true de rebus, we cannot infer that it is also true de sensu.
Per compositionem possibilities are therefore a sort of proper subset of de
rebus possibilities. Conversely, all affirmative proposition about impossibil-
ity (which are nothing else than negative propositions about possibility) are
such that their truth de rebus implies their truth de sensu, while the reverse
inference is not given.
After having stated this general thesis, Abelard proceeds to consider
some possible counterexamples one may advance against it, that is examples
of propositions which are true when taken de sensu but false when taken de
rebus.
Sed opponitur quod, si possibile est omnem substantiam esse spiritum,
id est possibile est ita evenire ut haec propositio dicit “Omnis substan-
tia est spiritus”, quippe posset contingere ut soli spiritus essent et tunc
vera esset haec propositio “Omnis substantia est spiritus”, nec tamen
ideo verum est de rebus quod unaquaeque substantia possit esse spir-
itus. Sed et, cum nullum filium habeam, propositio vera videtur de
sensu quae ait “Possibile est filium meum vivere”, id est “Possibile est
ita evenire ut haec propositio dicit ‘Filius meus vivit”’, quia adhuc for-
tasse ita continget; nec tamen vera est de rebus quae ait “Filius meus
potest vivere”, quippe per subiectum quod est “filius meus” positionem
existentiae filii mei facio et quasi ipsi exsistenti “posse vivere” copulo.
[...] Ideoque nec affirmationes “possibilis” de sensu videntur inferre
affirmationes de rebus, sicut nec e converso. Ac fortasse nil obest si
nulla sit inferentia. (LI De Int. 417.634-418.653)
The examples he considers are the following:
(a) It is possible for every substance to be a spirit;
(b) It is possible for my son to be alive (in a situation in which I have no
sons);
Abelard discards both counterexamples, suggesting that propositions (a)
and (b) are false both if they are considered de rebus and if they are taken
de sensu (where de sensu is intended in the new sense of de sensu per
coniunctionem). Proposition (a) is false not because the two predicates
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“being a substance” and “being a spirit” are opposite predicates but because
the predicate “being a spirit” is incompatible with the nature of (at least)
some of the things that are actually substances; proposition (b) is false
because it fails to satisfy the presupposition of existence that is implicitly
carried by the subject term “my son”, that is an empty term.66
Si bene tamen attendamus qualiter de sensu eas esse dicamus, viden-
tur semper illae de sensu inferre illas de rebus. Quod enim diximus,
eas modo accipi de sensu modo de rebus, idem est quod Aristoteles
per coniunctionem et divisionem accipit; ut cum dicimus “Possibile
est stantem sedere” vel “non sedere”, si de sensu accipimus, tale est
ut dicamus “stans potest sedere manens stans” vel “potest non sedere
manens stans”; ex quibus, si concedantur, potest inferre simpliciter
quod et potest sedere et potest non sedere. Quare, si quis de sensu ita
accipiat “Possibile est omenm substantiam esse spiritum” vel “filium
meum vivere”, falsae sunt, et ex eis necessario illae de rebus sequun-
tur quae etiam falsae sunt. Cum enim de sensu per coniunctionem
accipiuntur, talis est: “Omnis substantia potest esse spiritus manens
substantia” et “Filius meus potest vivere manens filius meus” unde pos-
sibile simpliciter sequitur. [...] Quotiens vera est affirmatio de possibili
de sensu accepta, ut expositum est, hoc est per coniunctionem sumpta,
vera est de rebus, simpliciter scilicet intellecta; sed non convertitur, ut
ostendimus. Si quis autem opponat quod “Diem crastinam possibile
est esse” vel “filium meum, cum nondum si pater”, hae propositiones,
de sensu verae sunt sed non de rebus, fallitur; si enim de sensu ac-
cipiatur “Dies crastina potest esse”, tale est per coniunctionem quod
possit esse manens dies crastina, quod falsum est; tamen verum est
quod diem crastinam possibile est esse; nam, licet non sit dies cras-
tina, sub hoc tamen nomine iam manet et si de ea non praedicetur.
Ideoque nam vere dici potest et “Dies crastina erit” et “Possibile est
ipsam esse”. At vero non ita “Filius meus erit” vel “filium meum pos-
sibile est esse” vera est, quippe nondum cadit sub oratione subiecta;
ideoque neque de rebus haec modalis vera est neque de sensu. (LI De
Int. 418.653-420.713)
Having discarded all counterexamples, Abelard confirms the rules of infer-
ence he gave in LI De Int. 416.619-417.633, according to which whenever
a proposition is true de sensu it is also true de rebus. Just as there is an
inferential relation between possibilities de rebus and de sensu, Abelard also
66For this existential requirement, see 2.1 below.
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maintains in LI that we could assess a valid inference from impossibilities
de rebus to impossibilities de sensu, i.e., anytime a proposition about im-
possibility is true per divisionem it is also true per compositionem, while the
viceversa is not valid.
Abelard’s discussion of the inferential relation between possibilities taken
per compositionem and possibilities taken per divisionem might help us to
understand better the difference between the “simple de sensu” interpreta-
tion and the “de sensu per coniunctionem” interpretation. Let us consider
a proposition such as (*) “It is possible for every substance to be a spirit”
(Possibile est omnem substantiam esse spiritum). The first understanding
requires, for this proposition to be true, that there is a relation of compat-
ibility between the nature of substances – independently of which are the
things that are substances in the actual situation – and what is signified
by the predicate “spirit”. In other words, it requires that there is a com-
patibility between the two predicates “substance” and “spirit”. This is the
sense that Abelard usually intends when he says that a proposition like (*)
is true de sensu if what is said by of the simple proposition “every substance
is a spirit” is one among all the things that might happen («evenire potest
quod haec propositio dicit»), i.e., if “every substance is a spirit” is the case
in some possible situation. This is indeed true, because there is a possible
situation in which every substance that exists is a spirit, as Abelard says in
LI:
Sed opponitur quod, si possibile est omnem substantiam esse spiritum,
id est possibile est ita evenire ut haec propositio dicit “Omnis substan-
tia est spiritus”, quippe posset contingere ut soli spiritus essent et tunc
vera esset haec propositio “Omnis substantia est spiritus”, nec tamen
ideo verum est de rebus quod unaquaeque substantia possit esse spiri-
tus.
Within this interpretation, there is no requirement for the compatibility
between the predicate “spirit” and the natures of the individuals things
that are included in the actual extension of the subject “every substance”.
However, there is also a second understanding of the per compositionem
interpretation – that Abelard mostly uses in the LI and that he calls de
sensu per coniunctionem – which does not only require, for the proposition
to be true, that there is a compatibility between being a spirit and the nature
of substance, but also requires that there is a compatibility between what
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is signified by the predicate and the nature of all the individuals that are
contained in the actual meaning of the subject, i.e., the nature of everything
that is a substance in the actual situation (LI De Int. 419.681-701). Because
some substances now exist the nature of which is not compatible with being
a spirit (because, for instance, their nature requires that they are corporeal
things), proposition (*) is false in the per coniunctionem reading, although
it is true in the simple de sensu one. It is not easy to always detect which
one of the two senses Abelard employs, for he often refers to both simply
as the de sensu or per coniunctionem reading. From what Abelard says in
the passage from the LI just quoted, however, it is clear that in order to
maintain a certain inferential relation between propositions per divisionem
and compound propositions, he propends to interpret these latter according
to a per coniunctionem understanding. This gives him the opportunity
to establish that all per compositionem possibilities are a proper subset of
per divisionem possibilities. In the Dialectica, the distinction between the
per compositionem and the de sensu understandings is instead not clearly
stated. Perhaps, Abelard had no need to develop it because in the Dialectica
he never tries to assess an inferential relation between de rebus and de sensu
claims.
Let us sum up Abelard’s position on the distinction de rebus-de sensu as
it is presented in the glosses on De Interpretatione. The distinction between
the two interpretations is explicitly proposed in LI De Int. 401.250-264 as a
distinction between two different meanings modal propositions can be given.
Differently from the Dialectica, the topic is not presented as related to the
problem of individuating which is the relation between simple and modal
predications, nor Abelard refers polemically to the de sensu interpretation as
being the position which was wrongly endorsed by his Master. The de rebus-
de sensu distinction is referred back to Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations,
where the Philosopher distinguished between a divided and a compound
interpretation of propositions. A proposition “It is possible for S to be
P” has different truth conditions in the two intepretations. To be true
de rebus, the proposition has to satisfy the condition that being P is not
repugnant to the nature of the thing that is an S. Abelard is not always
consistent in his way of using the de sensu or per compositionem in the
glosses. However, we may say that in this work he is inclined to interpret the
compound reading as what we called de sensu per coniunctionem, and he also
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sometimes uses the de sensu interpretation as having this meaning. In this
new meaning of being de sensu, in order to be true de sensu the proposition
has to satisfy two conditions: (i) that the two predicates “S” and “P” are not
repugnant to one another, that is that they can be simultaneously predicated
of the same subject; and (ii) that being P is not repugnant to the nature
of the thing that is actually S. The two interpretations de rebus and de
sensu are both presented as two alternative and consistent understandings
of modal propositions. However, also in LI Abelard makes clear that he
has a preference for the first interpretation, which he thinks to be more
fundamental than the second, and he provides some arguments against those
who choose to interpret modal propositions de sensu:
(i) first, if modal propositions are understood de sensu, they are not modal
propositions anymore, but they become simple propositions;
(ii) second, de sensu modal propositions do not have quantity, i.e., they
are not universal nor particular nor singular nor indefinite;
(iii) third, de sensu modal propositions are impersonal constructions, and
therefore they lack the possibility to convert.67
All de sensu propositions are said by Abelard to have an impersonal con-
struction. However, the majority of the de sensu propositions, though im-
personal in grammar, are personal according to their meaning, that is they
might be reformulated as having a personal (adverbial) construction. There
are though some de sensu modal propositions that are impersonal both with
67Objections (ii) and (iii) reveal a discrepancy between the position Abelard holds in
the Dialectica and the one he holds in the Logica Ingredientibus. As we have seen in 1.3.1
on page 57 above, in the Dialectica Abelard holds that whenever we have a pair of simple
propositions which are equipollent in virtue of conversion, also their corresponding modal
propositions are equipollent. So, for example, the following is valid:
(*) every man is an animal ⇔ Every non-animal is a non-man ⇒ 3 (Every man is an
animal) ⇔ 3 (Every non-animal is a non-man).
Given that possibility construed de sensu allow substitution of equipollent salva veri-
tate, Abelard argues then that conversions are always valid for de sensu. However, when
Abelard in the Dialectica speaks of the rules of conversions for modal de sensu proposi-
tions, he is actually referring to the principles according to which if two propositions like
(p) and (q) are equipollent, the corresponding de sensu modal claims (p*) “It is possible
that p” and (q*) “It is possible that q” are also equipollent. In the LI, he points out
instead that even if (p*) and (q*) are equipollent, they are not so in virtue of conversion,
and that in general de sensu propositions do not convert, insofar as they are impersonal
constructions and lack quantity.
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respect to their grammatical form and with respect to their meaning. Ex-
amples of such propositions are “It is necessary for a chimera not to be a
quality”, “It is necessary for chimera (not) to be”, or “It is possible for what
it is not to be”. Those propositions that are entirely impersonal cannot be
reformulated as having a de sensu per coniunctionem form, and they can
be understood only in the “old” meaning of the de sensu interpretation.
Also, these propositions that are entirely impersonal lack any possibility to
convert and they lack quantity. In LI De Int. 416.619-421.751 Abelard tries
to establish a system of logical relations holding between de sensu and de
rebus modal propositions. His general thesis is that all affirmative propo-
sitions about possibility that are true de sensu (in the new meaning) are
also true de rebus, while the reverse inference is not given. Conversely, all
affirmative propositions about impossibility that are true de rebus are also
true de sensu, while the vice versa does not hold. Abelard considers some
counterexamples to this position (among which also the proposition “It is
possible for my future son to be alive”, which he considered in the Dialectica
to be false de rebus and true de sensu),68 but he claims against the validity
of all counterexamples and concludes that the stated inferences between de
rebus and de sensu propositions hold without exceptions. The discussion
of the de rebus-de sensu distinction in LI is much longer and more detailed
than the one proposed in the Dialectica. Also, from what was said above, it
is evident that there are many discrepancies between the two logical works,
which testify that Abelard modified in time his opinion about the semantic
distinction. In the following section I try to sum up the major discrepancies
between the two works on this matter.
1.3.3 A comparison between the two logical works on the de
sensu-de rebus distinction
The first thing to note when comparing the two works is that they both
deal with the semantic de rebus-de sensu distinction and they both address
the problem of modal propositions being semantically ambiguous, but the
discussion of this topic is carried out in a different way. In the Dialectica, the
problem is addressed only indirectly, in relation to the question about how
modal propositions relate to simple ones, and how the first are derived from
68In the Dialectica the formulation of the example is slightly different: “It is possible
for a future son to be alive”.
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the second. There are two alternatives Abelard sets to answer such question:
either modal propositions deal with the same terms and the same things sim-
ple propositions deal with, or modal propositions deal with the meaning of
simple propositions. On closer inspection, we note that the two alternatives
presented by Abelard are nothing other than two different interpretations
one may apply when reading a modal proposition: a de rebus interpretation,
coinciding with the first alternative, or a de sensu interpretation, coinciding
with the second. In the Logica Ingredientibus, the question of the de rebus-de
sensu distinction is not related to the problem of how modal propositions
are derived from simple ones. Instead, the distinction is presented more ex-
plicitly – maybe thanks to the influence of Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations
– as a contrast between two possible scopes the modal term may be given:
a wide scope, so that the mode is applied to the whole meaning (sensus) of
a simple proposition, or a narrow scope, so that the mode is a qualification
of the way in which the predicate term attaches to the subject term.69 In
the Dialectica, the de sensu interpretation is presented as the position which
was held by Abelard’s master (which has been usually identified as William
of Champeaux, although this identification could be unjustified, as Martin
shows in (Martin, 2016)); there are instead no references to this master and
to his position in LI. Also, while in the Dialectica the de sensu interpretation
is presented as an erroneous and unsatisfactory interpretation of modalities,
in LI both interpretations are presented as reasonable and consistent ways
to read modal propositions, which diverge though insofar as they require
different conditions to be satisfied in order for a proposition to be true. In
the two works Abelard explicitly declares the priority of the de rebus inter-
pretation over the de sensu one, and puts forward some objections against
the plausibility of the de sensu. One of the objections that Abelard pro-
poses against the de sensu reading is common to both works: he says that
if someone interprets modal propositions de sensu, so that the modal term
is applied to the whole content of a simple proposition as its predicate, then
it is not correct to consider these propositions to be modal, but they are
strictly speaking propositions de puro inesse. A proposition is modal only if
69More precisely, we might say that in LI Abelard distinguishes between three possible
scopes that modal terms might be given: the narrow de rebus scope; the wide de sensu
scope (where “de sensu” is intended in the sense the expression has in the Dialectica; and
an “intermediate” scope which Abelard calls “de sensu per coniunctionem”, and which he
takes to corresponds to Aristotle’s compound reading in the Sophistical Refutations.
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asserts an inherence cum modo, that is a qualified inherence. But if a modal
proposition like “It is possible for Socrates to be a bishop” is understood de
sensu, it asserts that a certain predicate (“possible”) inheres unqualifiedly
to a certain subject (the meaning of the simple proposition “Socrates is a
bishop”). The inherence asserted is then simple, and not qualified, and so
the proposition is a simple, non-modal proposition. In the Logica Ingre-
dientibus Abelard refers to Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations and to the
Aristotelian distinction between the per divisionem and per compositionem
interpretation of modal propositions. These references are missing in the Di-
alectica. However, even if he does not use the same terminology, also in the
Dialectica Abelard conceives the de sensu interpretation as a sort of com-
pound interpretation. Abelard’s understanding of the de sensu and of the
per compositionem interpretation varies in the two works: in the Dialectica,
a proposition like “It is possible for an S to be P” is true de sensu if the two
terms “S” and “P” are not incompatible. In LI the author also requires, for
the proposition to be true in the compound sense, that being P is compati-
ble with the nature of the subject that is actually S. The first sense of the
compound interpretation coincides with the usual interpretation secundum
sensum of the modal term, that we also called “simple de sensu” interpre-
tation. In LI Abelard almost exclusively uses the compound interpretation
in the second sense, that we called above de sensu per coniunctionem (see
figure 1.1 on page 53 above).
Differently from what he does in the Dialectica, where he thinks that all
nominal propositions may be reduced to an adverbial form, Abelard claims
in LI that there are some nominal de sensu propositions which are imper-
sonal both according to their grammatical structure and according to their
meaning, and that therefore cannot be reduced to a personal (adverbial)
construction. The whole discussion about the personality and imperson-
ality of de sensu modal propositions is missing in the Dialectica, while it
covers an extensive part of the glosses. These propositions that are essen-
tially impersonal and cannot be rephrased as having a personal form are
not suitable of being interpreted de rebus or de sensu per coniunctionem,
but can only be interpreted in the simple de sensu reading. Moreover, these
propositions have no quantity, and therefore also completely lack the possi-
bility to convert. This is another difference between the two works: while
in the Dialectica Abelard claims that all conversions (both simple and by
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contraposition) are valid for de sensu propositions, in LI he argues for the
exact contrary position. This is not due to the fact that Abelard changes
his mind about which valid equipollences are there between modal claims,
but to the fact that whereas in the Dialectica Abelard thinks that when-
ever two non-modal claims (p) and (q) are related by conversion also the
corresponding de sensu claims (p*) “it is possible that p” and (q*) “it is
possible that q” are equipollent in virtue of conversion, in the LI he claims
instead that although (p*) and (q*) are equipollent, they are not in a rela-
tion of conversion to one another. Interestingly, the terminological similarity
between some passages of the two works on the topic suggests that in LI
Abelard takes into consideration the thesis and the arguments he gave in
the Dialectica and he argues with new arguments against his own position.
Another discrepancy between the two works is the fact that in LI Abelard
advances the thesis that all propositions about possibility that are true de
sensu (in the new meaning of de sensu, as de sensu per coniunctionem) are
also true de rebus, while the inference is not convertible. In the Dialectica
there is no attempt to set general rules of inference between propositions
de rebus and propositions de sensu, but at least in two occasions Abelard
suggests that there are some propositions about possibility that are true de
sensu but false de rebus. Also on this point, then, the two works disagree.
Such disagreement is well represented by the different treatment that is given
in the two works of the modal proposition “It is possible for my future son
(or, for a future son) to be alive”. In the Dialectica, the proposition is said to
be true de sensu, for there is a possible situation in which the simple sentence
“My son is alive” is true. In LI, on the contrary, the proposition is said to be
false both when interpreted de rebus and when interpreted de sensu. Again,
there are many terminological similarities in the two passages, and it seems
that in LI Abelard is arguing against the very same position and the same
arguments that he himself held in the Dialectica. From the treatment of the
future son example, it also seems that in LI Abelard understands both de
rebus and de sensu affirmative modal propositions as carrying an implicit
presupposition of the existence of their subjects. In the Dialectica, on the
contrary, Abelard holds that there are some de sensu modal propositions
which are true even if they are about non existent beings. The problem of






After having investigated Abelard’s definition of modes and his analysis of
the syntactical and semantical structure of modal propositions, I consider
in this chapter the core of Abelard’s modal logic, i.e., the system of rela-
tions of opposition and equipollence that he establishes as holding among
possibility, impossibility and necessity propositions (see 2.2 below). Abelard
considers both the relations that propositions with the same mode have to
one another, and the mutual relations holding for propositions with different
modes. The rules of inference governing the logical relationships between
possibility, impossibility and necessity are represented by means of different
squares of opposition, first for singular propositions (section 2.2.1) and then
for quantified ones (section 2.2.2). Among the others, Abelard establishes
an equipollence between the modalities of possibility and necessity, saying
that any proposition of the form “It is necessary for (every-some) S to be
P” is equipollent to “It is not possible for (every-some) S not to be P”, in
the sense that the two propositions are “concomitant”, i.e., they have the
same truth value in all possible situations. However, this equipollence (or
«natural concomitance», as Abelard calls it here) between the two modal
terms turns out to be problematic, given Abelard’s theory of the meaning of
affirmative and negative categorical propositions and of their implicit exis-
tential import, and this threatens to invalidate the consistency of Abelard’s
entire system of modal logic.
In order to understand this problem it might be helpful to dedicate some
time to discuss Abelard’s position on existential presupposition and non re-
ferring terms in his non-modal and modal logic, which I do in section 2.1.
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In particular, I argue that Abelard interprets all de rebus affirmative modal
propositions as having an implicit import, the satisfaction of which is a nec-
essary condition for their truth. I report several texts from Abelard’s logical
works to support this interpretation, in particular passages 201.1-17 from
the Dialectica and LI De Int. 639-652 from the glosses on Aristotle’s De
Interpretatione, where the issue is explicitly addressed by the author. I also
argue that Abelard is consistent in maintaining this opinion about de rebus
propositions both in the Dialectica and in the Logica Ingredientibus. On the
contrary, the two logical works differ quite significantly on the treatment of
the existential import in de sensu modal propositions. Once we have granted
that Abelard’s modal propositions behave as simple ones with respect to
their existential presupposition – that is, all affirmative modal propositions
have import, and all negative propositions have not – we need to address
a number of difficulties, and verify whether Abelard’s rules of oppositions,
conversions and equivalences among modal propositions is consistent with
such interpretation. In particular, we need to explain how Abelard’s posi-
tion on the existential import can be consistently maintained together with
his endorsement of some standard laws of modal equipollence, for which
“being possibly φ” is equivalent to “not being necessarily not-φ” and “being
necessarily φ” is equivalent to “not being possibly not-φ”. In those standard
equipollences, affirmative modal propositions are said to be equivalent to
negative ones, and this is problematic if affirmations and negations behave
differently with respect to their existential import. I argue that Abelard is
conscious of the many complications that are due to the implicit import in
modal propositions. It is because of these complications that he decides in
the end to restrict the validity of his modal system only to those propositions
whose subjects actually refer. According to Abelard, the standard laws of
equipollences, as well as many logical relations between modal propositions,
only hold under such condition. Empty terms, which Abelard struggled to
take into account within his non-modal categorical logic, are then definitively
expelled from his modal system.
Finally, in section 2.3 of this chapter I consider Abelard’s discussion
of the logic of modal claims that contain temporal qualifications. Abelard
refers to these claims as “determinate” or “composite” modal propositions,
as opposed to “simple” modal ones. Although Abelard’s interest is mainly
directed to temporal determinations, introduced by the adverbs “while”
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(dum, cum), “as long as” (quando, quamdiu, quotiens); “in every time”
(omni tempore), “before” (ante) and “after” (postea), in the Logica Ingre-
dientibus he also considers other sorts of qualifications, such as the spatial
qualification “where” (ubi), or the exclusive determination “only” (solum,
tantum). Abelard is particularly interested in those modal claims that con-
tain a “dum” qualification, as for example “It is necessary for Socrates to
read while he reads”, or “It is possible for Socrates to sit while he stands”.
To them, he devotes a long and intricate discussion both in the Dialectica
(206.7-210.180) and in the glosses on De Interpretatione (LI De Int. 422.778-
432.1085). Abelard’s aim is first to investigate the syntactical structure of
propositions of this sort and to list the various possible ways in which they
can be interpreted, and then to establish a system of logical rules relating
determinate modal propositions to simple modal ones and to propositions
de puro inesse. As Martin has already shown in (Martin, 2016), in his
discussion of determinate claims, Abelard reveals a rigorous and sophisti-
cated care in distinguishing the different scopes and semantic roles that can
be attributed to the linguistic items composing modal propositions, such
as the temporal adverb, the modal term and the other logical connectives
that might be included in them, in particular the negative operator “non”.
Abelard also takes into account some sophismata that are raised by propo-
sitions containing temporal qualifications. In particular, he considers some
absurd consequences that might be derived from the apparently innocuous
claim that it is possible for Socrates to sit in every time in which he lives
(Possibile est Socratem sedere omni tempore vitae suae), which according to
some people entails that Socrates is at the same time both sitting and not
sitting.
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2.1 The Existential Import of Modal Propositions
Before considering the rules of inference governing the logic of modal propo-
sitions, something must be said about whether modal propositions have or
have not, in Abelard’s logic, an implicit presupposition of the existence of
their subjects. The question about the existential import of Abelard’s modal
propositions is a complex one, which, as far as I know, has not yet been prop-
erly answered, and that it is generally not often addressed.1 It is however
important to understand how Abelard deals with it in his modal logic and
whether his modal system is consistent in this respect. In the following
section 2.1.1 I investigate the way Abelard deals with existential import in
non-modal propositions. As many other medieval logicians, Abelard thinks
that all affirmative non-modal propositions carry an implicit existential im-
port. He thinks the same about those propositions that include an internal
negation, that is, those propositions in which the negative particle “non” is
applied to the copula “est” and has the role of separating the subject term
from the predicate term. The two propositions “My son is alive” and “My
son is not alive”, for instance, are considered by Abelard to be false when
the subject term “my son” is an empty name, because in that case their
implicit existential presupposition would not be satisfied. On the contrary,
those propositions in which the negation is external and applied to an entire
proposition (as for example the proposition: “It is not the case that my son
is alive”) are always true when their subject term fails to refer, for there
the negative particle extinguishes the existential import of the proposition
to which is applied.2 Abelard’s treatment of negation shows that he was
aware of the problems connected to the existential import and to the pres-
ence of empty names in categorical propositions. His distinction between
internal negation and external negation – and the consequent reformulation
of the traditional square of oppositions – seems to be motivated exactly by
Abelard’s desire to provide a system of logical relationships that is valid
1Paul Thom suggests in (Thom, 2003b) that all de rebus propositions have an import,
according to Abelard. However, he does not go into the details of this assumption and does
not explain how Abelard’s system of equivalences and oppositions can be valid in spite
of that. Other interpreters, as Michael Astroh and Roberto Pinzani recognize that there
are problems connected to the existential presupposition in Abelard’s modal propositions,
and admit that the problem is in need of further discussion, which however they do not
undertake. See (Astroh, 2001) and (Pinzani, 2003) on this.
2For a brief analysis of Abelard’s theory of negation see 1.2.2 on page 36 above.
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also for those propositions whose subjects fail to refer. With respect to
this point, he largely goes beyond Boethius’s logic. But what about modal
propositions? Does Abelard consider the question of existential import also
when he deals with modal affirmations? And again, if modal claims have
such implicit import, is this consistent with the system of modal oppositions
and equipollences Abelard provides? The interpretation I propose in 2.1.2 is
that, just as simple propositions, all affirmative modal de rebus propositions
have an implicit import, while negative propositions do not. As for de sensu
modal propositions, I argue that all those propositions which are impersonal
according to construction but personal according to meaning (and therefore
all de sensu propositions that may be reformulated personally as being de
sensu per coniunctionem propositions) also have an implicit import. Finally,
in 2.1.3 I provide some evidence of the fact that Abelard envisages in the
Logica Ingredientibus some problems raised by this implicit presence of an
existential import, and that because of these problems he eventually decided
to restrict the validity of his modal system of equivalences and inferences
only to those propositions that do not contain empty names. Abelard’s
modal logic, then, only works for those propositions whose subjects fall into
the domain of actually existing things.
2.1.1 The existential import of simple propositions
It may be useful to briefly consider first the way Abelard deals with ex-
istential presupposition in non-modal categorical predications. This may
help to shed some light on how the problem must also be solved for modal
propositions. There are two places where Abelard considers the question of
existential presupposition of simple propositions: when discussing his the-
ory of extinctive negation and when discussing the rule of conversion by
contraposition. In the two places, Abelard opts for two different solutions
to avoid the problems raised by the presence of empty names. I will try
to trace these two alternatives and then consider whether one of the two is
applicable also in the case of modal propositions.
For what concerns simple propositions, Abelard’s idea – not unusual
among medieval logicians – seems to be that all affirmative propositions
have an implicit presupposition of existence of their subject, while their
corresponding negative propositions do not. The affirmative propositions
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(a) “Socrates is a man”,
(b) “Every man is an animal”,
(c) “Some man is an animal”
must be read as saying:
(a) “Socrates, who exists, is a man”,
(b) “Men exist and every one of them is an animal”,
(c) “Men exist and some of them are animals”.
A necessary condition for the truth of propositions (a)-(b)-(c) is that their
implicit existential import is satisfied, i.e., they are true only if Socrates, or
men, exist. In a situation in which there are no men (for example, before
creation, as Abelard often says), all three propositions turn out to be false.
Their corresponding negative propositions, if the negation is placed properly
so to extinguish the whole meaning of the affirmative proposition, do not
only negate the inherence of the predicate term to the subject term, but
also negate the presupposition of existence which is part of the meanings of
(a)-(c).3 These negative propositions are
(a*) “It is not the case that Socrates is a man”,
(b*) “Not every man is an animal”,
(c*) “No man is an animal”,
and they must be read as saying:
(a*) “It is not the case that (Socrates, who exists, is a man)”,
(b*) “It is not the case that (men exist and every one of them is an animal)”,
(c*) “It is not the case that (men exist and some of them are animals)”.
For the truth of an affirmative proposition such as (b) “Every man is an
animal” the fulfillment of two separate conditions is required: first that men
3For Abelard’s theory of extinctive negation see (Martin, 1991) and (Martin, 2004b).
This theory was also briefly considered in 1.2.2 on page 36 above.
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exist,4 and second that “being animal” is predicated of all of them. On
the contrary, for the truth of negative propositions such as (b*) is sufficient
that one of these two conditions is satisfied: either that men do not exist,
or that there is some man who is not an animal. If negation is understood
exstinctively, each affirmative proposition is contradictory (dividens) with
the corresponding negative one, that is the two propositions are never si-
multaneously true or simultaneously false. Let us consider propositions (b)
and (b*), for example: in all situations in which men exist, proposition (b)
is true – since both the existential presupposition and the requirement of
inherence between subject and predicate are satisfied – and (b*) is false; in
all situations where men do not exist (b) is false and (b*) is true. There
is no possible situation in which they are simultaneously true or simultane-
ously false. This picture of Abelard’s interpretation of simple propositions
is derivable from his discussion of negation in Dialectica 173-184, where he
argues, against Boethius, that the proper negation of a proposition as (b)
is the proposition (b*) “Not every man is animal” (Non omnis homo est
animal), and not the one proposed by Boethius (b**) “Some man is not
animal” (Quidam homo non est animal). This is because (b**) is an af-
firmative proposition that contains a separative, internal negation, and as
such it implicitly presupposes the existence of men. The meaning of (b**),
once explicitated, is in fact something like: “Men exist and some of them is
not an animal”. Both (b) and (b**) would then be simultaneously false in
a situation in which men do not exist, and so they are not in a relation of
contradictoriness, as Boethius wanted, but of contrariety.
Even if Abelard is very clear in saying that the affirmative universal
proposition must be negated by applying an extinctive negation to its whole
content, so to obtain the pair of dividentes “Omnis homo est albus”-“Non
omnis homo est albus”, we could be more confused about which is in his
view the proper way of negating the particular affirmative “Quidam homo
est albus”, i.e., whether the negative universal proposition “Nullus homo
est albus” is its correct contradictory and whether the “nullus” must be
4To my knowledge, Abelard does not discuss the number of men whose existence is
required for a universal assertion to be true. A common position assumed by later logicians
is that the existence of more than two men is a necessary condition for the truth of the
proposition “Every man is an animal”, i.e., that the use of omnis requires at least three
appellata (particular things). This rule is posited in the texts of some thirteenth century
logicians, such as Lambert of Auxerre, William of Sherwood, Roger Bacon or Ricardus
Sophista, while it is explicitly rejected by others, e.g. by Peter of Spain.
87
interpreted as including an extinctive or a separative negation. From what
Abelard says in Dial. 174.18-23 it seems that the proposition should be taken
as including a separative negation. He claims in fact that in the proposition
“Nullus homo est albus” the predicate “white” is removed by every thing
that is signified by the subject:
Cum enim huic propositioni: “omnis homo iustus est” haec contrarie
opponatur: “nullus homo iustus est”, illa vero contradictorie: “non
omnis homo iustus est”, atque utraque ipsius sententiam perimat, haec
quidem: “non omnis homo iustus est” simpliciter priori contradicit, illa
vero: “nullus homo iustus est”, plus facit, quae non tantum ostendit
non omni homini iustum convenire, verum etiam ab omni removeri.
(my emphasis)
This passage is taken by Martin as evidence that negation in a nullus-claim
is interpreted separatively by Abelard, and that because of this we should
represent his logic for non-modal propositions by means of a rectangle (not
a square) of oppositions (Martin, 2004b, p. 168). It is true though that
in another passage of the Dialectica, Abelard explicitly says that the two
propositions “Non quidam homo est albus” and “Nullus homo est albus”
have exactly the same meaning («tantundem proponunt»), and that both
should be read as having a preposed negation which extinguishes the sense
of the proposition to which is applied. Therefore, Abelard says, whenever
the particular affirmative is false, the corresponding nullus-claim turn out
to be true:
Ea [. . . ] quae ait simpliciter: ‘quidam homo non est albus’, albedinem
a quodam removet. Qui vero proponit: ‘non quidam homo est albus’
sensumque particularis affirmativae tollit, in contradictionem eius in-
cidit, universalem scilicet negativam, ac si diceret nullum esse album.
Qui enim negatione praeposita sensum propositionis exstinguit, ipsam
profecto falsam esse ostendit. Si autem falsa sit ‘quidam homo est
albus’, vera ipsius contradictoria relinquitur ‘nullus homo est albus’.
Tantundem ergo proponit ‘non quidam homo est albus’, quantum ‘nul-
lus homo est albus’; et merito. Quod enim dicitur ‘nullus homo’ tale est
quale etiam ‘ullus homo’ et qui negat quemdam hominem esse album,
omnia quoque eius accidentia perimit, idest et Socratem esse album
denegat et Platonem et quemcumque alium. (Dial. 177.24-36)
This passage points out - quite explicitly in my opinion - that a negative
claim such as “Nullus homo est albus” is taken by Abelard to be the proper
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contradictory of the corresponding quidam-claim, because, just as the propo-
sition “Non quidam homo est albus”, it contains a preposed negation which
destroyes the sense of the affirmative particular («sensum particularis affir-
mativae tollit»). I take then the nullus-formulation as containing an extinc-
tive negation, so that “nullus homo” must be taken as “non quidam homo”.
We must remember however that this is only a possible interpretation of
Abelard’s position, and that there are other passages which may lead us to
propend for a different reading, e.g., to the interpretation of a rectangle of
opposition proposed by Martin in (Martin, 2004b).
Figure 2.1 on the following page below shows the difference between
Boethius’ and Abelard’s formulations of the Aristotelian square of oppostion
(Boethius’ square is represented above, Abelard’s below). From Abelard’s
discussion of negation we infer that he was aware of the issues raised by the
existential import, and he tried to give consistency to the logic of simple cat-
egorical propositions and to the Aristotelian square of opposition resorting
to extinctive negation and to the attribution of existential presupposition
only to affirmative propositions, and not to negative ones. This is the first
strategy Abelard employs to deal with the issue of existential import in
non-modal logic.
Another place where Abelard faces the problem of existential presupposi-
tion is when he deals with the Boethian rule of conversion by contraposition.
According to such rule, a proposition like (c) “Every man is an animal” is
convertible in the proposition (c*) “Every non-animal is a non-man”. The
two propositions are equipollent in virtue of conversion, and therefore they
must have the same truth value in all possible situations. Let us consider
though a situation in which there are no men, but there is at least another
existing thing that is not an animal. In this situation, proposition (c), which
is affirmative and has therefore an implicit import, is false. Proposition (c*),
on the contrary, is true, for every thing that exists is a “non-man” in such a
situation. The presence of empty names, then, seems to invalidate the rules
of conversion by contraposition, for a proposition that contain an empty
subject is not generally equipollent with its converse proposition. Abelard’s
solution here is to restrict the validity of conversion by contraposition, that
is still maintained in his logic as a rule of inference, but only under certain
conditions: these conversions hold only for propositions that do not contain









(A) Omnis homo est albus 
 
Every man is white 
  
(E) Nullus homo est albus 
 






(I) Quidam homo est albus 
 
Some men are white 
  
(O) Quidam homo non est albus 
 




(A) Omnis homo est albus 
 
Men exist and every one of 
them is white 
 (E) Nullus ( = non quidam) 
homo est albus 
 
It is not the case that: men exist 





(I) Quidam homo est albus 
 
Men exist and some of them 
are white 
 (O) Non omnis homo est albus 
 
It is not the case that: men exist 
and every one of them is white 
 
contradictoriae subalternae subalternae 
contradictoriae subalternae subalternae 
Figure 2.1: Boethius’s and Abelard’s formulations of the traditional square
of opposition.
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existing thing, and that as such would convert into empty terms). Abelard
is not the first to notice the problems that are raised by the admittance
of Boethius’ rules of conversion by contraposition once taken in pair with
empty terms. We may find traces of this idea also in Garlandus Compo-
tista’s Dialectica.5 There, Garland notices that it is problematic to admit
conversions for those propositions containing terms that are predicable of
everything that exists (such as “substantia”), and that therefore convert in
propositions containing empty terms (as “non substantia”). The rules of
conversion by contraposition seem in fact not to hold for propositions of
this sort. It is not clear though whether Garland thinks that propositions
containing empty names are non significant propositions, for they contain
parts which fail to refer, or if they are significant but false propositions. For
Abelard, propositions that contain empty terms are certainly significant (for
terms have signification even if they do not have a referent), but they are
false if their quality is affirmative.
To sum up, I proposed that there are two places where Abelard deals
with existential presupposition in non-modal logic: in his discussion of nega-
tion and of the rules of conversions by contraposition. In these two places,
Abelard advances two different strategies to deal with the problem of empty
names. The first is to say that the satisfaction of an implicit existential pre-
supposition is a necessary condition for the truth of affirmative propositions
but not for the truth of negative ones (i.e., for those propositions where
negation is applied extinctively). This move allows Abelard to maintain
the system of inferences summarized by the traditional square of opposition
and to extend the validity of such a system also to propositions that contain
empty terms (which could not be done in Boethius’ logic). The second strat-
egy is to restrict the validity of certain logical rules (such as the Boethian
rule of conversion by contraposition) only to those propositions that do not
contain empty names. We will see in the following sections that Abelard tries
to use both of these strategies when dealing with existential presupposition
in modal logic. The idea I defend is that, just as non-modal propositions,
also modal ones contain an implicit existential presupposition as part of
their meaning, the satisfaction of which is necessary for the truthof affirma-
tive modal propositions but not for the truth of negative ones. I also argue
that Abelard’s move of distinguishing the truth criteria of affirmative and
5See (Garlandus Compotista, 1959) De conversione cathegoricarum 57.20-63.34.
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negative propositions with respect to their existential import is not enough
to preserve the validity of his modal system, and that in the end Abelard
decides to restrict the validity of his modal logic only to those propositions
that do not contain empty names.
2.1.2 Do de rebus propositions have an implicit existential
presupposition?
Both in the Dialectica and in the Logica Ingredientibus, Abelard understands
affirmative modal propositions as implicitly presupposing the existence of
their subjects. Just as in the case of non-modal claims, an existential as-
sumption is part of the meaning of propositions about possibility and ne-
cessity. The satisfaction of this existential presupposition is a necessary
condition for the truth of affirmative modal propositions, whereas it is a
sufficent condition for the truth of negative modal claims (where the nega-
tion is applied properly, that is, extinctively) that the existential import is
not satisfied. This is the case at least for de rebus modal propositions, and
for some de sensu modal ones. There are however other de sensu propo-
sitions that do not conform to this interpretation, as we will see in short.
The main evidence for this interpretation of modal claims is to be found in
a passage from the glosses on De Interpretatione, where Abelard considers
the proposition “It is possible for my son to be alive” (Possibile est filium
meum vivere), and asks whether this proposition is true in a situation in
which the speaker has no sons. This is the passage in question:
Sicut et, cum nullum filium habeam, propositio uera uidetur de sensu
quae ait: “Possibile est filium meum uiuere” id est: “Possibile est ita
euenire ut haec propositio dicit ‘Filius meus uiuit’ ”, quia adhuc fort-
asse ita continget; nec tamen uera est de rebus quae ait: “Filius meus
potest uiuere” quippe per subiectum quod est “filius meus” positionem
existentiae filii mei facio et quasi ipsi existenti “posse uiuere” copulo.
Unde nec, cum dico: “Filius meus non uiuit” faciens negationem sepa-
ratiuam, pro uera eam recipimus quia in subiecta oratione, filii scilicet,
positio facta est et ab eo quasi existente uiuere separo; ideoque, cum
non existat, falsa etiam est negatio. Ex quo multo magis falsa uide-
tur affirmatio quae dicit filium meum posse uiuere, cum de re ipsa
accipitur. (LI De Int. 417.639-652)
In this passage, Abelard says that if we consider the proposition (*) “It is
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possible for my son to be alive” as being de sensu, then it might be true
even if the subject fails to refer, while if the proposition is taken de rebus
is certainly false, because – just as it is the case for the simple categorical
proposition “My son is not alive”, where the negative particle is a separative
negation – by positing the subject term “My son”, I am also implicitly
positing its existence («positionem existentiae facio»). The satisfaction of
this existential presupposition is explicitly taken as a necessary condition
for the truth of proposition in question, and for de rebus affirmative modal
propositions in general.
What Abelard thinks about de sensu modal propositions is not com-
pletely clear. At times he says in fact that there are de sensu claims about
possibility that remain true event if their subject is an empty term. In
the passage just quoted, the author says that proposition (*) is true when
understood de sensu, although I have no sons. A few lines later, however,
Abelard says that even if the proposition is interpreted to be de sensu it
would still result to be false, because also de sensu propositions must fulfill
an existential assumption in order to be true (LI De Int. 419.702-420.714;
on this passage see 1.3.2 on page 70 above). In the Dialectica (204.1-17),
Abelard states that propositions like “It is possible that a chimaera is not
a man” (Chimaeram necesse est non esse hominem), which is understood
here as a de sensu proposition, are true even if its subject is empty. In
the same passage, Abelard considers again the proposition “it is possible for
my future son to be” (Filium futurum possibile est esse) and says that the
proposition is true, although the subject does not refer:
Multae uerae sunt affirmationes huiusmodi etiam de non-existentibus
rebus, quae, cum non sint, nullorum accidentium proprietates recipi-
unt. Quod enim non est, id quod est sustentare non potest. Sunt itaque
huiusmodi uerae: “filium futurum possibile est esse”, “chimaeram pos-
sibile est non esse”, uel “necesse est non esse hominem”; nihil tamen
attribui per ista his quae non sunt, intelligitur, sed, ut superius dic-
tum est, per “possibile” id demonstratur quod natura patiatur, per
“necesse” quod [dicit] exigat et constringat. (Dial. 204.1-17)6
Abelard seems then not to be always consistent in his treatment of de sensu
6In LI, Abelard gives a similar example of true modal propositions that concern non
existing things: “Necesse est chimera non esse qualitatem” and “Necesse est chimera esse
vel non esse” are in fact proposed here as being true (LI De Int. 403.299-302 and 403.312-
313).
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propositions with empty subjects, for at times he requires that also de sensu
affirmative propositions must have an existent subject in order to be true, at
other times he thinks that they can be true although their subject is empty.
The explanation of this puzzle might lie in the fact that Abelard, at least
in the Logica Ingredientibus, recognizes two different meanings in which we
could say that a proposition is de sensu (see 1.1 on page 53 above). A de
sensu proposition like “It is possible that ‘S is P’ ” might be true in virtue
of the fact that:
1. There is no incompatibility between the two predicates “S” and “P”.
This reading was labelled above as the “simple de sensu” interpreta-
tion;
2. The thing that is S can be P while-being-S, i.e., the predicate “S” is
compatible both with the predicate “P” and also with the nature of
the thing that is actually S. This reading is labelled by Abelard “de
sensu per coniunctionem”.
The second interpretation captures what Abelard intends in LI De Int. 417-
421, where he claims that every possibility proposition taken per compo-
sitionem is validly inferred from the corresponding proposition taken per
divisionem (see 1.3.2 on page 70). The first interpretation tries instead to
account for Abelard’s idea that a proposition is true de sensu if the dictum of
the simple proposition from which it descends is true in some possible situa-
tion. I suggested above that, generally speaking, Abelard tends to interpret
the per compositionem reading in the first sense in the Dialectica, while in
the glosses on De Interpretatione he suggests that the proper reading is the
second one, in order to maintain that there is a relation of inference from
possibilities per compositionem to possibilities per divisionem. However, his
use is not always consistent within the two works, for especially in the Logica
Ingredientibus he makes use of both senses.
The question about what is the proper interpretation of the de sensu
reading is related to the issue of existential import, because it seems that
Abelard takes propositions that are de sensu in the first sense not to have
an implicit import, while he considers those propositions that are de sensu
in the second sense as having implicit import, just as their de rebus cor-
respondents. What Abelard says in LI – that possibility propositions per
coniunctionem – or de sensu in the second sense – imply the corresponding
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de rebus propositions (LI De Int. 417.652-418.655) – seems to confirm this.
It follows from this affirmation that, if de rebus affirmative propositions
about possibility have an implicit existential import, then the per composi-
tionem corresponding propositions must have an implicit existential import
as well, otherwise the logical inference from de sensu to de rebus would fail.
Given Abelard’s support of this inference, we are able to conclude that those
propositions that are de sensu in the second sense (per compositionem) must
implicitly contain an existential assumption of their subject, just as de re-
bus propositions. If we interpret instead de sensu in the first sense, it is
not necessary for the subject of a de sensu proposition to exist, in order
for the proposition to be true, and this explains why Abelard says at times
that there are some modal propositions that are true even if the things they
talk about do not exist (e.g. “It is possibler for my future son to be”, “it
is necessary that a chimaera is not a man”). From this moment on I shall
set aside the problem of de sensu propositions, because the question I am
mainly interested in – that is whether Abelard’s modal logic is valid also
for those propositions that contain empty terms – only concerns de rebus
modal propositions, and not de sensu ones. The system of equipollences and
oppositions that Abelard proposes for modal claims is in fact only meant to
describe the logical behaviour of de rebus propositions. In the following sec-
tion I consider the rules of equipollence and opposition of Abelard’s modal
system. After having stated those logical rules, I consider whether they are
also valid when empty terms are included as subjects of modal propositions.
My conclusion will be that, even if the logical rules of contradiction and
the rules of equipollence between possibility and impossibility would remain
valid, this is not the case for the relations of equipollence between proposi-
tions about possibility and propositions about necessity. The logical relation
that Abelard establishes between possibility and necessity only holds if all
the terms in the system have an existing referent.
2.1.3 Existential presupposition and the modal square of op-
positions
Abelard is consistent in presenting, both in the Dialectica and in the Log-
ica Ingredientibus, the same schemes of logical rules for modal propositions.
Abelard begins with listing all possible forms of singular and quantified
propositions and establishing the orders of equipollences for both. After
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that, Abelard arranges a scheme of logical relations of contradictoriness,
contrariness and subalternation first for singular claims and then for quan-
tified ones. For sake of simplicity, I will only consider here singular modal
propositions, but the same conclusios may be drawn for particular and uni-
versal claims. There are four forms of modal porpositions with a same
singular subject and a same mode:
(a) “It is possible for Socrates to be white” (Possibile est Socratem esse
album);
(b) “It is possible for Socrates not to be white” (Possibile est Socratem non
esse album);
(c) “It is not possible for Socrates to be white” (Possibile non est Socratem
esse album);
(d) “It is not possible for Socrates not to be white” (Possibile non est
Socratem non esse album).
These four forms generate four orders of equipollence, representing the log-
ical relation that different modes have to one another, as in figure 2.2 on
page 98. All the propositions belonging to the same order are equipollent to
one another. We have it that propositions of the first order are contradicto-
ries of propositions of the third order. In the same way, the propositions of
the second order are contradictories of those of the fourth (see Dial. 199.4-5
and LI De Int. 491-494). Also, propositions of the third order may be con-
sidered as being contrary to propositions of the fourth, for they can be simul-
taneously false but cannot be simultaneously true with them. Propositions
of the second order may instead be considered as if they were subcontraries
with propositions of the first order, since they can never be simultaneously
false but they can be simultaneously true (see LI De Int. 494-497). Finally,
we are also able to set a further rule which works as a sort of subalternation:
all propositions of the fourth order imply all propositions of the first, and all
propositions of the third order imply all propositions of the second. In both
cases, the inference is not convertible, so that we cannot infer propositions
of the fourth from those of the first, nor can we infer propositions of the
third from propositions of the second order (Dial. 199.22-24; LI De Int.
475-478). The system of inferences holding among these propositions may




Figure 2.2: The four orders of equipollence among singular modal proposi-
tions.
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above, the system of logical relations presented in the square is valid, or at
least as long as the terms contained in the propositions are not empty. But
let us now consider a situation in which Socrates does not exist, and let us
evaluate the modal claims stated of the square in such a situation. If we
do so, we will notice that some of the logical relations stated in the square
would still be valid, while others would not.
First, let us take a pair of contradictory propositions, such as (1.a) “It is
possible for Socrates to be white” and (3.a) “It is not possible for Socrates
to be white”. As we proposed in section 1.2.2 above, although Abelard is
not explicit on this point, negation in (1.a) and (3.a) should be considered
as extinctive negation, in order to preserve the validity of Abelard’s orders
of contradiction and opposition. If it is so, the existence of the subject is
a necessary condition for the truth of affirmative propositions, whereas it
is sufficient for the truth of extinctively negative propositions that the sub-
ject does not exist. In the imagined situation, where “Socrates” is empty,
proposition (1.a) would be false, and proposition (3.a) would be true. The
relation of contradictoriness between (1.a) and (3.a) is preserved even when
the subject term is empty, and the same is the case for all contradictory pairs
stated in the square, because in all pairs we will find that one proposition
is affirmative (and as such will be false in the imagined situation) and the
other one is negative (and it will consequently be true in the same situation).
The relations of contradictoriness stated by Abelard among modal propo-
sitions are then maintained also for those propositions that contain empty
terms, granted that we take negation extinctively.7 Let us now consider
the relations of equipollence. I shall limit for the moment to the considera-
tion of the equipollence stated between the modality of possibility and the
modality of impossibility, setting aside propositions about necessity, which
7As said above in section 1.2.2, Abelard never explicitly says that negation should be
interpreted in this way while giving his orders of opposition and equipollence for modal
claims. Indeed, he does not mention the distinction between separative and extinctive
negation at all in his treatises on modalities, and there are some passages from the Di-
alectica that lead us to think that he might have interpreted negation separatively, not
extinctively. This might be due to the fact that Abelard initially does not take the issues
of empty terms or existential import into account, when he establishes his modal squares
of opposition. However, given the fact that, at least in the Logica Ingredientibus, he seems
to understand all de rebus propositions as having implicit import, if we want his rules
of contradiction and opposition to work, negation must be interpreted extinctively, not
separatively. If negation in proposition (3.a) “It is not possible for Socrates to be white”
was interpreted separatively, this proposition would not be the proper dividens of (1.a),
for they would both be false in case “Socrates” was an empty term.
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will be considered later. The two propositions (3.a) “It is not possible for
Socrates to be white” and (3.b) “It is impossible for Socrates to be white”
are said by Abelard to be equivalent. As such, they should have the same
truth value in all possible situations. A doubt is raised at this point: should
we consider proposition (3.b) as an affirmative proposition, as its grammat-
ical structure suggests, or is it instead a negative proposition, in which case
its grammatical form would not correspond to its real logical structure? If
(3.b) is affirmative, it would be a necessary condition for its truth that the
subject term “Socrates” was not empty. On the contrary, the non-existence
of Socrates is sufficient for the truth of proposition (3.a), that is certainly
negative. As a consequence, if (3.b) was indeed an affirmative proposition,
then it could not be equivalent with (3.a), for there would be possible situa-
tions – i.e., those in which Socrates does not exist – in which (3.a) and (3.b)
have a different truth value. As a general rule, it follows from what we said
above that propositions that have a different quality cannot be equipollent
to one another, for their truth value would differ in the situations in which
their subject term is empty. As a consequence, all the equipollences between
possibility and impossibility stated in the modal square would fail, if we take
propositions about impossibility to be affirmative propositions.
There is though a way to overcome this difficulty, and to preserve the
equivalence between propositions about possibility and propositions about
impossibility. The solution consists in saying that propositions about im-
possibility, such as (3.b), are really negative propositions. To say so, we
must claim that the grammatical structure of propositions about impossi-
bility does not correspond to their logical structure, and that, although they
are affirmative according to grammar, they are nevertheless negative with
respect to meaning.8 I think that, given what Abelard often says about
impossibility, we are allowed to consider propositions like (3.b) as negative
in meaning. Indeed, Abelard often says that the term “impossible” means
“not possible” and that to state that something is impossible amounts to
nothing more than to state that it is not possible (see for instance Dial.
194.5-6; LI De Int. 395.97-99 and 417.632-633). If we take literally this idea
that “impossible” and “not possible” are the same in meaning, the meaning
8Abelard often refers, in his discussion of modal logic, to the distinction between gram-
matical form and “logical” form, which he spells out as a distinction between the consider-
ation of a certain term or proposition with respect to its grammatical structure (secundum
constructionem) or with respect to its meaning (secundum sensum).
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of proposition (3.b) above would be the same as the meaning of proposi-
tion (3.a), and propositions that have the same meaning are, as a matter of
fact, equipollent to one another. In particular, if we considered proposition
(3.b) as being negative in meaning, in a situation in which “Socrates” is an
empty term, it would result to be true, just as proposition (3.a). The same
solution might be applied also to justify the equipollence between propo-
sitions (1.a) “It is possible for Socrates to be white” and (1.b) “It is not
impossible for Socrates to be white”. According to the interpretation I just
proposed, proposition (1.b) should be considered as containing – with re-
spect to meaning even if not with respect to grammar – a double negation,
so that its real meaning would be: “It is not the case that: it is not possible
for Socrates to be white”. Abelard explicitly admits, at least in one passage,
the equipollence between an affirmative proposition and the double negation
of the same proposition,9 and so again propositions (1.a) and (1.b) would
result to be equipollent in all possible situations, even in those in which their
subject term is empty.
Let us recapitulate for the moment what has been said so far: according
to our interpreation, Abelard thinks that it is necessary for the truth of
all affirmative modal propositions to have an existent subject, whereas the
non-existence of the subject is a sufficient condition for the truth of negative
propositions. The rules of contradiction that Abelard establishes between
modal propositions seem to retain their validity also when propositions con-
tain empty terms. In order to maintain also the stated rules of equipollence
between propositions about possibility and propositions about impossibil-
ity, I proposed that we should consider propositions about impossibility as
being negative with respect to their meaning. This interpretation allows
us to confirm that also the rules of equipollences between the possibility
and impossibility remain valid in presence of empty terms. In what follows,
I shall consider the rules of equipollence that Abelard establishes between
propositions about possibility (or, non impossibility) and propositions about
necessity. I will try to show that here Abelard’s modal system falters, be-
9See on this Dial. 179.20-26; the passage is quoted and commented by Martin in (Mar-
tin, 2004b, p. 167). Note however that the equipollence in this case should be considered
not as a reciprocal inference between two propositions, but as a mere equipollence (con-
comitance), for the two propositions have the same truth value in all possible situation
but do not have the same meaning. The relation between propositions (3.a) and (3.b)
would instead be a mutual inference, not just an equipollence.
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cause there is no way to account for these equipollences when we admit that
the terms contained in modal propositions might be empty.
Abelard says that proposition (1.a) “It is possible for Socrates to be
white” is equipollent to proposition (1.c) “It is not necessary for Socrates
not to be white”. Similarly, he establishes that (4.a) “It is not possible for
Socrates not to be white” is equipollent to (4.c) “It is necessary for Socrates
to be white”. The logical relations described by the pairs (1.a)-(1.c) and
(4.a)-(4.c) are standard equivalences that usually describe the logical relation
between possibility and necessity. However, it can be easily noticed that in
all pairs of equipollent propositions about necessity and possibility stated in
the square, one side of the pair is affirmative and the other side is negative.
And, as the reader may have noticed already, this proves to be problematic
when we take into account empty terms. Given the interpretation we have
been using so far of Abelard’s modal propositions, if we consider again a
possible situation in which Socrates does not exist, we will have it that,
for instance, proposition (1.a) is false in that situation, while proposition
(1.c) is true. And in general, if the subject term has no referent, all pairs
(1.a)-(1.c), (2.a)-(2.c), (3.a)-(3.c) and (4.a)-(4.c) would have one side that
is true and the other side that is false. Those propositions cannot therefore
be considered equipollent, for they do not retain the same truth value in all
possible situations, but only in those situations in which Socrates exists.10
I believe that Abelard, at least in the Logica Ingredientibus, was aware of
this problem, and he therefore decided to restrict the validity of his modal
system to only those situations in which the things referred to by the propo-
sitions’ terms exist. There is one passage from Abelard’s glossae that sup-
ports this interpretation. In that passage, Abelard very clearly says that the
equivalence between necessity and possibility (or impossibility) holds only
in so far the non-existent objects are not taken into account:
Sed uidentur nobis huiusmodi aequipollentiae modalium propositionum
tantum aequipollentiam custodire re subiecti termini permanente, ue-
lut tantum dum Socrates permanet, sicut et illae quarum aequipol-
lentiam superius ascripsit praedicato per finitum et infinitum uari-
10The same problem is observed in quantified modal propositions: the two propositions
“It is necessary for every man to be an animal” and “It is not possible for every man
not to be an animal”, which are supposed to be equivalent according Abelard’s rules of
equipollence, do not have the same truth value in all possible situations, for when men do
not exist the first proposition is false, while the second is true.
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ato. Quamdiu itaque Socrate permanente uera est: “Non possibile
est Socratem esse album” (uel: “Impossibile est”) uera est etiam quae
ait: “Necesse est Socratem non esse album” et e conuerso. Cum enim
uelimus in ui affirmatiuae categoricae accipere: “Necesse est Socratem
non esse albedinem” oportet ad hoc ut uerum sit rem manere sub
subiecto uocabulo, ut supra meminimus. Si uero in sensu aliarum
accipiamus, ut quidam uolunt, erit negatiua in sensu: “Necesse est
Socratem non esse albedinem” sicut illae et ita semper uera est cum
illis. Sunt enim quidam qui omnes propositiones eiusdem ordinis in eo-
dem sensu accipi uolunt ut mutuas ad inuicem consequentias habeant,
alioquin ex negatiua in sensu sequeretur saepe affirmatiua, quippe in
eodem ordine negatiuae affirmatiuis adiunguntur. Nos uero in diuerso
sensu eas quoque concedimus aequipollere ita ut rebus permanentibus
nulla possit esse uera uel falsa sine aliis. (LI De Int. 420.733-421.751)
Abelard says here that two propositions like “It is necessary for Socrates not
to be not white” and “It is not possible for Socrates to be white” (that is,
propositions (3.a) and (3.c) in the square above) are equipollent only under
the condition that Socrates exists, and this restriction is due to the fact that
the two propositions have a different quality, and while affirmative modal
propositions must satisfy an existential import in order to be true, negative
propositions do not.11
These remarks about the equipollence between possibility and necessity
highlight an important aspect of the way these two modes are related in
Abelard’s theory of modality, aspect that was suggested already in 1.1.3
above, but could be now understood more clearly. Abelard often suggests
that the two modes of impossibility and contingency can both be defined in
terms of possibility, because “contingent” has the same meaning as “possi-
ble” and “impossible” means nothing other than “not possible”. The three
terms are therefore treated as interdefinable notions, and indeed it seems
that the mode “possible” might be taken as the primitive notion from which
the other two are derived. When he speaks of the relation between possibil-
11Abelard proposes such restriction to the validity of modal equipollence rules against
the opinions of others, who want to say that the relations of equipollence that are set
between modal claims are valid unqualifiedly, for they think that the pairs of propositions
that are stated as equipollent always have the same meaning. Abelard says instead that
these pairs of modal propositions do not have the same meaning, because they are of
different quality, and that the equipollence established among them is valid only under
the conditions that the things they talk about exist, and so that they do not contain
empty names.
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ity and necessity, on the contrary, Abelard never defines the two modes one
in terms of the other, and he never uses the meaning of one to explain the
meaning of the other. Although according to Abelard these two modal terms
can be put in a logical system of equipollences, their relation can never be
expressed as a kind of interdefinability. It would be wrong then to interpret
Abelard’s modal logic as containing one single primitive modal operator,
and to derive the definitions of the other modal terms from it, because we
need at least two primitive modalities to account for his modal system. The
fact that the mutual equipollence between possibility and necessity is only
maintained in determinate situations, and not without restriction, confirms
the peculiar character of the relation between these two notions in Abelard’s
theory. I want to conclude this section only by suggesting that Abelard’s
awareness of the problems raised by the presence of empty names in logic is
remarkable. In noticing these difficulties, and in trying to provide a logical
system that could take into account empty terms, Abelard goes far beyond
Boethius and also beyond the debate on modal logic of his time. Although
is true that already in the works of Garlandus there is some acknowledg-
ment of the puzzles raised by empty terms for the validity of some logical
rules (such as the rules of conversions), and therefore it is likely that the
question was already “in the air” in the period in which Abelard writes his
logical works, Garland’s offers but sketchy remarks on this, not compara-
ble with the sophistication of Abelard’s discussion. Nevertheless, even if
Abelard was able, with his reformulation of Boethius’ square of opposition,
to provide a non-modal logic that would retain its validity also in presence
of non referring names, he is unable to do the same in the logic of modal
propositions. Empty terms, which Abelard struggled to take into account
within his non-modal system, are in the end excluded from his modal logic.
Before looking in more details to the rules of equipollence and opposition
that Abelard establishes between modal propositions, let us sum up in which
ways the presence of the existential import affects those logical relations.
First, I established that all affirmative modal propositions have an implicit
existential presupposition, while their corresponding negative – in which
the negation is applied extinctively as estinguishing the whole meaning of
the proposition – do not have such presupposition as a condition for their
truth. The propositions “It is possible for Socrates to be white” and “It
is necessary for Socrates to be white” are affirmative propositions, while I
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considered “It is impossible that Socrates is white” as a negative one. This
premise established, I argued the following:
(i) the logical relations among singular and quantified modal propositions
about the same modality are valid without further restrictions – and
then also when propositions contain empty terms, granted that nega-
tion is applied extinctively and that the existential import is a nec-
essary condition for the truth of affirmative propositions but not of
negative ones;
(ii) the logical relations among propositions about possibility and proposi-
tions about impossibility are valid unrestrictedly – again, also when
propositions contain empty terms – if we always reformulate “im-
possible” as “non possible”, and conversely “non impossible” as “non
(non(possible))”. The equipollence between “impossible” and “not pos-
sible” is a proper inference (they have the same meaning), while the
other equipollence between “possible” and “non impossible” is only a
relation of natural concomitance;
(iii) the logical relations among propositions about possibility and propo-
sitions about necessity, as well as the logical relations between im-
possibility and necessity, are valid only under the condition that the
subject terms of those propositions refers, and therefore that there are
no empty terms.
These conditions taken in mind, we can proceed to consider the rules of
equipollence and the other logical inferences Abelard establishes in his modal
system.
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2.2 The Modal Square of Oppositions
In the Dialectica and in the glosses, Abelard considers both the relations
that propositions with the same mode have to one another, and the rela-
tions holding among propositions with different modes. The rules of in-
ference governing the logical relationships between possibility, impossibility
and contingency are first set out for singular propositions (section 2.2.1)
and then for quantified propositions (section 2.2.2). In the following pages,
modal propositions are formulated grammatically as having a nominal con-
struction. The standard form Abelard uses is the one that places the subject
(in the accusative case) before the nominal mode, that is in turn followed by
an infinitive clause, such as “Socratem possibile est esse album”, or “Omnem
hominem possibile est esse album”. I will translate these expressions as “For
Socrates it is possible to be white” and “It is possible for every man to be
white”. As was said above (see 1.1.2), these constructions are ambiguous, for
they could be interpreted as being de rebus or de sensu. For the following
rules of inference, I will always consider modal propositions de rebus, since
this is, according to Abelard, the proper interpretation of modal claims.
2.2.1 Orders of equipollences for singular modal propositions
Let us first consider all various sorts of modal propositions, varied in mode
(possible, impossible, necessary), subject (de esse, de non esse), quality (af-
firmative and negative) and quantity (singular, particular, universal). As
said above, there are, for each mode, four singular modal propositions and
eight quantified modal propositions, listed in figure 2.3 on the next page (a
similar table could be reformulated for each mode). After having listed all
possible forms of modal claims, Abelard considers the orders of equipollence
between modalities that Aristotle gave in his De Interpretatione 12 and 13:
Si vero de rebus exponantur modales ut idem subiectum habeant in
sensu cum simplicibus, quattuor sunt enuntiationes de singulis modis
subiecto per signa non variato: duae scilicet de esse, affirmatio et nega-
tio, et duae similiter de non esse, hoc modo: “Possibile est Socratem
currere”, “Non est possibile Socratem currere”, “Possibile est Socratem
non currere”, “Non est possibile Socratem non currere”. Et de singulis
modis similiter quattuor secundum quod quattuor ordines modalium















(1) For Socrates it is possible to be 
white 
Socratem possibile est esse album 
 
(2) For Socrates it is not possible to be 
white 
 





(3) For Socrates it is possible not to 
be white 
 
Socratem possibile est non esse 
album 
 
(4) For Socrates it is not possible not to 
be white 
 
















Omnem hominem possibile est esse 
album 
(2) Not for every man it is possible to 
be white 
 
(For some men it is not possible to be 
white) 
 







(3) For some men it is possible to be 
white 
 
Quendam hominem possibile est esse 
album 
 
(4) For no man it is possible to be white 
 
 











Omnem hominem possibile est non 
esse album 
(6) Not for every man it is possible not 
to be white  
 
(For some men it is not possible not to 
be white) 
 
Quendam hominem non possibile est 





(7) For some men it is possible not to 
be white 
 
Quendam hominem possibile est non 
esse album 
 




Nullum hominem possibile est non esse 
album 
Figure 2.3: Table of singular and quantified modal propositions.
106
“Possibile est esse – Contingit esse – Non impossibile est esse – Non
necesse est non esse”;
“Possibile est non esse – Contingit non esse – Non impossibile est non
esse – Non necesse est esse”;
“Non possibile est esse – Non contingit esse – Impossibile est esse –
Necesse est non esse”;
“Non possibile est non esse – Non contingit non esse – Impossibile est
non esse – Necesse est esse”. (LI De Int. 409.459-410.471)
Differently from what Aristotle does in the De interpretatione, whose rules
of equipollence for modal claims are only schematic and did not consider
quantity, Abelard moves on to consider these four orders of equipollence in
combination with quality and quantity, varied first for singular subjects and
then for universal ad particular subjects. Beginning with singular modal
propositions, Abelard establishes the following four orders of equipollences
and a modal square of opposition, represented in figure 2.2 on page 98 (see
Dial. 198.35 ff.; LI De Int. 409.459-410.475) All the propositions belonging
to the same order are equipollent to one another. We have it that proposi-
tions of the first order are contradictories of propositions of the third order.
In the same way, the propositions of the second order are contradictories of
those of the fourth (see Dial. 199.4-5 and LI De Int. 411.491-494). Also,
propositions of the third order may be considered as being contrary with
propositions of the fourth, for they can be simultaneously false but cannot
be simultaneously true. Propositions of the second order may instead be
considered as if they were subcontraries with propositions of the first order,
since they can never be simultaneously false but they can be simultaneously
true (see LI De Int. 411.494-497). Finally, we are also able to set a further
rule which is a sort of subalternation: all propositions of the fourth order im-
ply the propositions of the first, and all propositions of the third order imply
propositions of the second. In both cases, the implication is not convertible,
so that we cannot infer propositions of the fourth from those of the first,
nor can we infer propositions of the third from propositions of the second
order. Abelard gives a justification for this last rule of subalternation (Dial.
199.5-21): his argument rests on the principle, repeated both in the Dialec-
tica and in the Logica that, if two propositions “p” and “q” are equipollent,
everything that is implied by “p” is also implied by “q”, and anytime “p”
follows from another proposition, also “q” follows from that proposition:
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Sunt enim omnes cuiuslibet ordinis propositiones ad se aequipollentes;
quicquid autem ad unam sequitur aequipollentium, et ad aliam; uel ad
quodcumque una sequitur, et alia. (Dial. 199.22-24. A same principle
in stated in LI De Int. 410.475-478)
Abelard is consistent in presenting, both in the Dialectica and in the Logica
Ingredientibus, the same schemes of rules. However, while in LI Abelard
mentions all these rules, in the Dialectica he does not consider the rules of
contrariness and subcontrariness among modal propositions. Also, although
he states also in the Dialectica that there propositions of the fourth and the
third order imply, respectively, those of the first and second order, Abelard
does not present this inference as a kind of subalternation, as he does in
LI. From this disparity between the two works, we may advance the conjec-
ture that only in LI Abelard explicitly sets the rules of modal propositions
suggesting that they can be put in a square of oppositions that resembles
entirely the square given for simple propositions.
2.2.2 Orders of equipollences for quantified modal proposi-
tions
Whereas there are four kinds of singular propositions, and consequently four
orders of equipollence, quantified modal propositions (always taken as being
de rebus) are doubled in number, and they are arranged in eight orders of
equipollence (Dial. 199.25 ff.; LI De Int. 412.518-413.538). Abelard states
the following rules of equipollence (Dial. 202.30-203.4; LI De Int. 411.478-
491):
(1) possibility and impossibility propositions are equipollent when they
have same subject, same quantity and same quality;
(2) possibility and necessity propositions are equipollent when they have
different subject, same quantity and same quality;
(3) impossibility and necessity propositions are equipollent when they have
different subject, same quality and same quantity.
The quality of a proposition is determined by its being affirmative or nega-
tive; the quantity by its being particular or universal (as we may note from
the rules above, equipollent propositions always have the same quantity).
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The subject is here to be taken as the term that is the subject with respect
to the grammatical construction, i.e., as the infinitive of the nominal clause.
Given these eight orders of equipollences, Abelard says in the Logica Ingre-
dientibus, it is not difficult to determine the other rules of contradictoriness,
contrariness, subcontrariness and subalternation, for the rules are the same
that were stated for singular propositions (LI De Int. 413.540-414.544). He
then leaves these rules implicit, but for clarity we can try to make them
explicit:
(i) there is a relation of contradictoriness between the first and seventh
order, and between the third and fifth order, as well as between the
second and eight order, and between the fourth and sixth order;
(ii) there is a relation of contrariness between the first and third order, and
between the second and fourth order;
(iii) there is a relation of subcontrariness between the fifth and seventh
order, and between the sixth and eighth order;
(iv) there is a relation of subalternation between the first and fifth order,
and between the third and seventh order; as well as between the second
and sixth order and between the fourth and eighth order.
Figure 2.4 on the next page represents the two squares of oppositions con-
taining quantified modal propositions de esse and de non esse.
Some scholars have claimed that, although Abelard must have been able
to establish, for any two quantified modal propositions, which was the logi-
cal relation holding between them, still he was probably unable to establish
some general rules of logical equipollence and opposition that would work
for all quantified modal propositions considered together, and that in the
end he was unable to construct a proper modal square of opposition. This
interpretation is defended by Thom in (Thom, 2003b, p. 54-5), and also in
(Knuuttila, 1993, p. 88). It is clear from both the Dialectica and the Logica
Ingredientibus, however, that Abelard made an effort to organize all singular
and quantified modal propositions into a general scheme of logical relations,
and to consciously put all these relations into three different squares of oppo-
sition (one for singular claims, one for quantified de esse claims, and one for
quantified de non esse claims). Although Abelard never represented these






(1.a) For every man it is possible to be white 
(1.b) For no man it is impossible to be white 





(3.a) For no man it is possible to be white 
(3.b) For every man it is impossible to be white 








(5.a) For some man it is possible to be white 
(5.b) For some man it is not impossible to be 
white 




(7.a) For some men it is not possible to be white 
(7.b) For some men it is impossible to be white 
(7.c) For some men it is necessary not to be white 
 
(2.a) For every man it is possible not to be white 
(2.b) For every man it is impossible not to be 
white 






(4.a) For no man it is possible not to be white 
(4.b) For every man it is impossible not to be white 








(6.a) For some men it is possible not to be white 
(6.b) For some men it is not impossible not to be 
white 




(8.a) For some men it is not possible not to be white 
(8.b) For some men it is impossible not to be white 
(8.c) For some men it is necessary to be white 
Figure 2.4: Modal squares of opposition for modal claims de esse and de
non esse.
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after him – his schemes of modal inferences were commonly used as a sketch
for later discussion of the logical system of modal propositions (Lagerlund,
2000, p. 37). As Martin already claimed in (Martin, 2001), Abelard’s infer-
ential system for modal propositions is a valid system. It is important to
point out however that its validity must be accepted only if two conditions
are granted. First, that the equipollences between modal propositions are
understood in the sense of mere concomitance (i.e., equipollent propositions
are those which are true or false in the same possible situations) and not in
the sense of proper consequence.12 Abelard says this explicitly in LI De Int.
411.502-412.517:
Inferentiam autem ubique accipimus in naturali comitatione, quia scil-
icet ita adiunctae sunt propositiones ut non possit euenire ita ut una
dicit quin etiam contingat ita ut alia proponit. Si enim secundum con-
sequentiam inferentias pensaremus, fortassis falleretur, cum uidelicet
una propositio alterius in se sententiam non contineat, ut: “Necesse
est esse” cum inferat: “Possibile est esse” sensum eius non uidetur
continere. (LI De Int. 411.502-412.508)
The second condition that must be granted to validate the rules of inference
stated above is that all terms included in modal propositions must refer
to something that exist, i.e., that none of these terms is empty. If this
is not granted, the equivalences between necessity and possibility are not
valid, and generally all equivalences by means of which someone infers an
affirmative proposition from a negative one would fail. This is because
affirmative modal propositions de rebus are always taken by Abelard as
having an implicit existential import, while negative propositions do not
have to satisfy an existential presupposition in order to be true. In order
to have valid equipollences among different modalities, we must posit the
condition that all terms in modal propositions actually refer.13 Abelard’s
modal logic only works in a domain of actually existent things.
12For such interpretation of Abelard’s conditionals, and for the distinction between
proper consequence and concomitance in Abelard, see (Martin, 2004b).
13For these conditions and for a general discussion of the problems raised by empty
terms in Abelard’ logic see 2.1 above.
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2.3 Simple and Determinate Modal Propositions
Abelard concludes his discussion of the logic of modalities by taking into ac-
count modal claims that contain temporal qualifications. Abelard refers
to these claims as “determinate” or “composite” modal propositions, as
opposed to “simple” modal ones. Although Abelard’s interest is mainly
directed to temporal determinations, introduced by the adverbs “while”
(dum, cum), “as long as” (quando, quamdiu, quotiens); “in every time”
(omni tempore), “before” (ante) and “after” (postea), in the Logica Ingre-
dientibus he also considers other sorts of qualifications, such as the spatial
qualification “where” (ubi), or the exclusive determination “only” (solum,
tantum). Abelard is particularly interested in those modal claims that con-
tain a “dum” qualification, as for example “It is necessary for Socrates to
read while he reads”, or “It is possible for Socrates to sit while he stands”.
To them, he devotes a long and intricate discussion both in the Dialec-
tica (206.7-210.180) and in the glosses on De Interpretatione (LI De Int.
422.778-432.1085).
As shown in table 2.1 on the facing page, the standard grammatical struc-
ture of modal propositions containing a temporal determination includes:
(i) a modal term, which usually has a nominal form (possibile, necesse) that
may or may not be preceded by an extinctive negation;14 (ii) an accusative
infinitive clause, that can vary in quality and quantity, and whose predicate
can be in present, future or past tense; (iii) a categorical proposition gov-
erned by a “dum” or a “quamdiu” or some other temporal adverb, which
again may be affirmative or negative, and whose predicate can be in the
present, past or future tense. Abelard’s aim is first to investigate the syn-
tactical structure of propositions of this sort and to list the various possible
ways in which they can be interpreted, as we shall see in section 2.3.1 below.
After having considered these possible interpretations, Abelard establishes
a system of logical rules relating determinate modal propositions to simple
modal ones and to propositions de puro inesse (section 2.3.2). In his discus-
sion of determinate claims, Abelard reveals a rigorous care in distinguishing
14Abelard does not count here the term “impossible” among other modal terms, for he
explicitly treats propositions about impossibility, such as “It is impossible for Socrates to
read while he sits”, as having the same meaning of the corresponding propositions about
possibility preceded by an extinctive negation: “It is not possible for Socrates to read
while he sits”. He explicitly says this in LI De Int. 432.1075-1081. I will return on this
point in section 2.3.3.
112
Nominal Mode Infinitive Accusative Clause Temporal or Determining Clause
(Non) possibile est Socratem (non) sedere dum/cum (non) sedet/stat
(Non) necesse est quendam hominem (non) sedisse ante/postea (non) sedebit/stabit
(Non) impossibile est omnem hominem (non) sessurum esse quamdiu/quotiens (non) sedit/stetit
Table 2.1: The grammatical structure of determinate modal claims.
the different scopes and semantic roles that can be attributed to the lin-
guistic items composing modal propositions, such as the temporal adverb,
the modal term and the other logical connectives that might be included in
them, in particular the negative operator “non”. I consider this aspect in
section 2.3.3.15 Finally, Abelard takes into account some sophismata that
are raised by propositions containing temporal qualifications. In particular,
he considers some absurd consequences that might be derived from the ap-
parently innocuous claim that it is possible for Socrates to sit in every time
in which he lives (Possibile est Socratem sedere omni tempore vitae suae). I
shall analyze this controversial claim and Abelard’s solution to the puzzles
related to it in section 2.3.4.
Abelard is not the first to consider the combination of modality and
temporal operators. A brief analysis of modal propositions containing dum-
clauses had been advanced already by Boethius, in his treatise on hypothet-
ical syllogisms (De Syll. Hyp. I, vi, 60-62). There, the author distinguished
between three sorts of modal propositions: (i) propositions in which the
modal term is predicated unqualifiedly (absolute) and without any determi-
nation or condition, as in “It is necessary for God to be immortal” (Necesse
est Deum esse immortalis) or “It is possible for a bird to fly” (Possibile est
avem volare); (ii) temporally qualified propositions in which the dum-clause
posits the existence or persistence of the modal clause’s subject, such as in
“It is necessary for Socrates to have a heart while he lives” or “It is possi-
ble for Socrates to read while he exists” (Necesse est Socratem habere cor
dum vivit; Possibile est Socratem legere quamdiu permanet); and finally (iii)
propositions in which a temporal clause is adjoined to the mode, the predi-
cate of which is the same as the predicate in the infinitive clause, as in “It
is necessary for Socrates to sit while he sits” (Necesse est Socratem sedere
15Martin has provided a detailed analysis of Abelard’s discussion about the scope of
the negative particle and its interaction with temporal qualifications in (Martin, 2016,
pp. 125-132).
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dum sedet). According to Boethius, this last sort of claims are equipol-
lent to the corresponding claims de puro inesse, so that “It is necessary for
Socrates to sit while he sits” is equivalent to “Socrates sits”. Thom notes
in (Thom, 2003b, p. 38) that in his second commentary on Aristotle’s De
interpretatione Boethius presents a similar division of the different kinds of
necessities, distinguishing between necessities that are “simple predications”
(e.g., “It is necessary that the Sun moves”), which seem to correspond to
what elsewhere he calls absolute necessities, and those that are “put forward
with the necessity of some accidental characteristic” (e.g., “It is necessary
that Socrates is seated when he is seated”), that correspond to conditioned
necessities.
Figure 2.5: Boethius’ distinction of different kinds of necessity and possibil-
ity.
Martin has recently shown that a debate on determinate of modal claims
and on their logical behavior was underway also during the eleventh and
the beginning of twelfth century, as witnessed by some treatises on modal-
ities of the time, such as Garlandus Compotista’s Dialectica and the two
anonymous Orléans treatises, designated by Iwakuma as M1 and M3, pre-
served in manuscript Orléans 266 and in Paris BN Lat 1336816 (Martin,
2016, p. 115-125). Garlandus’ analysis of determinate modal claims is very
concise, and essentially retraces the distinction made by Boethius between
16M1 = Orléans, Bibl. Municipale, 266: 166a-169a; Paris, Bibl. Nationale, lat. 13368,
175va-177ra. M3 = Orléans, Bibl. Municipale, 266: 252b-257b.
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three different sorts of necessity and possibility-statements. As Boethius,
Garlandus distinguishes two sorts of determinate claims, those in which the
determining clause and the modal clause have the same predicate (“It is
necessary for Socrates to sit while he sits”), which he takes to be equipollent
to the corresponding non-modal claims, and those in which the determining
clause posits the existence of the modal clause’s subject (“It is necessary for
Socrates to be a man while Socrates exists”). In the two treatises M1 and
M3 the analysis of temporally qualified claims is developed in more detail,
and concerns many of the questions that Abelard is also interested in, such
as the different possible interpretations of determinate modal claims, the
role of negation and the question about whether the usual rules of equipol-
lence and opposition that hold between simple modal proposition also hold
for determinate ones.17
As Thom notes in (Thom, 2003b, p. 38) the tripartite distinction of
modal claims that Boethius advances in the De Hypotheticis Syllogismis es-
sentially follows the one proposed by Theophrastus among three types of
necessity propositions.18 According to what Alexander of Aphrodiasias re-
ports, Theophrastus divided necessity-statements in (i) unqualified or abso-
lute necessity-statements; (ii) “limited” necessity-statements, which express
a conditioned (μετὰ διορισμοῦ) sort of necessity; and (iii) necessity propo-
sitions that are equivalent to simple (i.e., non-modal) assertions.19 Thom
Figure 2.6: Theophrastus’ distinction of different kinds of necessity.
points out that a similar distinction between different types of necessity was
17For an analysis of the discussion of modal claims in these two treatises, and the
comparison with Abelard’s works, see (Martin, 2016, pp. 115-132).
18Unlike Theophrastus, Boethius proposes a threefold distinction not only for necessities
but also for possibilities.
19This position held by Theophrastus is reported by Alexander of Aphrodisias in his
commentary of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics. See (Alexander of Aphrodisias 1991, 36, 25-29
ad A2, 25a9) and (Alexander of Aphrodisias 1999, 156, 29-157 ad A13, 32a18). See also
(Thom, 2003b, p. 22).
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frequently posited in Late Ancient logic, and particularly in Ammonius and
Stephanus (Thom, 2003b, pp. 21-36), who also proposed a threefold divi-
sion similar to the one used by Boethius.20 Stephanus, for example, divided
necessities in absolute necessities and hypothetical necessities. This last
category includes those predications that are necessary only as long as the
predicate belongs to the subject, such as “Socrates is sitting of necessity as
long as he is sitting”. The first category of absolute necessities is instead
divided into two kinds: the necessary predications of sempiternal beings
(“God is of necessity good”) and the substantial predications of contingent
beings, which are said to be necessary only under the condition that their
subject exists.21
Figure 2.7: Ammonius’ and Stephanus’ distinction of different kinds of ne-
cessity.
20For a discussion of the different sorts of necessity in the ancient commentators’ tradi-
tion see also (Alexander of Aphrodisias, 1999, pp. 148-152).
21See for instance (Stephanus, 2000, p. 158 ad 19a23-24), quoted in (Thom, 2003b):
“There is what is necessary absolutely and what is necessary hypothetically. We say that
something is necessary hypothetically, so long as the predicate belongs to the subject.
But the same things is capable also of not belonging, as that Socrates should be sitting or
sleeping. so long as the sleeper sleeps, of necessity sleep belongs to him. The absolutely
necessary is again twofold: it exists both in the case of eternal things and in the case of
things that come to be and cease to be, when a substantial differentia of the thing that is
subject is present. We say “substantial” because in the case of the hypothetically necessary
when the thing, that is, the predicate, is separated, for instance walking or sleeping, the
subject is not destroyed, but here, for instance in the case of fire if the heat is separated it
destroys the subject, that is, the fire. What is the necessity that is to be seen in the case
of eternal things? For example, when we say “The Sun is of necessity in motion”, “God is
of necessity good”. But in he case of things that come to be and cease to be, it is like this
fire. Like the particular, we mean, and not the universal, since this particular fire comes
to be and cease to be, but the universal is always the same and does not cease to be”.
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Abelard follows Boethius’ tradition in giving a threefold distinction for
possibility and necessity claims, although the categories in which he di-
vides these claims is slightly different. Apart from unqualified modal claims,
Abelard distinguishes between two different ways in which a temporal deter-
mination can be added to a modal proposition: intrinsically or extrinsically.
A qualification is intrinsic (intrasumpta determinatio) if the verb stated in
the determining clause is the same as the one included in the infinitive
clause, as in the modal proposition “It is possible for Socrates to read while
he reads” (Possibile est Socratem legere dum legit). On the contrary, the
qualification is extrinsic (extrasumpta) if the verb in the infinitive clause is
different from the verb in the determining clause, as in “It is possible for
Socrates to read while he sits” (Possibile est Socratem legere dum sedet), or
if the same predicate is repeated but is varied in quality, as in “It is possible
for Socrates to read while he does not read” (Possibile est Socratem legere
dum non legit).
Figure 2.8: Abelard’ distinction of different kinds of necessity and possibility.
In the glosses (LI De Int. 421.58-422.773) Abelard insists that, in the
case of intrinsic determinations, the infinitive clause and the determining
clause must not only have the same predicate but also the same subject.
According to Abelard, even when the subject term of the dum-clause is
not explicitly stated, if the determination is intrasumpta we should always
understand the dum-clause as if a relative pronoun “ipse” was implicitly
contained as its subject, in order to grant the identity between the subject
of the infinitive clause and the subject of the temporal clause. Abelard
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says for instance that the proposition “It is possible for a certain man to
run while is running” (Possibile est quendam hominem currere dum currit),
in which the temporal clause has no explicit subject, must be taken as
saying: “It is possible for a certain man to run while he himself is running”
(Possibile est quendam hominem currere dum ipse currit) and not as saying
“It is possible for a certain man to run while some man runs” (Possibile est
quendam hominem currere dum quidam homo currit):
Et videtur semper in determinatione huiusmodi, id est intrasumpta,
relativa pronomina intelligi ac si diceretur “Possibile est quondam
hominem currere dum ipse currit”, alioquin non bene identitas rei in
transumptione servaretur. Si enim diceremus “Possibile est quendam
hominem currere dum quidam homo currit” et non diceremus “dum
ipse currit”, non intrasumpta determinatio videretur cum ad idem non
referretur; nam proprie alium et alium quidam posset accipi. (LI De
Int. 421.758-422 774 )
Abelard limits the requirement of having the same subject only to modal
claims that contain intrinsic determinations. This may suggest that, in case
the determination is extrinsic, the subject of the determining clause might be
different than the one in the infinitive clause. If this was the case, we could
have determinate modal proposition of this sort: “It is possible for Socrates
to run while Plato sits”, or “It is necessary for every man to be rational
while some animal is irrational”. However, Abelard never gives examples of
determinate modal propositions in which the subject of the determination
is different than the subject of the infinitive clause. We should therefore
limit the following discussion to determinate modal propositions in which
the infinitive clause and temporal clause share the same subject.
Whereas for Abelard the predicate of an extrinsic temporal determina-
tion might be any sort of predicate that is different from the one included in
the infinitive clause, Boethius and Garland only consider as extrinsic deter-
minations22 those in which the predicate is a verb like existere, persistere,
vivere, such as in the two propositions “It is necessary for a man to have a
heart while he lives” (Necesse est hominem habere cor dum vivit), or “It is
possible for Socrates to read while he exists” (Possibile est Socratem legere
dum permanet). In these two cases, the function of the determining clauses
22Although neither Boethius nor Garland use the terminology of intrasumptae and ex-
trasumptae determinationes.
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“dum vivit” and “dum permanet” is to restrict what is said by the modal
claim to only those times in which the subject term is in fact existing, as if
it was said: “in those times in which Socrates exists, it is possible for him
to read at these times”, and: “in those times in which a man lives, it is nec-
essary for him to have a heart at these times”. Propositions of this sort are
contrasted with unqualified or “absolute” modal propositions, such as “It is
necessary for God to be immortal” (Necesse est Deum immortalem esse) or
“It is possible for a bird to fly” (Possibile est avem volare). According to
Boethius and Garlandus, if one wants to formulate a true necessity propo-
sition whose subject is a contingent being, i.e., an individual or a species
that does not exist sempiternally but only in some times, he can only do it
by means of a determinate modal claim. Every absolute necessity propo-
sition about non sempiternal beings will in fact turn out to be false. This
is because an absolute necessity proposition as “It is necessary for S to be
P” can only be true if it is impossible that “S is not P”, i.e., if there is no
possible situation or no possible time in which it is not the case that “S is
P”. But since the proposition “S is P” is false in those situations in which the
subject S does not exist, if S is not a sempiternal being there will be times in
which the claim is false, and therefore that S is P is not necessarily the case.
Unqualified necessity propositions with non-omnitemporal subjects are then
always false. On the contrary, a determinate proposition as “It is necessary
for S to be P while S exists” is true if it is impossible for S not to be P
only in those times and in those situations in which S actually exists. Gar-
landus explicitly deals with this problem in Dial. 84.25-85.9. He says there
that if one admits as true any unqualified proposition in which a necessary
property is predicated of a contingent being, absurd conclusions might be
drawn from it. If, for instance, someone admits that “Socrates necessarily
sits” and “this fire is necessarily hot” are true, an opponent might conclude
from it that Socrates is immortal or that this fire exists sempiternally. This
is the argument proposed by Garlandus: let us admit that the proposition
(a) “Socrates necessarily sits” (Necesse est Socratem sedere or Socrates ex
necessitate sedet) is a true proposition. If (a) is true, then proposition (b)
“for Socrates it is impossible not to sit” (Socrates non potest non sedere)
is also true. Proposition (b) means that there is no possible situation or
time in which the claim “Socrates does not sit” is true. If this is the case,
then there is also no possible situation in which Socrates is dead, because if
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there were a situation in which Socrates is dead, then the claim “Socrates
does not sit” would be true in that situation.23 If (b) is true, then, it is also
true that (c) “For Socrates it is impossible to be dead” (Socrates non potest
mori). Finally, if it is not possible for Socrates to be dead, we conclude that
(d): “Socrates is immortal” (Socrates immortalis est), which is, according
to Garlandus, absurd.24 Garlandus’ solution to the problem is that absolute
claims concerning the necessary properties of contingent beings, such as “It
is necessary for Socrates to sit”, “It is necessary for men to be mortal” or
“It is necessary for this fire to be hot”, are always false,25 and they must
then be temporally qualified by means of an extrinsic determination, if we
want them to be true and if we want to avoid absurd conclusions. This is
how Garland advises the reader to understand them in Dial. 85.3-9:
Quotienscumque aliquis fecerit tibi mentionem de necessario vel de
possibili vel de contingenti, determinatum secundum quem modum
acceperit. Nam si indeterminatum preterieris, inconveniens sepe inde
habebis. Poterit enim tibi probari et hominem esse immortalem et
ignem omni tempore durare ad similitudinem primi sophismatis. Si
quis igitur tibi dixerit hominem ex necessitate esse animal et ex neces-
sitate ignem calere, appone: “dum est homo” et “dum ignis calet”.
Extrinsic temporal determinations are then used by Garland – and prob-
ably by Boethius as well, even if this is not always explicit – as devices
that allow them to formulate true necessity propositions concerning con-
tingent beings.26 Abelard, on the contrary, is not interested in this use
23Garlandus seems here to implicitly assume that the affirmative proposition “Socrates
sits” has an implicit existential import, so that can only be true when Socrates exists,
while the negative proposition “Socrates does not sit” has not such an import, so that it
turns out to be true even if Socrates does not exist, as, for instance, in those times in
which he is dead.
24See Garlandus’s Dialectica 84.25-33: «Nisi taliter determinetur “necessarium” et “pos-
sibile”, sophismata orientur inde. Verbi gratia: “Socrates est immortalis”. Utrum. Si non
potest mori, est immortalis; sed non potest mori. Utrum. Si non potest non sedere, et non
potest mori; sed non potest non sedere. Utrum. Si ex necessitate sedet, et non potest non
sedere; sed ex necessitate sedet. Utrum. Si est vera ista propositio quae dicit: “necesse
est Socratem sedere”, et ex necessitate sedet; si quis tibi istam propositionem concesserit
sine determinatione, assume et regredere concludendo usque ad primam que in questione
fuit».
25Not only they are false when their subject’s referent(s) does not exist, but they are
false in every time.
26Both Boethius and Garlandus allow instead that we can have absolute claims about
possibility concerning non omnitemporal beings, such as “It is possible for a bird to fly”
(Possibile est avem volare). This proposition is omni-temporally true because, i.e., it is
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of extrinsic determinations. Although he is himself worried about the fact
that the equipollence between (a) “It is necessary for S to be P” and (b)
“It is not possible for S not to be P” is problematic in the case “S” refers
to a contingent being, he does not solve the problem by resorting to extrin-
sic determinations. Rather, he uses extrinsic determinations for different
purposes, such as to explore the relations of com-possibility or incompati-
bility between predicates, i.e., to investigate which predicates are possibly
or necessarily predicated simultaneously of the same subject.
2.3.1 The meaning of the dum-clause
After having distinguished between intrinsic and extrinsic qualifications,
Abelard moves on to consider the meaning and the logical properties of
determinate modal propositions, focusing especially on propositions con-
taining the temporal adverb “dum”. Abelard claims in the Dialectica and
in the glosses that a temporal clause introduced by “dum” always has a
twofold role: (i) it posits the existence of a certain (present, past or future)
moment of time and (ii) it states that a certain predication is true at that
time. The temporal proposition “while Socrates sits” (dum Socrates sedet),
for example, is taken by Abelard to mean: “a certain time t exists, such
that Socrates sits at t”. According to Abelard, when the predicate of the
dum-clause is in the present tense, the existential assumption made by the
dum qualification is referred to the present time. In parallel, if the predicate
of the dum-clause is in the past or future tense, the “dum” is referred to
some past or future moment.
Si quidem praesens verbum ponitur in determinatione, praesens po-
sitio temporis fiat; si praeteritum vel futurum, praeterita vel futura,
hoc modo: “Necesse est sedisse dum sedit” vel “non sedisse dum non
sedit” vel “sessurum esse dum sedebit” vel “non sessurum esse dum
non sedebit”. (LI De Int. 426.892-896)
There are some passages, however, in which Abelard seems to think that
even if the verb in the dum-clause is stated at the present tense, the “dum”
true even in those times in which birds do not exist, insofar as it is possible for God to
create them and to make things so that they can fly: «Item possibile est quod absolute
omni tempore contingere potest, ut “possibile est avem volare”: licet enim avis omni
tempore non sit, potest tamen contingere ut fiat a Deo et ut volet» (Garlandus’ Dial.
84.21-23).
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might refer to some moment of time other than the present. For example,
when Abelard considers in LI De Int. 425.860-877 the proposition “It is
possible for Socrates to sit while he sits and while he does not sit” (Pos-
sibile est Socratem sedere dum sedet et non sedet) he says that there are
two ways in which this proposition might be interpreted: either we take the
temporal adverb “dum” in the determining clauses “dum sedet” and “dum
non sedet” as referring to the present time only, or we can take only one of
them as referring to the present and the other as referring “indifferenter” to
some moment of time, which does not necessarily coincide with the present
(«sedere indifferenter utamur pro omni tempore et non sedere pro prae-
senti»). In the first case, the temporal clause “while he sits and does not
sit” is taken to mean
a) there exists a time t = now, such that ((Socrates sits at t) and (Socrates
does not sit at t)).
In the second case, it is taken to mean:
b) there exists a time t = now, there exists a time t’, such that ((Socrates
does not sit at t) and (Socrates sits at t’).27
By allowing that the proposition “dum sedet et non sedet” might be under-
stood in this second case, Abelard holds that in some cases a dum clause
whose verb is stated in the present tense is not referred to the present time
but “indifferenter” to any moment of time.28 However, this is not the usual
27Abelard considers these two possibilities in the following passage from the glosses:
«Ad quod respondendum est quod, si sedet et non sedet praesentis tantum designative
cum de Socrate stante agimus, non procedit [...] Si vero sedere indifferenter utamur pro
omni tempore et non sedere pro praesenti et de eo loquamur qui aliquando sedet et modo
non sedet, satis concedendum videtur a toto, quod videlicet, cum sit possibile eum sedere
omni tempore vitae suae, possibile sit sedere dum sedet et rursus possibile sit sedere dum
non sedet» (LI De Int. 425.869-874). Abelard makes the same point in Dial. 209.23-35,
where he considers the proposition “Possibile est Socratem legere quando legit et quando
non legit”. Also in this case, Abelard says that the two temporal determinations “quando
legit” and “quando non legit” can either be interpreted as referring both to the same
present time or as referring to every time (omnis temporis accipiuntur). In the Dialectica
and the glossae, Abelard proposes this interpretation of the temporal clause “dum sedet
et non sedet”, while trying to solve a puzzle that is raised by the admittance of modal
propositions with universal temporal qualifications, such as “it is possible for Socrates to
sit in every moment of his life”. I shall consider in more detail this puzzle and Abelard
solution in section 2.3.4.
28More accurately, Abelard proposes that when we have a conjunction of dum con-
ditions, we may read one of them tenselessly as referring to all times and the other as
referring to the present. He doesn’t however suggest that this option is available when
122
interpretation Abelard gives of temporal clauses in the present tense, and in
the other passages of the glosses and the Dialectica he is consistent in taking
temporal clauses as referring to the time that is expressed by the tense of
their predicates. We have then the following three cases:
“dum Socrates sedet” = “there exists a time t, t = now (Socrates sits at
t)”;
“dum Socrates sedebit” = “there exists a time t, t >now (Socrates sits at
t)”;
“dum Socrates sedit” = “there exists a time t, t <now (Socrates sits at t)”.
After having considered the meaning of the dum-clause, Abelard claims that
a modal claim containing a temporal qualification cannot be true unless its
determining proposition introduced by the dum is also true. Therefore,
affirmative determinate modal propositions always entail their determining
propositions, so that, for instance, the proposition “It is possible for Socrates
to read while he reads” entails that “Socrates reads”, and the proposition “It
is possible for Socrates to read while he lives” entails that “Socrates lives”.
Cum enim determinatio tempus ponat in quo aliquid contingere dicitur,
non potest ipsa vere copulari nisi contingeret quod in ea contingere
dicitur. Quomodo verum esset “Possibile est me legere dum lego” vel
“ubi lego” nisi tempus vel locus contingant in quibus legam? (LI De
Int. 422.785-789)
This inference rule, to which I shall refer as the “from determinate to de-
termining principle”, is reported by Abelard as the “common opinion” on
determinate modal claims (LI De Int. 422.780), and was indeed generally
accepted in the eleventh and twelfth century discussions on modalities.29
Abelard considers however some exceptions to this rule. First, he thinks the
inference is invalid in case that the temporal clause introduced by “dum”
falls within the scope of a negative particle (I consider this case in section
2.3.3 below). Second, the rule is invalid in the case that the temporal clause’s
we have only a single dum condition. Abelard proposes this interpretation while trying to
solve a puzzling argument (which will be analysed in section 2.3.4 below), but he offers
no further justification for it. The solution seems then to be ad hoc, and cannot be taken
as the usual Abelardian interpretation of the dum qualifications.
29See in particular (Martin, 2016) for the discussion of the same rule in the Orléans
treatises M1 and M3.
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predicate is stated at some tense other then the present, if the clause intro-
duced by the “dum” is negative. Therefore, it is not possible to infer, from
the truth of a determinate proposition like “Necesse est Socratem sedisse
dum non sedit” the truth of its determination “Socrates non sedit”. Nor
it is possible to infer from “Necesse est Socratem sessurum esse dum non
sedebit” the truth of “Socrates non sedebit”. This is because by means of
the temporal clauses “dum non sedit” and “dum non sedebit” is posited the
existence of an indefinite but particular moment of time at which Socrates
was sitting or at which Socrates will sit. However, by means of the simple
propositions “Socrates non sedit” and “Socrates non sedebit” is said that at
every past time or at every future time it is the case that Socrates does not
sit at that time. Then, when we consider the proposition “Si possibile est
Socratem sessurum esse dum non sedebit, Socrates non sedebit”, the infer-
ence fails because by means of the antecedent it is said that there exists
a time t>now such that Socrates does not sit at t and it is possible for
Socrates to sit, but by means of the consequent it is said that for every time
t>now Socrates does not sit at t. Abelard makes this point in the glosses
(but not in the Dialectica, where temporal propositions whose tense is other
than the present are not considered), when he says:
Cum enim dicitur “dum non sedet sedebit”, in “dum non sedet” prae-
sens positio fit temporis in quo non sedet, ac si poneretur iam contin-
gere illud tempus in quo non sedet, quod contingere non potest nisi
simul vera sit haec proposition “Non sedet”. Cum vero dicitur “sedebit
dum non sedebit” tale est ac si diceretur “sedebit dum contingit tempus
in quo non sedebit”; sed non ideo vera haec proposition “Non sedebit”,
quae omni tempore sedere removet; cum enim multa sint futura, non
est verum quod, si non sedebit in eo futuro, non sedebit. At vero,
cum unum sit praesens, oportet ut, quicquid non sedet in praesenti,
quotiens in significatione praesentis tantum profertur, quotiens itaque
determinatio praesentis supponitur verae modali et non removetur de-
terminatio, oportet propositionem quae ad determinationem pertinent
veram esse. (LI De Int. 427.915-427.928)
Abelard moves on to consider the meaning of modal propositions containing
dum-qualifications. According to what Abelard says in Dial. 206.23-37 and
LI De Int. 424.819-848, a proposition like (*) “It is possible for he who
is standing to sit while he stands” (Possibile est stantem sedere dum stat)
could be expounded in two different ways:
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1) There exists a time t=now such that ((this person stands at t) and (it
is possible for this person to sit));
2) There exists a time t=now such that (For this person, who is standing
at t, is possible to stand and sit at t).
In the first case, we have a temporal hypothetical proposition, in which the
“dum” adverb only works as a temporal qualification, i.e., it merely has the
role of positing the existence of some moment of time in which the predi-
cation “this person stands” is true. What the proposition says according to
this first sense is that there is a time in which the subject “stantem” actually
stands and it is (unqualifiedly) possible for this subject to sit. The proposi-
tion is hypothetical because is a conjunction of two distinct proposition: a
simple proposition (“this person stands at t”) and a modal proposition (“it
is possible for this person to sit”). If both the conjuncts are true, then the
entire proposition is true:
Ut, cum dicitur “Possibile est stantem sedere dum stat”, unus sensus
est temporalis hypotheticae constantis ex simplici categorica et modali,
ad si diceretur “Existente tempore quo stans stat, verum est quod
possibile est eum sedere”, et est vera temporalis hypothetica ex veris
propositionibus coniuncta. (LI De Int. 424.822-826).
In the second case, we have a modal categorical proposition, in which the
“dum” qualification not only has the role of positing the existence of a time
in which Socrates actually stands, but it also has the role of conjoining the
predicate of the infinitive clause with the predicate of the temporal clause,
in order to form a conjunctive predicate “stare et sedere” which is said
to be possible for a certain subject. According to this interpretation, the
proposition says that: there is a time (the present) in which the subject
actually stands and it is possible for this subject to stand and sit at the
same time t. According to this second interpretation, the proposition is
true in this sense if two conditions are satisfied: (i) if there is a moment of
time (the present one) in which the subject denoted by “stantem” actually
stands, and (ii) if the predicate of the infinitive clause and the predicate of
the temporal clause are not incompatible with each other and with the other
predicates conjoined to the subject at time t:
Alius vero est sensus cum dicitur “Possibile est stantem sedere dum
stat”, ut illud dum non solum ad existentiam temporis quo stat ponatur,
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sed magis ad coniunctionem accidentium circa idem subiectum, ac si
diceretur stantem posse sessionem habere cum stationem quam habet
(LI De Int. 424.831-836).
In both interpretations, the qualifying clause “dum stat” posits the existence
of a time in which the subject is actually standing, and therefore, however
interpreted, the determinate modal proposition “It is possible for he who is
standing to sit while he stands” entails its determining proposition “he who
is standing stands”.30 For this reason, the determinate claim “possibile est
stantem sedere dum stat”, taken as a modal categorical, is not the same as
the simple de sensu claim “possibile est stantem sedere manentem stantem”
because whereas it is a necessary condition for the truth of the first that the
subject “stantem” is actually standing, this is not the case for the latter:
Alius vero est sensus cum dicitur “Possibile est stantem sedere dum
stat”, ut illud dum non solum ad existentiam temporis quo stat ponatur,
sed magis ad coniunctionem accidentium circa idem subiectum, ac si
diceretur stantem posse sessionem habere cum statione quam habet. Si
autem sic exponeremus: “stantem posse simul habere stationem et ses-
sionem”, minus diceremus quam construction exigat, et non possemus
determinationem inferred quae ponitur. Quippe cum verum sit hunc
album sedentem posse esse nigrum et stare, non potest inferri quod vel
stet vel niger sit. At, si ita dicatur “Possibile est ipsum nigredinem
habere coniunctam stationi quam habet”, potest inferri quod stat; et
hic est sensus quem habet haec modalis “Possibile est hunc esse nigrum
dum stat”. (LI De Int. 424.831-842)
The two propositions “Possibile est stantem sedere manentem stantem” and
“Possibile est stantem sedere dum stat” are therefore not equivalent, for
while the latter tells us something about what is presently the case, the
former does not assert anything about actual facts, but only about possibil-
ities.
In the glosses (LI De Int. 428.957-969), Abelard states a further pos-
sible interpretation of determinate modal claims, in which the temporal
determination is applied to the modal term itself, i.e., to the term that is
the predicate with respect to the grammatical structure:
30As Martin shows in (Martin, 2016), the same distinction between these two possible
interpretations of determinate modal claims is also proposed in the Orléans treatises M1
and M3. In both treatises, this latter reading is proposed as the proper interpretation of
propositions of this sort.
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Nunc autem determinationes necessarii consideremus. Cum dicitur
“necesse est hunc stare dum stat” constat modalem veram esse, non
temporalem. Sed, si iuxta expositionem possibilis hanc determinatam
de necessario exposuerimus, non minus falsa erit quam temporalis, ut
scilicet ita dicamus necesse est ita evenire ut dicit haec proposition
“Hic stat dum stat”. Si enim necesse est, incommutabiliter verum est;
sed, cum iste non steterit, ex toto falsum est dicere “Hic stat dum
stat”. Restat tertius sensus qui verus est, quando ipse modus, scilicet
necesse, determinatur ac si ita dicatur “Iste stat necessario dum stat”,
hoc est “Stat ita quod non potest non stare retinendo stationem quam
habet”; et in hac quidem expositione determinatio quae est “dum stat”
est modi praedicati qui est “necesse”. (LI De Int. 428.957-969)
In the passage just quoted, Abelard says that a proposition like “It is neces-
sary for Socrates to stand while he stands” (Necesse est stantem stare dum
stat) may be interpreted in the two senses just mentioned, as a hypothetical
temporal proposition or as a modal categorical propositions, but it could
also be interpreted in a third sense, where the determination introduced
by “dum” is applied to the modal term. The three senses distinguished by
Abelard can be represented in the following way:
1. There exists a time t=now such that ((this person stands at t) and (it
is necessary for this person to stand));
2. There exists a time t=now such that (it is necessary that (this person,
who is standing at t, stands at t));
3. There exists a time t=now such that (it is necessary at t that (this
person, who is standing at t, stands at t));
Abelard claims that only when interpreted in the third way the proposition
is true. The temporal hypothetical proposition (1) is false because being
standing is not a necessary predication of Socrates (for, we may add, is not
required by his nature to stand). The modal proposition (2) would only be
true, Abelard says, if the simple proposition “this person stands while he
stands” were immutably true («si enim necesse est, incommutabiliter verum
est» (LI De Int. 428.962-963). But this is not the case, because there
are moments of time in which it is false, and therefore (2) is always false
(«cum iste non steterit, ex toto falsum est dicere “Hic stat dum stat”»).
Also in the case of proposition (3) the meaning of modal term “necessity”
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is spelled out in terms of immutability. But since in this case the mode
itself is determined, for this proposition to be true is not necessary that the
simple proposition “this person stands while he stands” is immutably true
in every time, but only in those times in which the subject actually stands.
Abelard suggests in LI that the third possible exposition of determinate
modal claims, in which the temporal qualification is applied to the mode
itself, is suitable for propositions about necessity, but not for propositions
about possibility (LI De Int. 428.969-429.981). The reason for this seems
to be that while “necesse” is a proper mode, or mode in sensu, and as
such it can be qualified by means of a temporal determination, “possibile”
is only improperly said to be a mode, i.e., it is a mode only with respect to
grammar, and not with respect to meaning, and being an improper mode
it is not possible to temporally determine it. As was said in section 1.1.1
above, a mode is a mode in sensu if it functions as a qualification of the
predicate to which is applied. Because “necesse” (or “necessario”) is a mode
in sensu, and it has then the role of qualifying a certain predicate, it can
itself be qualified in turn, so that if we say “Socrates stat necessario dum
stat”, by means of the temporal determination “dum stat” we qualify the
mode “necessario”, positing the qualification of a qualification. If “possibile”
were a mode in sensu, we would be able to qualify it too by means of a dum-
clause, Abelard says in LI De Int. 429.978-981 («si vero possibile modum
in sensu propositionis proximus possemus facere et supponere, ad ipsum
quoque determination referretur») but since “possibile” is only an improper
mode, we cannot qualify it.
Apart from temporal propositions introduced by “dum”, Abelard also
considers modal propositions in which a quamdiu-clause or a quotiens-clause
is included. Abelard’s remarks on these determinations are only scattered.
Differently from propositions introduced by “dum” or “cum” (translated
here as “while”), a temporal clause introduced by “quamdiu” (“as long as”)
has not the role of positing the existence of some moment of time in which
a certain predication actually occurs, but it has instead the role of stating
that a certain predication is possible or necessary for all those times in which
the subject has a certain property or is in a certain state, even if this is not
the case at the present time. The proposition “It is possible for Socrates to
sit as long as (quamdiu) he lives”, for instance, means that in every time in
which Socrates sits, it is possible for him to live. This proposition differs
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from the following one “It is possible for Socrates to sit while (dum) he lives”
because it is a necessary condition for the truth of the second, but not of
the first, that Socrates actually sits. The “from determining to determinate
principle” does not hold for quamdiu determinations, because the simple
proposition “Socrates sits” follows from the second but not from the first.
We may conclude this from what Abelard says in Dial. 208.7-11 about the
proposition “eum legere [necesse est] dum legit”, which according to him
could be expounded in two ways: either as saying that (a) “it is necessary
for Socrates to read as long as he reads”, or instead as saying that (b) “it
is necessary for Socrates to read while he reads”. He points out there that
proposition (b) is false, while (a) is true. Proposition (b), he claims, would
only be true if the corresponding non-modal claim “Socrates reads while
he reads” were omnitemporally true. But this is not the case, for in those
times in which Socrates is not reading, the proposition turns out to be false,
because of the meaning he attributes to the dum clause. Proposition (a), on
the contrary, is true, because it turns out to be true even in those times in
which Socrates does not read and, one might suppose, even in those times
in which Socrates does not exist.
Si enim dicamus hoc totum subiectum “eum legere [necesse est] dum
legit”, idest hanc temporalem, falsum est, quia hoc quod ipsa dicit,
non semper est, sed saepissime deficit, quando non legit. Si vero ita
exponamus: “eum legere est necesse quamdiu legit”, verum est, idest:
“est unum de his quae necesse est esse quamdiu legit”. (Dial. 208.7-11)
Because a quamdiu determination does not posit the existence of one single
time but refers to every time in which a certain predication is the case,
Abelard classifies it as a “universal determination”
Nam “dum” vel “cum” indefinitae sunt significationis, “quotiens” vero
vel “quamdiu” quasi universales.
2.3.2 The logic of determinate modal claims
After having considered the possible interpretations of modal claims that
contain temporal qualifications, Abelard establishes some logical rules that
describe their logical behavior and relate them to simple modal propositions
and to propositions de puro inesse. As we have already seen, Abelard ac-
cepts as valid the inferential rule according to which we can infer from a
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determinate modal claim its determining proposition. Boethius says in De
Syll. Hyp. 236.59-62 that determinate modal propositions with intrinsic
determinations not only infer their determining propositions, but they are
also equipollent to them. According to him, propositions like (a) “It is neces-
sary for Socrates to read while he reads” and (b) “It is possible for Socrates
to read while he reads” are equipollent to the non-modal proposition (c)
“Socrates reads”. This is not the case for determinate propositions with
extrinsic determinations, which infer their determining clause but are not
inferred by them. In the Dialectica (207.29-208.4) Abelard takes Boethius’
idea into consideration, but he notices that if we admit the equipollence
between (a) and (c) and between (b) and (c), we must also admit that also
the two propositions (a) and (b) are equipollent to one another, because
whenever two propositions are both equipollent to a same third proposition,
they are also equipollent to one another:
Qui enim concedit istas duas: “Possibile Socratem legere dum legit”
et “Necesse est legere dum legit” aequipollere huic: “Socrates legit”,
tunc ad se invicem ipsas aequipollere recipit; quaecumque enim eidem
aequipollent, etiam sibi necesse est aequipollere. (Dial. 207.16-18)
Abelard thinks that this is problematic, for he does not want to admit
that propositions about necessity can be inferred from propositions about
possibility. He then says that, although it is true to say that the three
propositions (c) “Socrates reads”, (b) “It is possible for Socrates to read
while he reads” and (a) “It is necessary for Socrates to read while he reads”
always have the same truth value in every possible situation, and they are
then in a relation of concomitance to one another, it is not correct to say
that there also is a mutual “inference” between the three:
Sunt igitur aequipollentes “possibile est Socratem legere dum legit”
and “necesse Socratem legere dum legit”, quod omnino mihi pro falso
constat, sicut et de modalibus cum extrasumptis determinationibus,
veluti istae: “possibile est sedere Socratem sedere, dum est homo”
et “necesse est Socratem sedere dum est homo”; illa enim vera est,
haec falsa. Similiter et istae cum determinationibus intrasumptis, si
proprietatem modorum attendamus, non aequipollent. Neque enim
“possibile” “necessarium” infert, sed ab eo infertur. Quamvis ergo una
numquam sine alia ita reperiatur, gratia scilicet identitatis termino-
rum, quantum tamen ad complexionem et naturam modorum cassa
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est et in his consecution “possibilis” ad “necessarium. Aequipollen-
tiam ergo, secundum Boethium, comitationis concedimus in istis, non
inferentiae. (Dial. 207.24-36)
Although Abelard does not explicitly say this, the equipollence (i.e., con-
comitance) between proposition (c) and proposition (a) only holds if propo-
sition (a) is understood as a modal categorical claims, not if it is understood
as temporal hypotheticals.
Figure 2.9: The logic of determinate modal claims.
In the glosses (but not in the Dialectica) Abelard also considers whether
any logical relationship between determinate modal propositions and sim-
ple modal propositions can be established. Abelard’s claim is that any
affirmative determinate modal proposition about possibility implies the cor-
responding simple modal propositions, while the converse inference is not
valid. From the fact that (a) “it is possible for Socrates to read while
he reads” it follows that (e) “it is possible for Socrates to read”, but not
viceversa. As far as propositions involving necessity are concerned, Abelard
establishes the opposite inference, i.e., he claims that any affirmative sim-
ple modal proposition about necessity implies a corresponding determinate
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proposition. For instance, if (d) “it is necessary for Socrates to read”, then
(g) “it is necessary for Socrates to read while he reads” or (f) “It is nec-
essary for Socrates to read while he sleeps” but the converse inference is
not valid. This is because, according to Abelard, it is possible to infer an
unqualified necessity from a determinate necessity, but a simple necessity
is not entailed by a determinate necessity. Figure 2.9 represents the logical
relationships outlined so far. Full arrows represent proper inferences, dotted
arrows represent mere concomitance. The relations represented in the figure
are valid both if we interpret determinate modal propositions as temporal
hypothetical claims and if we interpret them as modal categorical claims,
with the exception of the inference from (c) to (a), which only holds if (a)
is interpreted as a modal categorical.
Once established the logical relations between determinate modal propo-
sitions, simple modal propositions and propositions de puro inesse, Abelard
asks whether the relations of equipollence and opposition that were stated
for simple modal claims (see section 2.2 above) are also valid for determinate
ones. Abelard will answer positively, affirming that if claims of this sort are
interpreted correctly, their logical behavior can be properly described by the
same modal squares of opposition that he established for unqualified modal
claims (these squares were represented above in figure 2.4 on page 110). In
order to show how this is the case, however, we need to consider first deter-
minate modal propositions containing negations, and establish which is the
correct interpretation of negative adverbs included in them.
2.3.3 The interaction of mode, negation and temporal qual-
ifications in determinate modal propositions
With respect to the grammatical structure, there are three different ways in
which a negative particle can be applied in a determinate modal proposition:
it can be included in the temporal clause, as in (1) “It is possible for Socrates
to sit while he does not sit” (Possibile est Socratem sedere dum non sedet);
it can be applied to the verb in the infinitive clause, in which case we have
affirmative modal propositions de non esse, as in (2) “It is possible for this
stone not to be a man while it is a man” (Possibile est hunc lapidem non esse
hominem dum est homo); finally, it can be applied to the term that is the
predicate with respect to the grammatical structure, that is, to the modal
term, in which case we have negative modal propositions, as in (3) “ It is
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not possible that Socrates is a stone while he is a stone” (Non possibile est
Socratem esse lapidem dum est lapis). Abelard does not discuss at length
the first case, which he seems to find unproblematic. His main interest is
directed to propositions like (2) and (3). When dealing with the case of
determinate modal propositions de non esse, Abelard distinguishes between
three different ways in which they can be interpreted (see LI De Int. 422.789-
797; 430.1028-1047). Just as determinate modal propositions de esse, these
propositions can be understood as being temporal hypothetical propositions
or as being modal categorical propositions. Furthermore, depending on the
scope that we attribute to the negative particle, they also can be taken as
negative modal claims, if the dum-determination is included within the scope
of the negation, or as affirmative modal claims, if the dum-determination is
external to the scope of negation .
The proposition (2) “It is possible for this stone not to be a man while
it is a man” (Possibile est hunc lapidem non esse hominem dum est homo)
– that Abelard considers in LI De Int. 422.789-797 and 430.1028-1047 – can
be understood in the following ways:
(2.a) There exists a time t=now ((this stone is a man at t) and (it is possible
for this stone not to be a man)).
In this case, the dum qualification only has a temporal meaning, and the
proposition is then considered as a temporal hypothetical. As is the case for
the other temporal hypothetical propositions, proposition (2.a) implies its
determination “this stone is a man”. Because the determination is false, the
temporal hypothetical is false. We might also consider proposition (2) as a
modal categorical in which the negative particle is applied to the infinitive
clause and also to the temporal clause, so that the modal term “possible”
is applied to the whole sense of a negative claim, as if it said: there is a
possible situation in which the following is not the case, that this stone,
which is actually a man, is a man:
(2.b) There exists a time t=now (it is possible that this is not the case
(this stone, which is a man at t, is a man at t));
According to Abelard the proposition interpreted in this way is a true propo-
sition, for there is indeed a possible situation in which the proposition “this
stone, that is actually a man, is a man” is false. In this case, the temporal
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determination is part of the scope of the negative particle, or, as Abelard
says, the negative particle “intercipit” the temporal clause. Because the dum
determination is included in the scope of negation, and is then removed by
means of the “non” particle, the “from determinate to determining princi-
ple” is not valid, and therefore we cannot infer from proposition (2.b) its
determining clause, i.e. “this stone is a man”.
Finally, we can consider proposition (2) as an affirmative modal cate-
gorical in which the negative particle is only applied to the predicate of the
infinitive clause, not including the temporal determination within its scope:
(2.c) There exists a time t=now (it is possible that (this stone, which is a
man at t, is not a man at t).
Proposition (2.c) is a modal categorical proposition in which the mode “pos-
sible” is applied to the whole sense of a proposition constituted by an af-
firmative claim (“this stone is a man at t”) and by a negative claim (“this
stone is not a man at t”), and says there is a possible situation in which
the following proposition is true: “there exists a time t in which this stone
is a man and is not a man”. This, Abelard says, is entirely false. Because
in (2.c) the temporal qualification is external to the scope of negation, it is
valid to infer from (2.c) that “this stone is a man”.
Nunc et natura et vim modalium de non esse determinatarum consid-
eremus. Hae quidem pluribus modis exponi possunt quam illae de esse,
veluti cum dicitur “Possibile est non esse hominem dum est homo” vel
“non sedere dum sedet”. Nam (2.a) cum temporales hypotheticae, sicut
et illae inteliguntur; et cum modales, dupliciter, ut scilicet (2.b) illud
“non” praepositum verbo modo determinationem quoque intercipiat
et simul removeat, (2.c) modo non, sed omnino eam relinquat. (2.b)
Intercipit eam cum sic exponitur “Possibile est hunc lapidem non esse
hominem dum est homo” ac si dicatur “Possibile est hoc totum con-
tingere ut non sit hic lapis dum est homo”; et tunc videtur “possibile”
ad totum sensum temporalis negativae, ac si dicatur quod permittit
natura, ita quod omnino verum est. (2.c) Si vero dicatur ut permit-
tat natura hunc lapidem non esse hominem, ita quod etiam hominem
retineat, hoc est “non est homo quando est homo”, falsum est omnino,
et non est determinatio in negatione inclusa; et tunc tale est ac si ip-
sum “possibile” applicaretur huic temporali affirmationi constanti ex
affirmativa et negativa “dum hic lapis est homo non est homo”, ac si
diceretur posse contingere ut proponit haec temporalis “Hic lapis, dum
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est homo, non est homo”. Idem de “necessario” tenendum est circa non
esse; de “impossibili” autem, quoniam tantum est abnegativum “pos-
sibilis”, ex “possibili” satis apparet. (LI De Int. 431.1028-1049)
We shall now consider the case in which the negative particle is attached
to the predicate of the modal proposition, that is, to the modal term itself.
In LI De Int. 431.1061-432.1085, Abelard considers the following proposi-
tion: (3) “It is not possible for Socrates to be a stone while he is a stone”
(Non possibile est Socratem esse lapidem dum est lapis). There are again
three possible ways in which the proposition can be interpreted.31 It can be
interpreted as an affirmative hypothetical proposition (3.a), as a negative
hypothetical proposition (3.b) or as a negative modal proposition (3.c):
(3.a) There exists a time t=now (Socrates is a stone at t) and (it is not
possible for Socrates to be a stone)
(3.b) It is not the case that (There exists a time t=now (Socrates is a stone
at t) and (it is possible for Socrates to be a stone))
(3.c) it is not the case that (it is possible (There exists a time t=now
Socrates, who is a stone at t, is a stone at t))
In both propositions (3.b) and (3.c) the negative particle is interpreted as
an extinctive negation, i.e. it applies to the whole sense of the propositions
that follows it (Martin, 2016, p. 132).32 Because in both cases the temporal
determination is included within the scope of negation, it is not possible to
infer from (3.b) and (3.c) that “Socrates is a stone”, which instead correctly
follows from (3.a).
Consideremus ergo utrum ista negativa “Non est possibile esse lapi-
dem dum est lapis” sit (3.a) affirmativa temporalis vel (3.b) negativa
temporalis hypothetica vel (3.c) negativa categorica modalis; his enim
tribus modis accipi potest. Quod (3.a) si est affirmativa temporalis,
ac si diceretur “Dum est lapis non possibile est esse lapidem”, retento
eodem consequenti servatur aequipollentia secundum consequens quod
31Martin considers the possible interpretations of propositions of this sort in (Martin,
2016, pp. 131-132).
32According to Martin, Abelard’s discussion of determinate modal claims goes beyond
other contemporary debates on the same issues, like the ones reported in the Orléans
manuscripts M1 and M3, exactly because it relies on a new extinctive and propositional
understanding of negation.
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est simplex modalis hoc modo: “Dum est lapis impossibile est esse
lapidem” et “Necesse est non esse lapidem”. Si vero (3.b) negatio fiat
temporali hypotheticae hoc modo: “Non, dum est lapis, possibile est
esse lapidem” secundum consequens quoque quod est simplex modalis
servetur inferentia hoc modo: “Non, dum est lapis, non necesse est non
esse lapidem”. Si vero (3.c) sit negatio modalis determinatae, poterit
etiam cum determinatione aequipollentia custodiri: Et cum dicitur
“Non est possibile esse lapidem dum est lapis”, id est “Non potest
contingere id totum ‘dum est lapis, est lapis”’, similiter hoc totum im-
possibile dicamus, ut scilicet negatio quae intelligitur in “impossibili”
totum similiter auferat; et cum dicitur “Necesse est non esse lapidem
dum est lapis”, illud “non” praepositum ad “esse” simul determina-
tionem excludit, ac si diceretur id totum “Necesse est ut non sit lapis
dum est lapis”. Atque ideo quoniam determinationem quoque negatio
intercipit non potest per se inferri propositio posita in determinatione.
The problem concerning the proper way of interpreting negation is related to
the question about whether the logical rules of opposition and equipollence
that are valid for simple modal proposition are also valid for determinate
modal ones. Abelard reports in Dial. 208.21-209.11 one puzzling argument,
by means of which some people want to show that if we were to admit
these equipollence rules, we would end up with absurd conclusion, and that
therefore these equipollences are invalid in the case of determinate claims.
Martin has shown that this argument, to which he refers as “the Equipollence
Argument” (Martin, 2016, p. 130-2) is already discussed in treatises M1 and
M3 on modalities. The solutions proposed in these treatises and then by
Abelard to the Equipollence Argument rest on the idea that, if the negative
particle included in determinate claims is interpreted correctly, the logical
rules represented in the modal squares of opposition are valid for determinate
modal propositions just as they are for simple modal ones.
This is a reconstruction of the “Equipollence Argument”, as Abelard
presents it inDial. 208.21-209.11. As was said above, it is generally admitted
as a valid principle that we may infer, from a determinate modal claim,
its determining proposition. We may then admit as true that (a) “If it is
possible for Socrates to be a stone while he is a stone, then Socrates is a
stone”. By contraposition, we have that (b) “If Socrates is not a stone, it is
not possible for Socrates to be a stone while he is a stone”. Let us posit as
true that (c) “Socrates is not a stone”. From (b) and (c) follows (d) “It is not
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possible for Socrates to be a stone while he is a stone”. According to the rules
of equipollence represented by the modal square of opposition (see figure 2.4
on page 110), proposition (d) should be equipollent to (e) “It is impossible
for Socrates to be stone while he is a stone”, which in turn is equipollent
to (f) “It is necessary for Socrates not to be a stone while he is a stone”.
If we apply again the “from determinate to determining” principle, from
proposition (f) is inferred that (g) “Socrates is a stone”. But this, Abelard
says, is impossible, for it contradicts the initial hypothesis (c). The argument
is meant to show that the use of the standard equipollence rules between
possibility, impossibility and necessity – applied here to obtain propositions
(e) and (f) from (d) – leads to absurd conclusions, and that therefore these
rules should not be accepted as valid for determinate modal claims. Against
this opinion Abelard states that these equipollence rules are valid even for
propositions of this sort, and that the absurd conclusions derived in the
argument depend on the fact that the negative particles in propositions (d),
(e), and (f) are not interpreted correctlyinvalid . According to Abelard,
proposition (f) is equipollent to the other two only when interpreted in this
way:
(f) “It is necessary that this is not the case: Socrates is a stone while he is
a stone”33
that is, only if the modal term “necesse” is excluded from the scope of the
negative particle (Dial. 209.5-8) and if the negation is applied to the pred-
icate of the infinitive clause and also to the temporal determination (Dial.
209.2-3: «per negativam particulam similiter et esse lapidem cum determi-
natione ipsa denegamus»). The negative particle in propositions (d) and (e)
must instead be interpreted extinctively, i.e. must be applied to the whole
modal proposition, including the temporal determination (Dial. 208.32-
209.3: «per negativam particulam totum propositionis sensum exstinguimus,
idest ipsum praedicatum cum determinatione ipsa removemus», and again:
«totum propositionis sensum privare et exstinguere debemus»), so that their
meaning would be:
(d)=(e) “It is not the case that (It is possible for Socrates to be a stone
while he is a stone”)
33See Dial. 209.1-4: «Cum etiam dicimus necesse non esse lapidem, dum est lapis, per
negativam particulam similiter et esse lapidem cum determinatione ipsa denegamus, ac si
diceremus: “necesse est hoc totum: ‘non esse lapidem dum est lapis’ ”».
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If negation is interpreted in this way, the three propositions are indeed
equipollent. From their equipollence, however, no absurd conclusion is de-
rived, for the temporal determination “while he is a stone” in (f) is included
within the scope of the negative particle, and so the inference rule “from de-
terminate to determining” is not valid. Therefore, the inference from (f) to
(g) is not legitimate, and the puzzling argument proposed above is fallacious:
Sed contra dico quia, si aequipollentias servare volumus, oportet in
negativis non modum, sed praedicatum cum determinatione ipsa re-
moveri. Cum ergo dicimus: “si falsa est Socratem esse lapidem dum
est lapis, tunc vera est non possibile est Socratem esse lapidem dum est
lapis”, per negativam particulam totum propositionis sensum exstin-
guimus, idest ipsum praedicatum cum determinatione ipsa remove-
mus. Si enim determinationem relinqueremus, falsum esset, quippe
ita oportet esse ut dicit determinatio. Similiter et quando dicimus:
“impossibile est Socratem esse lapidem dum esse lapis”, totum propo-
sitionis sensum privare et exstingere debemus. Cum etiam dicimus
necesse non esse lapidem, dum est lapis, per negativam particulam
similiter et esse lapidem cum determinatione ipsa denegamus, ac si
diceremus: “necesse est hoc totum: non esse lapidem dum est lapis”.
Cum etiam dicimus necesse non esse lapidem, dum est lapis, per neg-
ativam particulam similiter et esse lapidem cum determinatione ipsa
denegamus, ac si diceremus: “necesse est hoc totum: non esse lapidem
dum est lapis” [...] Quare non videntur posse servari et in determi-
natis modalibus simplicium modalium regulae, nisi forte per “non” ad
“esse” appositum ipsum “esse” cum determinatione ipsa removeamus,
ut prius dictum est. (Dial. 208.30-209.11)
In the Dialectica Abelard concludes so that the rules of equipollence and
opposition represented by the modal squares correctly describe the logical
behavior of determinate modal claims, once granted that all propositions
containing negative particles are interpreted in such a way that the negation
also includes the temporal clause within its scope: «Quare non videntur
posse servari et in determinatis modalibus simplicium modalium regulae,
nisi forte per “non” ad “esse” appositum ipsum “esse” cum determinatione
ipsa removeamus» (Dial. 209.6-11).
In the Logica Ingredientibus, Abelard proposes a similar solution to the
same puzzle. Again, he is concerned about the equipollence between the
three propositions “It is possible for Socrates to be a stone while he is a
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stone”, “It is impossible for Socrates to be a stone while he is a stone”, and
“It is necessary for Socrates not to be a stone while he is a stone” (LI De
Int. 431.1050 ff.), for this last proposition seems to imply that “Socrates is a
stone”, which is absurd. And again, he thinks that the solution to the puzzle
lies in the fact that these propositions are ambiguous and we must carefully
expound their possibile meanings and carefully define the scope of the nega-
tive operator. The analysis provided in the glosses is slightly different from
the one in the Dialectica, for there Abelard takes into account all possible
interpretations of determinate claims that includes negation, which could be
affirmative temporal hypotheticals, negative temporal hypotheticals or neg-
ative modal categoricals. Abelard tries to show that, independently of how
the proposition is interpreted, the equipollence rules of modal propositions
can be saved:
Sed si verissime secundum distinctos modos expositiones modalium
determinatarum accipiamus, facile in his quoque aequipollentiam vel
inferentiam custodire poterimus [...] Atque ita aequipollentiam et in-
ferentiam modalium custodiamus in his quoque, quae huiusmodi de-
terminationes temporales habent vel extra– vel intrasumptae. (LI De
Int. 431.1050-432.1085)
The fact that the standard equipollences of modal claims are valid for
propositions containing temporal qualifications does not imply that they
are also valid for every sort of determination. In the Logica Ingredientibus
Abelard briefly considers two other kinds of qualifications – introduced by
the adverbs “solum” and “tantum”, that will be translated here with “only”
– which might be included in simple or modal claims, such as in “This only
is Socrates” (Iste tantum est Socrates) or “For Socrates only it is possible to
be a man while he is a man” (Possibile est solum Socratem esse hominem
dum est homo). Abelard asks whether the standard equipollences that are
valid for simple modal propositions, and that he had just shown as valid
also for temporally-determinate ones, are also preserved for propositions
containing a solum or tantum determination. These equipollences seem in
fact to fail for propositions of this sort. Let us consider for example the
proposition (a) “For Socrates only it is possible to be a man while he is a
man” (Possibile est solum Socratem esse hominem dum est homo), which
means that Socrates is actually a man and that he is the only thing for which
is possible to be a man. This proposition, Abelard says, is clearly false, for
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there are many things for which being a man is possible. If the standard
rules of equipollence are valid, proposition (a) should be equipollent to (b)
“For Socrates only it is not impossible to be a man while he is a man”
(Non impossibile est solum Socratem esse hominem dum est homo), which
is in turn equipollent to (c) “For Socrates only it is not necessary not to be a
man while he is a man” (Non necesse est Socratem solum non esse hominem
dum ipse est homo). One might think however that while propositions (a)
and (b) are false, proposition (c) is true, and therefore the equipollence
between them seems to fail.34 Nevertheless, Abelard thinks that there is
a way to maintain the usual modal inferences also in propositions of this
sort. Abelard’s justification for how these equipollence rules are supposed
to work is however not quite clear. He seems to suggest that since the three
propositions (a*) “Possibile est Socratem esse hominem dum est homo”, (b*)
“Non impossibile est Socratem esse hominem dum est homo” and (c*) “Non
necesse est Socratem non esse hominem dum ipse est homo” are equipollent
to each other, and since the adverb solum, once included in them, maintain
the same meaning in all, then also the three propositions (a), (b) and (c)
should be equipollent:
Fortasse autem quodammodo et servari poterunt supra positae inferen-
tiae modalium cum his quoque determinationibus, si videlicet in huius-
modi adverbiis “solum” vel “tantum” appositis eandem remotionem
secundum sensum semper retinuerimus quibuscumque vocibus adiun-
gatur et magis sensum quam verba attenderimus; veluti, cum proponi-
tur ad probandum quod “Possibile est solum Socratem esse hominem
dum est homo” et illud “solum” ad hoc ponitur demonstrandum quod
“Nil aliud possit esse homo dum Socrates est homo”, in eodem ubique
retineatur sensu; ut, cum dicitur “Non impossibile est solum Socratem
esse hominem dum est homo”, ita accipiatur “solum” quod nil aliud
possit esse homo dum est homo, ut retineatur illud “solum” in ea-
dem vim et in eodem sensu quem prius habebat et magis ad sensum
34Abelard says that the fact that the inference rules of the modal squares are not
preserved by propositions of this sort is perhaps not incongruous, for even when determi-
nations like tantum and solum are included in propositions de puro inesse, many inference
rules that are usually valid seem to fail. It is not the case, for instance, that “If only this is
Socrates, then only this is a man” (Si iste tantum est Socrates, iste tantum est homo); or
that “If it is not the case that only this is a man, then only this is a non-man” (Si non hoc
solum est homo, hoc solum est non-homo). Therefore, it would not be too problematic if
the usual modal inferences were not preserved by propositions that contain “solum” and
“tantum”.
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premissae propositionis aspiciamus quam ad verba aliarum proposi-
tionum. Et ita aequipollentia ubique servabitur. Quippe propositiones
ipsae quibus apponitur “solum” invicem aequipollent et ubique illud
“solum” in eadem vi et in eodem sensu ponitur, licet et in ceteris propo-
sitionibus, sicut in prima propositione, non videatur proprie applicari
propter commutationem appositarum vocum ad eundem sensum quem
prius habebat.
Abelard’s argumentation is not really convincing, because the fact that the
determination “solum” has the same meaning in the three propositions, and
that the corresponding non determined propositions are equipollent to one
another, does not per se guarantee that propositions (a), (b) and (c) are in
turn equipollent to one another. Perhaps what Abelard wants to suggest
here is that we must be careful in interpreting the propositions (a), (b)
and (c) in the same way, i.e. as being either all de rebus or all de sensu.
In his explanation he seems indeed to suggest that the three propositions
must be taken de rebus. According to the de rebus interpretation, the three
propositions have the following meaning: (a) “Socrates, and only Socrates,
has a nature which is compatible with being a man while he is a man”, (b)
“Socrates, and only Socrates, has a nature which is not incompatible with
being a man while he is a man”, (c) “Socrates, and only Socrates, has a
nature which does not require that he is not a man while he is a man”. If
interpreted in this way, all three propositions are false, and so they correctly
can be considered as equipollent. If instead they are interpreted as being
de sensu (e.g., “There is a possible situation in which his is the case: only
Socrates is a man while he is a man”), the three propositions would be all
true, and they would still maintain their equipollence. The initial puzzle
concerning the equipollence between (a), (b) and (c) was due to the fact
that while (a) and (b) were interpreted de rebus, and resulted then to be
false, proposition (c) was interpreted de sensu, and then considered to be
true. Having solved – or attempted to solve – the puzzle concerning the
determinations “solum” and “tantum”, Abelard is now able to conclude by
affirming that the rules of equipollence and opposition represented by the
modal squares in figure 2.4 on page 110 are valid not only for simple modal
claims but also for determinate ones.
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2.3.4 A sophisma raised by determinate modal propositions
Both in theDialectica (209.12-210.18) and in the glosses on Aristotle, (425.860-
428.956) Abelard presents a puzzling argument that arises when we consider
propositions containing universal temporal qualifications, such as: “it is pos-
sible for Socrates to sit in every time of his life” (Possibile est Socratem legere
omni tempore vitae suae). According to the opinion of some, reported by
Abelard in the Dialectica and in LI, propositions of this sort lead to absurd
consequences, as for instance to the claim that there is a moment of time in
which Socrates simultaneously sits and does not sit. This is a possible way
to reconstruct the argument. Let us posit as true the proposition that says:
(1) “it is possible for Socrates to sit in every moment of his life” (Possibile
est Socratem sedere omni tempore vitae suae). This premise in considered
true because there is nothing in the nature of Socrates that compels him to
stand. From (1) it is possible to infer, in virtue of a locus a toto, that (2)
“it is possible for Socrates to sit while he sits and does not sit” (Possibile
est Socratem sedere dum sedet et non sedet). If in fact there is some prop-
erty that is predicated of something in every time, then it is also predicated
of it in each singular part of this time («quicquid enim convenit alicui in
omni tempore aliquot, convenit ei in qualibet parte illius temporis» Dial.
109.19-21). Proposition (2) could be read as a conjunctive proposition say-
ing that “(It is possible for Socrates to sit while he sits) and (It is possible
for Socrates to sit while he does not sit)”. From (2) follows that (3) “It is
possible for Socrates to sit while he does not sit” (Possibile est Socratem
sedere dum non sedet). This inference is granted by the fact that the truth
of one conjunct follows from the truth of a conjunction. At this point, from
(3) one might infer proposition (4): “Socrates does not sit” (Socrates non
sedet), in virtue of the inference rule “from determinate to determining”. But
from proposition (2) one can also infer, by means of the same principle, that
(5) “It is possible for Socrates to sit while he sits” (Possibile est Socratem
sedere dum sedet), and then that (6) “Socrates sits” (Socrates sedet). From
proposition (1), which we admitted to be true, we have therefore inferred
that (7) “Socrates sits and does not sit”, which is absurd.
Abelard’s first reply to the argument is to point out that we should
disambiguate the determinate propositions (2), (3) and (5), which, as we saw
in section 2.3.1 above, can be understood either as temporal hypotheticals
or as modal categoricals. Abelard thinks that the argument is plausible only
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if they are understood as temporal hypotheticals:
Illud notandum quod, cum dicitur si possibile est eum sedere omni
tempore vitae suae, possibile est eum sedere dum non sedet, aliter
probabilis non est nisi illud dum in vi temporis acceptum coniungat,
as si diceretur “Possibile est ipsum sedere eo tempore existente in quo
non sedet” sicut existente crastino tempore vel alio in quo non sedet
praesentialiter, cum tempus nondum sit; et tunc illud dum ad exis-
tentiam temporis tantum applicatur. Si vero non solum vim temporis
habeat, verum etiam coniunctionis, tale est ac si diceretur “Possibile
est sedere et non sedere dum non sedet”, id est “Permanente iam tem-
pore in quo non sedet, possibile est ita contingere ut dicitur in hac
propositione ‘Socrates sedet et non sedet’ ”; si enim vim determina-
tionis temporalis recte attendamus, ut propositio quae in ea est inferri
possit, oportet nos facere in ipsa determinatione quidem positionem
temporis quo non sedet. (LI De Int. 425.878-426.891)
Although Abelard’s answer is laid out differently in the two works, there is
one point that both the Dialectica and the glossae locate as the reason for
which the argument is invalid. This reason has to do with the meaning of
proposition (2) “Possibile est Socratem sedere dum sedet et non sedet”. If we
expound this proposition as a temporal hypothetical, the dum clause has the
role of positing the existence of a certain time in which the determination
is true, that is of a certain time in which Socrates sits and of a certain time
in which Socrates does not sit. If we take these two times as referring both
to the present time, as if we said:
(2.a) “there exists a time t=now such that (Socrates sits at t) and (Socrates
does not sit at t) and (it is possible for Socrates to sit)”,
then the proposition will be certainly false, because two incompatible pred-
icates – being seated and not seated – are simultaneously attributed to
Socrates. If this is the case, Abelard claims, the argument fails because
proposition (2) does not follow from (1) in virtue of an a toto inference,
because a time t in which Socrates both sits and does not sit does not exist,
and therefore t is not a part of “omnis tempus vitae Socratis”:
Sed dico illam consequentiam omnino falsam: si possibile est eum leg-
ere omni tempore vitae suae, tunc legit quando legit et quando non
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legit, si in legit praesens tempus et in affirmatione et negatione at-
tendatur. Tempus enim in quo praesentialiter legit et in quo praesen-
tialiter non legit, non sunt partes temporis. Neque enim simul existere
possunt tempus in quo praesentialiter legit et in quo praesentialiter non
legit, sicut nec ipse simul legere et non legere potest. (Dial. 209.23-30)
The same opinion is held in the glosses:
Ad quod respondendum est quod, si sedet et non sedet praesentis tan-
tum sint designative cum de Socrate stante agimus, non procedit, cum
videlicet tempus in quo praesentialiter sedeat numquam contingat. (LI
De Int. 425.866-869)
There is another way in which we can interpret proposition (2), that is as
if the two predicates “sedet” and “non sedet” in the temporal qualification
were referring not to the present moment only, but “indifferenter” to any
time in Socrates’ life. We can for example take the predicate “non sedet” to
refer to the present time, and the predicate “sedet” to refer to some past or
future time, so that the meaning of proposition (2) would be:
(2.b) “there exists a time t=now, there exists a time t’, such that ((Socrates
sits at t’) and (Socrates does not sit at t) and (it is possible for Socrates
to sit))”,
As the reader might have already noticed, no absurd conclusion is inferred
from proposition (2.b), for although we are still concluding that Socrates sits
and Socrates does not sit, the two predicates refer to two different moments
of time. The argument could be reformulated in the following way:
(1) “for every moment t such that Socrates lives at t, it is possible for
Socrates to sit at t” [hypothesis]
(2.b) “there exists a time t=now, there exists a time t’, such that ((Socrates
sits at t’) and (Socrates does not sit at t) and (it is possible for Socrates
to sit))” [from whole to part]
(3) “(there exists a time t such that Socrates does not sit at t) and (it is
possible for Socrates to sit)” [from conjunction to conjunct]
(4) “Socrates does not sit at t” [from determinate to determining]
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(5) “(there exists a time t’ such that Socrates sits at t’) and (it is possible
for Socrates to sit)” [from conjunction to conjunct]
(6) “Socrates sits at t’ ”[from determinate to determining]
(7) “Socrates sits at t’ and Socrates does not sit at t”[from determinate to
determining]
Abelard proposes this first solution in the glossae, where he says:
Si vero “sedere” indifferenter utamur pro omni tempore et “non sedere”
pro praesenti et de eo loquamur qui aliquando sedet et modo non sedet,
satis concedendum videtur a toto, quod videlicet, cum sit possibile eum
sedere omni tempore vitae suae, possibile sit sedere dum sedet et rursus
possibile sit sedere dum non sedet. Quod si inferatur “Ergo sedet et
non sedet”, non est inconveniens, cum sedet indifferenter acceptum sit
omnis temporis, ac si diceretur “Sedet nunc vel sedit olim vel sedebit”,
et “non sedet” praesentis tantum sit temporis. (LI De Int. 425.869-
877)35
However, Abelard seems to be unsatisfied with this solution, and both
in the Dialectica and in LI he keeps on saying that, even if we understand
proposition (2) in the sense of (2.b), that is as a temporal hypothetical
proposition in which the two predicates refers to different moments of time,
the inference from (1) to (2.b) is nevertheless illegitimate, and so the whole
argument is invalid. Abelard’s dissatisfaction with this inference derives
from the idea that while by means of proposition (1) a certain possibility
is ascribed to a subject (i.e., Socrates has the potency to sit as long as
he exists), by means of determinate proposition (2), or any other temporal
hypothetical proposition of this sort, not only a potency is ascribed to a
subject, but is said that there is some moment of time, present or non
present, in which Socrates actually has a certain property. But, Abelard says
in the Dialectica, we are never entitled to infer an actuality from a potency.
The fact that we can derive proposition (2) from proposition (1) might have
some validity in virtue of the way things actually are. Nevertheless, it does
not count as a proper inference, because it does not necessarily follow from
35This solution is advanced as a possible solution to the puzzle also in the Dialectica,
where Abelard says that in a proposition such as (2) the predicates “sits” and “does not
sit” are understood as referring to every time, and not to the present only, as if we said
“sometimes he sits and sometimes he does not sit” (Dial. 209.30-35).
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the fact that Socrates has a possibility that this possibility is realized in some
moment of time. This point is rehearsed by Abelard both in the Dialectica36
and in LI.37
36In the Dialectica the author insists that although the two propositions might be true
together, and are actually true together, the locus a toto must not be accepted because it
requires in this case to infer an actuality from a potency. See Dial. 209.35-210.18:«Mihi
autem nullo modo hic locus a toto necessitate videtur tenere, sed semper constantia egere,
ut etiam cum dicimus de Socrate etiam legente: “si possibile est Socratem leger omni
tempore vitae suae, tunc possibile est legere dum legit” ac scilicet “cum tempus in quo
legit, sit pars vitae illius”. Alioquin sequeretur quod si possibile eum legere omni tempore
vitae suae, tunc legit, quod nullo modo de eo vivente, legente sive non legente, consequitur.
Neque enim potentia actum inferred potest. Sed [si] diceretur quod et ista: “si possibile
est eum legere omni tempore vitae suae, tunc cum legit et cum non, legit” in hac sequitur
constantia quod tempus in quo legit et in quo non legit sit pars vitae illius. Sed tunc
falsum erit antecedens et “legit” et “non legit” omnis sunt temporis. Locum vero a toto
omnino calumniari hic oportet, etiamsi tempus in quo legit sit pars. Sed si possibile est
eum legere omni tempore vitae suae, tunc possibile est eum <non> legere dum legit, quia
omne tempus vitae illius et illud in quo legit sine lectione potest esse».
37In LI Abelard says that, although the inference from (1) to (2.b) is a valid inference
ex actu – that is, because of the way things actually are, (1) and (2.b) are true together
– it is nevertheless not a valid inference ex natura, and only consequences ex natura must
be accepted as proper consequences. Because according to Abelard it is sufficient for the
validity of an argument that its consequence is always true together with the premises
given the way things actually are, the derivation a toto of (2.b) from (1) can be considered
as a valid argument. However, because this inference is not necessarily valid, it cannot be
considered a true consequence: «Hi, qui omnes argumentationes in consequentias veras
transferunt, poterunt fortasse eam recipere, ut dictum est, si sola positio temporis fiat,
non coniunctio propositionum. Quod si procedatur hoc modo “Si possibile est eum sedere
dum permanent tempus in quo stat, ergo stat”, et ita per medium inferatur quod, “si
possibile est hunc sedere omni tempore vitae suae, ergo stat”, concedunt fortassis hanc
quoque consequentiam gratia termini et per dissimilitudini medii termini resistunt, cum
prior consequentia sit ex actu, secunda ex natura. Nos autem huiusmodi consequentias
actuales nullo modo recipimus etsi argumentationes de his factas non reprobemus».
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Chapter 3
Nature and Epistemology of
Modalities
The catalogue of things that Abelard considers to be possible is exception-
ally varied. In the Dialectica, he starts his discussion concerning the nature
of modalities by saying that it is possible for Socrates, who is a layman, to
be a bishop, and that this is true even if Socrates was never a bishop nor
ever will be one (see section 3.2). It is clear then that Abelard’s theory
of modalities admits that some possibilities exist that are never realized in
time. In his commentaries on Porphyry’s Isagoge Abelard goes even further,
by admitting that it is true to say that, in some sense of possibility, it is
possible for a human being not to be able to laugh, even if the ability to laugh
is inseparable in act by human beings, i.e. even if there is no possible situ-
ation in which a human being exists who is unable to laugh. In Abelard’s
texts, then, not only we encounter possibilities that are unrealized but also
possibilities that are unrealizable (section 3.3). Other possible claims that
Abelard admits as true are the ones saying that it is possible for a blind
man to see, it is possible for a crippled man to fight, or again it is possible
for an amputee to walk. All these claims are true, not in the sense that it
would be possible for these facts to happen in the actual situation, but in
the sense that they could have happened if things had gone otherwise than
they actually went (section 3.4). Among the peculiar examples of Abelard’s
possibilities, we also find the one referring to the possibility that a certain
human being has of being dead or of being irrational (section 3.5). And
naturally, we have already considered and will return again on Abelard’s
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exposition of the modal claim stating that it is possible for he who is stand-
ing to sit (section 1.3; 3.4). In chapter 4 below, we will question instead
whether, according to Abelard, things and events that are included in God’s
providential plan could happen differently than God foreknows them, and
whether God’s actions themselves – including God’s creation of the world –
might have been otherwise than they actually are. All these different senses
of possibility are explained and justified by Abelard in terms of the natures
of things, and of what is compatible with these natures. In this chapter, I
investigate Abelard’s definition of possibility as non repugnancy with nature,
and I try to locate all the different senses that he attributed to the notions
of possibility, impossibility and necessity.
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3.1 Possibility as Non Repugnancy with Nature
In a well-known passage from the Dialectica, Abelard claims that the modal
proposition “Socrates is possibly a bishop” (Socratem est episcopus possi-
biliter) is a true proposition, even if Socrates was never a bishop nor ever
will be one. The truth of this proposition is justified by invoking the view
that what is possible for a certain subject is everything that is not repugnant
to this subject’s nature. According to this understanding of the notion, many
facts that never obtain are included among real possibilities, for there are in-
deed many things that are compatible with the nature of a subject and that
nevertheless are never actualized at any moment of this subject’s existence.
Abelard presents this argument in Dialectica 193-194, while addressing the
problem of how to give the truth conditions for sentences concerning possibil-
ities, necessities and impossibilities. With respect to their truth conditions,
the author says, modal sentences differ from simple categorical ones: while
these latter are evaluated true when the property expressed by the predicate
actually inheres in the thing referred to by the subject, and are evaluated
false when this is not the case, modal sentences are not said to be true or
false in virtue of some actual conjunction or separation between the predi-
cate and the subject. The modal sentence “Socrates is possibly a bishop”,
for instance, is true not in virtue of the predicate being actually – or in any
moment – conjoined to the subject, and in general to possibly inhere means
something different than to actually inhere or to inhere in some moment of
time (Dial. 193.19-23). Similarly, Abelard says that the modal proposition
“It is impossible for Socrates to be a stone” is not true in virtue of the fact
that being a stone never inheres in Socrates, but is true because the nature
of Socrates is not compatible with being a stone (Dial. 193.25-26).1 On the
contrary, a proposition like “Socrates is possibly a bishop” is true in virtue
of the fact that the predicate is compatible with the nature of the subject,
or, in Abelard’s words, the predicate is non repugnant with the nature of
the subject:
“Socratem possibile est esse episcopum”, etsi numquam sit, tamen
uerum est, cum natura ipsius episcopo non repugnet; quod ex aliis
eiusdem speciei indiuiduis perpendimus, quae proprietatem episcopi
1«Qui enim dicit: “Socratem impossibile est esse lapidem”, non tantum lapidem dici
monstrat non esse in Socrate, sed nec posse.».
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iam actu participare uidemus. Quicquid enim actu contingit in uno,
idem in omnibus eiusdem speciei indiuiduis contingere posse arbitra-
mur, quippe eiusdem sunt omnino naturae; et quaecumque uni com-
munis est substantia, et omnibus; alioquin specie differrent quae solis
discrepant accidentibus. (Dial. 193.31-194.5)
This passage from the Dialectica raises several interesting problems about
Abelard’s treatment of possibilities. First, the passage is used as evidence
of the fact that Abelard explicitly admitted the existence of unrealized pos-
sibilities, i.e. of possibilities that are never realized in time. Second, it is
evident in this passage that Abelard embraces a view according to which
different individuals substances might be the same with respect to their na-
ture. In third place, the passage could be read as a sketchy presentation
of an epistemology of possibility: the author says that we know, or that we
are entitled to believe, that it is possible for a subject to have a certain
property because we have experience of other individuals – which are of the
same nature as the subject under consideration – having that property in
act. Empirical experience seems then to be treated by Abelard as a good
guide to the knowledge of unrealized possibilities. All these aspects deserve
a further analysis, which I deal with in the next sections (see in particular
3.1.1 and 3.2 below). For the moment I shall consider in more detail what
Abelard means when he defines possibility in terms of non repugnancy with
nature.
Evidence of such an understanding of possibility is quite widespread in
Abelard’s texts on modalities. The definition often occurs in the Dialectica,
in particular in Dial. 196-198 and 200-204, and the same idea is rehearsed in
Dial. 176.27-31,2 Dial. 280.8-12,3 Dial. 385.3-5,4 and again in Dial. 98.16-
18.5 In the Logica Ingredientibus possibility is also conceived in conformity
2«Haec igitur: ‘quidam homo non est homo’, idest ‘quaedam res quae est animal ra-
tionale mortale, non est animal rationale mortale vel animal simpliciter’, semper falsa est;
est enim omnino impossibile quod ipsa dicit nec ullo tempore contingere potest nec eius
exemplum natura patitur».
3«Non sunt ulla opposita quia sibi non cohaerent sed quia, cum sint in eodem, simul ea
natura non patitur, ut sunt homo et lapis, quae etiam natura a se remota sunt; ‘animal’
autem ab ‘homine’ non alia causa removetur nisi quia ipse homo non ullo modo consistit».
4«“Potentiam” enim et “impotentiam” secundum naturam accipimus, ut id tantum
quisque possit suscipere quod eius natura permittit, idque non possit quod natura expel-
lit».
5«Nullam formam in nomine “potentis” intelligamus, sed id tantum quod naturae non
repugnet; in qua quidem significatione nomine “possibilis” in modalibus propositionibus
utimur».
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with what is allowed or permitted by the nature of a thing («secundum hoc
quod natura rei quoquo modo permittit»): see for example LI Cat. 124.33-
37;6 LI De Int. 266.541-5; 408.426-7; 414.568-415.594. Dispositions and
dispositional terms (as “fragile”, “durus”, “frangible” and the like) – that
are taken by Abelard to refer to a certain subject’s passive possibilities or
aptitudes – are also characterized by the author in terms of nature and of
what is (more or less) likely to happen in conformity with the nature of the
thing (“secundum facilitatem naturae”: see Dial. 28-32; Dial. 425.37-426.18;
LI De Int. 255.312-322).7
Abelard is certainly not the only nor the first author to give a definition
of possibility in terms of compatibility with nature. On the contrary, such
a definition was quite widely accepted among eleventh and twelfth century
logicians. A similar characterization of modalities is to be found for example
in Garlandus Compotista’s Dialectica. In a passage of this logical treatise,
the author seems to use exactly the same example that Abelard uses, when
he says that the proposition “It is possible for Garland to be a bishop” must
be considered true even if the property of being a bishop never actually
inheres in the subject, inasmuch as there is no incompatibility between the
nature of the subject and this property:
Potentia vero extra actum quam effectus non consequitur, est illa cui
nec natura repugnat nec tamen umquam erit, ut cum dico: “possibile
est Iarlandum fieri episcopum”, numquam tamen episcopus erit.
Immediately before this passage, Garlandus distinguished between potencies
in actu and extra actum, and then between potencies extra actum which are
followed by actuality at a certain time, and potencies extra actum which
are never actualized, and remain then pure potencies. This distinction ac-
curately follows Aristotle’s distinction at the end of De Interpretatione 13,
without much originality. What is new is instead the example Garlandus
6«Potentia quoque cum dicitur posse inesse alicui, talis est sensus quod eam subiectam
habere queat, hoc est naturae eius non repugnat, ut habeat».
7Although general or simple possibilities are defined only in terms of a subject’s nature,
aptitudes and dispositions are defined in terms of the subject’s nature plus some other
conditions, such as the subject’s physical constitution, or the external circumstances.
Consequently, whereas all subjects that have the same nature are thought by Abelard to
have all the same general possibilities, they might not have the same dispositions or the
same aptitudes, for their actual constitution or the circumstances they are in might vary.
For a more detailed comparison between simple possibilities and aptitudes see 3.4 below.
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gives of extra actum potencies which are not followed by actuality at a cer-
tain time: he says that it is true to say that “Garlandus is possibly a bishop”
even if Garlandus was never a bishop and never will be one. And new is also
the justification the author gives for the truth of this example, namely the
fact that the proposition is possible in so far as it is not repugnant to the na-
ture of Garlandus to be a bishop. Affinities with Abelardian understanding
of possibility in terms of non repugnancy with nature seem evident, which
shows that such an understanding of the modal notion was already in the
air at the time in which Abelard writes the Dialectica.8 Martin shows in
(Martin, 2016) that a similar understanding of possibility is to be found also
in two twelfth-century anonymous discussions on modalities, designated by
Yukio Iwakuma as M1 and M3, preserved in manuscript Orléans 266 and
in manuscript Paris BN Lat 13368.9 These two discussions, that report the
opinions of some early-twelfth century logicians concerning modal propo-
sitions,10 also take into account the issue of unrealized possibilities. They
admit that there are things that are possible for a subject although they
are never actualized in time, and the example they offer in that context is
again the fact that it is possible for a peasant to be a bishop. In (Mar-
tin, 2016), Martin proposes that indeed this definition of possibility as what
is compatible with nature, that is usually associated with Abelard, was in
fact a standard position in the twelfth century.11 However, although there
is an indubitable affinity between Abelard’s position and the positions of
Garlandus and the ones presented in discussions M1 and M3, and although
the interpretation of possibility in terms of compatibility with nature should
not be considered to be original to Abelard, it was nevertheless thanks to
him that this idea went beyond a sketchy intuition to account for unreal-
ized possibilities and gave rise to a systematic modal semantics. I will refer
8The similarity between the positions of the two authors has been already highlighted
by Paul Thom in (Thom, 2003b, p. 49), and (Thom, 2003a)).
9M1 = Orléans, Bibl. Municipale, 266: 166a-169a; Paris, Bibl. Nationale, lat. 13368,
175va-177ra. M3 = Orléans, Bibl. Municipale, 266: 252b-257b.
10The logicians whose opinions are described are referred to as Master W., Master Gos.,
and Master Gosl.; Martin notes that the first of these authors is probably William of
Champeaux and the second is almost certainly Goselin of Soissons.
11The origins of such an idea might probably be traced back even further, to late ancient
philosophy. Peter King suggests Abelard’s idea of grounding a subject’s possibilities on its
nature might have been inspired by Boethius’ analysis of modalities. According to King,
Boethius as well conceived possibilities as “rooted in the natures of things” (King, 2004,
p. 83 and note 62 p. 116). King proposes that this dependence of possibilities on natures
was based on Boethius’ interpretation of the Aristotelian notion of possibility.
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to this modal semantics as the compatibility semantics. The definitions of
modal terms on which this semantics is based are the following:
(i) to be possible is to be compatible with (or non repugnant to) the nature
of a subject;
(ii) to be impossible is to be excluded by (or repugnant to) the nature of a
subject;
(iii) to be necessary is to be required by (or included in) the nature of a
subject.
As we may note from these definitions, Abelard’s characterization of possi-
bility and impossibility and his characterization of necessity match up per-
fectly, although in the first case the notion appeals to what is compatible or
not compatible with nature, in the second to what is required or compelled
by nature. This dissimilarity well agrees with the idea I defended in section
1.1.3 and 2.1.3, proposing that, while the two modal concepts of possibility
and impossibility are treated by Abelard as being inter-definable, this is not
the case for possibility and necessity, nor for necessity and impossibility.
Although the modal notions of (im)possibility and necessity might be put
in a logical relation of equipollence – as they indeed are put in Abelard’s
modal system, although only under certain conditions, as we have seen in
2.1.3 – they are not definable one in terms of the other, i.e., the meaning of
“necessity” cannot be spelled out in terms of (im)possibility and viceversa.
In the following pages, I’ll try to provide a more detailed characterization
of the notions of nature, of compatibility or non repugnancy between the
nature of a thing and a certain predicate, and finally the notion of being
required by or be contained in the nature of something.
3.1.1 Nature
According to Abelard, every (existent) individual substance has a nature.
It is in virtue of having a certain nature that all individual substances are
sorted out into natural kinds, and are “classifiable” so that we can refer to
them as men, donkeys, stones and so on.12 Such a classification is not con-
ventional or mind dependent, but is grounded on the nature of things. This
12Note that this is true only of natural substances, because for Abelard human products,
as artifacts, do not have a specific nature. There is not something as, for example, the
nature of tables, or the nature of books. One may wonder therefore in virtue of what
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position – which has been called Aristotelian essentialism, or strong natu-
ralism (Marenbon, 1997, p. 117 ff.) is an underlying and basic principle of
Abelard’s ontology. Abelard’s theory of natures is based on the traditional
distinction between accidental and substantial properties of individuals. Fol-
lowing the Porphyrian tradition, Abelard thinks that accidental are all the
features or “forms” that it is possible to separate, either in act or in thought,
from the substance in which they inhere, without this substance being de-
stroyed. Socrates’ whiteness, for instance, is accidental to him for it can be
actually separated by him: if Socrates gets a tan, he looses the property of
being white, athough he remains the same individual and the same sort of
thing. The ability to laugh is also accidental to Socrates, for it is possible
to separate it from him in thought, i.e., it is possible to conceive Socrates as
being without the ability to laugh and yet as being again the same individ-
ual and the same sort of thing (see section 3.3 on this). Neither whiteness or
ability to laugh are then part of Socrates’ nature. The substantial features
of an individual are instead those forms that cannot be separated in act or in
though from a substance without incurring in its destruction. These forms
are the ones that “constitute” or “are contained in” the substance’s nature.
The nature of an individual human being, for example, is constituted by the
forms of animality, mortality and rationality, and by many other differentiae
of which we are not aware.
Abelard’s natures are immutable, both in the sense that the substantial
forms constituting them do not vary through time and in the sense that
individuals cannot vary with respect to their nature. It is in fact not possible
for a certain individual to have a different nature and different substantial
forms while remaining the same individual substance. If an individual looses
one of its substantial forms (if, for example, a human being looses rationality
or animality), it undergoes a substantial change and it is not the same
individual anymore.13 This implies that categorical propositions stating
something about the nature of things, as for example “Socrates is a man”,
these different individual things are susceptible of being classified into kinds, or types, of
things.
13We should say however that Abelard is not always coherent on this point, for he says
at times that a certain individual, that is actually a human being, might have different
substantial properties than the ones she or he actually has. This could lead us to suppose
that Abelard maintains that an individual substance might be the same individual even
if it had different substantial properties and therefore a different nature. Some evidence
related to this point was presented in 3.5 on page 188.
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“Socrates is rational” or “men are animals” are always true, at least as
long as their subject is not empty, i.e., as long as its subject term refers to
something that exists.14 Natures are also immutable in the sense that the
“number” of existing natural kinds, is invariable, i.e., there cannot be more
or fewer natural kinds, nor different ones. The natures that were ordained
by God during the secondary creation are in fact all the natures that exist,
and that will exist in future.15
Abelard insists that, generally speaking, we are usually very ignorant
about natures and about what constitutes them.16 Most of the time we are
in fact not able to specify which are the substantial forms of the different
individual substances we have experience of. In a famous passage from the
Dialectica, Abelard states that it is not the aim of the logician to investigate
the nature of things, but that studying natures and their causes is the pur-
pose of physics, or natural philosophy. He does nevertheless recommend to
logicians and natural philosophers, who both are interested in natures even
if for different purposes, to take each other achievements into consideration:
Hoc autem logicae disciplinae proprium relinquitur, ut scilicet vocum
impositiones pensando quantum unaquaque proponatur oratione sive
dictione discutiat. Physicae vero proprium est inquirere utrum rei
natura consentiat enuntiationi, utrum ita sese, ut dicitur, rerum propri-
etas habeat vel non. Est autem alterius consideratio alteri necessaria.
Ut enim logicae discipulis appareat quid in singulis intelligendum sit
vocabulis, prius rerum proprietas est investiganda. Sed cum ab his
rerum natura non pro se sed pro vocum impositione requiritur, tota
eorum intentio referenda est ad logicam. (Dial. 286.31-287.1)
Other remarks about our ignorance of natures are also to be found in LI
De Int. 252.211-217and 254.275-7.18 How are we to interpret Abelard’s
14Hypothetical propositions whose truth is grounded in the nature of things, such as “if
it is a man, it is an animal”, “if it is a body, it is corporeal”, are eternally true, even at
those times in which the things they talk about are non existent.
15Abelard says that all sorts of species together with their essential features have already
been determined by God, and it is false to say about species that do not exist, like
chimaeras or goat-stags, that they might exist someday: «Nam coniunctionis actum in
quibusdam cognovi et chimaeram vel hircocervus amplius, ut esse possint, seminaria in
rerum natura non habere ex illa dei creatione, quae die septimo specierum omnium formas
complevit, in quibus seminaria futurorum posuit, ut iam amplius nullam novam speciem
crearet» (LI De Int. 249.157-162).
16See on this (King, 2004, p. 81 ff.) and (Marenbon, 1997, p. 117).
17«Quantum ad nos vero multae sunt occultae naturae praesentes, quae a nobis nul-
latenus comprehendi adhuc valet».
18«Quis enim deum veraciter et perfecte, ut in se est, comprehendere possit aut multa
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claims about our ignorance regarding natures? There are two ways in which
we might be ignorant on the natures of things: (a) we might ignore, of all
or some individual substances, to which natural kind they belong to; or
(b) we might “unproblematically know to which kind any given particular
substance belongs” (Marenbon, 1997, p. 117) but still not be able to describe
what is the nature of a certain thing, i.e. what is the specific differentia
that distinguishes a certain thing from other substances of different kinds.
Abelard clearly claims that we are ignorant about natures in the second
sense. It is less clear whether he also thinks that we are ignorant in the
first sense, i.e., if we are similarly fallible in saying to which kind a certain
substance belongs. It is probable, however, that the ignorance Abelard
refers to should be intended only in sense (b), as Marenbon pointed out in
(Marenbon, 1997, p. 117). If this is the case, although we have the capacity
to correctly sort all substances out in their natural kind, we are not be able
to say in which respect the members of a certain group are different from
the members of another group, because we are not always able to specify
their essential features, and consequently to associate them with their proper
definition.
The notions of nature and of natural kind are a cornerstone of Abelard’s
metaphysics and semantics, as well as of his theory of modalities. However,
some interpreters have thought that Abelard’s assumption of the existence
of natures could endanger one of his most strenuously defended philosoph-
ical positions, i.e., his nominalism, or irrealism. This is because Abelard
claims, in Dial. 194.5 and elsewhere, that different individual things be-
longing to the same natural kind, like Socrates and Plato, are all of a same
nature (eiusdem sunt naturae).19 This idea is also to be found in Dial.
etiam de occultis rerum naturis, quae suae deus tantum reservat scientiae?».
19Abelard does not defend the idea, at least not in these terms, in the Logica Ingre-
dientibus. This seems to suggest that Abelard realized, after he finished to write the
Dialectica, that the notion of many individual things having the same nature had prob-
lematic consequences for his ontology, and for this reason he did not employ the same idea
in LI.
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188.14;20211.26-27;21228.3;22385.6;23426.5;24582.19.25 But if this is the case,
and if natures are something that really exist, Abelard’s ontology would ad-
mit the existence of things that are shared simultaneously and in whole by
different individuals, and this is exactly what his irrealism wants to deny.
Some interpreters26 have defended the idea that, in admitting natures and
natural kinds as having a real role in his ontology, Abelard did indeed run
into an inconsistency with the irrealist thesis he endorses elsewhere. Other
scholars27 have claimed instead that Abelard’s natures do not constitute a
threat for his irrealism, and that Abelard’s strong naturalism is consistent
with his nominalism.28 The core of the problem, in brief, is the following: the
position Abelard maintains in Dial. 193.31-194.5 is that different particular
individuals – say, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle – have the same possibilities
and necessities in virtue of having the same nature. But Abelard’s nominal-
ism says that no universal thing has to be admitted in ontology, i.e., there
could exist no thing which is shared as a whole at the same time by different
things. If a nature is something that really exists, and it is the same in (i.e.,
it is shared by) different individuals at the same time, then such a nature
would be a universal.
A possible way out of this problem consists in saying that Abelardian
natures are reducible to other entities that are admissible in his ontology,
such as individual properties or individual forms. As Martin has shown
in (Martin, 1992, p. 111 ff.), Abelard’s ontology could be characterized in
20«Omnes quidem homines secundum eamdem naturam uniuntur».
21«Ex actu quidem rei nulla est certitudo, cum actus ipse qui futurus est, nondum est
vel fuit; ex natura quoque nulla est certitudo, cum ceteros homines qui eiusdem naturae
sunt, hos quidem homines legere, illos non legere; vel prandere fortasse et non prandere
contingat».
22«Cumque substantiae nomen univocum sit, non est ipsius intellectus multiplex, sed
unus, quod ex eadem naturae convenientia significatis est impositum».
23«Cum autem omnia eiusdem speciei particularia eiusdem sint naturae – unde etiam
dicitur ipsa species tota individuorum substantia esse – , idem omnia recipere potentia
sunt et impotentia».
24«Quas enim natura infert potentias aequaliter, sicut natura ipsa, omnibus inest, ut
rationalitas s singulis hominibus».
25«Licet enim ‘homo’ et ‘album’ diversis imposita sint, idem tamen de singulis enuntiata
notant et secundum eamdem naturam aut proprietatem omnibus imposita sunt».
26See for example (Spade, 1980) and (Panaccio, 2009); both are quoted in (Marenbon,
2015, p. 44 ff.).
27See for example (King, 2004) and (King, 2015), again quoted in quoted in (Marenbon,
2015, p. 44 ff.).
28For a presentation of the problem, see also (Marenbon, 1997, p. 117-137) and (Maren-
bon, 2015).
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contemporary terms as a sort of trope theory, in which is posited the exis-
tence of individual accidental forms such as Socrates’ rationality, Brunellus’
blackness, or Sophroniscus’s paternity, that are in various ways related to
other individual forms or to individual substances (Socrates; Sophroniscus;
Brunellus). Of all the individual forms that are attached to a certain sub-
stance, some are separable from it, in the sense that their attachment to
the substance could “come and go” during the individual’s lifetime. The
relation between Socrates and the individual whiteness that Socrates has in
some moments of his life is of this sort. Other forms are inseparable from
the substance to which they belong in the sense that it is impossible for the
substance to exist without these particular forms being attached to it. This
second sort of relation is called by Martin “strict inseparability”, and de-
scribes the relation that holds for instance between Socrates and Socrates’s
ability to laugh. These two first relations that may hold between individual
substances and individual forms – the relations of separability and the one
of strict inseparability – can be considered as external relationships, in the
sense that they do not have to do with the internal structure, or essense, of
a substance (Martin, 1992, p. 112). Finally, another sort of relation that
might hold between an individual substance and an individual form is the
one that there is between a substance and its individual generic form or its
individual differentiae, and that characterizes, for instance, the attachment
of Socrates’ rationality or Socrates’ animality to Socrates. This relation is
stronger than the former two and was labelled by Martin “conceptual insep-
arability”, in the sense that not only it is impossible for a substance such as
Socrates not to have the differentiae it actually has, but it is also impossible
to separate in mind or in thought Socrates from his individual animality
or rationality. Abelard also says that having these forms is required for
Socrates being the sort of thing that he actually is. The forms that are in
such a relation to an individual are also called its essential or substantial
forms.
Taking into account this ontology, one might suppose that the nature of
an individual substance is nothing else than all the substance’s individual
essential properties taken together. Within this interpretation, talking about
the nature of Socrates would amount to nothing more than talking about
his individual animality, his individual rationality and so on. This view
would then identify natures with structured sets or bundles of individual
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properties, that are grounded in the individual bodies of substances, so that
the nature of Socrates, for example, would then be something like:
NatSocrates: {Socrates’ animality, Socrates’ rationality, Socrates’ mortality,
...};
while the nature of Plato would be instead identical to this other structured
set:
NatP lato: {Plato’s animality, Plato’s rationality, Plato’s mortality, ...}.
In this framework, each nature would be an individual thing, and therefore
there would be no reference to universal entities. We could still maintain
that both Socrates and Plato have the “same” nature, although their natures
are really numerically different from one another, insofar as the two sets
NatSocrates and NatP lato are two instances of the nature of human beings:
Nathumanbeings: {animality, rationality, mortality, ...}.
This is what Peter King seems to suggest in (King, 2004, p. 81), when he says
that “an individual’s nature is not something really shared with or common
to other individuals; Abelard’s refutation of realism has shown that this is
impossible. Nor is the nature anything in addition to the substantial forms
and attributes of the individual: Socrates does not have a human nature as
well as his substantial form and the attributes consequent on having that
form”.
A consequence of this interpretation is that the natures of two individual
substances of the same kind like Socrates and Plato cannot be “the same” in
the sense of numerical sameness. The two entities NatSocrates and NatP lato
are in fact numerically different from one another. According to King, it is
Abelard himself who points out that the sameness of different individuals’
natures should not be taken in the sense of numerical sameness. Evidence
for this is for example a passage from Abelard’s Tractatus de intellectibus,
where he says that «There is no nature that subsists indifferently; any given
thing, wherever it exists, is personally distinct and found to be numerically
one [...] What else is human nature in this man, i.e. in Socrates, but Socrates
himself? Surely it is nothing other than exactly the same in essence» (TI 75-
76, quoted and translated in King, 2004, p. 115).29 We must note however
29As King says here, Abelard expresses the same sentiment in many other passages, for
instance LI Isag. 24.17–20.
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that when in the Dialectica Abelard stresses the idea that two individual
substances have “the same” nature, he never makes clear in which sense we
should interpret this sameness, whether numerically or in some other sense.
This interpretation of natures has then the merit of reducing natures to
entities that are perfectly admissible in Abelard’s ontology, but requires to
interpret Abelard’s idea that all individuals of the same kind have the same
nature only in the sense that they have a nature of the same sort, not they
their natures are essentially or numerically the same.
3.1.2 Repugnancy and requirement
The second notion that constitutes Abelard’s definition of possibility is the
notion of non repugnantia, usually translated as compatibility: Abelard says
that is possible for a certain individual what is compatible (non repugnant)
with its nature. The use of the notion of repugnancy in the logic and theory
of modalities does not originate with Abelard but is to be found long before
him, starting at least from Boethius. Thom recognizes four ways in which
Boethius interprets this notion (Thom, 2003b, p. 36 ff.):
(1) Of three terms φ, χ and ξ, the two terms “φ” and “ξ” are repugnant
(or incompatibles) if “φ” and “χ” are contraries, i.e. if they cannot be
simultaneously predicated of the same subject, and if “ξ” entails “χ”
or “χ” entails “ξ”. This definition is based on what Boethius says in
his In Ciceronis Topica (Boethius, 1988, p. 225).
(2) If there are two terms “φ” and “χ”, of which the first entails the latter,
then the proposition “if it is φ then it is ¬ χ” is an incompatible. As
Stump points out (Boethius, 1988, p. 225 n. 4), it is propositions that
are called incompatibles here, and not terms. This characterization
tries to capture Boethius’ idea that “an incompatible is that which
cannot exist simultaneously with the thing with which it is said to be
incompatible” (Boethius, 1988, p. 124). According to this characteri-
zation, examples of incompatibles are “if it is day, there is not light”,
or “if it is a man, it is dead”, where “dead” stays for “not animate”.
(3) Incompatibles are those terms that are not contraries to one another
but rather are the consequents of contraries, so that if “φ” and “χ”
are contrary terms, every term that is implied by “φ” is incompatible
with every terms that is implied by “χ” (Boethius, 1988, p. 127).
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(4) Incompatibles are those terms that are not contraries but rather the an-
tecedents of contraries (like for example the couple of terms “waking”
and “snoring”, (Boethius, 1988, p. 134).30
In all these cases, the relation of repugnancy is said to hold either between
two terms or between two propositions.
Abelard uses the term repugnantia in different passages of the Dialectica
and of the Logica Ingredientibus. There are two senses in which Abelard
employs the word: in the first sense, repugnancy is a relation holding be-
tween linguistic items, two predicates or two sentences; in the second sense,
repugnancy is a relation holding between a predicate and the nature of an
individual thing, or nature in general.31 Two predicates or two sentences
are in a relation of repugnancy if there is some kind of opposition – be
it contrariness or contradictoriness – between the two. For example, the
two terms “white” and “black” are said to be repugnant inasmuch as they
are contraries, i.e. they cannot be simultaneously present in one subject:
«nullo modo eidem simul inesse possunt» (Dial. 174.25 ff.). A relation of
repugnancy could also hold between contradictory terms or sentences. For
example, it holds between the two contradictory sentences “some man is
just” and “no man is just” (Dial. 173.29.32). Moreover, if two terms imply
or are implied by contrary or contradictory terms they are also said to be
repugnant to one another: the predicate “to snore” (stertere) and “to be
awake” (vigilare), for instance, are said to be repugnant inasmuch as “to
snore” implies the predicate “to sleep”, which is contrary to the term “to be
awake” (Dial. 450.33 ff.). As could be easily seen, this notion of repugnantia,
which Abelard employes in order to define the modal concepts of possibility
and impossibility, is itself defined in modal terms. The notion of repugnancy
is in fact spelled out in terms of contrariness and contradictoriness, which
are in turn defined in terms of (im)possibility: two sentences are contraries if
they cannot be simultaneously true, they are contradictories if they cannot
be simultaneously true or simultaneously false. This is why King claims that
Abelard merely proposes an analysis of modal concepts, and not a reductive
30For this list of various senses of repugnancy in Boethius (Thom, 2003b, p. 36-8).
31In LI Cat. 273.36 or LI De Int. 415.571-416.610, as in many other passages, we find
this second construal of the term, when Abelard says that some predicate is or is not
repugnant with the nature of Socrates, or the nature of human beings. We find instead
the first use of the term – repugnancy as a relation between predicates or sentences – for
example in Dial. 173-174, in Dial. 450, and in LI Cat. 129.30.
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elimination of them (King, 2004, p. 116).
The second construal that Abelard offers of the term “repugnantia” con-
cerns the relation holding between a certain predicate and the nature of
some individual substance. Abelard says, for example, that the predicates
“being irrational” or “being dead” are repugnant to the nature of Socrates.
This second construal of the term can be easily led back to the first sense of
“repugnancy”, taken as a relation between terms or sentences, if we consider
Abelard’s natures as sets of predicates, as was suggested in 3.1.1 above. The
nature of a certain individual subject, say Socrates, can be represented as
a finite and well defined set of predicates, that are the substantial predi-
cates of the subject in question, in this case the set NatSocrates: {“animal”,
“mortal”, “rational”}. There is a relation of repugnancy between a certain
predicate “φ” and the nature of Socrates if the term “φ” is incompatible with
at least one of the predicates constituting the nature of Socrates. If we take
as “φ” the predicate “irrational”, for example, we say that it is repugnant
with the nature of Socrates, because it contradicts one of the predicates con-
stituting Socrates’ nature, that is the predicate “rational”. On the contrary,
if the predicate “φ” is not repugnant to any of the predicates constituting
the set NatSocrates, we say that the nature of Socrates is compatible with
φ, or that the nature of Socrates “allows” or “tolerates” (patitur ; permittit;
non expellit) being φ.
Thanks to the definitions of the two notions of “nature” and “repug-
nancy” we are now able to give the truth conditions for possibility and
impossibility propositions:
(i) a proposition “It is possible for S to be φ” is true iff the predicate “φ” is
not repugnant to any of the predicates that constitute the set NatS ;
(ii) a proposition “It is impossible for S to be φ” is true iff the predicate
“φ” is repugnant to (at least) one of the predicates that constitute the
set NatS .
I shall turn now to consider Abelard’s semantics for modal sentences about
necessities. As we said, to define necessity Abelard appeals to two notions:
the notion of nature, and the notion of being required by or being part of a
certain nature. According to Abelard, a sentence “It is necessary for S to
be φ” is true when the predicate “φ” is required (exigitur) by the nature
of S. At times he also says that the sentence is true iff “φ” is part of, or
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is contained in, the nature of S. This is the case when “φ” is a substantial
(or an essential) predication of S, that is if “φ” is identical to one of the
predicates constituting the set NatS , or, in other words, if “φ” is contained
in NatS . We could then say that
(iii) A proposition “It is necessary for S to be φ” is true iff the predicate
“being φ” is identical to one of the predicates constituting the set
NatS .
We may be tempted, for sake of simplicity, to rephrase this third definition
in terms of nature and repugnancy, so that we could have all definitions of
modal concepts stated in terms of two notions only, nature and repugnancy.
We could do this saying thatff
(iii.b) A proposition “It is necessary for S to be φ” is true iff the predicate
“being non-φ” is repugnant to at least one of the predicates constitut-
ing the set NatS .
However, this is at the least questionable, in so far as Abelard never de-
fined necessity in terms of possibility or impossibility, and the equipollence
between necessity and possibility only holds under determinate conditions,
as was shown in 2.1 above. The truth conditions (i)-(iii) define Abelard’s
“compatibility semantics” for modal sentences. It is possible to give along
these lines the truth conditions for quantified modal sentences as well. This
is what Abelard suggests in Dial. 200.22-32.32 The sentence “It is possible
for some man to be φ” is true if being φ is not repugnant to the nature of
some man. Since all human beings have the same nature, the sentence is
true iff the predicate “being φ” is not repugnant to one of the predicates
constituting the set Nathumanbeing. The sentence “It is possible for every
man to be φ” is true if being φ is compatible with the nature of every man.
32«Relinquitur ergo particularem negativam esse “quemdam hominem non est possibile
esse album”, sicut et “quidam homo non est albus”. Et est talis sensus: “cuiusdam hominis
natura repugnat albo vel non patitur album”. Sic enim recte videntur mihi omnes huius-
modi propositiones exponi, ut de rebus ipsis agamus sic: “omnem homineni possibile esse
album”, idest: “natura omnis bominis patitur albedinem”, idest: “nullius hominis natura
repugnat albedini”; “nullum hominem possibile est esse album”: “nullius hominis natura
patitur album”, idest: “uniuscuiusque hominis natura repugnat albo; quemdam bominem
possibile est esse album”: “cuiusdam hominis natum patitur album”, idest: “non repugnat
albo”; particularis autem negativa iam superius exposita est. Sic etiam alias modales de
rebus exponas, ut eas quae de necessario fiunt, sic : “omnem hominem necesse est esse
album”, idest: “omnis hominis natura albedinem necessario exigit”».
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Again, the sentence is true iff “being φ” is not repugnant to one of the pred-
icates constituting the set Nathumanbeing. Note that, according to what I
called here the Abelardian “compatibility semantics”, the three modal sen-
tences “it is possible for every man to be φ”, “it is possible for some man to
be φ” and “it is possible for Socrates to be φ” are equivalent, i.e. they have
exactly the same truth conditions.
In the following section, I consider Abelard’s admittance of unrealized
possibilities, and I try to say something on the sort of epistemology of modal-
ities we can extrapolate from his texts.
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3.2 Unrealized Possilities and Their Epistemology
What is at first sight problematic about Abelard’s example of Socrates being
possibly a bishop is that, if we consider the proposition to be true, we have
to justify how we can admit that the predicate “being a bishop” possibly
inheres in Socrates even if it never actually inheres in him. Abelard says in
fact that the proposition “It is possible for Socrates to be a bishop” is true
even if Socrates was never a bishop and never will be one. Abelard seems
to introduce the interpretation of possibility as compatibility with a thing’s
nature exactly to make room for the existence of unrealized possibilities of
this sort. This understanding of possibility is indeed what allows him to
claim that the meaning of possible inherence could not be spelled out in
terms of actual inherence. This is what Abelard proposes in the Dialectica:
Cum ergo dicimus: “Socrates est episcopus possibiliter” et uerum enun-
tiamus, quomodo per “possibiliter” inhaerentiam episcopi ad Socratem
determinamus, cum ipsa omnino non sit? Nullo enim modo proprietas
episcopi Socrati laico cohaeret. Nec “posse cohaerere” dicendum est
“cohaerere”. (Dial.193.19-23)
As was said above, the example used here by Abelard, concerning the unre-
alized possibility that a certain subject has of being a bishop, was already
discussed in some debates on modal propositions prior to Abelard, at least
starting from the late eleventh and early twelfth century. We find indeed sim-
ilar examples in Garlandus Compotista’s Dialectica and in the discussions
on modalities by William of Champeaux and Goselin of Soissons reported
in the two twelfth-century manuscripts M1 and M3, that have been recently
considered by Martin in (Martin, 2016).33
The discussion about unrealized potencies was probably motivated by
the need of twelfth century logicians to interpret and comment on the the-
ory of modalities developed by Aristotle in De Interpretatione 9 and 13. In
the very end of De Int. 13, while presenting a list concerning all different
sorts of possibilities that exist, Aristotle also includes some possibilities that
he calls pure potencies, i.e. potencies that are never followed by actualiza-
tion. Aristotle also deals with unrealized possibilities in chapter 9 of the De
Interpretatione, where he claims that a proposition like “It is possible for
this cloak to be cut up” should be considered true even if the cloak will never
33For a brief presentation of these manuscripts, see 3.1 on page 151.
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be cut up. Early medieval thinkers had then the necessity to include into
their discussion of modalities an account of unrealized or “extra actu” pos-
sibilities, and the understanding of possibility in terms of non repugnancy
with nature could have developed precisely to this purpose. If possibility
is understood in this way, in fact, the admittance of unrealized possibilities
becomes quite straightforward and unproblematic: according to this view,
to say that something is possible for a subject has nothing to do with this
subject’s potentialities, powers or capacities, nor what is possible for a sub-
ject is determined by the external actual circumstances in which the subject
finds himself, by its physical constitution or its contingent situation. Possi-
bility is only defined in terms of non repugnancy with the subject’s essential
features.
The passage from the Dialectca where Abelard defends the possibility
Socrates has of being a bishop is interesting not only for its explicit ad-
mittance of unrealized possibilities, but also as a hint of how we should
understand Abelard’s epistemology of modality, i.e. his theory concerning
how we know and how we can justify our belief that something is possibly
or necessarily predicated of a thing. In virtue of what, for instance, are we
justified in saying that “It is possible for Socrates to be a bishop” is a true
proposition, while, say, “It is possible for Socrates to be irrational” is a false
one? In Dialectica 193-194, Abelard says that our perception of the actual
world does not only guide us to the knowledge of realized possibilities, but in
some sense it is also a good guide to the knowledge of unrealized ones. This
is because our perception that some property actually inheres in a member
of a certain species – e.g., that being a bishop actually inheres in the man
S – does not only ground our knowledge that S possibly is a bishop, inas-
much as what is actual is also possible, but it also grounds our knowledge
that being a bishop possibly inheres in all individuals that are of the same
species as S, in so far as they all have the same nature, and therefore the
same possibilities and the same impossibilities. From what we perceive as
actual in one subject, then, we derive a knowledge about what is possibly
(though not actually) predicated of the other subjects with the same nature.
In this sense, perception is a guide not only to realized, but also to unrealized
possibilities.34 This is what Abelard defends in the Dialectica:
34Note that this is not the case within an interpretation of possibility in terms of powers
or potentialities. From the perception, say, that a certain man S has the power or dis-
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Cum dicimus: ‘Socratem possibile est esse episcopum’, etsi numquam
sit, tamen uerum est, cum natura ipsius episcopo non repugnet; quod
ex aliis eiusdem speciei indiuiduis perpendimus, quae proprietatem
episcopi iam actu participare uidemus. Quicquid enim actu contingit
in uno, idem in omnibus eiusdem speciei indiuiduis contingere posse
arbitramur, quippe eiusdem sunt omnino naturae; et quaecumque uni
communis est substantia, et omnibus; alioquin specie differrent quae
solis discrepant accidentibus. (Dial. 193.31-194.5)
A similar position is held by Abelard also in Dial. 385, where Abelard says
that:
Quod enim in uno particularium uidemus contingere, id in omnibus
eiusdem speciei indiuiduis posse contingere credimus; “potentiam” enim
et “impotentiam” secundum naturam accipimus, ut id tantum quisque
possit suscipere quod eius natura permittit, idque non possit quod
natura expellit. Cum autem omnia eiusdem speciei particularia eius-
dem sint naturae unde etiam dicitur ipsa species tota indiuiduorum
substantia esse, idem omnia recipere potentia sunt et impotentia. (Dial.
385.1-8)
In this last passage, Abelard claims that possibility and impossibility (here,
potentia and impotentia) are to be understood with respect to nature (se-
cundum naturam), as what is permitted and allowed or instead as what
is rejected by the nature of something. Because all individuals of the same
species are all of the same nature, from what we see actualized in one individ-
ual we might derive a knowledge about possibilities which are yet unrealized
in other individuals of the same species.
Nevertheless, perception – or inductive abstraction, as Knuuttila calls it
(Knuuttila, 1993, p. 91) – is certainly not a complete or infallible guide to
the knowledge of natures and possibilities. Perception is not fallible in the
sense that we might be wrong about which individuals belong to the same
natural kind, and consequently in thinking that a certain individual have
the same nature as other individuals. This is because according to Abelard
we are unproblematically able to classify things in the proper natural kinds
(see 3.1.1 on page 155). It is fallible because not all the possibilities of a
position to be or to do φ we are not allowed to derive the general belief that all subjects
with the same nature (in this case, all men) have the power or disposition to be or do φ.
In this sense, perception is not a good guide to possibilities intended as potentialities.
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thing could be known through our perception of what is actual in the other
individuals of the same species, since the fact that a certain property does
not actually inhere in any member of a species does not entail that having
that property is impossible for them. There could be possibilities which are
never manifested in any member of the species and are yet real possibilities
of these individuals. Indeed, as I suggest in the next section, there are some
possibilies that are in principle non actualizable in any member of a species
but that are still possible for them, such as the possibility human beings
have of not being able to laugh or the possibility for corporeal substances
not to have a colour. Perception is then not an infallible or complete guide
to the knowledge of modalities. It is though the only epistemic access that
we have available to individuals’ possibilities and necessities.
3.3 Unrealizable but Conceivable Possibilities
According to the “compatibility semantics” that Abelard advances to inter-
pret modal propositions, some predication – say, “S is φ” – is necessary if φ
is an essential or a substantial form of S. It is necessary in this sense that,
for example, this man is an animal or that this man is mortal. The same
predication “S is φ” is instead said to be possible if being φ is not repugnant
to any predication that constitute the nature of S. We are so allowed to
say, for instance, that it is possible for this man to be a bishop, or that it
is possible for a blind man to see, or for an amputee to walk (I’ll consider
these last two examples in 3.4 below). Within this paradigm, we are also
allowed to say that it is possible for a man not to be able to laugh, and,
generally speaking, it is possible for any individual substance not to have
one of its “inseparable accidents”. This idea is defended by Abelard in his
commentary to the theory of propria presented by Porphyry in the Isagoge.
As it is known, Porphyry defined propria as kinds of inseparable accidents,
i.e. as those properties that – although not constituting the essence or the
nature of their subjects – are nevertheless inseparable in actu from them.
Examples given by Porphyry of this peculiar kind of accidents are the ability
to laugh for men, or the blackness for crows or Ethiopians. They are insep-
arable in so far as there is no realizable situation in which the subject does
not have them: it would not be possible, for example, that a man exists who
is not able to laugh. When taken in pair with the definition of “accident”
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as that property which can belong or not belong to the subject without the
subject being destroyed (praeter subiecti corruptione), Porphyry’s definition
of propria seems at a first sight to be self contradictory. In which sense
do these properties accidentally belong to their subjects while being at the
same time inseparable from them? The solution proposed by Porphyry to
reconcile these two conflicting characterizations of propria (as both insepa-
rable and accidental) was to consider these properties, although inseparable
in act from their subjects, as separable in mind from them, in the sense
that they could be conceived as separated from their subjects.35 Essential
properties would instead be the ones that are inseparable both in act and
in mind, so that a situation in which they do not belong to their subjects
would be not only unrealizable but also inconceivable.
In his glosses on Porphyry, Abelard compares Porphyry’s treatment of
propria to the one Boethius gives in his De Divisione. There, Boethius
argues against Porphyry that propria are not separable from their subjects
in any sense, neither in act nor in the mind. The abilities to count and
to do geometry, for instance, are absolutely inseparable from human beings,
because even if they are not part of human beings’ substance, if they were
separated from it, this substance would be destroyed.36 Boethius’ position
seems here to be that, even if propria are not essential properties of the
subject, because they do not constitute its nature nor they are part of its
definition, they are nevertheless absolutely inseparable from it, i.e., they are
not separable either in act or in reason. In LI Isag. 90-92, Abelard aims
to reconcile the opinions of the two authorities, Porphyry and Boethius, by
saying that their controversy rests on an ambiguity in the terminology.37
35The relevant passage for this thesis is the incipit of Isagoge 05: «Accidens uero est
quod adest et abest praeter subiecti corruptionem. Diuiditur autem in duo, in separabile et
in inseparabile; namque dormire est separabile accidens, nigrum uero esse inseparabiliter
coruo et Aethiopi accidit (potest autem subintellegi et coruus albus et Aethiops amittens
colorem praeter subiecti corruptionem)».
36This is what Boethius says on this: «Aliud rursus est quod ratione separari non possit,
quod si separatum sit species interimatur, ut cum dicimus inesse homini ut solus numerare
possit uel geometriam discere. Quod si haec possibilitas ab homine seiungatur, homo ipse
non permanet; sed haec non statim earum sunt quae in substantia insunt, nam non idcirco
homo est quoniam haec facere potest, sed quoniam rationalis est atque mortalis» (LI Isag.
89.38-90.5).
37The reconciliation is though unbalanced on the side of Porphyry, because Abelard
says that Boethius’s position is not only contrasting with the one held by Porphyry, but
is also inconsistent in itself: «At vero hoc loco Boethius tam sibi ipso quam Porphyrio
contraries esse videtur» (LI Isag. 90.5-7).
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There are in fact, according to Abelard, two ambiguities in Porphyry’s and
Boethius’ discussions: the first concerns the notion of “separability in mind”,
the second concerns the notion of “possibility”. As for the first ambiguity,
Abelard says that “separability in mind” could be interpreted in two ways:
with respect to our human mental abilities or with respect to “the nature
of things”. While Porphyry uses this latter interpretation, Boethius uses
the first one. As for the second ambiguity, Abelard says that there are two
ways in which some property is said to be possibly belonging to a subject; in
the first sense it is not possible that propria do not belong to their subject,
because there are no possible situations in which it happens that the subject
exists and it is separated from one of its propria. Boethius, who uses this
sense of possibility, is then right in denying that propria are separable from
their subjects. There is however a weaker sense of possibility with respect
to which we can truly say that it is possible for a subject to be without a
proprium, in virtue of the fact that inseparable accidents are not required
(exiguntur) by the nature of the thing.38 In this second, weaker, sense, it is
possible that a thing is without a proprium, e.g. it is possible for a man to
be unable to laugh, in the sense that the ability to laugh is not included in
human beings’ nature.
This is the outline of Abelard’s argument: Boethius says that propria
are accidents. In saying so he admits that they are not part of the nature
of their subject. Because, Abelard thinks, the nature of a thing is anterior,
or prior, to its accidents, it must be true that accidents are separable from
the substance in some sense, for there could indeed be no priority without
separability. But if propria are in some sense separable from the substance
of their subject, and clearly they are not separable in act, the only way in
which they are separable is separability in reason (ratione separari possunt):
Sed si, ut ipse ait Boethius, accidentia sunt propria, quomodo saltem
ratione separari non possunt, quae natura separari permittit? Sicut
et ipse Boethius ibidem in ipsis Diuisionibus glaucitatem oculorum a
subiecto ratione diuidit, Porphyrius nigrum a coruo. Praeterea ipse
Porphyrius ad differentiam proprii et speciei in sequentibus dicit, quod
ante subsistit species quam proprium, proprium uero posterius fit in
38Abelard refers to the ambiguity of the term “possibility” saying that this term could
be understood positively or negatively. The term has a “positive” meaning if we take it as
referring to what is actualizable or realizable; it has a negative meaning if we take it as
referring to what is not repugnant to nature.
170
specie. Quomodo autem ante est quam proprium in natura, si non
possit ab ea proprium saltem ratione separari? (LI Isag. 90.10-18)
So what Abelard is maintaining here is that if some property is an accident, it
is posterior to the nature of a substance; if it is posterior, it is also separable
from its nature, and if it is separable from the nature, it is separable in
reason (potest ratione separari).
How are we to interpret this separability in reason? There are, Abelard
says, two possible interpretations for this notion: in the first sense, it is
“separable in reason” what we, as rational human agents, are able to conceive
as separated. This is what Abelard calls separability in reason “quantum ad
discretionem hominum”. This is not the sense in which propria are separable,
and Abelard denies that we could in fact conceive or imagine a man who is
unable to laugh, or that in general we could conceive any substance as being
without its inseparable accidents. This is because our mental activity is very
much influenced by our experiences, so that our imagination is limited and
governed by what we have perceived as happening in act. Since Boethius
intends the separability in mind with respect to our discernment, he is then
right in denying that the ability to laugh or to count is separable in mind
from men. The second sense in which the separability in reason can be
interpreted, the one Abelard attributes to Porphyry, has nothing to do with
our mental capacities, but concerns the natures of things: some property is
separable in reason if it is not part of the nature of a thing. This is Abelard’s
separability quantum ad naturam rei:
Sed sciendum est quod duobus modis “separari ratione” accipitur, scil-
icet uel quantum ad discretionem hominum uel quantum ad naturam
rei. Quantum autem ad naturam Porphyrius dicit speciem priorem
esse proprio, Boethius uero quantum ad discretionem nostram dicit
potentiam numerandi uel discendi geometriam ratione non separari ab
homine. (LI Isag. 90.19-24)
We should now ask whether “conceptual separability” quantum ad naturam
rei entails possibility in any sense in Abelard’s mind, i.e. whether the fact
that something is conceivable entails that it is also possible, in some sense of
possibility. My opinion is that it does, and this interpretation rests mainly on
three passages from Abelard’s tractatus De proprio. In the first, Abelard says
that the nature of human beings would allow, or would be compatible with
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the lack of the capacity to laugh, because this capacity does not constitute its
essence. But this is precisely the way in which Abelard defines possibility
within the semantics that was presented above: possible is that which is
allowed by the nature of a thing (i.e., that which “natura permittit”, or
“natura patitur”):
[Propria] in natura rei iuxta eundem Boethium et Porphyrium separa-
bilia sint, quia uidelicet bene natura hominis pateretur ipsum esse sine
risibilitate, quippe ea substantiam eius non constituit sicut rationali-
tas et mortalitas nec per eam natura hominem facit sicut per illas. (LI
Isag. 90.39-91.3, my emphasis)
In a second passage, Abelard distinguishes between two senses of what pos-
sibly is, i.e. of what “contingere potest”: in a first sense it is impossible
for a man to be without the ability to laugh, because it could not happen
in act that there is a man who is unable to laugh. In another sense, how-
ever, Abelard admits that it might happen that a man is without this ability
(«alio modo contingere potest hominem posse esse sine proprio»), because
it is not required by its nature to have this property («non ex eo quod est
homo exigere proprium»):
Sed licet homo non possit esse sine risibilitate quodammodo, quia
uidelicet non potest contingere, ut homo sit et non risibilis, alio tamen
modo contingere potest, ut uoluit Porphyrius hominem posse esse sine
proprio, ut uidelicet negatiue intelligatur sic: non ex eo quod est homo,
exigere proprium. (LI Isag. 91.11-16, my emphasis)
In the first sense, possibility seems to be understood as some sort of of real-
izability or actualizability: it is impossible that a man is without the ability
to laugh because such a situation is not realizable. In the second sense, pos-
sibility is instead understood in terms of compatibility with a thing’s nature.
If some property is not required (exigitur) by the nature of a thing, it is not
a necessary one, and therefore the contrary property is possible.
The last passage I want to propose as evidence that conceptual separa-
bility entails for Abelard some sense of possibility is the following:
Quod itaque dicitur homo posse esse sine risibili, duobus modis ac-
cipi potest, scilicet uel quod ex eo quod homo est, non exigat risibile,
quod uerum iuxta acceptionem Porphyrii, uel quod homo possit esse
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ita, quod non sit risibilis, quod quia falsum est, bene Boethius negat.
Nec contrarius Porphyrius, cum Porphyrius “posse esse” negatiue ac-
cipiat, Boethius affirmatiue acceptum remoueat. (LI Isag. 91.27-32,
my emphasis)
The passage points out more explicitly that it is the notion of “being possible
for something” (posse esse) that Abelard charges of being ambiguous, and
susceptible of being interpreted in two different ways. Again, the distinction
between two senses of being possible is done in terms of what is realizable on
the one hand (e.g. it is realizable that some man exists who is not able to
laugh) and in terms of what is compatible with the nature of something on
the other (it is compatible with the nature of man to be without the ability
to laugh). In the first sense, the one used by Boethius, it is impossible that
a man is not able to laugh; in the other sense, the one Abelard attributes
to Porphyry, it is possible.
On the basis of this twofold interpretation of the notion of possibility, we
can now evaluate the statement “Socrates is not able to laugh” (Possibile
est Socratem non esse risibilem) in two ways, getting two different results:
in the first interpretation the statement is false, inasmuch as what it says is
unrealizable, in the second interpretation the statement is true, inasmuch as
it is “conceivable”. The two different readings of the modal notion are not
reducible to one another. We might try however to interpret both of them
extensionally, drawing upon two different sets of possible situations:
(I) realizable situations, i.e. situations that are possible in the sense that
they can happen, or that they are in actu possible,
(II) situations that are possible in the sense that they are in some sense
“conceivable” , i.e, that are non repugnant to nature.
Let us note that set (I) of possible situations is a proper subset of (II), the
set of conceivable situations, for everything that is possible in the first sense
is also possible in the second. The converse does not hold, i.e. there are
conceivable situations that are not actualizable situations.
If the idea of conceivability, or separability in the reason, is present in
nuce already in Porphyry, it is Abelard who draws first a link from it to a
certain sense of possibility. Nevertheless, it is not easy to understand what
Abelard has in mind when talking of “conceivability with respect to the na-
ture of things”. There are, I think, two ways in which we could understand
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Abelard’s notion of separability in reason. The first is to intend this con-
ceivability as an epistemological notion, but referring it to some rational
superior agent who would have, unlike human beings, a complete knowledge
of the natures of things and therefore would be able to mentally separate
the properties that constitute the nature of a substance from the proper-
ties that belong to it only accidentally. The second is to use the notion of
“separability in reason” not as an epistemological notion, but instead as a
metaphysical one. “Separable in mind” in this sense would refer to those
properties that do not contradict the essential properties of an individual,
independently of any reference to the epistemological capacities of rational
agents. In both cases, this separability in reason has nothing to do with our
mental capacities or with our ability to conceive things and situations. The
capacity we have of conceiving or imagining is then not a “good guide” to
possibility in any sense, and therefore the notion of conceivability plays no
role in Abelard’s epistemology of possibility. From what we are able to con-
ceive, in fact, we can derive no knowledge whatsoever about what is possible
or impossible for a subject.
The commentary on Porphyry’s treatise on propria is not the only place
where Abelard treats statements about possibility as being ambiguous and
susceptible of being evaluated both true and false depending on the meaning
we give to the modal term. In the next section I consider other modal
propositions treated by Abelard as ambiguous, such as the propositions “it
is possible for an amputee to walk”, “it is possible for a crippled man to
fight” and “it is possible for a blind man to see”.
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3.4 Simple Possibilities and Determinate Poten-
tialities
In Dialectica 96.17-99.24, Abelard presents his theory of “natural potencies
and impotencies” (potentiae et impotentiae naturales), i.e. possibilities and
impossibilities that belong to substances in virtue of their nature and not in
virtue of being acquired through some sort of learning, experience or train-
ing. Here, Abelard introduces an interesting distinction between “simple”
potencies (potentiae simplices, or that belong simpliciter to their subject)
and “determinate” potencies, that the author also calls “aptitudes” (poten-
tiae determinatae or aptitudines). Potencies that belong “simpliciter” to
their owners are in turn divided into those ones that are required by the
nature of a thing, inasmuch as they constitute the thing’s nature, and those
that are simply compatible with the nature of the thing, and which belong to
their owners only accidentally. Potencies that belong simpliciter and that
are required by the nature of their subject are for instance the potency hu-
man beings have of being rational and mortal,39 or the potency that honey
has of being sweet.40 Simple potencies that are merely compatible with the
nature of their owners are, for example, the potency human beings have of
being white or black, and also the potency they have to run or to fight. We
know that these last potencies are compatible with the nature of human be-
ings because we have experience of some men and women who are actually
runners or pugilists: because all human beings are of a same nature, what is
actualized in one is compatible with the nature of all. Natural simple pos-
sibilities are then the same for all members of the same species. They are
also immutably belonging to their owners, in the sense that it is impossible
for an individual to loose one of its simple possibilities or to gain different
ones during its lifetime. Because the nature of a substance is invariable,
everything that is compatible or required by it in a certain moment, it is so
in every moment of time (or better, in every moment in which the substance
exists). Furthermore, simple potencies belong to their owners independently
39«Sunt autem aliae potentiae vel impotentiae quae naturae propriae sunt, non aptitu-
dinis, in eo scilicet quod non solum eas natura contulit, verum etiam eas exigit, ut ra-
tionalitas, irrationalitas, mortalitas, immortalitas, quae speciei cui insunt, naturam totam
occupant nec ei per accidens, sed substantialiter insunt. Omnes enim homines rationales
sunt vel mortales, sed non omnes salubres vel pugillatores dicuntur; unde haec per accidens
inesse clarum est» (Dial. 96.34-97.3).
40See Dial. 99.21-24.
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of the external circumstances, of the physical constitution and of any con-
tingent condition their owners find themselves into. The only condition that
determines which simple natural potencies an individual has or has not is
this individual’s nature.
Determinate potencies, or aptitudes, are somehow also dependent on
the nature of their subjects: it is a necessary condition for having an ap-
titude that its possession is not incompatible with the nature of the thing.
However, the possession of an aptitude also depends on other conditions,
such as the physical conformation of an individual and perhaps – Abelard
is not clear on this point – the external and contingent circumstances the
individual is in.41 The distinctive mark of determinate potencies, which dif-
ferentiates them from simple ones, is that they usually require, when they
are attributed to a thing, a certain qualification or determination, that is
usually expressed by means of an adverb: determinate potencies are for in-
stance the ability to fight well, to run rapidly, or to be easily broken. It is
because of this that Abelard refers to them as “potentiae determinatae” or
“cum determinationes”. Other examples of aptitudes are the potency that
certain material things have to be hard or soft (i.e., to be hardly or eas-
ily broken and cut), or the potency that some animate things have to be
in good or bad health (i.e., the aptitude they have of getting more or less
easily sick).
Neque enim cursor aut pugillator a simplici potentia currendi vel pug-
nandi (quae enim fortasse substantialiter insunt), nominantur, immo
a potentia pugnandi facile vel currendi leviter. Potentiarum itaque
41It is not clear whether the possess of a determinate potency is also dependent on
the external circumstances in which the subject is. Paul Thom (Thom, 2003b, p. 51)
seems to think that external circumstances could prevent a subject from having a certain
determinate potency. Thom alludes there to the Stoic problem, reported by Alexander
of Aphrodisias, concerning whether chaff which is in the depths of the sea still has the
possibility to burn. Thom says that, according to Abelard’s understanding of possibility,
it would be true to say that chaff has the simple potency to burn – insofar as it is
compatible with its nature: “Chaff at the bottom of the ocean has precisely the same
nature as chaff on dry land”. But chaff does not have the determinate (Thom says,
the “concrete”) potency to burn because of the external circumstance in which it finds
itself. This concrete possibility is prevented by an external circumstance, and not by an
inappropriate physical constitution of the chaff. Thom is here suggesting that for Abelard
the possess of determinate, or concrete, potency is not only dependent on the nature and
the physical constitution of a thing, but also on other external contingent conditions which
are independent of the thing itself. However, as far as I know, Abelard never provides
examples of such a situation, i.e. of a situation in which a subject is prevented from having
a determinate potency because of some external factor.
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vel impotentiarum huiusmodi aliae sunt ad aliquid facile faciendum,
ut potentiae vel impotentiae facile pugnandi vel currendi, aliae non
ad patiendum facile, sed magis ad resistendum facile, ut “sanativus”
dicitur eoquod possit non facile infirmari, idest resistere vehementer
infirmitati, ac vix eum contingat infirmari, “aegrotativi” vero aecon-
trario dicuntur, ex impotentia scilicet eiusdem, per quod videlicet non
queant facile resistere infirmitati. “Durum” quoque dixit secundum
potentiam non facile secari, hocest secundum id quod facile sectioni
resistat; “molle” vero secundum impotentiam eiusdem, de eo scilicet
quod non possit non facile secari, idest facile resistere sectioni. (Dial.
97.4-14)
When a determinate potency belongs to an individual, it does not necessarily
also belong to all other individuals of the same species. Not every human
being, for instance, has the determinate potency to fight easily, only some
do. In particular, only human beings that have a particular, and similar,
physical consitution have this aptitude, for instance those ones who have
the appropriate flexibility of arms and legs:
Alia enim est potentia pugnandi simpliciter, quae omnibus aequaliter
inest hominibus, alia potentia pugnandi facile secundum flexibilium
membrorum aptitudinem, quae non omnibus inest. (LI Cat. 229.25-
27)
Moreover, differently from simple possibilities, determinate potencies do not
omnitemporally belong to their subjects: even if a human being has the
ability to fight easily in a certain time, this does not necessarily mean that
he or she has this potency in every time in which exists. It is in fact possible
for an individual to loose (and maybe also gain, although again Abelard
is not clear on this) one of its determinate potencies: because the possess
of such potencies depend on the physical conformation of a subject, and
because the physical conformation of a substance are susceptible to change,
the subject’s aptitudes are also susceptible of varying through time. The
famous boxer Muhammad Ali certainly had the determinate ability to fight
well, but he probably did not have such an ability when he was a small
child, nor when he was an old man. If circumstances had changed – e.g. if
he were to loose an arm in a certain moment of his life – he would have lost
perhaps the determinate potency to fight easily from that moment on. He
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would have nevertheless maintained, as a member of the species of human
beings, his simple potency to fight.
Abelard’s distinction between simple and determinate potencies could
also be described as a distinction between “abstract” and “concrete” po-
tencies of individuals. This is how Paul Thom characterizes the distinction
(Thom, 2003b, p. 51). Simple potencies are said “abstract” potencies inas-
much as they do not refer to what the individual is concretely able to do and
to what he is actually capable of. Determinate potencies, instead, are the
possibilities that are really open to a subject, in the sense that they represent
the subject’s effective capacities, powers and dispositions. I will also refer
to determinate potencies as the potentialities of an individual substance, in
so far as – differently from simple potencies, which are permitted by nature
but could be unactualizable – determinate potencies are susceptible of being
actualized in a certain moment of time, given the actual condition of their
owners (and maybe also given the suitability of the external circumstances).
Abelard thinks that in common language, when we talk of an individ-
ual’s capacities, we usually refer to this second sense of the term “possible”,
i.e. to what a subject is concretely able to do, or to what an individual can
really become. The sense of possibility we use in common language refers
then to aptitudes, or determinate potencies (LI Cat. 229.34-36).42 However,
Abelard says that the proper and more fundamental sense of possibility is
the first one, i.e, the sense of simple possibilities. Using a distinction I
already proposed in section 3.3 above, we could say that the distinction be-
tween simple and determinate potencies retraces the distinction between a
wider sense of possibility as non repugnancy with nature and a stricter sense
of possibility as what is “realizable” or “actualizable” in a certain possible
situation. Just as I said there that what is possible in the sense of “realiz-
able” is for Abelard a proper subset of what is possible in the sense that it
is “compatible with nature”, so we could say that all determinate potencies
that are effectively realizable by their subjects are properly included in the
general potencies that these subjects have in virtue of their nature.
42«Mancus in natura possit pugnare, sicut curtatus pedes habere vel ambulare, non
tamen eum ad hoc potentem dicere solemus, cum aptitudine careat» (LI Cat. 229.34-36,
quoted in (Martin, 2001, p. 102)).
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3.4.1 An amputee can walk and a blind man can see
The distinction between simple and determinate potentiae or impotentiae
is to be found in many passages of Dialectica and Logica Ingredientibus.43
Consistently with the passage just read, Abelard always interprets simple
potencies as the ones that are compatible with (or required by) the nature
of a thing secundum hoc quod natura rei permittit (exigit) (LI Cat. 229.25),
while determinate potencies correspond to potentialities – or concrete, ac-
tualizable potencies – and can be represented as a sort of “subset” of simple
potencies. It is in referring to this distinction between two senses of pos-
sibility that Abelard claims that modal propositions like “A crippled man
possibly fights” (Mancus pugnare potest) is susceptible of been considered
both true and false: it is true if we interpret it according to the first sense
of possibility, since the simple potency to fight is properly attributed to all
human beings and for all their lifetime; it is false if we interpret possibility
in the sense of potentialities or aptitudes, because a man who is now crip-
pled had lost (or never had) the concrete possibility to fight. With a similar
argument, Abelard says that other modal propositions could be considered
both true and false, such as the one stating that “an amputee can have feet”
or that “it is possible for an amputee to walk” (Possibile est curtatum pedes
habere vel ambulare): again, this is true if we take “possible” as indicating
the simple potency the amputee has to walk, in so far as having this potency
is allowed by his nature and not repugnant to it. We know that the ability to
walk is compatible with the nature of man because we observe some member
of the same species exercising this ability, just as we know that the ability
to fight is compatible with the nature of man because we observe some man
who are actually fighting (LI Isag. 105.3-4; LI Cat. 229.34-5).44 On the ba-
43See in particular Dialectica 96-99; 384-389; 391-392; LI Isag. 96-109; LI Cat. 122-139;
223-251; 259-285; LI De Int. 265.516-519.
44 Indeed, if Abelard were to follow the tradition in considering bipedalitas as a sub-
stantial predication of human beings, and part of the definition of “man”, he would be
forced to say not only that “it is possible for an amputee to have two feet” is a true modal
proposition, but also that “it is necessary for an amputee to have two feet” is true. If
indeed bipedalitas is a substantial form of human being, it is a property which is required
by the nature of man, and therefore every man has it of necessity and could not loose it
without his substance being lost and destroyed too: «cum bipes homini sit substantiale,
non potest amittere esse bipedem, nisi corrumpatur secundum substantiam hominis, quam
necessario bipedalitas facit sicut rationalitas et ceterae differentiae» (LI Isag. 104.18-23).
If it is so, however, it is hard to deal with the case of the amputee, which seems to offer
a counterexample to the thesis for which necessarily every man is bipedal. This is why
Martin suggested that probably Abelard was quite discontent with considering bipedalitas
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sis of the same distinction between simple potencies and aptitudes, Abelard
justifies his idea that it is possible for a man who has lost his sight, or who
was born blind, to see. Because the simple capacity to see is not repugnant
to the nature of human beings, and because the possess of a simple potency
is independent of the actual, contingent physical constitution of a subject,
the proposition saying that a blind man can see should be considered true,
if we interpret this possibility secundum naturam, i.e. as a simple potency:
Quilibet enim homo, etiam ille qui caecus est, possibilis est uidere.
Bene enim tota eius natura pateretur ut et tempore suo uisionem sus-
cepisset et eam in uita sua custodisset, ut numquam in eo caecitas
conti[n]gisset. Quod enim in uno particularium uidemus contingere,
id in omnibus eiusdem speciei indiuiduis posse contingere credimus;
“potentiam” enim et “impotentiam” secundum naturam accipimus, ut
id tantum quisque possit suscipere quod eius natura permittit, idque
non possit quod natura expellit. Cum autem omnia eiusdem speciei
particularia eiusdem sint naturae – unde etiam dicitur ipsa species tota
indiuiduorum substantia esse -, idem omnia recipere potentia sunt et
impotentia. (Dial. 384.2-385.8)
The example of the blind man who possibly sees offers some interesting
elements concerning Abelard’s understanding of possibility. The blind-man
case was analysed in detail by Martin in (Martin, 2001) and (Martin, 2004b),
who argues that from the way Abelard deals with it we might infer two
important things about his conception of modalities: first, that contingency
must be referred not only to the future but also to the present and the past,
which shoud not therefore be considered necessary, inasmuch as things could
have happenend differently than they did or do; and second, that there are,
according to Abelard, many alternative possible histories, i.e. many possible
ways in which things could have been, different from the one that actually
takes place.
Abelard talks of the two properties of having sight and being blind as if
they were in a relation of habitus and privatio, and he follows Aristotle in
maintaining that anyone who is susceptible of the habitus is also susceptible
as a substantial form of man (Martin, 2001, p. 103). Anyway, Abelard tries in LI Isag.
104-105 to keep both things together – the existence of men that are amputees and the
thesis for which bipedalitas is an essential feature of man – by saying that we should under-
stand bipedalitas as the disposition or the natural capacity of having two feet, instead of
understanding it as the actual possess of two feet, just as we should understand risibilitas
as the ability to laugh and not as the property of being actuallly laughing.
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of the corresponding privatio. Any human being who has sight might lose
this potentiality and become blind, just as any man with a thick head of
hair might become bold.45 Starting from the moment in which a natural
potentiality such as the ability to see or to walk is lost, the habitus “turns”
into the corresponding privatio, which is according to Abelard an irreversible
state, i.e., there is no possibility for the former habitus to be reinstated. This
means that once someone has become blind, there is no chance for his sight
to be restored, and no chance that he might have the concrete potentiality
to see again:
Cum autem de habitu transitus fiat in priuationem, de priuatione in
habitum impossibile est fieri regressionem. (Dial. 384.28-30)
In order to interpret Abelard’s understanding of modalities, it is very im-
portant to stress the impossibility of a reversion from privatio to habitus:
when Abelard says that there is a sense in which it is possible for a blind
man to see, this is not to be understood in the sense that possibly, in some
future time, a man who is now blind will see again.
Generally speaking, the blind man’s possibility to see is not referred to a
time other than the time in which the man is actually blind: what Abelard
maintains is that a blind man has the possibility to see in the same time
in which he is blind («Posset enim contingere, ut is qui caecus factus est,
videret hoc etiam tempore quo caecus permanet»). This, Abelard explains,
should be taken in the sense that things might have gone in such a way that
the person who is actually blind did not become blind but would have the
effective, concrete ability to see (Martin, 2001, p. 110):
45A subject is susceptible of a privatio only after having had the corresponding habitus –
or, if he never had the habitus, only after having reached the time in which, in virtue of its
nature, he should have had the habitus. For example, Abelard says, it is not correct to say
that a newborn dog is blind before he reached the time in which he should naturally have
the ability of sight, while it is correct to say that the animal is blind if after having had
the ability to see he looses it, or if after nine days from his birth (i.e. the time after which
he should be naturally able to see) he still does not have the ability to see: « Tunc autem
tantum priuationem contingere dicimus quando habitum in suo quoque tempore, quod
scilicet ei natura determinauit, deesse uidemus, ueluti, si in nono die catulus uisionem non
recipiat, eum caecum esse non dubitamus. Non itaque omnis ille priuationem habet qui
non habet habitum, sed qui, inquit Aristoteles, quando contingit habere, non habet, id
est tempore quo naturaliter fuerat susceptibilis habitus. “Edentulum enim, inquit, non
omnem illum dicimus qui non habet dentes nec caecum qui non habet uisum, sed qui,
quando contingit habere, non habet”, id est in tempore quo debuit habitus inesse» (Dial.
384.15-24).
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Unde omnes homines concedimus posse videre, etiam eos qui caeci sunt,
nec tamen regressionem posse fieri de privatione ad habitum. Posset
enim contingere, ut is qui caecus factus est, videret hoc etiam tempore
quo caecus permanet, ita quidem, ut numquam habuisset caecitatem
atque nulla esset regressio. Sed hoc omnino impossibile est, ut is
qui caecus est, vel quislibet alius possit videre, postquam caecus est,
hoc est praecedente caecitate reperiret visionem. Concedimus itaque
eum qui caecus est, posse videre simpliciter, quia si videre posset,
ut numquam habuisset caecitatem, sicut ceteri faciunt, posse autem
eum videre, postquam caecus est, non est possibile. Sic curtatum con-
cedimus posse habere duos pedes, sed non posse habere, postquam
amiserit, hoc est non posse recuperare pedes; et stantem concedimus
sedere in praesenti, sed non posse sedere dum stat, in eo scilicet quod
possit habere stationem et sessionem. Nullo itaque modo concedimus,
quod sie caecum possibile est videre simpliciter, quod possit fieri regres-
sio de caecitate ad visum. Quippe, ut dictum est, ita ille qui caecatus
est, posset videre, ut numquam contigisset in eo caecitas et ita illud
non esset regressio caecitatis post visionem. (LI Cat. 273.39-274.18)
In the same way in which we say that a blind man possibly sees, we also
say that an amputee possibly walks, or that a person who is sitting possibly
stands: in all cases, the subject has the simple potency to see, walk or stand,
inasmuch as these potencies are compatible with the subject’s nature, but
at the same time the subject lacks the determinate potency to do it, i.e.
the realization of this potency is not possible given the conditions in which
the subject is in the actual situation and time. However, the subject might
have had the concrete, determinate potency to see, walk or stand, in the
sense that things might have gone so that this person who is actually blind
now would have been seeing now, the person who is actually amputee would
have been walking now, and the person who is sitting now would have been
standing now.
All the modal propositions “It is possible for a blind man to see”, “It is
possible for an amputee to walk” or “It is possible for he who is sitting to
stand” could be interpreted as having the following logical form
– It is possible for S, who is now P, not to be P.
Propositions of this form are susceptible of being interpreted in two ways,
synchronically or diachronically, dependently on the temporal index we at-
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tribute to the modal term “possibly”.46 We can interpret the sentence di-
achronically as saying:
(i) It is possible for S, who is P at time t, not to be P at time t’,
or it could instead be interpreted synchronically as saying:
(ii) It is possible for S, who is P at time t, not to be P at time t,
As Martin has shown, Abelard’s treatment of the blind man case suggests
that he interpreted possibilities in the second sense, as synchronic possibili-
ties. A man who is blind at a certain time, for Abelard, has the possibility
to see at the very same time in which he is blind. Furthermore, because a
man who is blind has no actual possibility to regain his sight in the future
(because there is no possible reversion from privatio to habitus) the possi-
bility he has to see is not referred to some future time in which he might be
actually able to see.
In this respect Abelard distances his view from Aristotle’s understanding
of possibilities and modalities in general. In Aristotle’s view, a proposition
of the form “S is P and possibly S is not P” (e.g. “Socrates sits and pos-
sibly Socrates does not sit”) should be understood as saying that: Socrates
is sitting now and there was in a precedent moment (e.g., yesterday) the
possibility that Socrates would be sitting now. Similarly, when one says that
“Socrates is sitting now and it is possible now that he stands”, he means,
according to an Aristotelian understanding of modalities, that it is possible
for Socrates, who is now sitting, to stand at some future moment of time,
e.g., tomorrow. This understanding of possibilities is said diachronic be-
cause, in sentences like “It is possible for S, who is now P, not to be P”,
the modal term is indexed to a certain time that is different (in the case
of Aristotle, antecedent) from the temporal index given to the sentence “S
is P”. This is not the case in Abelard’s paradigm, at least from what we
could infer from the way in which he deals with the blind-man case: the
set of (simple) possibilities that are open for an individual – which is, as
we saw, determined by what is compatible with its nature – is immutable
and remains the same for all the individual’s lifetime, independently of the
46This distinction between a diachronic and a synchronic understanding of modal sen-
tences was presented by von Wright in (von Wright, 1984). For the use of this distinction
in understanding medieval interpretations of modality, see (Knuuttila, 1993). For the
specific case of Abelard’s theory, see (Martin, 2001) and (Martin, 2004b).
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properties that this individual actually has in a certain moment of time.
The (simple) possibilities that were open for an individual are the same in
past and future times.
3.4.2 The coincidence between the simple-determinate dis-
tinction with the de sensu-de rebus distinction
Because of the ambiguity of the notions of “possibility” and “potency”,
modal propositions like “It is possible for a crippled man to fight”, “It is
possible for an amputee to walk” and “It is possible for a blind man to
see” are susceptible of being evaluated both as true propositions or as false
propositions: they are true if we consider the term “possibility” as referring
to the simple possibility that a man has, qua human being, to fight, walk or
see; they are false if we instead make reference to the determinate possibili-
ties (i.e., to the “real”, “concrete” potentialities) of the three subjects, and
if we consider the subjects not simply as human beings but qua amputee,
qua crippled or qua blind person. An interesting point of the discussion
of simple and determinate potencies is that Abelard refers the semantical
ambiguity of these propositions as being related to the ambiguity that is
present in the proposition “He who is standing possibly sits” (Possibile est
stantem sedere). As was seen in section 1.3 above, this last claim could also
be considered as both true or false depending on the scope that we attribute
to the modal term. When Abelard speaks about the distinction between
the de rebus and de sensu interpretation of modal sentences – which he also
calls the distinction between the divided (per divisionem) and compound
(per compositionem) sense – Abelard says that the claim in question is true
if we interpret the proposition de re, or per divisionem, while it is false if we
interpret it per coniunctionem. It seems indeed that Abelard conceives the
two distinctions between
(i) per divisionem – per coniunctionem possibilities,
(ii) simple – determinate possibilities,
not only as being related, but as if they were pointing out the same se-
mantical ambiguity. Abelard explicitly makes this connection both in the
Dialectica and in LI:
Est igitur aliud enuntiare simpliciter possibile, aliud cum determina-
tione, cum hoc verum sit, illud falsum, sicut et hae[c] propositiones
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de Socrate sedente: “possibile est Socratem stare”, “possibile est stare
dum sedet”; prima enim uera est, secunda falsa (Dial. 385.14-15).
Concedimus itaque eum qui caecus est, posse videre simpliciter, quia si
videre posset, ut numquam habuisset caecitatem, sicut ceteri faciunt,
posse autem eum videre, postquam caecus est, non est possibile. Sic
curtatum concedimus posse habere duos pedes, sed non posse habere,
postquam amiserit, hoc est non posse recuperare pedes; et stantem
concedimus sedere in praesenti, sed non posse sedere dum stat, in eo
scilicet quod possit habere stationem et sessionem.” (LI Cat. 274.7.14)
According to what Abelard says, when the proposition “It is possible for
he who is standing to sit” is interpreted in the divided sense, in order to
evaluate it we must consider whether there is a relation of compatibility
between the predicate “being seated” and the nature of the subject to which
the term “stantem” refers. Let us assume here that the subject “stantem” is
referring to a human being, say Socrates. Because there no incompatibility
between the predicate “being seated” and the set NatSocrates, i.e. the set
of predications constituting Socrates’ nature, the proposition is true. On
the contrary, when the proposition “It is possible for he who is standing to
sit” is interpreted per coniunctionem, in order to evaluate its truth value we
still have to consider the predicate “being seated” and the thing to which
the subject “stantem” refers, but we do not consider the thing which is
standing only qua human being, i.e. only with respect to what constitutes
his nature, but we consider it as being in a certain specific condition, e.g.
as being actually standing, and we must evaluate whether there is a rela-
tion of compatibility (a) between the predicate “being seated” and all the
predications which constitute the set NatSocrates; (b) between the predicate
“being seated” and the additional determination that we attribute to the
thing, i.e. the predicate “standing”. The proposition in question satisfies
condition (a) but fails to meet condition (b), because there is a repugnancy
between the two predicates “sitting” and “standing”, and it is then false per
coniunctionem, although it is true per divisionem.47
We should now ask in what sense does this distinction coincide with
the distinction between simple natural potencies and aptitudes. It is easy
to see the coincidence between simple potencies and de rebus possibilities:
47The per divisionem-per compositionem distinction is analysed in more detail in section
1.3 above.
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both are only defined in terms of what is compatible with the nature of their
owner, and they are independent of any other condition, being it the physical
constitution of the subject, the external circumstances or the contingent
properties that he has in a certain moment of time. Also, they both are
invariable through time, in the sense that they cannot be “gained” or “lost”
by their owners, and they are the same in all members of a species. Finally,
just as the correct and proper understanding of the notion of posibility is,
according to Abelard, in the sense of simple or unqualified natural potencies,
so he maintains that the proper sense of modal propositions is the de rebus
interpretation.
The connection between determinate (i.e concrete, realizable) potencies
and the de sensu interpretation of modal claims is perhaps less straight-
forward. However, what Abelard probably wants to suggest is that in both
cases we use the notion of possibility referring not to what is generically pos-
sible for a subject and to what is compatible with its nature, but referring
to what is potentially realizable for this subject given its actual conditions
and given the contingent properties that it actually has. For instance, we say
that a blind man does not have the determinate potency to see or that a
person who is now sitting does not have the determinate potency to stand
because, as long as their actual condition lasts (which in the first case is
irreversible, in the second case is merely contingent), their simple potency
to stand or to see is not realizable. Correspondingly, the propositions “It is
possible for a blind man to see” or “for he who is sitting to stand” are false
when taken per compositionem because there is an incompatibility between
the predicates “to stand” and “to see” with the specific description we give
of the subject – that is considered not only as a human being but as actually
sitting, or as being actually blind. Determinate potencies correspond to per
compositionem possibilities also in the sense that, just as all possibilities per
compositionem are a proper subset of the corresponding possibilities taken
per divisionem (see 1.3.2 above), similarly all the potencies that are con-
cretely realizable for a certain subject are a proper subset of the generic
potencies that the subject possesses in virtue of having a certain nature.
What Abelard seems indeed to be interested in, while referring to all
these semantical distinctions, is a way to distinguish a wider – we could
say almost “logical” – sense of possibility as what is non contradictory or
contrary with the nature of things, from a stricter sense of possibility – which
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is included in but not coincident with the first – as what is in effect realizable
or actualizable given the way things actually are. The several semantical
distinctions considered above – the de rebus-de sensu in section 1.3; the
conceivable-actualizable in section 3.3; and finally the simple-determinate in
this section – aims to characterize in different ways these two interpretations
of the notion of possibility, and to argue for the priority of the first sense
over the second one.
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3.5 Some Puzzles about Abelard’s Modalities De
Rebus
As was seen in section 1.3 above, the usual way in which Abelard defines
the de rebus interpretation of possibility is the following: it is possible de
rebus for a subject to have a certain property if having this property is
compatible with its nature. This is the proper and more fundamental sense in
which, according to Abelard, the notion of possibility should be understood.
Within this interpretation of modalities, impossible is what is excluded by
(or incompatible with) the nature of a substance, and necessary is what is
required by it. If someone considers for instance a proposition like (*) “It
is possible for Socrates to be dead”, in order to evaluate if (*) is true in
the de rebus interpretation he has to check whether the predicate “dead”
is repugnant to some of the predicates constituting the nature of Socrates.
This nature, just as the nature of every other human being, is constituted
by the substantial predications “animal”, “rational”, “mortal”, and by many
other substantial predications that are yet unknown to us.48 Because being
an animal requires being animate, and so “animate” is also included in the
nature of Socrates, there is indeed an incompatibility between this nature
and the predicate “dead”. Therefore, proposition (*) should turn out to be
false if possibility is interpreted in this way. There are nevertheless several
examples of true possibility propositions, advanced by Abelard both in the
Dialectica and in LI, the truth of which cannot be accounted for by means
of this de rebus interpretation (nor of the de sensu one), and that indeed
seem to raise some puzzles about Abelard’s understanding of possibility. In
particular, Abelard tries to argue for the truth of propositions like “It is
possible for this individual, which is now a man, to be dead” (Dial. 196.29-
197.31), and “It is possible for this individual, which is now a man, to be
irrational – or to have a different rationality than the one it actually has”
(LI Isag. 84.16-21; LI Isag. 92.21-33).
The first example is proposed by Abelard in the Dialectica. Here, the
author says that the proposition “possibile est hominem mortuum esse” –
which should be false along the usual de rebus interpretation because being
dead is incompatible with being animate – might still be considered true if
we take the subject as referring to the individual “thing” that is now Socrates
48For this reading of natures see 3.1.1 on page 153.
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– i.e., to the individual body, or the individual substantia, that is Socrates
in the actual situation. This is because, whereas being dead is incompatible
with Socrates, if we consider the substantia that Socrates is there is nothing
in the nature of this substantia that is incompatible with being dead:
Restat autem nunc post conversiones ut ostendamus secundum eorum
expositionem eas falsas quas veras aestimant, ut istam: “possibile est
hominem mortuum esse”, sic scilicet expositam: “possibile est quod
haec propositio dicit: ‘homo est mortuus”’. [...] Nullo itaque modo
videtur vera haec propositio: “possibile hominem mortuum esse”, ut
scilicet de sensu simplicis exponatur. Cum vero de rebus exponitur,
vera videtur hoc modo: “possibile est hominem esse mortuum”, idest
id quod est homo, potest mortuum fieri. Sed dico quia fieri mortuum
non est esse mortuum; fieri enim mortuum, mori est; non mortuum
esse. “Moriens” autem et “mortuum” adversa sunt; “moriens” enim
viventis nomen est: neque enim moritur nisi vivens. Videtur ergo pos-
sibile hominem mori, unde mortalis dicitur, sed non mortuum esse. [...]
Ea ergo quae natura rei non exspectat, non possumus confiteri posse
illi inesse, sed quae tantum in esse advenientia naturam rei non ex-
pellunt. Possumus itaque hoc corpus, quod tamen homo est, confìteri
posse mortuum esse, si corporis proprietatem tantum attendamus, sed
non hunc hominem. “Corpori” enim “mortuum” non repugnat, sed
“homini”. [...] At vero mortuum numquam homini inhaerebit: neque
enim ipso existente neque non existente; quod quidem patens est, cum
videlicet alterum non patiatur alterum. Sed tamen hoc corpus, quod
homo est, mortuum erit; quippe ut “corpus” acceptum “mortuo” non
repugnat . Sicut ergo fatemur quia hoc corpus erit mortuum, sic et
recipimus quia possibile est hoc corpus esse mortuum, sed non ideo
hominem, quamvis tamen et hoc corpus homo sit. Aliud est enim cor-
poris simplicem attendere in eo naturam, aliud hominis proprietatem
in eodem considerare. Secundum namque substantiam quae homo est,
remanebit homine in se destructo, non tamen homo. (Dial. 196.29-
197.31, my emphasis)
Abelard seems to suggest that there is indeed a sense in which it is true to
say that it is possible for this individual, that is actually a human being,
to be dead, but only granted that we consider it not qua human being,
but qua body, or corporeal thing. This is because the predicate “dead” is
incompatible with the nature of human beings, but not with the nature of
bodies («“Corpori” enim “mortuum” non repugnat, sed “homini”»). What
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Abelard is suggesting here is that there is a particular reading of modal
claims - which does not coincide with the de rebus interpretation nor with the
de sensu one - in which possibilities and necessities are referred to things not
qua belonging to the natural kind to which they actually belong, but as “bare
individuals”, i.e., merely as corporeal things. According to this reading,
the notion of possibility is still spelled out in terms of compatibility (non
repugnantia) with nature, just as it is in the standard de rebus interpretation,
but the nature into consideration is the one of the substance taken as a mere
body, or as a mere substantia.
This peculiar reading of the notion of possibility might be of help to
interpret also what Abelard says in some passages of the LI, where he claims
that the individual thing that is now the human being Socrates might have
had other substantial forms or a different nature than the ones it actually
has. We may find this idea in LI Isag. 84.16-21:
Sed profecto omnis differentia de specie universaliter dicitur praedicari
et destructa ea necessario destrui res. At vero haec rationalitas pluribus
non inest neque propter eam homo periret. Ipse quoque Socrates, sicut
hic homo est per eam, ita etiam posset esse per aliam, sive quae sit,
sive numquam sit;
and also in LI Isag. 92.21-33:
Nota etiam, quod <cum> ait: abesse et adesse praeter subiecti cor-
ruptionem, hoc substantialibus quoque formis conveniat. Sic enim ra-
tionalitas adest huic homini, ut non corrumpatur, et sic posset hic
homo sine ea esse, ut ideo non corrumperetur. Posset enim contin-
gere, ut haec substantia hominis numquam rationalis fuisset, ideoque
numquam corrumperetur propter rationalitatem, cum eam numquam
habuisset. Posset etiam fortassis contingere, ut sic ista careret, quod
aliam rem habuisset et nunquam istam et ideo numquam per istam
corrumperetur.49
Again, Abelard says that there is a sense in which it is possible for a certain
subject to have different substantial forms than the ones it actually has:
“Socrates sicut hic homo est per eam [rationalitatem], ita etiam posset esse
49This and the previous passage were considered and analyzed by Marenbon in (Maren-
bon, 2008); the passage of the Dialectica in which Abelard claims that it is possible – in
some sense of possibility – for this human being to be dead was analyzed also by Cameron
in (Cameron, 2015).
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per aliam”; “Posset enim contingere ut haec substantia hominis numquam
rationalis fuisset”. At least in the second passage, however, Abelard is care-
ful in pointing out that it is not this individual human being (e.g., Socrates)
who has the possibility of being not rational, but it is the thing that is now
a human being (haec substantia hominis) that might have been not rational,
and that indeed might have been not a human being at all, but a different
sort of thing.
The idea that it is possible for an individual thing to have different sub-
stantial properties than the ones it actually has could be justified by referring
to Abelard’s ontology of substances and differentiae. As was proposed by
Martin in (Martin, 1992), and then developed by Marenbon in (Marenbon,
2008), Abelard’s ontology could be characterized in contemporary terms as
a sort of trope theory, where accidents and differentiae exist and are indi-
viduated independently from the substances that are their bearers in the
actual situation. Moreover, in Abelard’s ontology accidents and differentiae
seems to be only contingently connected to their bearers, in the sense that
the same forms that are attached to a certain individual in the actual his-
tory might have gone to a different individual, and other forms might have
attached to this one, so that at least for all created individual substances it
is true to say that, in some sense, they could have had different forms and a
different nature than the ones they actually have. Properly speaking, how-
ever, the fact that it is possible for an individual taken qua mere individual
body (or qua mera substantia) to have a different nature does not imply
that it is possible for an individual substance to have a different nature. In
particular, the fact that it is possible for this thing that is Socrates (or, for
this thing that is a man) to be irrational does not imply that it is possible
for Socrates or for this man to be irrational. Indeed, Abelard thinks that
the two claims “this man is possibly irrational” and “Socrates is possibly
irrational” have the entirely same meaning – because the two expressions
“Socrates” and “this man” have the same meaning (LI 64.14-24; LI 65.3-
19)50 – and are both false. They could only be true if instead of referring
to the individual Socrates qua member of a certain natural kind, we refer
to it qua body, or qua substantia, which we can do by replacing the subject
“this man” and “Socrates” with the expressions “this thing that is a man”
50Abelard’s idea that proper names have a sense is advanced by Martin in (Martin,
1992, p. 113).
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or “the substance that is Socrates”.
The three passages above are also interesting because they provide some
evidence about Abelard’s understanding of individuality, and about which
are according to Abelard the necessary and sufficient conditions that an
individual thing must satisfy in order to be the same individual. What is
said in the passages quoted seems in fact to confirm that for Abelard things
are individualized – and we may say even identified or identifiable – inde-
pendently from their actual forms and differentiae, and that there is for
Abelard a sense in which an individual can be considered as the same indi-
vidual through time or across possible situations even if it does not have the
same accidents and the same substantial forms. Things are individualized
independently of their forms in the sense that for Abelard things are per-
sonally distinct (discretae) not in virtue of their forms but in virtue of their
concrete essentia, i.e. of the matter of which they are composed out (see
LI Isag. 13.19-25 and (Marenbon, 2008) on this). Furthermore, according
to Abelard, things are also indentifiable independently of their forms, in the
sense that we can refer to the same individual thing – both through time and
counterfactually – not referring to it qua member of a natural kind, but only
qua mere substance, or qua corporeal thing. Abelard admits that we can do
this either by means of linguistic items such as “this” or “this substance”,
which «ex sola discretione inventa sunt et meras significant substantias» and
«simpliciter secundum discretionem personalem inventa sunt», or by means
of some expressions such as “haec substantia hominis” or “id quod est homo”
or again “hoc corpus quod homo est”. This point is raised explicitly in LI
39.18-26, where Abelard says:
Veluti cum dico: “ego”, “hic”, singularis sunt significationis, nullius
tamen superioris proprie individua dicuntur, quia ex sola discretione
inventa sunt et meras significant substantias, quarum nullam naturam
vel proprietatem determinant, quia “hic” per se dictum neque dicit
“haec substantia” neque “hic homo” neque “hoc rationale” vel “hoc
album”, sed simpliciter secundum discretionem personalem inventum
est.
It is then possible for Abelard to refer to something as an individual without
including its accidental or substantial forms in our reference, and this is
exacly what Abelard does when he says that it is possible for the individual





The existence of contingent events – i.e., of events that are equally apt to
happen or not to happen in time – is taken by Abelard as an evident and
indubitable feature of the way things are. According to him, contingency
characterizes both the natural world, inasmuch as some natural events are
not the outcome of a chain of natural causes but happen by chance, and
the human world, in the sense that some events that take place are the re-
sult of human free will and unconstrained deliberation. Generally speaking,
Abelard holds that it is possible for things to be otherwise than they actu-
ally are, and that there are many alternative ways in which things might
be. As any indeterminist, however, Abelard has to deal with several fatalist
arguments, that aim to prove either that the existence of contingent events
is per se untenable or that it is incompatible with some fundamental and
irrevocable principles of logic or theology. In particular, in the Dialectica
and the glossae on De Interpretatione 9, Abelard deals with two kinds of
deterministic arguments. The first kind, which is usually labelled logical
determinism, includes arguments formulated to demonstrate the incompat-
ibility between admitting contingent future events and the validity of the
logical principles of bivalence and of excluded middle. According to these
arguments, if someone admits that every proposition is necessarily either
true or false, and that of all pairs of contradictory statements necessarily
one of them is true and the other is false, then he also must admit that
all propositions – including future ones – are necessarily true or necessarily
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false, and therefore that none of them is contingent. Abelard considers three
different but related arguments for logical determinism, and tries to solve
all of them by arguing for the compatibility between general bivalence and
contingency. A second kind of fatalism, that is commonly called theological
fatalism, includes arguments that aim to prove the incompatibility between
contingency and some theological dogmas or principles. In particular, one
puzzle that Abelard considers in the Dialectica and in the Logica Ingredien-
tibus asks whether divine omniscience is compatible with human free will,
and with our power to do other things than the ones we actually do. Once
again, Abelard’s purpose is to argue for the compatibility between God’s
complete and infallible knowledge and the possibility that things have to be
otherwise than they are.
In this chapter, I examine all the arguments that Abelard considers for
logical determinism (4.1) and for theological determinism (4.2) in his log-
ical works, and the many ways in which he attempts to answer them. I
also try to provide a brief analysis of the various sources that Abelard used
for his discussion of the topic, which are especially Aristotle’s De Inter-
pretatione 9 and Boethius’ commentaries on it for what concerns logical
determinism (4.1.1); Cicero’s De Fato, Augustine’s De civitate Dei and De
libero arbitrio, Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy and William of Cham-
peaux’s Sententiae for theological determinism (4.2.1). In section (4.1.2) I
consider Abelard’s definitions of some notions that have a crucial role in his
discussion of future contingents: the notion of future events, the notion of
contingency and the notion of determinate or indeterminate events or truth
values. Finally, in section 4.2.3, I compare the theory of contingency that
Abelard maintains in his logical works with the one he embraces in his the-
ological works, in order to specify more clearly in what sense and to what
extent Abelard’s indeterminism should be interpreted.
194
4.1 The Compatibility between Contingency and
Bivalence
4.1.1 Logical determinism from Aristotle to Boethius
In the central chapters of De Interpretatione, Aristotle advances three dif-
ferent but related principles, which capture what he thinks is the nature of
assertoric propositions and of contradictory statements. In the first place,
Aristotle advances a principle that is usually referred to as the Principle
of Bivalence [PB], according to which for every statement p, either p
is true or p is false.1 Moreover, in chapters 6-8 of the De Interpretatione,
where Aristotle deals with opposite or contradictory statements, he says that
statements of this sort “divide truth and falsity”, so that of any pair of con-
tradictory propositions p and q, it is always the case that one of them is
true and the other is false (De Int. 17b38-18a7).2 Here, he advances the
following two principles: first, the idea that for any pair of contradictory
statements p and q, it is necessary that either p or q, principle that is also
known as the Law of Excluded Middle [LEM]; and second the idea that
exactly one of p and q is true and the other is false, which has been called
the Rule of Contradictory Pairs [RCP].3
As is well known, the general validity of all these principles is questioned
in the ninth chapter of De Interpretatione, where Aristotle considers fu-
ture contingent statements, i.e., propositions referring to future events that
might equally happen or not happen, such as “There will be a sea battle
tomorrow”. In this chapter, Aristotle asks whether principles [PB], [LEM]
and [RCP] hold for future propositions of this sort or whether they must
1See for instance De Int. 4.16b33-17.a4, where Aristotle says that: “Every statement
is significant [...] but not every sentence is a statement-making sentence, but only those
in which there is truth or falsity. There is not truth or falsity in all sentences: a prayer is
a sentence but is neither true nor false”. Translated by Ackrill in (Ackrill, 1963, p. 45-6).
For the same principles see also Categories IV 2a7-10 (cf. X 13a37-b3, b27-35): “Every
affirmation seems to be either true or false, whereas none of the things said without
combination is either true or false, e.g., “man”, “white”, “runs”, “wins””; and De anima
III 6,430b26-7: “An affirmation is something said of something, as is a denial too, and
every one is true or false”. Quoted and translated in (Ademollo, 2010, p. 97-8).
2I use the ordered pair (p,q) rather than the ordered pair (p,¬ p) in order to avoid
questions on whether Aristotle’s conception of negation is internal or external to a propo-
sition.
3For the difference between [LEM] and [RCP] see (Jones, 2010, p. 12-7). For the use of
these principles in Aristotle’s De Interpretatione see also (McKim, 1972); (Gaskin, 1995);
(Crivelli, 2004).
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be admitted only for past and present propositions. The question arises
because when the three principles are applied to future statements, some
deterministic consequences seem to follow. One might claim in fact that if
every future statement is necessarily either true or false, and therefore is
always true or false, as [PB] requires, then the correspondent future event
is already now bound to happen or not to happen, and its happening or
non-happening is then inevitable, not contingent. Similarly, if we consider a
pair of contradictory future propositions such as “There will be a sea battle
tomorrow” and “There will not be a sea battle tomorrow”, and we say that
it is necessarily the case that exactly one of the two is true and the other is
false, then we will have it that of the two corresponding future events one
is necessarily going to be realized, while the other necessarily is not. The
argument in De interpretatione 9 has the structure of a dilemma, and two
ways out are set before us: either we maintain the unqualified validity of
[PB], [LEM] and [RCP] and we accept the fatalistic consequences that follow
from them, i.e. the idea that there are no contingent events and everything
necessarily happens as it happens, or we reject the general validity of the
three principles and we admit that they are only valid for past and present
propositions, but not for future contingent ones.4
It is evident from what Aristotle says in De Int. 18b26-19a22 that he
takes determinism as an absurd position, which must be rejected. Much less
clear is which is Aristotle’s way-out from the dilemma, and how he is able
to argue against the deterministic argument. In particular, it is not clear
whether Aristotle decides to reject the general validity of bivalence and of
the rule of contradictory pairs, or whether instead he maintains the unqual-
ified validity of the two principles and argues for the compatibility between
them and the existence of contingent events. Setting aside the problem of
which is the correct interpretation of Aristotle’s text, I shall focus here on
the interpretations that have been given of it by ancient and early medieval
commentators, in order to understand the background of Abelard’s discus-
sion of the topic, which I deal with in section 4.1.3 below. There are three
main lines of solution that have been advanced to address the dilemma posed
by Aristotle.5 According to the first, Aristotle would end up by rejecting
4For a recent systematic reconstruction of Aristotle’s argument in De Int. 9 see (Criv-
elli, 2004, p. 198-233).
5See in particular (Gaskin, 1995, p. 12-7) and (Sharples, 2009, p. 208-9) on this.
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general bivalence and by saying that future contingent propositions are nei-
ther true nor false. According to the second, Aristotle would answer the
deterministic argument by making a distinction between truth and neces-
sity, and by claiming that the actual truth of future statements does not
entail their necessity. Finally, according to a third possible interpretation,
Aristotle would be able to maintain both the unqualified validity of prin-
ciples [PB] and [RCP] and the existence of contingent facts by invoking a
distinction between determinate and indeterminate truth values. I give in
what follows a brief reconstruction of the three interpretations.
The First Solution: future contingent propositions are neither true
nor false
First, one might opt for the rejection of the general validity of [PB] and
[RCP], and claim that the two principles do not hold for future contingent
propositions. This means to say that propositions of this sort are neither
true nor false, and that of at least for some pairs of contradictory statements
p and q it is not necessarily the case that either p is true or q is true. This
solution is at times referred to as the “Standard interpretation” of Aristo-
tle’s dilemma,6 or as the “antirealist” interpretation, or again as the “oldest
interpretation”, for it is the first interpretation of Aristotle on record. As
Boethius reports in (Boethius, 1880, II 208, 1-4), Stoics thought that this
was Aristotle’s way out from the dilemma, and the solution that he chose
in order to maintain indeterminism.7 On their part, Stoics did not embrace
Aristotle’s solution, for they opted for the other horn of the dilemma, i.e.,
they accepted the universal validity of bivalence and maintained that for ev-
ery past, present and future event it is impossible to happen otherwise than
it actually happens.8 As Simplicius reports in his commentary on Aristotle’s
Categories (Simplicius, 1907, 407.6-13), also some Peripatetics interpreted
the Aristotelian argument in De Interpretatione 9 as if a qualification of
bivalence was required, and other ancient commentators as well attributed
6See (McKim, 1972, p. 81); (Kretzmann, 1998, p. 24-5); (Sharples, 2009, p. 209).
7«Now some people – the Stoics among them – thought that Aristotle says that future
contingents are neither true nor false. For they interpreted his saying that nothing [of that
sort] is disposed more to being than to not being as meaning that it makes no difference
whether they are thought false or true; for they considered them to be neither true nor
false [in Aristotle’s view], but falsely.» (Boethius, 1880, II, 208.1-4, translation by N.
Kretzmann).
8See (Cicero, 1968, 20-21); (Bobzien, 1998, p. 59-86).
197
this solution to Aristotle and accepted it as the right answer to the problem,
such as Epicurus, the Platonist Nicostratus and probably also Alexander of
Aphrodisias.9
The idea that future contingent statements are neither true or false
is ascribed to Aristotle also by many modern commentators, in particu-
lar starting from Łukasiewicz’ interpretation in (Łukasiewicz, 1957) and
(Łukasiewicz, 1967). According to Łukasiewicz, [PB] must not be applied
to future contingent propositions, and a third truth value (“neither true nor
false”) must be introduced for propositions of this sort.10 As we shall see
shortly, it is not clear whether Boethius’s interpretation of Aristotle must
also be understood as involving a qualification of bivalence, or if instead
he took Aristotle as maintaining [PB] and [RCP] as valid for every asser-
toric statement. It is, however, very clear from what Abelard says in the
Dialectica and the LI that he takes principles [PB], [LEM] and [RCP] to
hold unqualifiedly, and he explicitly rejects the idea that future contingent
statements are neither true nor false (see 4.1.3 below).
The Second Solution: the present truth of future events does not
entail their necessity
Other interpreters, both in antiquity and modern times, have resisted the
idea of propositions being neither true nor false, and argued that Aristotle
aims in De Int. 9 to maintain both general bivalence and indeterminism.
This view is usually referred to as the “non-standard interpretation” of Aris-
totle (McKim, 1972, p. 83-4), and it is different from the standard one for
it requires no qualification of principles [PB], [LEM] or [RCP]. This means
that every statement is true or false, and there are no truth values other
than these two. According to the proponents of this solution, Aristotle’s
aim is to point out that the fatalist argument is based on some confusion
concerning the use of the two notions of necessity and truth. In particular,
9For anti-realist interpretations in Antiquity see (Łukasiewicz, 1970a, p. 125);
(Łukasiewicz, 1970b, p. 176-8); (Sorabji, 1980, p. 93); (Weidemann, 1994, 303-8, 319);
(Mignucci, 1996, p. 305-10); (Mignucci, 1998, p. 75,85); (Sorabji, 1998b, p. 3, 13); (Criv-
elli, 2004, p. 226-7).
10Among interpreters who have followed this line of interpretation, and who think that
Aristotle’s solution consists in a qualification of bivalence, see in particular (Frede, 1970),
(Frede, 1985), (Sorabji, 1980), (Craig, 1988), (Weidemann, 1994), (Gaskin, 1995), (Criv-
elli, 2004).
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he claims that the principle according to which of every pair of contradictory
statement necessarily one is true and the other is false is not to be confused
with the principle stating that of every such pair one member is necessarily
true and the other is necessarily false. In other words, the modal operator of
necessity cannot be distributed over disjunction, and it is not valid to infer
from the truth of this principle
– for every pair of contradictory statements p, q, necessarily (p or q);
that the following principle is also true:
– for every pair of contradictory statements p, q, (necessarily p) or (neces-
sarily q);
Among ancient philosophers, this solution was sustained by the Academic
Sceptic Carneades, as Cicero reports in his De Fato.11 Also some mod-
ern commentators have attributed this solution to Aristotle. This second
interpretation is mainly based on a famous passage from Aristotle’s De In-
terpretatione 9, where the Philosopher distinguishes between the necessity
that things have to be as they are while they are, from the “unqualified” ne-
cessity of being in a certain way.12 Anscombe and others take this passage
as an indication that Aristotle aims to solve the puzzle by distinguishing
between truth and necessity, and by claiming that the necessity of the event
is a different issue from the analytical necessity involved in the definition of
the term “true” (Sharples, 2009, p. 210).
The idea that the necessity of a disjunction does not entail the necessity
of either disjunct is very fortunate in history of logic, and it will be employed
also by Abelard in his commentaries on De Int. 9 (see 4.1.3 below).
The Third Solution: future proposition are indefinitely true or
indefinitely false
Finally, a third solution that in late antiquity and early medieval times
had been attributed to Aristotle is the idea that although future contingent
statements are either true or false, and so they respect just as past and
11See (Sharples, 2009, p. 209) on this.
12See De Int. 19a23-6): «That what is is when it is, and what is not is not when it is
not, is necessary; but it is not the case either that all that is, necessarily is, or that [all]
that is not, [necessarily] is not. For it is not the same thing for all that is to be of necessity
when it is, and [for it] to be of necessity without qualification».
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present statements the principle of bivalence, they are nevertheless only
indeterminately or indefinitely true or false. This solution was adopted
by Boethius in his two Commentaries on De Int. 9, and thanks to him
became very popular in early latin medieval discussions on logical fatalism.
According to the proponents of this solution, all statements are either true
or false, and all pairs of contradictories have exactly one member that is true
and the other that is false. In particular, they maintain that every present
and past statement is determinately true or false, inasmuch as it corresponds
to events that are definite or determined, in virtue of their happening or
having happened in time. On the contrary, future contingent propositions
such as “there will be a sea battle tomorrow” are only indeterminately true
or false, because the event to which they correspond is not yet determined.
Boethius is not the first to propose such a solution to the problem of log-
ical fatalism. We find a similar position already in Ammonius, who claims
that all pairs of contradictory future sentences divide the two truth val-
ues not in a definite way (ὡρισμένως, ἀφωρισμένως) but in an indefinite
(ἀωρίστων) one (Seel, 2001b, p. 234). Despite the similarity between their
opinions, Boethius probably did not draw on Ammonius’ commentary, for
although their terminology is similar, they use the terms “definite” and “in-
definite” in a quite different way (Sorabji, 1998b). It is more likely that
Boethius and Ammonius drew on a common tradition of earlier Greek com-
mentaries on De Interpretatione 9, which are now lost but probably included
some treatment of logical fatalism(Ebbesen, 2009, p. 29).13
What exactly Boethius’ and Ammonius’ solution to the problem of log-
ical determinism involves has been object of debate. First, it is not entirely
clear what they intended with the terms definite and indefinite, and whether
by means of this distinction they were in effect able to maintain principles
[PB] and [RCP] without incurring in deterministic consequences. Second, it
is unclear why Boethius and Ammonius – or the earlier proponents of this
third solution – thought that this was a proper interpretation of the Aris-
totelian text, given that Aristotle never employes the concept of definite and
indefinite truth in De Int. 9. To answer first to this second question, Kret-
zmann proposes that Aristotle himself may provide a source for Boethius’
13On Ammonius’ treatment of De Int. 9, and on the differences between his and
Boethius’ approach, see (Mignucci, 1996); (Mignucci, 1998); (Sorabji, 1998a); (Sorabji,
1998b); (Seel, 2001a).
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and Ammonius’ interpretation: even if he does not employ the concepts of
“definitely true” and “indefinitely true” in the De Interpretatione, he used
nevertheless a similar terminology within his discussion of contraries, in the
tenth chapter of the Categories (Kretzmann, 1998, p. 28 ff.). There, the au-
thor discusses couples of contraries, such as black and white or hot and cold,
and considers cases in which, of a pair of contraries, one of the two belongs
to a substance “by nature”; as, for instance, being hot belongs by nature
to fire, or being white to snow. Aristotle says that, in these cases, of two
contraries one definitely (ἀφωρισμένως) belongs and the other definitely does
not belong to a certain subject (Cat. X 12b38-40). This passage on pairs of
contraries – whose members can belong to a subject either definitely (i.e., by
nature) or indefinitely – was probably put in parallel with the Aristotelian
discussion of pairs of truth values – whose members also belong definitely or
not definitely to assertoric statements. This is probably why Boethius feels
entitled to “emend”, without further explanation, Aristotle’s text in De Int.
9, adding the term “definitely”:
And so he [viz. Aristotle] concludes the whole question of propositions
that are future and contingent, and says that it is evident that it is
not necessary that all affirmations and negations be definitely true [or
false] (“Definitely” is missing [from Aristotle’s claim], however, and so
must be supplied in one’s understanding). For of those that are con-
tingent and future it is never the case that one is definitely true and
the other false. (Boethius, 1880, I 125,16-22)
He next introduces this: “therefore, it is necessary that the affirma-
tion or the negation be true or false” – i.e. with “definitely” supplied
in one’s understanding (Boethius, 1880, 141,18-20)
The parallel between the discussion in Categories 10 and the treatment of
future contingent might be confirmed by what Abelard says in Dial. 219.36-
220.9. There, Abelard refers to a similar connection between the problem
of future contingents’ truth and what Aristotle said in his “tractatus oppos-
itorum”. Abelard claims that when we consider a pair of contraries, none
of which belongs to a subject “by nature” (such as sanus and non sanus
referred to Socrates), it is necessarily true that one contrary belongs to the
subject and that one does not belong to it, but this does not mean that it is
one and the same contrary that necessarily belong to the subject, while the
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other necessarily does not belong to it. In the same way, he says, when we
consider a pair of future contingent propositions, necessarily truth belongs
to one proposition and not to the other, but this does not mean that one and
the same proposition is necessarily true and the other is necessarily false.14
An analogy between Aristotle’s discussions of opposites and his discussion of
future contingents is then explicitly proposed in Abelard’s Dialectica, and
it is perhaps relying on this analogy that Boethius introduces the terms
definitely and indefinitely in the context of logical determinism, implicitly
suggesting that – just as opposites can belong to a subject definitely or in-
definitely – in the same way truth and falsity can belong to propositions
both in a definite way or in an indefinite way.15
The main thesis of Boethius’ response to logical determinism is advanced
in many passage from his commentary on De Interpretatione, such as the
following:
It is necessary that either the affirmation be true or the negation, but
not that either of them be definitely true, the other definitely false.
For if someone else denies what we say: – “Alexander is to be bathed”
– and says “Alexander is not to be bathed”, it is indeed necessary that
this whole [state of affairs] come about – that either he is bathed or
that he is not bathed – and it is necessary that one be true and the
other false: either the affirmation, if he has been bathed, or, if he has
not been bathed, the negation. But it is not necessary that definitely
the affirmation be true, because in cases of this sort the negation could
come about; but neither is it ever definite that the negation be true
([and] the affirmation false), because the negation can fail to come
about. Accordingly, as regards the whole contradiction it is of course
necessary that one be true, the other false. But that one be definitely
true, the other definitely false – as is the case regarding things that are
past and those that are present – is not possible in any way. (Boethius,
1880, I 106,30-107,16, translated in (Kretzmann, 1998))16
It is clear from the passage quoted that Boethius wants to preserve not only
[LEM] but also principles [PB] and [RCP], but it is not evident in what
14I consider this passage in detail in 4.1.3 on page 222 below.
15According to Kretzmann (Kretzmann, 1998, p. 28-9), evidence for this parallel could
be found also in Ammonius, and was probably suggested in some earlier commentary on
De Interpretatione (maybe already by Alexader of Aphrodisias).
16Other passages in which Boethius advances this idea are: (Boethius, 1880, I, 108,18-
26; 125,20; II, 204,8-25); see also (Boethius, 1880, I, 109,9-17; 110,28-112,4; 114,8-24;
208,7-23; 211,26-213,4; 219,5-17).
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exactly his concept of “indefinite truth” consisted. Contemporary interpre-
tations of this Boethian concept may be divided in two groups (Knuuttila,
2010). According to a first group of interpreters, the idea is that all pairs
of contradictory future statements differ from the other contradictory pairs
because truth and falsity are not definitely distributed between them, and
so future contingent propositions are neither definitely true nor definitely
false. Propositions of this sort only have the disjunctive property of be-
ing true-or-false. Each future proposition would then be now true-or-false,
but it would not have either truth value definitely.17 This solution has the
risk of collapsing into the “standard interpretation” of Aristotle’s De Int. 9
(here, the “first solution”), for indeed the truth value true-or-false that is
attributed to contingent statements seems to be a third truth value, differ-
ent from the two traditional truth values “true” and “false”, and therefore
these statements seems not to not respect principle [PB] or [RCP]. If this
is indeed Boethius’ position, his interpretation of Aristotle would entail a
qualification of bivalence, after all. Another possible interpretation claims
that, according to Boethius, future contingent propositions are not definitely
true or false because their truth-makers are not yet determined. They are
however still either true or false, although in an indeterminate way. This
second reconstruction of Boethius’ interpretation involves no qualification of
the principle of bivalence, nor of the rule of contradictory pairs. Every state-
ment is in fact either true (determinately or indeterminately) or false, and
all pairs of contradictory propositions necessarily have exactly one member
that is true and the other false.18
Boethius’ commentaries concerning the Aristotelian answer to logical
determinism, along with his own distinction between definite and indefinite
truth values, became widely influential in Middle Ages, and were the main
source for Abelard’s discussion of the same topic. Just as Boethius, Abelard
argues for the compatibility of the existence of future contingent events (and
of corresponding future contingent propositions) and the validity of princi-
ples [PB], [LEM] and [RCP], which he takes to hold unrestrictedly for any
sort of propositions. Before going into the details of Abelard’s arguments
against logical determinism, I shall discuss a number of notions that are
17Among interpreters that have supported this interpretation, Knuuttila mentions
(Frede, 1985); (Craig, 1988); (Gaskin, 1995); (Kretzmann, 1998).
18This interpretation of Boethius and Ammonius is advanced for instance in (Mignucci,
1988); (Mignucci, 1998); (Seel, 2001b); (Beets, 2003).
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relevant to his discussion of future contingents, i.e. the notions of future
propositions and future events ( 4.1.2), the notions determinacy and cer-
tainty ( 4.1.2 on page 209), and finally the notion of contingency ( 4.1.2 on
page 214).
4.1.2 Some key concepts in Abelard’s discussion of future
contingents
In this section I consider some notions that are central in Abelard’s discus-
sion of future contingents. Abelard offers a definition and an analysis of
these concepts both in the Dialectica and in the glossae on Aristotle’s De
Int. 9; where needed, I will try to highlight the differences or stress the
similarities between the two works. In general, Abelard’s terminology quite
closely follows the one used by Boethius in his two commentaries on Peri
hermeneias, in particular for his definition of contingency and for his dis-
tinction between determinate and indeterminate (in Boethius: definite and
indefinite) events or truth values. What is quite new in Abelard is that he
pays a greater attention to what should we understand as being the onto-
logical correlates of some of these notions. For instance, he devotes some
time to discuss the ontological status of eventus rerum, and the ontological
correlate of contingency and chance.
Propositions and events
According to Abelard, sentences may be classified into three categories:
propositions about the past (propositiones de praeterito), propositions about
the present (de praesenti) and propositions about the future (de futuro).
Such a classification is carried out depending on the tense of the sentence’s
main verb or copula.
De praesenti autem tempore propositiones fiunt, quaecumque dicunt
aliquid esse vel non esse aliquid, sive praesentes res sint, sive praeteri-
tae, sive futurae, sive omnino numquam sint, veluti iste: “crastina dies
est” vel “chimaera est” vel “non est”. De praeterito etiam tempore sive
de futuro de eisdem fieri possunt, quotiens scilicet aliquid, sive sit sive
non, dicimus fuisse vel fore vel negamus idem. (LI De Int. 249.145-151)
Abelard’s main concern while commenting on De Interpretatione 9 are ev-
idently propositions in the future tense. Propositions about the future can
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be divided into two further categories: in the Dialectica Abelard labels the
two categories “natural future propositions” (de futuro naturale) and “con-
tingent future propositions” (de futuro contingenti); while in LI he refers
instead to them as determinate (de eventu determinato) and indeterminate
(de eventu indeterminato) future propositions. The sentences in the first
category signify future events that are instances of a natural law. These are
for example “Socrates will die” or “God will be immortal”. Although these
propositions refer to future events, Abelard thinks that they are determinate
propositions, for reasons that will be explained in 4.1.2 below. The second
category of future sentences includes sentences that signify contingent future
events, the happening of which is not required by nature and that therefore
might equally happen or not happen (ad utrumlibet se habent). Examples
of a future contingent proposition are “Socrates will eat”, or “Socrates will
die tomorrow”. The events signified by these sentences are indeterminate
because they cannot be known either in virtue of the act of things (since
it still have not taken place yet) nor in virtue of the nature of Socrates: if
indeed someone had a complete knowledge of the nature of human beings,
he would conclude that it is possible for Socrates both to read and not to
read tomorrow, and so he could not know, before it has happened, which
one of the two events will indeed take place tomorrow.
Si quis dicat “Socrates comedet” vel “morietur cras”, indeterminatum
eventum proponit, de quo scilicet nulla natura rei cuiusquam nos cer-
tificare potest. (LI De Int. 250.162-164)
In the Dialectica, Abelard makes a further distinction between natural future
sentences that are necessary (such as “God will be immortal”) and natural
future sentences that are not necessary (such as “Socrates will die”). As we
have seen in section 2.1.3 above, in the Dialectica Abelard maintains that
only those propositions whose subject is a sempiternal being (e.g., God) are
necessary propositions. A proposition like “Socrates will die”, which has a
non-sempiternal being as a subject, is therefore not necessary.19
In the glosses, Abelard thinks that only contingent or indeterminate
propositions are properly considered future claims, for he says that proposi-
19This is because, if such a proposition were necessary, it would be impossible for it
to be false (for necessary is defined, in the Dialectica, as what the contrary of which is
not possible). But indeed there are some possible situations in which the propositions
“Socrates will die” is false, namely those situations in which Socrates does not exist.
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tions de futuro naturale, such as “Socrates will die”, are really propositions
about the present, and not about the future. This is because propositions of
this sort say something about the essential features of a subject, i.e. about
the subject’s nature, and natures are for Abelard invariable in time, so that
what will constitute the nature of a thing in the future is just the same as
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Figure 4.1: Abelard’s division of propositions with respect to tense.
propositions are what Abelard calls eventus, or eventus rei, which we could
translate as “events”, “states of affairs”, or – in order to avoid any strong
metaphysical commitment – the “obtaining” or the “coming about” of things
(King, 2004, p. 105).
Just as propositions, events are classified by Abelard as being present,
past and future (Dial. 211.2); necessary, natural or contingent (Dial. 211.2;
215.9); and also determinate and indeterminate (Dial. 211.5-6; 211.29; LI
De Int. 250.163; 252.27). Events are indeed the proper bearers of deter-
minacy and indeterminacy, and propositions are said to be determinate or
indeterminate only in virtue of the determinacy of the eventus to which they
refer:
Sicut autem eventus contingenti futuri indeterminatus est, ita et propo-
sitiones quae illos eventus enuntiant indeterminatae verae vel falsae
dicuntur. Quae enim verae sunt, indeterminatae verae sunt, et quae
falsae, indeterminatae falsae sunt secundum indeterminatos, ut dictum
est, eventus quos pronuntiant. (Dial. 211.28-32).21
20See LI De Int. 254.282-286: “Hoc autem tantum futurum, quod contingens dicitur,
Aristotelem futurum vocare arbitramur, quia ea futura, quae naturaliter contingunt, non
tamquam futura, sed tamquam praesentia reputat, quia sic iam certa sunt quasi praesen-
tia”.
21Events are also the truth makers of propositions, that is the thing in virtue of which
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We have it that (i) whenever an eventus is determinate, the corresponding
proposition is also determinate. One might wonder whether the opposite
entailment is also true, i.e. whether (ii) whenever a proposition is deter-
minately true or false also the event to which it refers is determinate. As
Kretzmann points out in (Kretzmann, 1998, p. 29-30), Boethius’ maintained
both (i) and (ii), which he probably derives from his Aristotelian correspon-
dence theory of truth, according to which the nature of events is perfectly
mirrored into the truth and falsity of propositions.22 Abelard seems to sug-
gest a similar principle when he says in the glossae that if a proposition like
“Socrates will eat” is determinately true, then it must be also the case that
the future event that Socrates will eat is also determinate, for the truth of
propositions depends on the events:
At vero si “Socrates comedet” est vera determinate, oportet et determi-
natum esse, quod Socrates comedet, quia sicut veritas propositionum
ex eventu rerum pendet ita et cognitionem ueritatis uel falsitatis ex
cognitione euentuum necesse est haberi. (LI De Int. 251.189-191)
I will argue however that this will turn out to be problematic, and that
Abelard maintains (i) but rejects (ii) in both the Dialectica and the LI,
where he holds that there are propositions which are determinate although
their correspondent event is indeterminate (see 4.1.3 below).
With the exception of the pages devoted to the discussion of future
contingents, where the concept of eventus rei or eventus rerum is frequently
employed, Abelard does not use the concept in many other parts of his
philosophical works. This makes it difficult to properly characterise what
it is to be an event and what role events play in Abelard’s ontology. In
LI De Int. 253.245-254.269, Abelard says that there are two ways in which
one can intend the term eventus: either they are the things themselves that
propositions are about (res ipsae de quibus agunt propositiones), or they are
the senses, or the dicta, of propositions (id totum quod propositio dicit).
Sed ad hanc profecto positionem sententiae, quae scilicet omnes propo-
sitiones de praesenti vel praeterito determinatas iudicat ex eventu de-
propositions are true or false: «Ex his itaque Aristoteles manifeste demonstrat ipsas affir-
mationes et negationes in proprietate veri ac falsi sequi illos eventus rerum quos enuntiant,
gratia quorum tantum esse verae vel falsae dicuntur» (Dial. 251.3-5).
22See for instance (Boethius, 1880, II 188.14-17): «Predicativarum autem propositionum
naturam ex rerum veritate et falsitate colligitur. Quemadmodum enim sese res habent,
ita sese propositiones habebunt, quae res significant».
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terminato et non illas de futuro contingenti, quaestio occurrit, quid
eventum rei accipiant. Si enim res ipsas, quae eveniunt, eventus ap-
pellent, profecto “chimaera est hircocervus” vel “non est” non habet
eventum, id est res aliquo modo evenientes, quia nil omnino umquam
sunt, nec ex se notitiam dare potest magis quam futurum bellum, quam
ex se ipso non habet, cum nil omnino sit. [...] Si quis autem id totum
quod propositio dicit, eventum vocet, id utique nil est, nec magis hic
eventus quam ille praesens est vel praeteritus vel futurus dici poterit,
cum omnino nil umquam sit. (LI De Int. 253.242-257)
Abelard discusses this problem while considering the position according to
which every past and present proposition is determinate. He says here that
however we intend the term “event”, this position is problematic, for there
are at least some events that are said to be determinate but do not exist.
If we take events to be the “things themselves” that a proposition is about,
there will be some past or present propositions – such as “A chimaera is
not a goat-stag” or “The world was created on the first day” – that do not
refer to any existing eventus, for the things they talk about do not exist.
If we instead interpret events as the dicta to which propositions refer, we
will have it that all events do not exist, for dicta, according to Abelard, are
not real components of the ontology. In both cases, then, either some or
every present and past proposition is about an event that does not exist,
and if they do not exist it is hard to explain how they can be determinate.
The natural conclusion could be to state that either (i) not every present
and past proposition is determinate (for those which correspond to non
existing events are not), or that (ii) events are neither things nor dicta.
Nevertheless, Abelard seems not to opt for any of these two solutions, and
he never explicitly state his opinion about what is the correct interpretation
of the eventus rerum. In fact, he is content with dropping this problem as
soon as he has raised it.
Although it is true that Abelard is never explicit on this point, some
commentators have argued that Abelard’s notions of eventus and his concept
of dictum could be assimilated, for just as dicta, events are the “cause” of the
proposition’s truth or falsity. Moreover, just as in the case of dicta, Abelard
does not commit himself to the existence of events, and he avoids saying that
they have a real place in ontology.23 Not everyone agrees however in the
23Marenbon notes in (Marenbon, 1997, p. 205) that in the Sententiae Parisienses it
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identification of dicta with events. Lewis, for example, argues against this
position in (Lewis, 1987, p. 87-8), saying that Abelard’s view is not clear
and that he presents the identification of events with dicta as problematic
in the glosses on De Interpretatione 9. Also King, insisting in (King, 2004,
p. 105) that Abelard’s use of the term “eventus” does not commit him to
the existence of events, seems to say that the eventus rerum are nothing
other than the things themselves and their occurrence or coming about.24
Whatever the word “eventus rei” is supposed to mean, what we can conclude
from Abelard’s discussion in LI De Int. 253.242-257 is that we might say
that a certain event is determinate (which, as we will see in a moment,
means that it can produce some knowledge about itself) without committing
to the existence of these events.
We shall now pass to investigate Abelard’s notion of determinacy, to-
gether with the correlate notion of certainty.
Determinacy and certainty
The notion of determinacy is spelled out by Abelard in epistemological
terms, although as we shall see it is not properly speaking an epistemological
notion, but a metaphysical one. According to him, an event is determinate
if and only if it is “accessible to knowledge”, or, as Abelard puts it, if it is
knowable in itself (ex se cognoscibilis, aptus ex se ipso sciri). There are two
ways in which an event might be knowable in itself (ex se ipso): (i) it might
be knowable in virtue of its existence, i.e. in virtue of its happening in some
past or present moment of time (cognoscibilis ex existentia sui, cognoscibilis
ex actu) or (ii) it might be knowable in virtue of nature (cognoscibilis ex
natura), i.e. in virtue of the fact that it is an instance of some natural
law. Events that are happening or have happened in time are knowable
ex actu in the sense that we might have experienced them, witnessed to
is stated explicitly that events are not things, and so an interpretation of them as dicta
would be natural. Nevertheless, Marenbon himself also points out that the two notions
cannot be exactly coincident, for there are some propositions which refer to a dictum but
have no corresponding eventus, such as false propositions.
24«Thus the eventus of the sea-battle does not refer to the event of which the sea-battle
is a part, but to the occurrence (or “obtaining”) of the sea-battle. But the occurrence of
the sea-battle is nothing other than the sea-battle, just as Socrates’s existence is nothing
more than Socrates: neither the occurrence nor his existence outlasts or is outlasted by
its subject. And the sea-battle itself is nothing but the ships and sailors and their doings.
Hence Abelard’s use of the term eventus doesn’t commit him to the existence of events,
or anything beyond concrete individuals».
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them, or because we remember them (see LI De Int. 254.277-280).25 Events
that are instances of natural laws are instead knowable in the sense that, as
was explained elsewhere (see 3.1 on page 150), by means of our perceptual
experience we might gain some informations about what is compatible or
required by the nature of things.
It follows from this characterization of events that all past and present
events are determinate, inasmuch as they are knowable ex actu. However, it
is not the case that all past and present propositions are also determinate,
and there are in fact some past and present propositions whose truth value
is indeterminate.26 In the glosses on De Int. 9 (251.196-204), Abelard gives
the following examples: “Socrates is the name of the man who will eat
tomorrow” (Socrates est nomen hominis comesturi in crastino), or “I see
the man who will eat tomorrow” (video hominem comesturum in crastino),
These propositions are indeterminate, although being at the present tense,
because “the discernment of their truth or falsity depends on the future”
(discretio veritatis vel falsitatis earum ex futuro pendet). Although Abelard
does not explain in which sense the truth value of these sentences depends on
the future, we might suppose that propositions of this sort are indeterminate
because there is no present eventus to which they correspond (if there were,
this event would be determinate and so would be the proposition), and that
even if they are formulated in the present tense they actually refer to some
future, indeterminate, event.27
Among future events, there are also some determinate events, the ones
that are knowable in virtue of the nature of things. Events of this sort are
signified by sentences that Abelard calls “de futuro naturali” (see figure 4.1
on page 206). These events are just as knowable as present and past events
are: because the nature of things is fixed and unchangeable, if someone
knows what the nature of human beings consists in, and he then knows, for
25«Cum autem quorundam praesentium vel praeteritorum notitiam habemus, aut prae-
sentiam rei alicuius ratio percipit aut recordatio est eius quod percepit, et saepe de occultis
ex manifests certificamur» (LI De Int. 254.277-280).
26This is because there are, according to Abelard, some propositions that are in the
present or past tense but refer to future events.
27There is another kind of propositions that, although stated in the past or present
tense, it would be tempting to consider indeterminate, i.e. those propositions in which
it is predicated the present or past truth of future propositions, such as: “It is true that
Socrates will eat tomorrow” or “It was true that Socrates will eat tomorrow”. Abelard
maintains however that propositions of this sort are determinate propositions, correspond-
ing to determinate events, and this causes him some troubles, as we shall see in 4.1.3 below.
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example, that mortality is required by such a nature, he will also know that
Socrates will die, even if such an event has not yet happened.28
Although it is spelled out in terms of knowability, Abelard’s notion of
determinacy seems not to be an epistemological notion in the end, for things
are said to be determinate not on the basis of the fact that they are effectively
known by us or by some other agent, nor of the fact that they are accessible
to knowledge given our epistemological powers as cognizers. Rather, they
are said to be determinate on the basis of their nature: inasmuch as they
happened or inasmuch as they express a natural law. Both in the Dialectica
and in LI, Abelard is very careful in distinguishing between what is knowable
from what is actually known by us. He refers to the first as “determinate”
(determinatus) and to the second as “certain” (certus).29 There are a great
number of things that are knowable but that we do not actually know.
For example, Abelard says, which is the number of stars and whether this
number is even or odd is knowable, inasmuch as it is a present event, but is
not actually known by us (Dial. 212.2-7; LIDe Int. 250.176-181). Also many
other present, past or natural future events are determined but actually
unknown, and so uncertain. We may also say that there are a great deal
of events that Abelard considers determinate (i.e., knowable) although not
only they are not actually known by us, but also they are in principle not
accessible to our knowledge, given our epistemological powers. Many events
that are determinate in virtue of nature, for instance, are epistemologically
inaccessible to us, because natures themselves are mostly inaccessible to our
28Abelard says that also sentences like “A chimera will not eat” and “A chimera will
not be a goat-stag” are determinate (see LI De Int. 249.155-157), and in particular,
are determinately false. The events to which these propositions refer are in fact again
“knowable” in virtue of the nature of things, for if someone had a complete knowledge
of nature, he would know that there are no such things as chimaeras and there will
never be, and therefore these propositions are necessarily false. The natural kinds God
had created in the past are all the natural kinds that will ever exist, and there could
not be more (or less) natural kinds in the future: «Propositiones autem futuri temporis
aliae fiunt de eventu indeterminato, id est omnino incerto, quantum in ipso est, aliae
de eventu determinato cognitione aliqua naturae. Ut si dicatur Socrates morietur vel
albedo vel chimaera non comedet vel chimaera non erit hircocervus, singula quae dicuntur
certificari nobis possunt ex natura aliqua rerum iam incognita. Nam coniunctionis actum
in quibusdam cognovi et chimaeram vel hircocervum amplius, ut esse possint, seminaria
in rerum natura non habere ex illa dei creatione, quae die septimo specierum omnium
formas complevit, in quibus seminaria futurorum posuit, ut iam amplius nullam novam
speciem crearet» (LI De Int. 249.152-250.2).
29On the distinction between certus and determinatus see in particular Dial. 212-213;
LI De Int. 252.227-254.281).
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knowledge. Similarly, some events that are determinate in virtue of their
happening are inaccessible to us, in the sense that there is no way in which
we could have experienced them or got acquainted with them. The event
to which this proposition refers “The world was created in the first day”,
which Abelard takes as being determinate, is certainly unknowable by us in
virtue of acquaintance, for there is no way in which we could have perceived
or in which we could remember this event as happening in time. It seems
then that even if Abelard introduces the notion of determinacy in terms of
knowability, the determinacy of events has nothing to do (or, not much to
do) with what we actually know or with what we are capable of knowing,
i.e., with our epistemological capacities as human beings. Abelard’s notions
of determinacy and indeterminacy cannot then be properly considered as
epistemological notions.
Strange as it may seem, there are according to Abelard also things that
are indeterminate, i.e. not “knowable” in the sense stated above, but that
are actually known. If for example a prophet or an angel informs us that an
event will occur in the future, we would know that this event will happen,
although the event is in itself indeterminate, i.e., not knowable. In this case,
the event is considered to be indeterminate because it is not known “in virtue
of itself” (non ex se ipso sciri), but it is certain because we might know it
in virtue of some divine authority. Our knowledge of future events that is
derived by prophetic elements in the Scripture is of this sort: it concerns
events that are known but are still indeterminate:
Aliud etiam “determinatum” sonare videtur quam “certum”, quia de-
terminatus dicitur eventus, qui ex se cognoscibilis est nobis, ut paritas
vel imparitas astrorum ex ipsa praesentia, quam habent, de se cog-
nitionem dare potest; certa vero sunt, quae quoquo modo actualiter
cognita sunt. Ut si quid de futuro contingenti testimonio angeli ad
discretionem veniret, certum quidem illud esset mihi non ex se, sed
ex auctoritate angeli. Sed determinatum non esset, quia ex se ipso
cognoscibile non esset. Non omne itaque determinatum certum est
vel e converso, quia “certum” actualiter accipimus, quod iam scilicet
actualiter alicui constat, “determinatum” autem possibiliter sumimus,
quod videlicet aptum est ex se ipso sciri. (LI De Int. 252.226-233)30
Although Abelard does not make any explicit reference to it, at the basis
30For the same distinction in the Dialectica see Dial. 212.21-23.
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of this idea there might be the intuition, that Abelard could have taken
from Boethius, that things can be known either according to their nature
and power or according to the capacity of their cognizers. According to this
idea, there are certain things and states of affairs that cannot be known
by themselves because their nature is indefinite but that can be yet known
by God in virtue of the power that God has of cognizing all things. This
principle, that Marenbon has called “the Modes of Cognition Principle” and
which is related but not coincident with the “Iamblichus’s Principle”, was
used by Boethius in order to explain how indefinite events could be known
by God in a definite way (Marenbon, 2013b, 14-6). This principle might
be also at the basis of Abelard’s idea that there are some things which are
indeterminate, and so not knowable, but are known by God, and could also
be known by us if God’s knowledge is revealed to us in some way – via an
oracle or a prophecy.31
In LI Abelard also distinguishes between what is actually known by us,
as rational human agents, from what is known by God. He stresses there the
idea that, with respect to our knowledge (quantum ad nos), many past and
present events, as well as many future natural events, are unknown, because
we are often ignorant about what happens and about the nature of things,
but are nevertheless determinate. With respect to God’s knowledge (quan-
tum ad Ipsum), on the contrary, many events that are indeterminate are
actually known, because God has knowledge of future contingent events as
well. He knowns for example whether the child that a woman will conceive
will be a boy or a girl or whether in the day of reckoning a man will be saved
or damned (LI De Int. 251.204-252.212). Later in the glosses, Abelard will
say that in fact God has a complete and simultaneous knowledge of all the
events that take place in all times, from which we can infer that, from God’s
perspective, all events are equally both determinate and certain. This refer-
ence to God’s complete knowledge posits several problems, concerning the
compatibility between God’s foreknowledge and the admission of contingent
future events. I deal with this problem in section 4.2 below. Now, I shall
consider Abelard’s analysis of the other core notion that comes into play in
his discussion about De Interpretatione 9, that is, the notion of contingency.
31Also Boethius embraced the idea that there are events that are certain although they
are not determined, see (Boethius, 1880, I 107.88); (Boethius, 1880, II 189.23).
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Kinds of contingency
In the glosses on De Intepretatione, Abelard says that the name “contin-
gency” (utrumlibet) is imposed on things or events not in virtue of a com-
mon property that they have but in virtue of a common cause, i.e., in virtue
of the fact that these events are equally apt to happen and not to happen.
This remark is in line with something that Abelard insists on elsewhere, i.e.,
the idea that modal terms (necessity, possibility and, here, contingency) do
not refer to substances nor to some property or quality that things have, but
are indefinite terms (see 1.1.4 above). The name “utrumlibet” refers to all
events that are equally apt to happen and not to happen:
Est itaque “utrumlibet” nomen quorumlibet tam existentium quam
non-existentium, secundum hoc quod se ad fieri et non feri se habent
quae numquam erunt sicut illae quae erunt. Et hoc est nomen “utrum-
libet”, non ex proprietate aliqua datum, sed ex causa communis inven-
tumex eo scilicet quod res, quibus convenit, aeque ad fieri et non fieri
se habent, id est aeque, ut dictum est, possibile est eas evenire et non.
(LI De Int. 255.304-311)
Following Boethius, in the Dialectica Abelard divides contingency into three
“species”: chance (casum), free will (liberum arbitrium) and natural dispo-
sition (facilitas naturae).32 Chance (Casus) is a name that refers to unex-
pected events (inopinati eventus), unexpected not just because we did not
foresee them, but because they are they are not governed by a simple natural
law such that they could be forseen by us («inopinatus non quantum ad ac-
tionem nostrae cognitionis sed quantum ad naturam»). Events that happen
by chance may be the outcome either of some natural cause or of a human
action. We only say that a chance event is the outcome of a human action
if such an action is not preceded by any deliberation, judgement or hope to
obtain that result. For instance, if a man digs a hole in a field, with the
purpose of planting a tree, and he discovers a treasure, we might say that his
discovery happens by chance, because it is a result of a human action that
was undertaken with the purpose to obtain a different outcome than the
one it actually obtains (Dial. 215.9-15; LI De Int. 256.332-257.349). Free
Will (Liberum Arbitrium) is a name that refers to events of which our
32This division retraces Boethius’ distinction in (Boethius, 1880, II 190.1-6, 194.15-17,
195.4).
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action is the efficient cause and the achievement of which is preceded by the
will (voluntas) to obtain that result and by a certain judgement of the mind
(iudicio mentis). An event achieved by a certain agent is a result of free
will if in the agent there is a conjunction of will and mental deliberation, to-
gether with an absence of external constraints that would prevent him from
achieving that result. Natural Disposition (Facilitas Naturae) is a
name that refers to events that happen because some subject has a natural
disposition to bring them about, but that are not required by nature and
so might also not happen. For example, a glass has a natural disposition
to break, and if it does break we would say that the cause of this event
is a certain natural disposition, or a natural potency, that the glass has to
break (Dial. 215.28-32). The efficient cause of these events is neither hu-
man action nor chance. The analysis of contingency that Abelard proposes
in the Logica Ingredientibus is slightly different from the one proposed in
the Dialectica. Rather than following Boethius’ division of contingency in
chance, free will and natural disposition, in LI Abelard only says that con-
tingent events might have three possible efficient causes: they might happen
in virtue of nature (ex natura), in virtue of human action (ex nobis) or in
virtue of a conjunction of the two.
As some commentators have noticed,33 Abelard thinks that contingency
should be referred not only to future events, but also to present and past
events, for even if these events have already happened, things might have
occurred in such a way that they did not take place (see section 3.4.1 above).
For instance, Abelard thinks that even if it is true that Socrates is sitting
now, we might still say that it is now possible for Socrates not to sit, for
things might have been so that Socrates was not sitting now, but standing.34
The existence of contingency and contingent states of affairs is taken for
granted by Abelard, just as it was by Aristotle and Boethius. In the next
section I consider the three argument that he advances in the Dialectica and
33See in particular (Knuuttila, 1993); (Martin, 2004a); (Martin, 2001) and (Knuuttila,
2010). For the distinction between diachronic and synchronic paradigm of modalities see
(von Wright, 1984).
34With respect to this point, Abelard’s position is different from the one embraced
by Boethius, who made use of a diachronic paradigm of modalities, in which past and
present are characterized as necessary insofar as they are inevitable, and possibilities are
only referred to the future. It is not clear whether Abelard is the first to propose a
sort of synchronic reading of possibilities or whether this paradigm was also held by his
contemporaries.
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the LI against logical determinism.
4.1.3 Abelard’s three arguments against logical determinism
Abelard considers three different arguments that someone might advance in
favor of the incompatibility between contingency and principles [PB], [LEM]
and [RCP]. The First Argument (Dial. 210.31-211.1, 212.36-213.28 and
LI De Int. 245.59-66) aims to demonstrate that the principle of bivalence
does not hold for future propositions, relying on the idea that since future
propositions do not have a determinate truth value, they do not have a truth
value at all, i.e. they are neither true nor false. If propositions of this sort
are neither true or false, the proponent of the argument goes on, the nature
of contradictory statements does not hold for them, and so principles [LEM]
and [RCP] do not generally hold. Abelard considers then a Second Ar-
gument (Dial. 213.29-214.25 and 219.25-222.25, LI De Int. 245.1-246.71),
which has a form of a reductio ad absurdum. The proponent of such an argu-
ment claims that, if for any pair of contradictory propositions “p” and “¬ p”
it is necessarily the case that either “p” is true or “¬ p” is true, as principle
[RCP] wants, then we have it that either what is said by “p” is necessarily
the case or that what is said by “¬ p” is necessarily the case. If it is so,
the events signified by “p” and “¬ p” necessarily occur or not occur, and
therefore they are not contingent events. But since it is evident that there
are future contingent events and that not everything that happens happens
necessarily, principle [RCP] does not hold unrestrictedly, and in particular
it does not hold for future sentences. Finally, Abelard devotes a long part
of his work to a Third Argument (Dial. 212.10-23, LI De Int. 252.215-
253.241), which, differently from the first two arguments, is not set out in in
Aristotle’s or Boethius’ discussions on future contingents. The argument is
developed from the consideration of propositions like “that Socrates will eat
tomorrow is true”, in which truth is predicated in the present tense of some
future contingent proposition. According to the proponent of this argument,
the truth value of present sentences like “that Socrates will eat tomorrow is
true” must be determinate – inasmuch as it signifies a present state of affairs
that is determinate. But if this is the case, the future event expressed by
these propositions (in the example, that Socrates will eat tomorrow) must
be determinate too, because it seems that if the present proposition “that
Socrates will eat tomorrow is true” is determinate, then also the future state
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of affairs that Socrates will eat tomorrow should be determinate. But if this
future state of affairs is determinate, then it is not contingent. Since one
could rephrase a similar argument for every future event, because for any
future event π we could formulate a proposition such as “it is (or it was) true
that π”, if the argument proposed above is valid, then one may argue that
every future event is already determinate, and therefore not contingent.
Abelard’s general answer to the arguments of logical determinism may
be summarized in the following way. First, Abelard claims that the principle
of bivalence ([PB] above) holds unqualifiedly, and therefore every proposi-
tion either has the truth value true or it has the truth value false, and he
recognizes no other truth values beyond these two. In particular, Abelard
explicitly argues against the position that future contingent claims are nei-
ther true nor false (see 4.1.3 below), and he also seems not to embrace
Boethius’ idea that some propositions are only disjunctively true-or-false.
In this respect, his analysis of future contingents differs not only from the
one proposed by Boethius (see 4.1 on page 195) but also from the position of
some authors contemporary to him, such as the author of the 12th-century
treatise editio super Aristotelem De Interpretatione, who offers a solution
similar to the one advanced by Boethius,35 and Garlandus Compotista, who
claims in the Dialectica that all assertoric propositions may be included in
the following three cases: true propositions, false propositions, and either-
true-or-false ones (alia vera, alia falsa, alia vel vera vel falsa).36
35For an analysis of the position presented in this work see (Knuuttila, 2010, p. 81-2),
who summarizes it in the following way: «Contradictory present tense propositions are de-
terminately true and determinately false and also disjunctively determinately/necessarily
true or false (etiam sub disiunctione), whereas contradictory future contingent propositions
are merely disjunctively true or false (sub disiunctione tantum; 100,13-19: 112,7-113,3).
The author does not explain this distinction, but he seems to understand Boethius’s com-
ments in the way most contemporary commentators do and to accept the idea that future
contingent propositions are merely true-or-false».
36See (Garlandus Compotista, 1959, 74.19-31): «Sic dividitur perfecta oratio: alia vera,
alia falsa, alia neque vera neque falsa, alia vel vera vel falsa. Vera est illa quae determi-
natam veritatem habet, ut “homo animal est”; falsa que determinatam falsitatem habet,
ut “homo lapis est”, alia neque vera neque falsa, sicuti illa que non est enuntiativa, velt
hec: “putasne anima immortalis sit?”; alia vel vera vel falsa, sicuti illa que neque deter-
minatam veritatem habet neque determinatam falsitatem; sed alterum necesse est habere
indeterminate, ut hic patet: “cras finiemus Periermeneias”: hec enim indeterminatam
veritatem habet vel indefinitam falsitatem, quia neque ad verum neque ad falsum se ha-
bet, sed secundum utrumlibet, idest secundum dispositionem idest pro voluntate nostra
vel secundum casum idest secundum hoc quod casualiter aliquid evenit sine dispositione
nostra: potest enim vera esse vel falsa». It is interesting to note that here Garlandus
mixes up Boethius’ terminology, which distinguished propositions as being “definite” and
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Second, Abelard considers the Aristotelian principle [RCP], according to
which of every pair of contradictory statements “p” and “¬ p” it is necessary
that exactly one is true and the other false. This is taken by Abelard to hold
unrestrictedly and unqualifiedly for all propositions, independently of their
modal status and tense. The general validity of principle [RCP], however,
does not entail any deterministic consequences because, Abelard says, it is
not valid to infer, from the necessity of a disjunction, the necessity of the
disjuncts.
Third, Abelard thinks that future contingent propositions, although they
already have one of the two truth values true or false, are now only inde-
terminately true or false. This is because their truth-maker (that is, the
eventus rei to which they refer) is not yet determinate, where determinate
is taken to mean “knowable in virtue of its happening or in virtue of nature”
(Dial. 211.28-32). Abelard does not only embrace this idea but attributes
it to Aristotle himself (LI De Int. 245.59-246.71). Nevertheless, even if the
future statements “p” and “¬ p” are only indeterminately true or false, the
proposition which says “Necessarily: either p or ¬ p” is not only true but
determinately true (Dial. 212.36-213.3).
Finally, while discussing the third argument Abelard points out that it is
possible for a future proposition to be determinate without the correspond-
ing future event being determinate as well. For example, we might indeed
say that propositions like “Socrates will eat tomorrow” is determinate, ac-
cording to the fact that a this proposition is either true now or it is false now,
but this does not necessarily entail that the future event that Socrates will
eat tomorrow is also determinate. In what follows, I shall consider the three
arguments of logical determinism in more detail, together with the solutions
that Abelard proposes to invalidate them. I will pay a special attention to
the third argument (see 4.1.3 on page 226) for although it has been object
of some modern interpretations – in particular in (Normore, 1985); (Lewis,
“indefinite”, with the terminology that will be used by Abelard, of being “determinate”
and “indeterminate”. Another interesting point made by Garlandus in his discussion of
future propositions is that when we talk about statements that are indefinitely or inde-
terminately true or false, this indeterminacy has nothing to do with our ignorance, i.e.
the fact that we are uncertain (incerti) of their truth value, but it depends on the nature
of the states of affairs to which these propositions refer: «Indeterminatam veritatem vel
falsitatem dico habere ista propositionem non ideo quia nos ignoremus eius veritatem vel
falsitatem, sed quia ad utrumque, vel ad verum vel ad falsum, se potest habere aliquo casu
vel aliqua dispositione». This topic will be developed also by Abelard, who distinguishes
carefully between determinacy and certainty (see 4.1.2 above).
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1987); (Knuuttila, 2010) – many points of it are still controversial, and I will
try to offer some new insights on it.
The First Argument: future contingent propositions are neither
true nor false
The First Argument that Abelard considers is based on the idea that future
contingent propositions have no truth value. The proponent of such an ar-
gument claims first that sentences about future contingents are neither true
or false, and second that if neither “p” nor “¬ p” is true, the disjunctive
proposition “p or ¬ p” is also not true, and therefore the logical principles
[RCP] is not valid for propositions of this sort. Future contingent proposi-
tions are considered not to have a truth value because their truth-maker (i.e.
the event they express) is not yet determined. The idea that a proposition
can be true or false only if it is determinately true or false is an implicit
assumption of this first argument, and it is exactly this claim that Abelard
tries to dismiss, by saying that a proposition could be true or false also
indeterminately.
Abelard only mentions briefly this argument in Dial. 210.31-211.1, where
he reports the idea of some people that contingent propositions like “p” and
“¬ p” are not properly dividentes and do not constitute a contradictory pair,
for neither of them is true, inasmuch as they are not determinate:
Contradictio [enuntiationum de futuri contingenti] quibusdam non vide-
batur posse fieri, hocest affirmatio et negatio dividentes, eo scilicet
quod nulla propositio de huiusmodi futuro vera videtur; pro eo videlicet
quod, dum adhuc futurum est, non sit eventus rei determinatus. Nulla
enim vera videbatur posse dici propositio nisi quae determinate esset
vera, et falsa similiter, ut sunt omnes illae de praesenti vel praeterito
et necessario futuro vel naturali.
The same idea is presented again in the Dialectica (213.3-10) and appears
once also in the glossae on De interpretatione:
Quoniam autem propositiones de praesenti et praeterito, quae-
cumque verae sunt vel falsae, determinate verae sunt vel falsae, nulla
autem veritas vel falsitas contingents futuri determinata erat, plerique
propositiones de contingenti futuro veras vel falsas omnino esse denege-
bant, eo videlicet quod ea, quam habent, veritas vel falsitas eis nondum
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aperiri posset. Unde non ita proprietatem contradictionis recipiebant
in propositionibus de futuro huiusmodi sicut in praesenti et praeterito.
(LI De Int. 245.59-66)
The argument could be outlined in the following way:
(1) Let “p” be a future contingent proposition. The event π to which
proposition “p” refers is not determinate, i.e. π is not knowable in
virtue of its happening or in virtue of the nature of things.
(2) Since π not determinate, proposition “p” is neither determinately true
nor determinately false.
(3) Because it is not determinately true or false, “p” does not have a truth
value, i.e., it is neither true nor false. The same is the case for propo-
sition “¬ p”
(4) If neither “p” nor “¬ p” are now true, the disjunctive proposition “p or
¬ p” is also not true. In particular, it is not determinately true.
(5) If “p or ¬ p” is not true now, even more so it is not necessarily true.
Proposition “p”, and all propositions of this sort, are exceptions to the
validity of [RCP]
Abelard answers to this argument in two steps. First, he attacks passage (3)
of the argument, saying that having a determinate truth value is not a nec-
essary condition for having a truth value. Some propositions might be true
or false even if only indeterminately. This answer relies on the definition
Abelard gave of determinacy. An event is determinate, according to him, if
it is “knowable”, i.e. if it can produce a knowledge about itself (“notitiam
de se conferre potest”). Abelard says that we cannot infer, from the fact
that it is impossible to know which is the truth value of a proposition, that
this proposition is neither true nor false, because we must be careful to dis-
tinguish the knowability of truth from truth itself. People who propose this
idea, according to Abelard, make reality depend on knowledge or ignorance,
which is wrong.
[Propositiones de futuro contingenti] dividentes esse denegebant, cum
neutram illarum veram vel falsam dicerent, eoquod determinate quae
vera vel falsa esset, nescirent. Cum enim neutram per se veram esse
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vel falsam recognoscerent, neutram veram esse vel falsam volebant;
ac si minus, aliquid eorum quae propositiones dicunt, in re esset vel
non esset propter eorum cognitionem vel ignorantiam, secundum quae
scilicet ipsae propositiones verae esse vel falsae dicendae sunt. Si enim
ita est ut propositio dicit, vera est; si autem non, falsa, sive haec nobis
cognita sint sive non. (Dial. 212.36-213.11)
Second, Abelard makes use of Boethius’ idea of indeterminate truth values,
i.e. he claims that propositions can be true or false not determinately but
indeterminately. Future contingent propositions have a truth value, even if
only an indeterminate one. Abelard attributes this solution to Aristotle him-
self, who assigns truth and falsehood equally to all propositions, although
truth is not determinate in all of them (see LI De Int. 246.69-71):
Quorum errorem postea [Aristoteles] corriget veritatem vel falsitatem
omnibus aequaliter assignans, licet non sit in omnibus determinata.
But again an opponent might insist that we cannot consider future propo-
sitions to be true, for we only assign truth to propositions that say what is
actually the case (quod est in re), and future contingent propositions never
express something that is actually the case, but only something that will
be the case. What Abelard answers to this is not entirely clear to me. He
says that although it is right to say that future propositions do not express
things that are actually the case, what they say might however be true and
will be true, and so they too, in some sense, express something that “est in
re”.
Sed fortasse dicitur non esse vera illa propositio quae id dicit quod in re
non est; verum propositiones de futuro id quod nondum est enuntiant;
unde verae esse non videntur. Sed ad haec dico quod dum adhuc ipsa
res futura est de qua propositio agit, id tamen etiam in re esse potest
quod propositio dicit, ut ea quae de bello futuro fit, hoc modo: “bellum
fiet”. Dum enim nondum fit ita est ut propositio dicit, quod scilicet
fiet; dum autem ipsum fit, non iam quod fiet dicetur, sed quia fit.
(Dial. 213.21-28)
To conclude his answer to the first argument, Abelard claims that even if
a future contingent proposition “p” is only indeterminately true or false,
the disjunctive proposition “p or ¬ p”, as well as the state of affairs to
which it refers, is nevertheless determinately true. According to Abelard, the
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determinacy of a composite proposition does not depend on the determinacy
of its components:
Cum autem propositionum de contingenti futuro nulla sit vera vel falsa
determinate, omnium tamen dividentium determinatum est et necesse
alteram veram et alteram falsam, cuiuscumque sint temporis, ut sunt
illae et quae de futuro contingenti fiunt, veluti istae: “Socrates hodie
leget”, “Socrates hodie non leget”. (Dial. 212.36-213.3)
Whether or not Abelard’s answer to this argument is satisfactory, it shows
very clearly that both in the Dialectica and in the glosses he takes the princi-
ple of bivalence and the rule of contradictory pairs to hold unrestrictedly for
all propositions, and in order to maintain this he employes the traditional
distinction between determinate and indeterminate truth values.
The Second Argument: from the necessity of disjunction to the
necessity of disjuncts
Abelard presents then a second argument that could be advanced against
the validity of what Abelard calls the “proprietas contradictionis” – i.e. our
principle [RCP] – for future contingent propositions. The argument retraces
quite closely Aristotle’s discussion in De Int. 9, and it claims that, if we
admit that it is necessarily the case for any pair of contradictory proposi-
tions “p” and “¬ p” that either “p” is true or “¬ p” is true, then we have
it that either what is said by “p” is necessarily the case or that what is said
by “¬ p” is necessarily the case. If it is so, the events signified by “p” and
“¬ p” necessarily occur or not occur, and therefore they are not contingent
events. This leads to the destruction of contingency, and in particular to the
destruction of human deliberation (consilium) and actions (negotium). But
since it is evident that there are some events that are brought about by hu-
man beings’ deliberation and their free actions, the premise of the argument
must be false, and therefore principle [RCP] does not hold unrestrictedly,
and in particular it does not hold for future sentences.
The argument is considered both in theDialectica (213.29-214.25; 219.25-
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222.25)37 and in LI (245.1-246.71),38 and it has the form of a reductio ad
absurdum, that could be expounded in the following way:
(1) For all pairs of contradictory propositions “p” and “¬ p”, it is necessary
that exactly one of them is true and the other false.
(2) Either it is necessary that the event signified by “p” is the case or it is
necessary that the event signified by “¬ p” is the case.
(3) Let us consider the future contingent propositions “q” and “¬ q”, and
the future events χ and ¬ χ to which these propositions refer. If the
principle stated in (1) holds, it is necessary that either “q” is true or
its contradictory “¬ q” is true, therefore either χ will be necessarily
the case or ¬ χ will.
(4) This means that the future events χ and ¬ χ are not contingent, inas-
much as they are not equally apt to happen and not to happen. Rather,
they are necessary events.
37This is how the argument is expounded in the Dialectica: «Id falsificare nitebantur sic
argumentantes: si omnium affirmationum et negationum, dividentium scilicet, necesse est
alteram veram et alteram falsam, tunc omnium eorum quae dividentes propositiones enun-
tiant, alterum necesse est esse, quod scilicet vera dicit, alterum non esse, quod videlicet
falsa proponit. Quare et eorum quae contingentia futura sunt, necesse est alterum esse,
quando scilicet, alterum non esse. Hic enim “esse” et “non esse” circa quaelibet tem-
pora propositionum accipienda sunt, cum iam scilicet nulla amplius ad esse et non esse
aequaliter sese habeant, quod est proprium utrumlibet, ubi scilicet omnia ex necessitate
contingunt; ii namque addunt quod irrita fiunt amplius consilium et negotium. [...] Utquid
enim oporteret consiliari vel negotiari ut ea quae fieri volumus, fierent, cum ex necessitate
futura sint, quippe vel quae fierent, etsi nullum esset aut consilium aut negotium nostrum?
Quod enim ex necessitate contingendum est, nullo poterit casu disturbari vel impediri. As-
sumunt autem postea per consequentis destructionem, hoc modo: sed ista non pereunt;
idque ex eo demonstrant quod multa futura sunt quae ad utrumlibet se habent, hocest
quae fieri et non fieri aequaliter possunt, ut hanc vestem, quae incidenda est, possibile
incidi et non incidi. Plura etiam contingere videremus per consilium et negotium nos-
trum. Concludunt itaque illud quoque destruendo quod in proximo praecessit, hoc modo:
quare non omnium eorum quae dividentes propositiones dicunt, necesse est alterum esse,
alterum non esse. Unde etiam primum destruunt antecendens, hoc modo: quare non
omnium dividentium propositionum necesse est alteram veram, alteram falsam».
38In the glossae (LI De Int. 245.1-246.71) Abelard presents the argument in a similar
way, although more concisely. He states there that the unqualified admission of the [RCP]
implies that everything takes place by necessity, and therefore that both human deliber-
ation and free actions do not exist («Si omnis contradictionis alteram partem necesse est
esse veram et alteram falsam, tunc omne necesse est esse vel non esse. Quod, si ita est,
perit utrumlibet et consilium et negotium»). But since it is evident that they exist («sed
illa non pereunt»), we conclude, by means of the destruction of the consequent, that the
antecedent (“si omnis contradictionis etc.”) is destroyed as well, and so that [RCP] does
not hold for every proposition: «Unde non ita proprietatem contradictionis recipiebant in
propositionibus de futuro huiusmodi sicut in praesenti et praeterito».
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(5) If there were no contingent future events, human deliberation and ac-
tions (consilium and negotium) would be abolished, for there would
be no point in choosing and deliberating if everything that happens
happens necessarily.
(6) But this is absurd, because it is evident that many events are brought
about by means of deliberation and actions.
(7) We must then reject the first premise, and claim that it is not the
case that of every pair of contradictory propositions “p” and “¬ p”,
necessarily one is true and the other is false.
Abelard’s reply to the Second Argument is rather well known. His solution
consists in saying that the first premise of the argument – i.e. the Aris-
totelian rule of contradictory pairs (omnium affirmationum et negationum
necesse est alteram esse veram et alteram falsam) – is ambiguous, for it
could be read as having different senses. The first thing to do in order to
solve the argument is then to consider the meaning of this premise and to
disambiguate it:
Sed prius nobis inspiciendum est qualiter ipsius antecedens Aristoteles
intellexerit, a quo argumentatio incipit, hoc videlicet: omnium affir-
mationum et negationum necesse est alteram esse veram, alteram esse
falsa, ut hoc prius discusso ipsum ab inconvenienti facilius absolvamus.
(Dial. 219.32-6)
In order to explain the meaning of this principle, Abelard puts it in analogy
with another Aristotelian principle about contraries, which says that of any
pair of contrary predicates, such as healthy and non-healthy, it is necessarily
the case that one inheres in a substance while the other does not inhere (De
Int. 17b26 ff.). This claim however should not be taken as saying that, of
the two contraries, one and the same always inheres in the substance and
the other always does not inhere in it, but it must be taken as saying that
always one or the other of the two inheres and always one or the other of
the two does not inhere. Similarly, it is not the case that of every pair of
propositions “p” and “¬ p”, one and the same proposition is necessarily true
and the other is necessarily false, but it is true that one or the other of the
two is necessarily true and one or the other of the two is necessarily false.
The ambiguity seems to lie in the use of the term “altera”, which could be
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understood either as picking one of the two propositions rigidly (one and
the same proposition is necessarily false) or as picking indifferenter and sub
disiunctione one proposition or the other. In the latter case, Abelard says,
the term “altera” must be read in the sense of “alterutra”. If we read the
principle in the first sense, as saying that for every pair “p” and “¬ p” “it is
necessary that p is true or it is necessary that ¬ p is true”, the principle is
false. If instead we read it in the second sense, as saying that “it is necessary
that indifferently one of p or ¬ p is true” the principle is true.
Potest autem et vere et falso accipi, sicut et illud quod in tractatu
oppositorum de eisdem affirmationibus et negationibus dixit, alteram
scilicet semper esse veram et alteram falsam, veluti istarum: “Socrates
est sanus” et “Socrates non est sanus”. Si enim intellexeris quod uni et
eidem semper verum inhaereat, falsum est, cum potius neutra illarum
veritatem custodiat, sed modo vera sit eadem, modo falsa. Si vero ita
sumpseris ut “alteram” non circa una tantum teneas, sed indifferenter
accipias ac si dicas “alterutram”, verum est. Semper enim alterutra
vera est, hocest semper ita se habet quod vel haec vel illa vera est.
Haecque Aristotelis acceptio exsistit, cum scilicet ait alteram semper
esse veram et alteram falsam, ut illud scilicet “dividue” sumeret ac si
“alterutram” diceret. Sic quoque et hoc loco, cum ait alteram necesse
est esse veram et alteram falsam.
That this was also Aristotle’s own solution to the problem, Abelard claims,
is clear from what he says when he distinguishes absolute necessity from
conditional necessity, i.e., when he distinguishes things that are unqualifiedly
(simpliciter) necessary from things that “necessarily are when they are”:
Sic quoque et hoc loco, cum ait alteram necesse est esse veram et
alteram falsam, quod quidem ipse manifeste in sequentibus in solu-
tione huius argumentationis declaravit, cum ait: “igitur esse quod est,
quando est, et non esse quod non est, quando non est, necesse est; sed
non omne quod est necesse est esse nec quod non est necesse est non
esse; non enim idem est omne quod est esse necessario, quando est, et
simpliciter esse ex necessitate”.
The distinction between unqualified necessity and conditional necessity is,
according to Abelard, at the basis of Aristotle’s answer to the Second Argu-
ment. In the case of principle stated in premise (1), the modal term “neces-
sary” could be attributed to propositions “p” and “¬ p” either unqualifiedly
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(simpliciter) or conditionally, i.e. under disjunction (sub disiunctione). Be-
cause we are never entitled to infer from a conditional necessity an absolute
necessity, we are also not entitled to infer from the fact that it is condition-
ally necessary that either “p” is true or “¬ p” is true, the fact that one of
“p” and “¬ p” is absolutely necessary (or, we might say, we are not entitled
to infer from the necessity of a disjunction the necessity of either disjunct).
Quemadmodum “necessarium” simpliciter enuntiamus sub disiunctione
de his omnibus quae dividentes affirmationes et negationes dicunt, sic
et de orationibus. Omne enim esse vel non esse necesse est et futurum
esse vel non. Sic quoque omnem affirmationem et negationem veram
esse vel falsam necesse est, sed non semper veram esse necesse est nec
semper falsam esse necesse est.
The Second Argument is then harmless according to Abelard, because if
premise (1) is taken in the proper sense, as saying “Necessarily (p is true or
¬ p is true)”, then (1) is true but (2) does not properly follow from it and so
the argument is invalid; if instead premise (1) is taken as saying “Necessarily
(p) or necessarily (¬ p)”, then (2) does indeed follow from (1) and so does
the conclusion of the argument, but the whole argument is based on a false
premise.
The Third argument: all future contingent events are determinate
Finally, both in the Dialectica and in the glosses, Abelard proposes a third
argument that an opponent could use to argue that, if we admit the principle
of bivalence as unqualifiedly holding for every proposition, there is no future
event which is not determined. This argument locates a problem in Boethius’
way out of logical determinism, i.e. in the use of the distinction between
determinate and indeterminate truth values. According to the proponent
of this argument, this distinction does not save us from the threat of the
fatalistic consequences of unrestricted bivalence, for if we admit that future
contingent propositions are already now either true or false, it follows that
they also are already now determinately true or false. The puzzle is based on
the idea that for any future contingent proposition, as for instance “Socrates
will eat tomorrow”, it is possible to formulate a present (or past) proposition
which predicates the truth or the falsity of the former proposition, as in “that
Socrates will eat tomorrow is true”, or “that Socrates will eat tomorrow was
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true”. The propositions that we obtained refer to present or past state of
affairs, and therefore they should be determinately true, if every present and
past event is determinate. However, one might think that if the proposition
“that Socrates will eat tomorrow is true” is determinately true, then also the
state of affairs that Socrates will eat tomorrow must be determinate, because
the determinacy of a proposition depends on the determinacy of the event
to which it refers. But if this is the case, then also the future event that
Socrates will eat tomorrow is already determinate, and not contingent. Since
one could construct a similar argument for every future event, because for
any future event π it is possible to formulate a proposition such as “it is
(or was) true that π”, if this argument is valid, then every future event is
already determinate, and then not contingent.
Among all the three arguments that Abelard considers concerning logical
determinism, this seems to be the one that troubles him the most, and to
which he dedicates the greatest attention. What his solution consists of
has been matter of debate,39 and also the exact form of the argument is
obscure. In the following pages, I shall try to provide a reconstruction of
the argument, and I propose what I think is Abelard’s solution to it, which,
in my view, is the same in both the Dialectica and the Logica Ingredientibus.
The argument posits four different entities, two propositions and two events:
– a future contingent proposition (p) = “Socrates will eat”;
– a future event (π) = that Socrates will eat, which is the referent of propo-
sition (p);
– a present proposition (q) = “that Socrates will eat is true”;
– a present event (χ) = that truth inheres in proposition (p); which is the
referent of proposition (q).
The argument moves from the determinacy of event (χ) to the determinacy
of proposition (q),40 then from the determinacy of (q) to the determinacy
of (p); and finally from the determinacy of (p) to the determinacy of (π). In
order to formulate the argument we must first identify some principles that
Abelard more or less explicitly accepts as premises:
39In particular, the argument is discussed in (Normore, 1982), (Lewis, 1987) and (Knu-
uttila, 2010).
40Proposition (q) is determinate in the sense that it is either determinately true or
determinately false.
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(I) An event is determinate if and only if it is knowable in itself (cognosci-
bilis ex se), i.e. if it is apt to produce some knowledge about itself
(notitiam de se potest conferre) either in virtue of its happening in the
present or in the past, or in virtue of being an expression of a law of
nature.
(II) For every proposition (p), it is necessary that either (p) is true or (p)
is false.
(III) Every present event is determinate, in virtue of its happening in the
present.
(IV.a) A proposition is determinately true or false if the event to which it
refers is determinate.
(IV.b) A proposition is determinately true or false only if the event to
which it refers is determinate.41
(V) If the proposition “ ‘p’ is true” is determinate, then proposition “p” is
determinate.
The first premise is Abelard’s definition of determinacy, which was consid-
ered in detail in 4.1.2 on page 209. Textual evidence for this definition may
be found in Dial. 212.13 ff. and LI De Int. 252.227-254.281. When dis-
cussing the third argument, Abelard is very careful in distinguishing between
determinate events and propositions from certain ones: while the first con-
cept refers to what is knowable, the second refers to what is actually known.42
The distinction between the two concepts is of great relevance for Abelard’s
discussion of the argument, for he thinks that while the argument is valid
when we talk about certainty, it is not valid in the case of determinacy.
The second premise is principle [PB]. As was said above, Abelard argues
that this principle is valid for all sorts of propositions, and therefore also
for future contingent ones. I think that recent interpretations of this third
argument of logical determinism underestimate the role of principle [PB]
41Saying that a proposition is determinate and that it has a determinate truth value is
the same thing.
42As was said in 4.1.2, in the Dialectica Abelard thinks that not everything that is
certain is also determinate, for we might actually know that some future event is going to
happen (maybe because a prophet or a divine sign told us so) although this event is not
knowable in itself (ex se).
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for the validity of the argument. As I show below (see 4.1.3 on page 233),
without the acceptance of this principle, the argument would not be as
problematic as in fact Abelard takes it to be. In particular, the acceptance
of this principle is the reason for which a proposition like “that Socrates will
eat is true” – and the event to which it refers - are taken by Abelard as
being determinate.
The third premise follows from Abelard’s definition of determinacy. Abelard
states several times that any present or past event is determinate at least in
its nature (saltem in natura sui), which means that even if we do not know
it, it is nevertheless knowable in virtue of its happening.43 The conjunction
of this principle with premise (IV.a) leads to the conclusion that all proposi-
tions which refer to present events are determinately true or false. Evidence
of this idea could be found in the Dialectica, where Abelard says that all
present events and all corresponding present propositions are determinate:
[Sunt determinate verae, et falsae similiter] omnes illae de praesenti vel
praeterito et necessario futuro vel naturali. Quia enim omnium prae-
sentium vel praeteritorum vel futurorum necessariorum vel naturalium
eventus in natura sui determinatus est, quaecumque propositiones de
istis verae sunt, determinatae verae sunt, et quaecumque falsae, de-
terminate sunt falsae, in eo scilicet quod determinatos eventus rerum
enuntiant de quibus agunt. (Dial. 210.35-211.5)
We find a similar position in the glossae:
Propositiones vero de praesenti vel praeterito, quaecumque verae sunt
vel falsae, vera vel falsa determinate iudicant, quia etsi actualiter cog-
nita non sit veritas earum vel falsitas, in natura tamen definita est, quia
iam in rerum praesentia vel est vel fuit. Unde notitiam de se conferre
possunt, et quantum in ipsis est, cognosci. (LI De Int 250.169-176)
Premises (IV.a) and (IV.b) taken together say that not only whenever an
event φ is determinate the proposition which is about φ is determinately
true or false, but also that whenever a proposition has a determinate truth
value then it must be about some determinate event, i.e., there is no other
way for a proposition to be determinate unless it refers to some determinate
43See for instance Dial. 211.1-2: «Omnium praesentium [...] eventus in natura sui
determinatus est»; Dial. 212.1-2: «Quod autem praesens est, determinatus est saltem in
natura».
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event. The first side of the principle is uncontroversially accepted by Abelard
as true. The other side of the implication, from the determinacy of the
proposition to the determinacy of the event, is instead more controversial.
Abelard does say at times that the determinacy of a proposition always
depends on the determinacy of the event de quo agit. See for example the
following passage:
At vero si (p) “Socrates comedet” est vera determinate oportet et de-
terminatum esse, quod (π) Socrates comedet, quia sicut veritas propo-
sitionum ex eventu rerum pendet, ita et cognitionem veritatis vel fal-
sitatis ex cognitione eventuum necesse est haberi.
Nevertheless, I argue that Abelard does not embrace principle (IV.b) and
that his solution to the puzzle turns exactly on his rejection of premise
(IV.b), because he thinks that although it is true that whenever an event
is determinate the propositions that refer to it are also determinate, the
converse is not given, because a proposition can be determinately true or
false even if the event to which it refers is not determinate44.
The fifth premise is not explicitly recognized by Abelard as a premise
and never really justified by him. However, at least once in his discussion
of the argument he passes, although without giving any further justification
for this inference, from the determinacy of proposition (q) “that Socrates
will eat is true” to the determinacy of proposition (p) “Socrates will eat”.
In LI De Int. 251.184-192, in fact, he says that:
Veluti cum dicitur (p) “Socrates comedet”, haec propositio iam pro-
fecto praesentialiter est vera vel falsa, et haec propositio quae dicit (q)
“ ‘Socrates comedet’ est vera” de praesenti est et ideo iam vel deter-
minate vera est vel determinate falsa saltem in natura praesentis in-
haerentiae veritatis vel falsitatis quam habet. At vero si (p) “Socrates
comedet” est vera determinate oportet et determinatum esse, quod (π)
Socrates comedet.
In this passage, Abelard seems to pass from the fact that proposition (q)
is determinate to the determinacy of proposition (p), and then to the de-
terminacy of the future event (π). Nevertheless, he does not feel the need
44As I will say later, this position seems indeed to be a rather ad hoc and not entirely
persuasive solution, for it is unclear how Abelard can maintain that it is possible for a
proposition to be determinately true or determinately false even if the event to which it
refers - that according to Abelard’s theory should be the truthmaker of the proposition -
is itself indeterminate.
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to justify this entailment. He does not say, for instance, that this entail-
ment holds because proposition (q) infers (p) and determinacy is preserved
in valid inferences. The passage quoted, however, leads us to think that
Abelard does accept the principle formulated in premise (V), and uses it in
his discussion of the third argument.45 Indeed, that the determinacy of a
proposition like (p) follows from the determinacy of (q) seems evident if we
consider Abelard’s definition of determinacy in terms of knowability: if in
fact it is knowable that “Socrates will eat is true”, it is also knowable that
“Socrates will eat”.
These premises given, we can now try to outline the argument.
(1) Let (p) be the future proposition “Socrates will eat”. Let (π) be the
future event that Socrates will eat, to which (p) refers;
(2) it is necessarily true (= it is true in every time) that either (p) is true
or (p) is false [Principle II];
(3) it is now true that (p) is true or (p) is false [ex toto from principle II];
(4) either it is now the case that truth inheres in (p) or this is not the case;
(5) let (χ) be the present event that truth inheres in proposition (p), and let
(q) be the present proposition “that Socrates will eat is true”, which
refers to event (χ);
(6) event (χ) is determinate (i.e. it is determinately true or determinately
45In his reconstruction of the argument, Lewis says that this principle (V) has no role
in Abelard’s discussion of the argument, for Abelard directly infers the determinacy of the
future eventus (π) from the determinacy of the present proposition (q), without passing via
the determinacy of proposition (p). Lewis’ position is based though on some emendation
on the text, which concerns the exact passage that I take as evidence of Abelard’s inference
from proposition (q) to proposition (p), i.e. passage LI De Int. 251.184-192 quoted above.
In Lewis’s interpretation, the passage goes: «At vero si “‘Socrates comedet’ est vera”
[est vera] determinate, oportet et determinatum esse quod Socrates comedet». In this
interpretation, the passage states the inference from proposition (q), which is said to be
determinate, to the eventus (π). In the recent edition of the text by Jacobi and Strub,
to which I refer here, Lewis’ emendation was not integrated, and the text goes instead
in the following way: «At vero si “Socrates comedet” est vera determinate oportet et
determinatum esse, quod Socrates comedet», and it states then both that proposition (p)
is determinately true – which is inferred by the truth of (q) – and that the determinacy
of (p) implies the determinacy of (π). In my reconstruction of the argument, I follow
Jacobi and Strub’s edition of the text, and I consider the passage at stake as referring
to the determinacy of proposition (p), and not of proposition (q), which was said to be
determinately true in the passage before this, LI De Int. 251.184-189.
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false) in virtue of its happening in the present time (either it occurs
now, or it does not occur now) [principles I, III];
(7) if the event (χ) is determinate, the present proposition (q) is determi-
nate [principle [IV.a];
(8) proposition (q) is determinate;
(9) if proposition (q) is determinate, proposition (p) is determinate [prin-
ciple V];
(10) proposition (p) is determinate;
(11) if proposition (p) is determinate, the future event (π) is determinate
[principle IV.b];
(12) the future event (π) is determinate.
The third argument seems to be a valid argument, and therefore a rejection
of it must rely on the rejection of one of the premises, i.e., one of the prin-
ciples (I)-(V). Interpreters have proposed different solutions in this sense.
Normore claims in (Normore, 1982, p.361-3) that Abelard offers two possi-
ble solutions to the argument, one in the Dialectica and one in the glossae.
In the glossae, Abelard solution is, according to Normore, to say that not
every present proposition is determinately true or false, and in particular
that proposition (q) is not determinate. Abelard does indeed say in LI
that there are some past and present propositions that are not determinate,
because their determinacy, or “knowability”, depends on some future con-
tingent event. Propositions like “Socrates is the name of the man who will
eat tomorrow” (Socrates est nomen hominis comesturi in crastino) or “I see
the man who will eat tomorrow” (video hominem comesturum in crastino)
belong to this category (LI De Int. 251.196-204):
Sed nec istae de praesenti “Socrates est nomen hominis comesturi in
crastino” vel “homo comesturus in crastino est Socrates” vel “video
hominem comesturum in crastino” determinari possunt nisi per futu-
rum [...] Non itaque omnes de praesenti vel praeterito propositiones
verae vel falsae determinate esse videntur, quando videlicet veritatis
vel falsitatis earum discretio ex futuro pendet. [...] Si autem ad hu-
manam scientiam rescipiciamus, cum hic Aristoteles iuxta humanam
opinionem disputet, non omnes propositiones de praesenti vel praeter-
ito definitae videntur. (251.196-215)
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This solution seems reasonable, for it is reasonable to think that some
present propositions are true or false only indeterminately, if their deter-
minacy (i.e. knowability) depends on an indeterminate event. However, as
Lewis says in (Lewis, 1987, p. 102) this seems not to be Abelard’s solution
to the puzzle: there is no doubt that Abelard admits the existence of present
and past propositions that are not determinate,46 but proposition (q), which
is at stake here, is not one of them. This might sound odd, for it seems that
the knowability of proposition (q) depends on some future event, and as such
it should be indeterminate. Lewis says that the reasons for which Abelard
does not want to put propositions as “that Socrates will eat tomorrow is
true” in the same boat as propositions like “Socrates is the name of the man
who will eat tomorrow” are unclear. I think instead that Abelard has im-
portant reasons for saying that propositions like (q) are determinately true
or false, and that these reasons have to do with Abelard’s acceptance of
[PB], i.e. principle (II) above. According to this principle, every proposition
– even future contingent ones – necessarily have either the truth value true
or the truth value false. This means that in the present moment of time,
a future proposition like (p)= “Socrates will eat tomorrow”, is either true
or false, even though only indeterminately. If the future proposition is now
either true or false, then it is necessary that there is now a present state
of affairs which consists in the inherence or non-inherence of the truth to
proposition (p), i.e., in the present time either the property of being true
inheres in (p) or it does not. One of these two possible states of affairs is
present, and as such it must be determinate in virtue of its happening. This
conclusion might be avoided by saying that future propositions like (p) are
neither true or false in the present moment, because they will only obtain
a truth value in some future moment. However, Abelard wants to maintain
that every proposition already has a truth value and is so either true or false.
Dropping this idea would in fact imply the rejection of general bivalence.
Propositions like “Socrates is the name of the man that I will see to-
morrow” or “Socrates is the man who will eat tomorrow” are different from
propositions like (q). The former propositions are indeterminate because,
46This is why I chose to state, as a premise of the argument, Abelard’s principle that
all present events are determinate, and not that all present propositions are determinate.
The idea that there are indeterminate present propositions is stated by Abelard only in
the Logica Ingredientibus, for in the Dialectica Abelard seems to think that every past and
present propositions is determinately true or false.
233
although they are stated in the present tense, there is no present eventus
to which they refer, but they are instead about some future event. There
is in fact no such present event as Socrates having the property of being
the man that I will see tomorrow, or as Socrates having the property of be-
ing a man who will eat tomorrow. The admission of indeterminate present
propositions does not threaten the validity of principle (III) nor the validity
of principle (IV.a) above, because present propositions which are indetermi-
nate do not refer to any present or determinate event. On the contrary, for
propositions like (q) this way out is not possible, because proposition (q)
does indeed correspond to some present event – the actual inherence or non
inherence of truth in (p) – which being present must be determinate. Be-
cause of Abelard’s acceptance of principle (II), then, he is obliged to accept
that propositions like (q) are determinate propositions, and so Normore’s
first way out cannot be Abelard’s solution to the puzzle.
Another possible way out to the puzzle, which according to Normore is
Abelard’s solution in the Dialectica, would be instead to reject principle (V),
used in the argument in passage (10), i.e. the idea that the determinacy of
(q) necessarily entails the determinacy of (p). As Normore says, the rejection
of principle (V) is a particular case of the rejection of the general idea
that determinacy is preserved in valid inferences (Normore, 1982, p. 362).
Normore’s interpretation is based on two passages, one from the Dialectica
and one from the LI. In Dial. 212.19-21, Abelard says that:
Non ergo vero recipimus quod si determinatum sit antecedens, deter-
minatum sit et consequens. Sed fortasse si certum fuerit antecedens,
certum erit et consequens.
In the glosses there is a similar passages, where Abelard says that although
we admit that when a consequent properly follows from an antecedent, then
if the antecedent is certain the consequent is also certain, we do not admit
that if the antecedent is determinate the consequent is also determinate:
Aliud etiam “determinatum” sonare videtur quam “certum”, quia de-
terminatus dicitur eventus qui ex se cognoscibilis est nobis [...] certa
vero sunt, quae quoquo modo actualiter cognita sunt. [...] Unde et si
talis consequentia recipiatur, “Si ‘Socrates comedet’ est vera, Socrates
comedet”, et certum sit antecedens, certum erit et consequens. Sed non
fortasse, si determinatum sit antecedens, et consequens, quia praesens
eventus ex se cognoscibilis est, sed non ita futurus contingens.
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I think however that these two passages do not give us Abelard’s solution to
the argument. In them, Abelard simply points out that we must not infer
from the determinacy of the present proposition (q) “that Socrates will eat
is true” that the future event π that Socrates will eat is also determinate.
This tells us what Abelard is trying to demonstrate, but not how he justifies
his conclusion.
Finally, a third interpretation of Abelard’s solution is proposed by Lewis,
who attempts in (Lewis, 1987) to provide a systematic reconstruction Abelard’s
answer to the third deterministic argument. According to Lewis, the puz-
zling conclusion of the argument depends on the fact that determinacy is
misleadingly understood by some people as certainty. What Abelard would
be saying is that when we consider two events like our χ and π, and we
assume that the first is certain, i.e. actually known by us, then we cannot
but conclude that the second is also certain, i.e. from the certainty of χ
necessarily follows the certainty of π. It seems evident in fact that whenever
we actually know that Socrates will eat is true we also know that Socrates
will eat. However, determinacy is different from certainty, as Abelard often
insists, and although this argument is valid if we were speaking of certainty,
it does not work when we speak of determinacy. Although it is true that
Abelard stresses the distinction between certainty and determinacy, pointing
out this distinction cannot per se be Abelard’s justification for the invalidity
of the third argument. The fact that the argument is plausible only if we
speak of certainty but not if we speak of determinacy does not tell what ex-
actly is wrong in the deterministic reasoning represented in (1)-(12). Lewis
is then right in pointing out that Abelard’s distinction between certus and
determinatus is crucial in his exposition of the Third Argument, but it is
not in this distinction that Abelard’s solution lies.
As I mentioned, my idea is that Abelard solves the argument by reject-
ing principle (IV.b) above, which is needed to infer the determinacy of the
eventus (π): that Socrates will eat from the determinacy of proposition (p):
“Socrates will eat”. He thinks in fact that while the determinacy of the
present event (χ) entails the determinacy of the present proposition (q), and
the determinacy of (q) entails the determinacy of the future proposition (p),
the fact that (p) is determinate does not necessarily entail that the event
it talks about is also determinate. To show this, I turn now to consider





























Figure 4.2: The chain of entailments from the determinacy of the present
event to the determinacy of the future event in the Third Argument.
Logica Ingredientibus, for there the author considers the argument in more
detail. I will then try to show that the exposition and solution presented in
the Dialectica agrees with this, although is laid out in a more concise way,
with the exception of some minor points that I will point out.
The Third Argument in the Logica Ingredientibus
In LI, Abelard starts by saying that, although it is reasonable to think that
every present and past proposition is determinate, inasmuch as it refers to
a determinate event, and that every future contingent proposition is inde-
terminate, inasmuch it refers to an indeterminate event, a question arises
concerning those present or past propositions such as “that Socrates will
eat is true”, that are not knowable but by means of some future contingent
event.
De quibusdam tamen praesentibus sive praeteritis restat quaestio, utrum
definita sint, scilicet in natura, cum <non> nisi per futura indeter-
minata sciri queant. Veluti cum dicitur (p) “Socrates comedet”, haec
propositio iam profecto praesentialiter est vera vel falsa, et haec propo-
sitio quae dicit (q) “ ‘Socrates comedet’ vera est” de praesenti est et
ideo iam vel determinate vera est vel determinate falsa saltem in natura
praesentis inhaerentiae veritatis vel falsitatis quam habet. At vero si
(p) “Socrates comedet” est vera determinate oportet et determinatum
esse, quod (π) Socrates comedet, quia sicut veritas propositionum ex
eventu rerum pendet, ita et cognitionem veritatis vel falsitatis ex cog-
nitione eventuum necesse est haberi. (LI De Int 250.182-251.189)
Abelard says here four things. First, that proposition (p)= “Socrates will
eat” is either true or false in the present moment, in virtue of the principle
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of bivalence, as stated in principle (II). Second, that because (p) is presently
true or false, there is a present event (χ) which consists in the present inher-
ence or non inherence of truth to proposition (p). Event (χ) is determinate,
in virtue of the fact that all present events are determinate, as principle (I)
says. Third, since proposition (q) refers to a determinate state of affairs, it
is determinately true or false itself, on the basis of principle (IV.a). Fourth,
he passes from the determinacy of (q) to the determinacy of (p), using im-
plicitly principle (V) above, and finally from the determinacy of (p) to the
determinacy of the future event (π) using principle (IV.b), which says that
if proposition (p) is determinate, and (p) is about event π, then π must be
determinate as well.
Starting from this last passage, Abelard tries to provide a solution to
the puzzle. The fact that both the present event (χ) and the present propo-
sition (q) are determinate seems not to be questioned by Abelard. What is
problematic is the status of proposition (p): does the fact that (q) is deter-
minate imply that also (p) is determinate? And, if so, does the determinacy
of proposition (p) imply the determinacy of the future event (π)? What
I think Abelard answers to this is the following: proposition (p) is deter-
minate. However, when we say that a proposition is determinate we could
intend this in two different ways: either according to the fact that it refers
to a determinate event (quantum ad eventum), or according to the property
that it presently has of being true or false (quantum ad veritatem ipsam, or
quantum ad praesentem et determinatam inhaerentiam veritatis). The first
is the proper (and, according to Abelard, the Aristotelian) way of intending
the term “determinate”, and in this proper sense proposition (p) is not de-
terminate. Proposition (p) is instead determinate in the second, improper
sense, inasmuch as there is a determinate present event (χ) consisting in the
inherence or non inherence of truth in (p).
Sunt autem qui dicunt, quod (p) “Socrates comedet”, quae fortassis
praesentialiter vera est, determinate vera est quantum ad veritatem
ipsam, scilicet proprietatem quam praesentialiter habet, quippe deter-
minatus est eventus proprietatis praesentialiter ei inhaerentis, et ipsam
iam determinate veritatem habet. Sed licet determinate vera dicatur
propositio quantum ad praesentem et determinatam inhaerentiam ver-
itatis, quantum tamen ad eventum, quem loquitur indeterminatum,
indeterminate vera est. Et hoc loco Aristoteles determinate vel in-
determinate veras vel falsas propositiones dicit quantum ad eventus,
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scilicet determinatos vel indeterminatos, quos proponunt. (252.215-
225)
There is then a sense in which (p) is determinate (quantum ad praesentem
et determinatam inhaerentiam veritatis), but this does not lead to the con-
clusion that the event expressed by (p) is also determinate, because it is not
the case that if a proposition is determinate in the second improper sense,
the event to which it refers is determinate as well. Abelard’s solution to
the puzzle is then to reject the general validity of principle (IV.b): there
are propositions which are determinately true (if we intend “determinate”
in the second improper sense) even if the event to which they refer is not
itself determinate.
Only after giving this solution, Abelard proceeds to say that the ar-
gument above, although it does not work when it involves determinacy, is
instead plausible and valid if we replace determinacy with certainty, i.e. if
we speak not of what is knowable but of what is actually known by us. This
is why we must be careful in distinguishing the meaning of “determinate”
(determinatum) from the meaning of “certain” (certum). Again, what differs
in the behavior of the two “operators” of determinacy and certainty is the
fact that while principle (IV.b) is invalid for the first, it is a valid principle
for the second: whenever it is the case that a proposition is certain (i.e.
actually known by us) it is also the case that the event expressed by that
proposition is equally certain, because anyone who knows that, for instance,
“Socrates will eat” is true, also knows that Socrates will eat.
Aliud etiam “determinatum” sonare videtur quam “certum”, quia de-
terminatus dicitur eventus, qui ex cognoscibilis est nobis, ut paritas
vel imparitas astrorum ex ipsa praesentia, quam habent, de se cogni-
tionem dare potest; certa vero sunt, quae quoquo modo actualiter cog-
nita sunt. [...] Unde et si talis consequentia recipiatur: “Si ‘Socrates
comedet’ est vera, Socrates comedet”, et certum sit antecedens, certum
erit et consequens. Sed non fortasse, si determinatum sit antecedens,
et consequens, quia praesens eventus ex se cognoscibilis est, sed non
ita futurus contingens. (252.226-253.241)
The inference that Abelard is considering here («Si “Socrates comedet” est
vera, Socrates comedet») is the one in which the antecedent is our propo-
sition (p), and the consequent is the future contingent event (π). If the
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antecedent was certain or actually known by us (which is not), then the
consequent would also be certain, but it is not the case for determinacy or
knowability. This means that we might have cases in which a proposition is
determinate without the corresponding event being determinate, which con-
firms the fact that Abelard’s solution to the argument lies in the rejection
of principle (IV.b).
I shall now consider more in detail Abelard’s discussion of the argument
in the Dialectica (211.32-212.23).
The Third Argument in the Dialectica
Although Abelard’s discussion in the Dialectica is much more concise than
the one proposed in the glossae, the two expositions are similar, and they
have the same structure. First, Abelard states that all present and past
propositions are determinately true and false, while future contingent propo-
sitions only have an indeterminate truth value, depending on the determi-
nacy or indeterminacy of the eventus to which they refer:
Sicut autem eventum contingentis futuri indeterminatus est, ita et
propositiones quae illos eventus enuntiant indeterminate verae sunt,
et quae falsae, indeterminate falsae sunt secundum indeterminatos, ut
dictum est, eventus quod pronuntiant. (Dial. 211.28-32)
However, Abelard goes on, one might wonder whether a future proposition
is already determinately true or false in virtue of the fact that we might
presently predicate its actual truth or falsity (secundum praesentem inhaer-
entiam veritatis vel falsitatis).
Nam fortasse et verae determinate vel falsae quodammodo secundum
praesentem inhaerentiam veritatis vel falsitatis videbuntur enuntia-
tiones de huiusmodi quoque futuro. (Dial. 211.32-35)
Abelard outlines then the argument, establishing the premises from which
it moves. The first premise is that all present events are determinate, for
even if we have no knowledge about them they are definite or determinate
in their nature:
Quod autem praesens est determinatum est saltem in natura. Cum
enim secundum scientiam numerus astrorum incertus sit, utrum videlicet
ipsa paria sint an imparia, in natura tamen determinatum est illud
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quod est, hocest, non recusat ex se cognosci, quod iam actu subsistit
(212.1-6)
and then he claims that every present proposition refers to some present
determinate event, and that any proposition which refers to a determinate
event is itself determinate:
Omnia praesentia determinatum eventum habent (211.35-36)
Sic quoque et quaelibet praesentia naturaliter ex se ipsis determinata
sunt (212.6-7)
Abelard has then assumed what we called principle (III) – every present
event is determinate – and principle (IV.a) – if the event is determinate, the
proposition is determinate. The fact that he claims here that all present
propositions refer to a present event would suffice, together with principles
(III) and (IV.a), to claim that any present proposition is also determinate.47
However, Abelard also invokes another reason for the fact that a proposition
like (q) “that Socrates will eat is true” is determinate, which is a consequence
of what we called above principle (II). Abelard says that every proposition
is necessarily (i.e., in every time) either true or false, and therefore even for
future propositions like (p) “Socrates will read today”, either the property
of being true inheres in them or does not inhere in them in the present time.
There is then a present (and so determinate) eventus (χ) consisting in the
inherence or not inherence of the property of being true in the proposition
(p).
Cum enim omnia praesentia determinatum eventum habeant omni-
umque dividentium certum sit alteram veram esse, alteram falsam, de
quocumque tempore proponatur, cum dicimus: “Socrates hodie leget”,
oportet iam alteram veram esse, alteram falsam, ut iam videlicet huic
praesentialiter verum insit, illi verum falsum. (211.35-212.1)
Abelard has then established the determinacy of event (χ): that truth inheres
in proposition (p), and consequently the determinacy of the corresponding
present proposition (q): “that Socrates will read today is true”. He now
passes to infer, from the determinacy of (q) the determinacy of the future
47The Logica Ingredientibus differs from the Dialectica for Abelard abandons there the
idea that every present proposition refers to a present event, and he holds that some
present propositions are indeterminate; see 4.1.3 on page 232.
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proposition (p), by saying that every proposition which has the property of
being true or the property of being false already in the present, must be
itsef determinately true or determinately false, even if it is determinate only
secundum susceptionem veritatis, and not secundum certitudinem eventus
de quo agit:
Unde et quaecumque propositio veritatem iam habet, determinate eam
habet, ac determinate fortasse vera dici potest secundum susceptionem
veritatis, non secundum certitudinem eventus de quo agit. (212.7-9)
I take this passage as an instance of principle (V) above: if proposition “it
is true that (p)” is determinate, proposition (p) is determinate. Moreover,
Abelard suggests here that the term determinate, when referred to proposi-
tions, could be interpreted in two different senses, just as suggested in LI. In
a first sense, a proposition is said to be determinate secundum certitudinem
eventus de quo agit, i.e. according to the knowability of the correspond-
ing event. In a second sense, it is said determinate secundum susceptionem
veritatis, i.e. according to the fact that it is possible to predicate in the
present moment of time its truth or falsity, obtaining a determinate propo-
sition. The distinction corresponds to the one Abelard makes in LI De Int.
252.220-225; but while in LI Abelard says that only the first sense is the
proper interpretation of propositions’ determinacy, in the Dialectica he is
silent on this point. At this point, Abelard asks whether, from the fact that
the future proposition (p) is determinate follows that the future event (π)
to which it corresponds is also determinate.
Sed fortasse dicitur et ipse eventus rei determinatus esse. (212.10)
And finally Abelard gives his solution, saying that although it is plausible
that whenever it is certain that a proposition is true, it is also certain that
the event to which the proposition refers is the case («quicumque de veritate
propositionis certus est, de eventu quoque dubitare non potest»), it is not
the case that whenever a proposition is determinate, the corresponding event
is also determinate:
Cum enim ex veritate propositionis rei eventus numquam videatur in-
ferri, quicumque de veritate propositionis certus est, de eventu quoque
dubitare non potest; si enim certum est antecedens, et consequens. Sed
aliud certum, aliud determinatum. Ea namque tantum determinata
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sunt quae iam ex se ipsis cognosci possunt. Futura vero ex se cognosci
non valent, sed si aliquam certitudinem per responsum divinum vel per
signa aliqua de futuris habere contingeret, certa quidem esse possent
quocumque modo cognita, sed non determinata, nisi ex proprio eventu
cognoscerentur. Non ergo verum recipimus quod si determinatum sit
antecedens, determinatum sit et consequens. Sed fortasse si certum sit
antecedens, certum erit et consequens. (212.10-21)
Just as he does in the glosses, Abelard concludes then that from the deter-
minacy of (p) one cannot infer the determinacy of (π), invalidating therefore
passage (10) of the argument, which was justified by principle (IV.b).
It is clear now that in the two works the structure of the argument
is the same. Abelard considers a future event (π) which is supposed to
be contingent, and so indeterminate, and the future proposition (p) which
corresponds to it. He starts the argument by saying that, in virtue of the
definition of “determinacy”, every present event is determinate. He assumes
then what I called above principles (I) and (III).48 He proceeds stating that,
in virtue of principle (II), there is a present event (χ) consisting in the actual
inherence or non inherence of truth in the future proposition (p), which is
determinate in virtue of its happening in the present.49 He claims then that
the determinacy of (χ) entails the determinacy of the present proposition
(q), in virtue of principle (IV.a), and that the determinacy of (q) entails the
determinacy of (p), in virtue of principle (V).50 Proposition (p), however,
is determinate only in an improper sense, not “quantum ad eventum” but
“quantum ad praesentem et determinatam inhaerentiam veritatis”. Because
proposition (p) is determinate only in this improper sense, it does not follow
from its determinacy that also the future event (π) is determinate, for it is
not always the case that if a proposition is determinate the event to which
it refers is also determinate.51 Abelard’s solution is then that a proposition
might be (improperly) determinate although the event to which it refers
is indeterminate. The argument is invalid because premise (IV.b) is to be
rejected. Abelard also says that a same argument might be validly proposed
if we substituted certainty to determinacy, and that we must be careful in
48See Dial. 212.13 ff. and LI De Int. 252.227-254.281 for principle (I). See Dial. 211.1-2;
212.1-2; LI De Int 250.169-176 as evidence of principle (III).
49See Dial. 211.35-212.1; LI De Int. 252.215-225 as evidence of principle (II).
50See LI De Int. 251.184-192 and Dial. 212.7-9 as evidence of principle (V).
51See Dial. 212.7-9; LI De Int. 252.215-225 for the discussion of the two meaning of
“determinate” and for the rejection of principle (IV.b).
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distinguishing the two concepts.
Abelard’s idea of distinguishing two different ways to understand the
determinacy of a proposition, however, might seem an ad hoc solution, and
far from convincing. What this Third Argument does in fact show is that the
traditional proposal, advanced by Ammonius and Boethius, of solving the
puzzles of logical determinism by means of the determinate-indeterminate
distinction is not entirely satisfactory, and it could raise further difficulties.
Abelard is however able, to his satisfaction, to provide an answer to all
three arguments for logical determinism that he considers in the Dialectica
and in the glossae. In the same two works, he also deals with another sort
of deterministic arguments, the ones that are raised by the idea that God
has complete and invariable knowledge of all events that happen in time. I
discuss these arguments in the next section.
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4.2 The Compatibility between Contingency and
Divine Foreknowledge
As we have seen, Abelard devotes a long discussion to the problem of logical
determinism, i.e. to the puzzles that the logical principles of bivalence and
excluded middle give rise to with respect to the existence of contingent
future events. However, at least until the beginning of the twelfth century,
the most troublesome fatalistic arguments that medieval authors had to deal
with were not connected to logical determinism but, instead, to theological
determinism. In particular, many puzzling arguments were raised from the
idea that God is omniscient, i.e. that he has a complete knowledge of all
events, including future contingent ones. God’s knowledge was generally
assumed to be not only complete but also eternal and immutable, and many
authors maintained therefore that already in the past God “foreknew” all
events that would take place in the future.52 When these assumptions on
God’s knowledge are taken in conjunction with the intuition – quite common
in ancient and medieval philosophy – that whatever is past or present is
somehow fixed and necessary, they seem to imply the idea that if it is or
was known that it will be the case that p, then necessarily it will be the case
that p.53 How could this principle be reconciled with the idea that there
are contingent events, which might equally take place or not take place,
and with human freedom of choice, i.e. with the idea that there are open
alternatives in the future among which human agents can freely choose?
The problem of compatibility between God’s knowledge and the exis-
tence of contingent events and of human free choice (and consequently hu-
52The immutability of God’s knowledge was usually maintained as a consequence of
God’s simplicity and invariability. For the connection between immutability of God’s
knowledge and determinism in Aristotelian and medieval thought see (Gelber, 2004,
p. 22 ff.). See also (Kretzmann, 1966); (Castañeda, 1967); (Kenny, 1979).
53For the formulation of this principle and his connection to the other problems related
to future contingent propositions, see (Normore, 1982, p. 358-9) and (Normore, 1985, p. 3-
4). Normore notes that this principle is associated to the idea that if it is (was) known
that p then necessarily it is (was) known that p. Normore also notes that another related
deterministic argument that Christian authors had to deal with concerns the concept of
prophecy and the admission of prophetic elements in the Scripture. This argument is
based on the principle according to which necessarily, if it was prophesied that p, then it
will be the case that p, and aims to conclude that all future events that are prophesied
in the Scripture will take place necessarily and not contingently. Abelard does not deal
directly with this argument in his logical works, and so I will not consider this variation
of theological fatalism in what follows.
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man beings’ responsibility for their actions) is not the exclusive property
of medieval Christian authors, but can be traced back to antiquity.54 An
ancient source that is particularly relevant for medieval developments on the
theme is Cicero’s argument in De Fato, which poses the problem of incom-
patibility between divine foreknowledge and contingency and aims to solve
it by rejecting the idea that God has a complete knowledge of all events.
Cicero’s argument will be the basis for Augustine’s and then Boethius’ dis-
cussions on theological determinism, which constitute the main sources for
eleventh-century debates on future contingents, and also for Abelard’s own
discussion of it in the Dialectica and in the glosses on De Interpretatione 9.
In the following section, I shall consider briefly Augustine’s and Boethius’
attempts to reconcile foreknowledge and contingency, and I will draw atten-
tion to some early medieval developments on the problem (in particular, in
Anselm of Canterbury’s and William of Champeaux’s works). In section
4.2.2 I shall proceed to analyze the way in which Abelard enters the debate
and tries to solve the puzzle of theological determinism. Abelard’s solution,
although partly based on Augustinian and Boethian elements, is innovative
and interesting, for it is an application of the distinction between the de
rebus and de sensu interpretation of modal proposition, that he himself had
developed in his logical works. In contrast to Abelard’s way out of logical
determinism, which did not have a great impact among his successors and
was usually rejected in favor of different solutions, Abelard’s analysis of fore-
knowledge was highly influential in Middle Ages, and became the standard
solution to the problem, although it was usually repeated in the slightly
modified form in which Peter Lombard put it in his Sententiae I, 38.2 (Knu-
uttila, 2010, p. 84).
4.2.1 The problem of divine foreknowledge before Abelard
Augustine
Although Aristotle’s De Interpretatione had already been translated into
Latin at the time in which Augustine writes his discussion of future contin-
gents, Augustine never quotes the Aristotelian text, and he was probably not
familiar with it.55 What instead seems to have stimulated Augustine’s the-
54As Craig notes in (Craig, 1988, p. 59), this problem was already discussed in Ammo-
nius and even before him.
55See on this (Craig, 1988, p. 59-60) and (Holopainen, 2006, p. 109).
245
ory on future contingents is Cicero’s discussion of the topic in his De Fato.
There, the Latin philosopher argues against the Stoic theory of determinism,
according to which everything that happens, including human choices and
actions, is predetermined and therefore happens necessarily. The fatalist
dilemma considered by Cicero and then commented on by Augustine has
the following form (Craig, 1988, p. 64):
(1) If God foreknows [all future things and hence foreknows] that a man is
going to sin, it is necessary that the man sins.
(2) If it is necessary that a man sins, the man does not sin voluntarily, but
sins by necessity.
(3) Either God does not foreknow all future things or the man does not sin
voluntarily but by necessity.
Cicero’s answer to the argument is that we must reject the idea of a divine
foreknowledge, in order to preserve the existence of human freedom of choice,
which, according to him, is the foundation of the notions of responsibility
and morality. Cicero claims in fact that there can be no foreknowledge
without a determined order of causes, and there could be no freedom of
choice if such an order of causes exists. Augustine, on his part, rebuts
Cicero’s idea that there is no foreknowledge (and, in particular, no divine
foreknowledge), for the completeness and eternity of God’s knowledge is to
him an inescapable principle which cannot be dropped, not even to save the
contingency of human actions.
However, according to Augustine, the solution cannot be to choose the
other horn of the dilemma either, and say that what is to be rejected is
contingency and freedom of choice, for he thinks, just as Cicero did before
him, that freedom of choice is what grounds human beings’ responsibility
for their actions and then moral behavior. Human beings are “free” not only
in the sense that their acts are not constrained by some external causes, but
also in the sense that they have the real possibility of choosing between dif-
ferent alternative courses of action. For instance, whenever a man commits
a sin, he is taken to be responsible only if before committing the evil action
it was possible for him both to commit and not to commit it, and if facing
these opposite paths he deliberately chose the evil one. Therefore, both
divine foreknowledge and freedom of choice are non negotiable principles,
246
and, as Augustine says, «the God-fearing mind chooses both freedom and
foreknowledge. It accepts both and supports both with religious loyalty».56
The only solution to the argument should be to prove that there is no incom-
patibility between these two principles. This is what Augustine attempts to
do in his De civitate Dei V, 8-11 and in De libero arbitrio III, 1-4.57
It is not easy to provide a clear interpretation of what Augustine’s an-
swer to the dilemma posed in (3) consists in. Some interpreters, e.g. Craig
in (Craig, 1988), read Augustine as adopting the same solution that will
be later adopted by Boethius (see 4.2.1 on the next page), i.e. as saying
that since God’s knowledge is timeless and eternal, it is not strictly speak-
ing foreknowledge, but it is just as our knowledge of the present. Just as
we know the things that we see presently happening in front of us, God,
who is timeless, simultaneously knows everything that happens in all times.
But just as our knowledge of the present does not impose any necessity on
events, in the same way God’s knowledge does not make events necessary
or predetermined. What Augustine would be suggesting according to this
interpretation is that although it is indeed necessary that whatever God
knows will happen, this is a harmless sense of necessity, and does not imply
that all events are predetermined and not contingent (Craig, 1988, p. 66-73).
Other interpreters have more recently shown that, although it is true that
Augustine frequently refers to God and God’s knowledge (or “providentia”)
as being timeless and eternal, differently from Boethius in the Consolation
of Philosophy,58 he does not use this idea to solve the puzzle of theological
fatalism. According to these interpreters, Augustine’s solution does not
consist in saying that God’s knowledge of future events is like our knowledge
of present things, but it consists instead in denying that the existence of a
56See (Augustine, 1955, V, 9), transl. Green, 173. Quoted in (Holopainen, 2006, p. 110).
57For Augustine’s discussion of Cicero’s argument see (Craig, 1988, p. 59-60); (Knuut-
tila, 1993, p. 66-70); (Holopainen, 2006, p. 109-10).
58See (Holopainen, 2006, p. 110-11) on this: «In his attempt to show how they can
be compatible, Augustine does not refer to God’s eternity, and he is happy to speak of
God’s knowledge of the future as “foreknowledge” (instead of speaking of it as “present
knowledge” insofar as it is the knowledge possessed by a timeless being). However, in the
background of Augustine’s discussion, there is one idea which often goes together with the
idea of divine eternity, namely, the idea of divine providence. The determined order of
causes on which foreknowledge is based can also be called “providence” – at least as far as
we are talking about things which are good. If God’s being is timeless, the same seems to
apply also to his providence. In the present context, however, Augustine does not refer to
the timeless nature of providence. What matters here is that there is a determined order
of causes which depends on God and is known by him».
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determined order of causes, which God knows, would bring it about that the
human will could not choose freely. On the contrary, Augustine says that
God’s foreknowledge is what “guarantees” the existence of contingency and
freedom of action: the fact that God already knows that some actions will
result from unconstrained deliberation and free choice makes it sure that
these actions are in fact free and not predetermined. Human wills would
then be at the same time both free and part of the determined order of
causes which God knows (Holopainen, 2006, p. 110).
Boethius
Whether it is, or is not, a part of Augustine’s reply to theological determin-
ism, the Neoplatonic idea that God’s knowledge is eternal, immutable and
somehow “timeless” or “tenseless” is very influential in medieval discussions
on future contingents and foreknowledge (Craig, 1988, p.73-8). In particu-
lar, this idea is one of the elements that constitute Boethius’ solution to the
puzzle of divine foreknowledge: in his Consolation of Philosophy Boethius
argues that God’s knowledge is not strictly speaking foreknowledge, i.e.
knowledge of the future, because God, who is eternal, does not foresee events
but simply sees what happens in the entire span of temporal series as if it
was presently happening. This idea is used by Boethius to argue that, just
as our knowledge of the present does not impose necessity on things, in the
same way God’s knowledge of events does not make future events necessary,
unless we intend “necessity” in a weak and harmless way. I shall now look
at this argument in more detail.59
As is well known, in the Consolation of Philosophy Boethius engages in
a dialogue with the personification of Philosophy, by whom he is gradually
convinced to give up his complaints about the adversities of his condition.
Lady Philosophy persuades him that the divine providence has already set
everything in the right way and for the best, including human actions and
his own fortunes. Philosophy also tries to convince the Prisoner that, despite
the existence of a fixed providential plan, there are things that happen not
necessarily but contingently, some of which are the result of human free
59For an interpretation of Boethius’ argument against theological determinism see in
particular (Craig, 1988, p. 79-98); (Galonnier, 2003); (Marenbon, 2003); (Marenbon, );
(Evans, 2004); (Marenbon, 2005); (Holopainen, 2006, p. 105-9); (Sharples, 2009); (Za-
gzebski, 2011); (Marenbon, 2013b).
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choice and deliberation. The argument for theological fatalism is proposed
by Boethius in the following way:
If God foresees all things and cannot be mistaken in any way, what
providence has foreseen will be, will necessarily happen. So, if God
foreknows from eternity not just what humans do but also their plans
and volitions, there will be no freedom of choice, for there will not
be able to be any deed, or any sort of volition that infallible divine
providence has not foreseen. For if volitions are capable of turning out
differently from how they have been foreseen, then there will not be
firm foreknowledge of the future, but rather uncertain opinion, and I
judge it wicked to believe that about God. (Boethius, 1973, quoted
and translated in Marenbon, 2103, p. 11)
As Marenbon points out, in the passage just quoted the Prisoner is setting
out is a “transcendental argument”: we can be sure that the world is such
that God can foreknow all things. But, if any of these things could turn out
differently, then God could not foreknow them. It is not true then to say
that some events are contingent – i.e., that they can equally either happen
or not happen – because it is impossible for them to be otherwise than God
knows them. No future event – not even human volitions – is such that it
will not, in the Prisoner’s terminology, necessarily take place: the future is
fixed, not contingent (Marenbon, 2013b, p. 12).
Boethius’ way out from the fatalistic consequences of the argument is
constituted by three different elements (Sharples, 2009, p. 216-20).60 First,
Boethius says that things that are known are not always cognized in virtue
of their nature, but rather they are cognized in virtue of the power and
capacity of the knower, in this case, God:61
The cause of this error is that each person considers that all the things
that he knows are cognized only from their own power and nature. It
is the complete reverse: for everything that is cognized is cognized,
not according to its own power, but rather according to the capac-
ity of those who are cognizing. (Boethius, 1973, IV.24-25, quoted in
60As Sharples notes, all these three elements were already present in Ammonius’ discus-
sion of future contingents and in other discussions precedent to Boethius’ Consolatio, but
differently from Boethius, Ammonius does not combine the three in a unique solution.
61This claim can be traced back to the Neoplatonist philosopher Iamblichus (c.245-c.345
AD) and has been labelled in (Evans, 2004, p. 268-9) the ’Iamblichus Principle’.
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Marenbon, 2013, p. 13-4)62
A second element of Boethius’ solution is the distinction between two differ-
ent kinds of necessity: absolute or simple necessity and conditional necessity.
The kind of necessity that might be inferred from God’s foreknowledge is the
last, harmless sense of necessity. It is in this second sense of necessity that
one could say that, if I know that Socrates is walking now, then necessarily
he is walking now. The same works for God’s knowledge: if God knows that
something will happen, then this thing will necessarily happen, but only in
a conditional sense, not in the sense that its happening is inevitable and not
contingent.
For there are really two necessities, the one simple, as that it is neces-
sary that all men are mortal; the other conditional, as for example, if
you know that someone is walking, it is necessary that he is walking.
Whatever anyone knows cannot be otherwise than as it is known, but
this conditional necessity by no means carries with it that other simple
kind. (Boethius, 1973, p. 428-430)
As emphasized in (Sharples, 2009, p.218-9), the distinction between con-
ditional and absolute necessity is part of the solution, and not itself the
solution that Boethius advances to argue against theological determinism.
What still needs to be guaranteed in order to solve the puzzle of theological
fatalism, and which constitutes the third element of Boethius’ solution, is
the idea that God’s knowledge is not properly speaking foreknowledge, be-
cause God can know all past and future events as if they were simultaneously
present to him.63
62This is a distinction that will be relevant also in Abelard’s discussion of future con-
tingents: there are some things that are knowable or cognizable in virtue of their nature
or in virtue of their being happened in time. These are the things that Abelard calls
“determinate”. There are also, according to Abelard, other things that are not cogniz-
able nor accessible to our knowledge, because they have not happened and their nature
is indeterminate, but that can be “certain” or “actually known” by us (maybe inasmuch
as a prophet or an angel informed us about them). As strange as it may seem, there are
therefore things that are not knowable but are nevertheless known. This is what happens
with God’s knowledge of future contingents: these events are not knowable, because their
nature is indeterminate, but are nevertheless known by God (and can be known by us, if
some divine prophecy informs us about them) because they are cognized in virtue of the
cognizer’s capacity and not in virtue of their own power and nature.
63As Marenbon notes in (Marenbon, 2013b), whether this position must be read meta-
physically or epistemically is matter of debate. In the first reading, the idea is that God is
atemporally and eternally present, and therefore simultaneous with everything that hap-
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Putting the three elements together, Boethius is able to deny the general
claim according to which if it is known by God that p will be the case, then
it is (absolutely) necessary that p will be the case. He argues for this using
an analogy with our own knowledge of the present: if someone knows that
a man is walking, because he sees that this man is walking now, then it is
necessary that this man is walking now. However, necessity should be taken
here in the sense of conditional necessity, in the following way:
[Necessarily (it is known that this man is walking → this man is walking)]
and not in the sense that walking is itself necessary for this man, as if it was
said:
[This man is walking → necessarily (this man is walking)].
Because God’s knowledge of the future is like our knowledge of the present,
in virtue of the fact that he knows all events as if they were happening
now, it is true to say that if God knows that this man will be walking
tomorrow, then necessarily this man is going to walk tomorrow, but this
claim is just as harmless as saying that if I know that this man is walking
now, then necessarily this man is walking now. God’s knowledge of the
future does not impose any necessity on the events, but is rather derived
from the happening of these events.
Theological determinism in the eleventh century
Boethius’ argument for the reconciliation between God’s complete knowl-
edge and contingency is extremely influential in early medieval discussions,
and it will be rehearsed in part also in Abelard’s discussion of theological
determinism. In the eleventh century, however, Augustinian sources on fore-
knowledge were just as important as Boethian ones. At least in the first half
of the century, the question on future contingents was discussed almost only
in connection with God’s foreknowledge and omnipotence, and not with
pens in time; in the second reading, «it is not the case that all events past, present and
future are simultaneous with God’s eternal present, but it is a feature of his way of being
that he is able to know them as if they were present» (Marenbon, 2013b, p. 18). Marenbon
opts for the second interpretation and argues that the metaphysical ground for this third
element of Boethius’ solution is not the atemporality of God but rather his simplicity and
immutability: being simple and unchanging, God’s knowledge cannot be influenced by
the happening of things, and must be itself simple and simultaneous (Marenbon, 2013b,
p. 17-9).
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respect to the problems of logical determinism presented in De Interpre-
tatione 9 and in Boethius’ commentaries on the Aristotelian texts.64 The
authors of this period make reference to the question whether the idea that
everything that has happened and will happen stands eternally in the di-
vine plan is compatible with human free choice. Nevertheless, many authors
thought that the puzzling consequences raised by divine foreknowledge were
a merely apparent problem, that could be avoided by making reference to a
distinction between different kinds of necessity, i.e. conditional and absolute
necessity. This is for instance what Anselm of Canterbury says in Cur Deus
homo (Holopainen, 2006).65
Anselm refers to the problem of the harmony between God’s providence
and human free choice in several works, such as in De Casu Diaboli (ca.
1080), where the problem of future contingents is referred to as “the very
celebrated question” (Holopainen, 2006, p. 104), in his last treatise De Con-
cordia (1107-1108), and particularly in hisCur Deus homo (1098).66 What
is particularly notable in Anselm’s discussion of foreknowledge is his distinc-
tion between antecedent necessity (necessitas praecedens) and sequent ne-
cessity (necessitas sequens). Antecedent necessity is, according to Anselm,
necessity in the proper sense, i.e. it is the necessity that is imposed on a thing
by its external efficient cause (see in particular Cur Deus homo II 17, 125.6-
126.2). Things that are said necessary in the sense of sequent necessity, on
the contrary, are those things that are necessary in virtue of their happening
in a certain moment of time, as if I say that if Socrates is walking now it is
necessary that he is walking, for it is impossible for him not to be walking
while he is walking. Anselm thinks that the problem of future contingents
might be solved by invoking the distinction between two kinds of necessity,
for, he claims, future contingent events are only necessary in the second and
64See (Holopainen, 2006) on this point.
65For a survey of these sources see (Holopainen, 2006). In this essay, the author considers
the discussion of divine foreknowledge in Anselm of Besate’s Rhetorimachia (1045-48), in
Peter Damian’s De divina omnipotentia and in Anselm of Canterbury. Holopainen argues
that all these sources lead us to think (i) that the problem of future contingents was already
debated already in the 1020s, and (ii) that Augustine, rather than Boethius, constituted
the main source for these debates. See also (Holopainen, 1996) and (Holopainen, 1999)
on this point.
66As pointed out by Holopainen, in this last work there is the only reference Anselm
makes to the problem of future contingents as a separate problem, distinguished from
the problem of divine foreknowledge (Anselm of Canterbury, 1961a, II 17), quoted in
(Holopainen, 2006, p. 104).
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improper sense of necessity, and not in the sense of being predetermined by
some external efficient cause. It is in this sense of subsequent necessity that
what is past is necessarily past, what is present is necessarily so, and what
will be necessarily will be,67 and it is in this sense that what God foreknows
necessarily will come to pass (Normore, 1982, p. 359-61). Also, according to
Anselm, it is to the second sense of necessity that Aristotle is referring to in
his De Interpretatione 9, when he worries about whether all future events
are necessary:
Haec est illa necessitas quae, ubi tractat Aristoteles de propositionibus
singularibus et futuris, videtur utrumlibet destruere et omnia esse ex
necessitate astruere. (Cur Deus homo, II 17, 125, 20-22, quoted in
(Holopainen, 2006))
In order to explain what it means to say that things are necessarily going
to be as God knows them to be, or as we ourselves know them by means of
some prophecy, he says that neither God’s nor our knowledge of the future
impose any necessity on things, because this knowledge is not the cause of
their happening, in the sense that it is not the efficient external constraint
that brings them about.68
Another author writing in the late eleventh and early twelfth century who
is interested in the question of theological determinism and whose work will
be a source for Abelard’s discussion of the topic is William of Champeaux
(ca. 1070-1122). Exactly as Abelard will do in the Dialectica, William
considers the following puzzling inferences:
(i) if God’s foreknowledge is infallible, then future events – including the
actions of human beings – all happen of necessity;
on the other hand,
67«Pariter autem verum est quia fuit et est et erit aliquid non ex necessitate, et quia
necesse est fuisse omne quod fuit, et esse quod est, et futurum esse quod erit» (Anselm of
Canterbury, 1961b, p. 249, 10-12), quoted in (Normore, 1982, p. 360).
68As Knuuttila shows in (Knuuttila, 2014), in explaining Mary’s believing the truth of
a prophetic statement concerning the death of Christ, Anselm writes: «Therefore, since
her faith was true faith it was necessary that things would be as she believed. But if
you are once again disturbed by my saying “It was necessary...”, then remember that the
truth of the virgin’s faith was not the cause of his dying freely but that her faith was
true faith because this was going to happen.» (Cur Deus homo II 17, 124.27-125.3; quoted
in (Knuuttila, 2014)). On Anselm’s theory of modalities and future contingents see also
(Serene, 1981); (Knuuttila, 1993); (Marenbon, 1996); (Holopainen, 1999) and (Knuuttila,
2004).
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(ii) if future events, including the actions of human beings, could occur
otherwise, then God’s foreknowledge is fallible.69
William thinks that both entailments (i) and (ii) are invalid, and that deter-
minism of future events cannot be inferred from God’s infallibility. In order
to show this, he first argues that God foreknows not only the actions that
human beings will choose in the future, but also all the range of possibilities
among which they can choose (William of Champeaux, 1959, § 237-238) and
he also foreknows the “modes” of these actions, i.e. whether future actions
are contingent or necessary (Marenbon, 1997, p. 226).70 William also claims
that although the events to which future contingent propositions refer are
not determinate, inasmuch as they do not exist yet, God knows them as be-
ing determinately true or determinately false (William of Champeaux, 1959,
§ 238, 36, quoted in (Guilfoy, 2012)).
The proposition which says that “if future events could occur otherwise,
then God’s foreknowledge is fallible”, was interpreted in several ways by
William’s contemporaries (Guilfoy, 2012). In order to save the infallibility
of God’s knowledge, some rejected the idea that things can be otherwise
than they actually are. Others held that, because some events could occur
otherwise than they do, God is actually fallible and they dismissed so God’s
infallibility arguing that rather he is just “very lucky epistemically” (Guilfoy,
2012). William rejects both views, by claiming that the inference from
“the event could occur otherwise” to “God is or could be deceived” is not
necessary (William of Champeaux, 1959, §237.68). However, William does
not provide a justification for the invalidity of entailments (i) and (ii) above.
Abelard will also consider these inferences both in the Dialectica and in the
Logica Ingredientibus, and he will explain their invalidity saying that they
are based on a confusion between the de rebus and de sensu interpretation
of modal claims.
69See (Guilfoy, 2012) on this.
70Marenbon quotes a passage from William’s Sententiae as evidence for this idea: «Nota
etiam quia Deus non solum providet actus hominum, sed etiam omnes modos. Cum enim
modo sedeam, hoc providet Deus et modum etiam, scilicet posse non sedere; sedere enim
et posse non sedere non sunt contraria» (William of Champeaux, 1959, § 238, p. 197,
18-21).
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4.2.2 Abelard on theological determinism
While commenting the ninth chapter of De Interpretatione, Abelard says
that there are some people who claim that everything that happens hap-
pens of necessity, and they try to demonstrate this by referring to God’s
providence or predestination. They say in fact that because God has al-
ready established a providential plan and knows that everything will happen
in a certain way, things cannot happen but in conformity to his knowledge,
which is infallible, and according to his providential plan, which is unchange-
able («secundum eius providentiam, quae falli non potest, et institutionem
praedestinationis, quae mutari non potest»), and so every single event hap-
pens necessarily the way it happens and when it happens:
Sunt autem nonnulli, qui nil utrumlibet appellent nec aliqua futura
contingentia dicant, sed omnia quae eveniunt ita ut eveniunt ex ne-
cessitate evenire. Quod ex dei providentia sive praedestinatione co-
nantur ostendere. Aiunt enim, quod deus, qui in sua providentia falli
non potest, omnia ab aeterno providit et pradestinavit ita evenire ut
eveniunt, et tunc evenire quando eveniunt; quare secundum eius provi-
dentiam, quae falli non potest, et institutionem praedestinationis, quae
mutari non potest, necesse est singula ita et tunc evenire ut eveniunt
et quando. Et ita omnia sub necessitate costringunt, ut nullatenus
vitari possit, quin eveniant, sicut eveniunt et quando. (LI De Int.
259.388-398)71
A consequence of this opinion, Abelard goes on, is that everything that
happens is determined by God, who in this way would be chargeable for
both every good things and every evil thing that come about («omnium
bonorum laudem vel malorum culpam in auctorem omnium refundebant»),
while every human being would be relieved from the responsibility for her
or his own actions. This opinion, Abelard says, is execrable not only with
respect to Christian religion but also with respect to natural reason, and in
particular to Peripatetic philosophy:
Quae pessima omnium haeresum non solum christianorum religioni,
verum etiam philosophorum naturali rationi abominatio est, et maxime
(teste Boethio) < Peripateticorum > (LI De Int. 259.402-4)
71The same problem is posed in Dial. 217.19-22: «Cum enim ab aeterno Deus omnia
futura esse, sicut futura erant, providerit, Ipse autem in dispositione suae providentiae falli
non possit, necesse est omnia contingere sicut providit; si enim aliter contingere possent
quam lpse providerit, possibile esset Ipsum falli».
255
Abelard strongly rejects the idea that the infallibility of God’s knowledge
and the fixedness of God’s providential plan imply that there are no con-
tingent events and that nothing is up to human beings’ free choice. Before
investigating the fallacies in this fatalistic argument, he devotes part of his
discussion to define what he means by the terms “providence” (providentia;
vis providentiae) and “predestination” (vis praedestinationis).72
According to Abelard (LI De Int. 259.404-260.410), when we speak of
“providentia” we refer to God’s knowledge of future events (praescientia
futurorum). This consists in the simultaneous knowledge of every singular
state of affairs that takes place in the future, before it happens (simul singula
praescivit, antequam eveniret), and is the knowledge not only of the good
things, which are efficiently caused by God, but also of the evil things that
we, not God, are responsible for («est providentia non solum praescientia
bonorum, quae ex eo procedunt, verum etiam malorum, quae a nobis fiunt»).
Abelard’s praedestinatio is instead the same as fate (fatum or fatatio), i.e.
it refers to those things that God has established to happen in history and
that are brought about by him: «praedestinatio idem esse quod fatum, id est
fatatio, videtur, quando videlicet bonum quod providet stabiliendo mente dis-
posuit, ut eveniat, quando ipse voluerit». In contrast to providence, which,
as was mentioned above, is the knowledge of both good and bad things, pre-
destination only includes good things, for evil things that happen are caused
by us and not by God. Following Augustine, Abelard thinks in fact that
predestination is nothing other than “praeparatio beneficiorum dei”. The
distinction between the two concepts of providence and fate was already
proposed by Boethius in (Boethius, 1973, IV.6),73 and Abelard makes a di-
rect reference to his work in LI De Int. 261.425-444, where he says that
Boethius distinguished between “providentia”, which is the same as divina
ratio, and “fatum”, which is the divine dispositio of events that take place in
the world of moving things (rebus mobilibus dispositio). Abelard notes that
72This distinction is proposed only in the glosses on De Int. 9, and not in the Di-
alectica, where Abelard only speaks of providentia or divine foreknowledge, and never of
predestination.
73This distinction had a long history already before Boethius. See (Sharples, 2009,
p. 214) on this point. As Sharples notes, this distinction «became particularly significant
in the Platonist tradition of which Boethius is part, where it was emphasized not only
that fate is the working-out of the providential plan in space and time, but that rational
human souls can rise above the level of fate». The topic was debated, for instance, in
Plotinus, Proclus, Calcidius and Augustine. See (Sharples, 1991, 29-31) and references
there.
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there is an ambiguity in Boethius’ words, because he presents foreknowledge
and predestination as being at the same time two different things and the
same thing. According to Abelard, it is correct to consider the two as being
essentially the same thing, and to say that both God’s providence and pre-
destination are nothing more than God himself. This is because, he says, it
is somehow improper to distinguish among different attributes of God, given
that God’s nature is simple and indivisible.74 However, the two are also con-
sidered to be different from the point of view of human beings because the
two names are assigned according to a different causa impositionis:
Quae quidem verba habent ambiguitatis, cum scilicet modo idem fa-
tum et providentiam vocat, modo diversa. Sed cum in deo nil sit aliud
ab ipso nec aliud sit sapientia eius vel providentia vel praedestinatio (id
est fatalis stabilitio) eius, quam ipse, recte idem essentialiter dixit; quia
vero homines <imponentes> nomina tam creatori quam creaturis ali-
unde providentem, aliunde fatalem dixerunt, recte secundum diversas
vocabolorum causas diversa fatum et providentiam dixit, sicut aliud
risibile esse, aliud navigabile esse dicimus, cum tamen idem sit penitus
navigabile et risibile, ac est tale, ac si dicatur quod aliud sonat “risi-
bile”, aliud “navigabile” secundum diversas impositionis causas. Sic et
deus et providentia dicitur ex eo quod providet et praescit, et fatum ex
eo quod stabilit et disponit in creaturis. Nec ullae sunt proprietates,
quas in eo intelligamus, dum eum providentem vel fatalem dicimus
vel scientem vel intelligentem vel bene agentem, sed more humano lo-
quentes simplicem eius essentiam et in se omnino invariabilem pro his,
quae per eum invariabilem varie fieri contingunt et varie a nobis exscog-
itantur, variis designamus nominibus. (LI De Int. 261.444-262-462)
After having distinguished between foreknowledge and predestination, Abelard
insists that neither of them impose any necessity on things, for by means
of foreknowledge God knows whatever will be, including future contingent
events, but knows them as being contingent and not as being necessary.
Similarly, predestination does establish what will take place in the future
but again not as taking place necessarily:
At vero, cum provideat vel praedestinet futura, neque providentia eius
neque praedestinatio necessitatem rebus infert. Providet enim futu-
rum fieri, sed non ex necessitate fieri; stabilit futurum, ut fiat, sed non
74For Abelard’s discussion of God’s simplicity see in particular LI De Int. 262.455-
263.485.
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ut ex necessitate fiat. Sic enim providet et stabilit futura, sicut sunt
eventura, ut scilicet sic eveniant ut possint etiam non evenire. Quippe
sic eventura sunt ut possint etiam non evenire (LI De Int. 264.491-497)
Sic ergo integre providentiam eius consideremus, quae omnia simul
praescivit, quae ad meum actum sive possibilitatem pertinebant, et
ita me ambulare modo et simul modo posse non ambulare providit,
secundum eius providentiam et me ambulare contingit et posse non
ambulare quia utrumque in eius providentia aequaliter persistit. (LI
De Int. 264.507-512)
Moreover, Abelard recalls Boethius’ analogy between God’s knowledge of
the future and our own knowledge of present facts. Just as from the fact
that I see someone walking in front of me, and that I know that he is walking,
this does not imply that he is walking necessarily, so it is not right to infer
from the fact that God already knows that I will be walking or that I will
sin that I do so of necessity:
Sicut enim, si quis ante me ambulet, quem videam et sciam ambu-
lare, visus meus et scientia non confert ei, ut ex necessitate ambulet,
nec tamen ambulantem videre vel scire possum, nisi ipse ambulet, ita
dei providentia me ita ambulaturum providit vel peccaturum, ut mihi
necessitatem in altero non inferret; alioquin ipse me compelleret pec-
care, nec reus essem, qui coactus peccarem, sed ipse per quem peccare
cogerer. (LI De Int. 264.501-7)
Although Abelard does not explicitly hold the idea that God’s knowledge is
not strictly speaking foreknowledge, we might infer that he, like Boethius,
embraces this idea by his insistence that God knows all events simultane-
ously (omnia simul praescivit, see LI De Int. 264.508; 259.407). As Maren-
bon suggests it is the case for Boethius (Marenbon, 2013b, p. 17-9), the
metaphysical ground on which Abelard bases the idea that God knows fu-
ture events just as he knows past and present events is not God’s eternity or
his atemporality, but rather his simplicity, and the consequent immutability
of his knowledge.
Finally, Abelard considers the “astute but quibbling” argument (callida
sed cavillatoria argumentatio) which claims that, if it is possible for things to
happen otherwise than they actually happen, then it is possible for God to
fail (si res aliter evenire possunt quam eveniunt, possibile est deum falli):75
75This argument is considered in Dial. 217.16-219.24 and LI De Int. 265.520-267.3.
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Si possibile est rem aliter evenire, quam evenit, possibile est rem aliter
evenire, quam deus eventuram esse providit. A pari. Et ita possibile
est deum rem aliter providere, quam evenit, et ita possibile est deum
falli. Si enim aliter evenit res, quam deus providit, vel aliter providit
deus, quam evenit, deum fallitur. Unde si possibile est aliter evenire,
quam deus providit, vel aliter providisse, quam evenit, possibile est
deum falli. Cuiuscumque enim antecedens est possibile, possibile est
et consequens. [...] Cum itaque haec consequentia vera sit: “Si res
aliter evenit, quam deus providit, vel aliter providit, quam evenit, deus
fallitur”, vera est et haec: “Si possibile est aliter providisse vel evenire,
possibile est deum falli”. Itaque per medium probata est proposita
consequentia, haec scilicet: “Si possibile est rem aliter evenire quam
evenit, possibile est Deum falli”. (LI De Int. 265.524-266.539)
The argument could be represented in the following way:
(1) If things happen otherwise than they happen, then things happen oth-
erwise than God foreknows.
(2) If things happen otherwise than God foreknows them, then God is
wrong.
(3) For any two propositions p and q, if p entails q, then if it is possible
that p it is possible that q.
(4) If it is possible for things to happen otherwise than they happen, then
it is possible for things to happen otherwise than God foreknows.
(5) If it is possible for things to happen otherwise than God foreknows,
then it is possible for God to be wrong.
(6) If it is possible for things to happen otherwise than they happen, then
it is possible for God to be wrong.
(7) It is possible for thing to happen otherwise than they happen.
(8) It is possible for God to be wrong.
Abelard’s answer consists in pointing out that modal propositions used in
the argument are ambiguous, for they can be interpreted in different ways. In
As main source for a discussion of this argument Abelard explicitly refers to Augustine’s
De civitate Dei, V 9, and to the Augustinian treatment of Cicero’s position in De fato
(cap.10-20), De natura Deorum and De divinatione (II.6.15).
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particular the proposition (7): “It is possible for things to happen otherwise
than they happen” (Possibile est rem aliter evenire quam eveniunt) might
be understood (i) de rebus, i.e. as saying that it is compatible with the
nature of things to be otherwise than they actually are; or (ii) de sensu,
as saying that the whole sense of this proposition is possible: “things are
otherwise than they are”. In the first sense, the proposition is true, in the
second sense the proposition is false. The same is the case for proposition:
“It is possible for things to happen otherwise than God foreknows them”,
which is according to Abelard true de rebus but false de sensu:
Cum dicitur: “Possibile est rem aliter evenire quam evenit”, duo sunt
sensus, sicut duo, cum dicitur: “Possibile est stantem sedere”. Si enim
ita dicimus, quod rem illam quae stat, natura permittit sedere, verum
est; si vero ita, quod natura permittit ita esse ut dicit haec propositio:
“Stans sedet”, falsa est. Similiter si dicamus, quod possibile est rem
evenire aliter modo, quam evenit vel quam deus adhuc in sua provi-
dentia habueritm qui tantum eam evenire providit, verum est. Si vero
dicamus quod possibile sit ita contingere, ut haec propositio dicit: “Res
evenit aliter, quam evenit” vel “aliter, quam deus providit” falsum est.
(LI De Int. 266.541-550)
A very similar position is maintained by Abelard in the Dialectica. Although
he does not employ there the same terminology, it is clear from the discussion
of theological fatalism that the distinction between the de rebus-de sensu
interpretations of modal claims was already fully developed in the Dialectica,
for Abelard says that in the proposition “It is possible for things to happen
otherwise than God foreknows them” (Possibile est rem aliter evenire quam
Deus providit) might be true or false, dependently on the scope we assign to
the different syntactical components of the proposition. Instead of speaking
of the modal operator being attributed to the thing itself (de rebus) or
to the sense of a proposition (de sensu), Abelard explains the difference
between the two interpretations in the following terms: although in both
cases “possibile” is the predicate of the proposition and “to happen” is the
subject,76 nevertheless in the first case we must interpret the expression
“otherwise than God foreknows” as being a determination of the predicate,
in the second case as being a determination of the subject, in this way:
76See 1.1.1 above.
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(i) for things to happen (subj) [it is possible (pred) otherwise than God
foreknows(det)];
(ii) [for things to happen (subj) otherwise than God foreknows(det)] it is
possible(pred).
The proposition is true when interpreted in the first sense, and it signifies
that things have the potency of happening differently than they actually
happen (“[res] potentiam aliter proveniendi habet”), so that the term “pos-
sible” is attributed to the things themselves and refers to their potentialities;
it is false if we instead attribute the modal term to the whole sense of a cat-
egorical proposition, which entirely is the subject of the modal term (totum
subiectum est), as if we said that this whole sense is possible (“istud totum
est possibile”): “things happen otherwise than God foreknows”. The same
could be said of the other modal claim involved in the argument: “it is pos-
sible for things to happen otherwise than they happen”, which is again true
de rebus and false de sensu.77
Coming back to the puzzling argument, Abelard argues that the ar-
gument is only valid if all modal claims are interpreted de sensu, for the
principle stated in (3) is only valid for de sensu propositions, and not for
de rebus ones. But since the modal proposition stated in (7) is false when
taken de sensu, even if the conclusion stated in (8) follows from it, it is itself
false, for it is inferred from a false premise:
Si dicamus quod possibile sit ita contingere, ut haec propositio dicit:
“Res evenit aliter, quam evenit” vel “aliter, quam deus providit” falsum
est, et ex hoc falso et impossibili satis concedendum est sequi illud
falsum et impossibile, id est quod possibile est deum falli. Tunc enim
regula praedicta locum habet: cuiuscumque antecedens possibile est, et
77See Dial. 218.26-219.2: «Dicimus autem eam [“si possibile est rem aliter evenire quam
Deus providit, possibile est Deum falli”], quodammodo intellectam, veram esse, cum scil-
icet antecedens quoque ipsius verum est, alio vero modo, falsam, cum videlicet ipsum
antecedens falsum accipitur. Est autem verum hoc modo intellectum, cum illud “aliter
quam Deus providit” determinatio est praedicati quod est “possibile”, hoc modo “rem
evenire est possibile aliter quam Deus providit”, quippe potentiam aliter proveniendi ha-
bet. Si vero ad subiectum determinatio ponatur, quod est “evenire”, atque ita dicatur:
“rem evenire aliter quam Deus providit” (istud totum) est possibile, falsum est nec probari
potest. Omnino enim impossibile est quod haec propositio dicit: “res aliter evenit quam
Deus providit”, quod scilicet totum subiectum est, “possibile” vero simpliciter praedica-
tum, sicut et istud: “res aliter evenit quam evenit”. Multum autem refert ad sententiam
orationis determinationes praedicatis modis adiungi seu eorum subiectis, sicut in tractatu
modalium supra monstravimus».
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consequens, quia tunc “possibile est” ad totas propositiones, non ad res
applicatur. Si autem ex vero procedimus secund priorem expositionem,
non sequitur, ut possibile sit deum falli magis, quam si diceremus: “Si
is qui stans est potest sedere, possibile est stationem et sessione, eidem
inhaerere simul”. (LI De Int. 266.548-558)78
Abelard is then able to maintain both that things can be otherwise than
they are, in the sense that being in the actual way is not compelled by their
nature, and that they can be otherwise that God foreknows, in the sense
that if they were otherwise, God would have a different knowledge of them:
Posset enim aliter evenire <res> quam deus habuit in providentia sua,
quam habuit. Nec tamen falleretur deus, quia sicut res aliter posset
evenire, ita et ipse aliter posse providisse, ut, sicut hoc modo tantum
providit, ita et alio tantum providisset, qui similiter cum eventu alio rei
concordasset sicut et iste modus providentiae cum isto eventu. Et sic
sana tunc esset providentia sicut et nunc. (LI De Int. 266.555-267.564)
Posset enim aliter evenire quam evenit, et secundum Dei providen-
tiam contingere, pro eo scilicet quod aliam providentiam habuisse pos-
set quam istam quam habuit secundum alium eventum. (Dial. 219.19-
21)
4.2.3 Was Abelard really an indeterminist?
From what Abelard says in the glossae and in the Dialectica it is easy to in-
terpret him as a defender of indeterminism, or at least as a defeder of the idea
that there is no incompatibility between indeterminism and the admittance
of some essential logical principles (such as bivalence or the rule of contra-
dictory pairs) or certain theological dogmas that Abelard takes as indis-
putable and undeniable (such as the completeness and infallibility of divine
knowledge). In both works, Abelard insists on the fact that the acceptance
of these principles does not per se exclude that things might be otherwise
than they actually are, and that some events happens contingently and not
necessarily. However, as Marenbon pointed out in (Marenbon, 2013a), the
interpretation of Abelard as indeterminist seems to be less secure once we
take into consideration some ideas that he defends in his theological works,
in particular in the Theologia Christiana (c. 1122-26) and in the Theologia
78The same solution is proposed in about the same words in the Dialectica (219.2-9).
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Scholarium (later 1130s). Here, Abelard embraces and argues for the thesis
that it is impossible for God to do more things or different things than the
ones he actually does. The core idea of the argument is that, because God
is supremely good and being good is one of his essential features, whenever
God chooses among a set of alternative courses of actions he cannot but will
to choose for the best one, and since he is also able to bring about whichever
he wills, he cannot but bring about the best action among all alternatives.
It is then impossible for him to choose otherwise than he chooses, and to
act otherwise than he acts. This means that God necessarily does whatever
he does, in the sense that even if there are many courses of actions that
are possible, God’s choice among these alternatives is necessitated or “com-
pelled” by his nature (Marenbon, 2013a, p. 45-74). Although this thesis does
not directly argue for determinism, inasmuch as it concerns the necessity of
God’s choices, and not the necessity of all natural events or human beings’
actions, Marenbon points out that Abelard’s acceptance of this thesis might
threaten his own acceptance of contingency: if we admit for instance that
God necessarily acts as he acts, and that everything that happens is part
of God’s providential plan, then all course of history, and every action or
intention included in it, are entirely determined and have no possibility of
happening differently then they actually happen (Marenbon, 2013a, p. 87).
It is interesting to take into consideration Abelard’s discussion of God’s
possibilities and necessities for two reasons. First because in this discus-
sion Abelard refers to the theory of modalities that he had developed in
his logical works. Secondly because by an analysis of this discussion we
could try to establish whether there is continuity or discontinuity between
Abelard’s logical works and his theological works with respect to his theory
of contingency and indeterminism. Marenbon gives in (Marenbon, 2013a,
p. 45-87) a rich and detailed analysis of the argument in question, which he
labels the “NAG” (i.e. “No Alternatives for God”) argument, providing a
reconstruction of the argument’s premises and a comparison of the ways in
which the argument is presented first in the Theologia Christiana and later
in the Theologia Scholarium.79 I follow here Marenbon’s reconstruction of
79As Marenbon points out, the argument is, as far as we know, Abelard’s invention,
although it was problably influenced by ancient and medieval sources, in particular by
Plato’s Timaeus, by Augustine’s discussion about God’s mnipotence and Jerome’s idea
that God is rigidly bound to act according to reason (Marenbon, 2013a, p. 47-8). A first
analysis of the NAG argument is presented by Marenbon in (Marenbon, 1997, p. 216-225).
263
the argument, to which I will try to contribute by adding a few remarks that
I think might be of help to understand Abelard’s positions on the topic.
In the version that Abelard uses in the Theologia Scholarium (3.27-8),
the argument has the following structure:
(1) God does x at t.
(2) God cannot do anything at any time which is not good to do at that
time.
(3) If it is good for x to be done at t, it is not good that x be desisted from
being done at t.
(4) It is good that x be done at t.
(5) It is not good that x be desisted from being done at t.
(6) God cannot desist from doing x at t.
(7) God cannot do other than x at t.
A necessary premise for the validity of this argument is the idea that God is
omnipotent, in the sense that he is able to bring about wathever he wishes,
and that being absolutely good is part of his nature and essential to him, so
that it is necessary for him to act in the best possible way. As Marenbon
notes, the understanding of necessity and possibility that Abelard uses here
is exactly the same as the one he uses in the Dialectica and Logica Ingredi-
entibus, where something is necessary for a certain subject if it is required
or included in this subject’s nature, i.e. if it is one of its substantial proper-
ties. What is possible for a subject is instead whatever is compatible with
the subject’s nature, i.e. if it is not repugnant to the subject’s substantial
properties, even if it is not actualizable or realizable because of the sub-
ject’s actual constitution or because of the external circumstances. In this
respect, there is then absolute continuity between Abelard’s logical works
and his theological ones.
Another essential premise for the argument to work is that there is al-
ways only one course of action which is the best action or the best choice.
Therefore, if we say that God necessarily does what is best, this “best” picks
out univocally one single option.80
80Abelard has an argument to justify this premise, see (Marenbon, 2013a, p. 61-2).
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Although it does not directly argue for determinism, the NAG argument
seems to have deterministic consequences. For instance, a possible objec-
tion that Abelard thinks could be moved to the argument claims that, if
God necessarily does what he does, then all human beings who are going
to be damned because of the way things are in the actual history are nec-
essarily damned, i.e. it might not have been possible for them to be saved
(Marenbon, 2013a, p. 53-5). Let us consider a damnandus, i.e. a person
who deserves damnation because of the evil actions he or she has done in
life. Abelard starts by saying that the following inference is true:
(1) If this man is saved by God, then God saves this man.
Then, he advances a logical principle according to which, whenever of two
propositions one entails the other, it is true that if the first proposition is
possible, the second must be also possible. This principle is held by Abelard
as valid on several other occasions (see for instance 1.3.1 on page 57 and 4.2.2
on page 259). Marenbon refers to it as the “transfer of possibility principle”,
that might be represented in this way:
(2) For any two propositions p and q, if p entails q, then if it is possible
that p it is possible that q.
If we accept both (1) and (2) as true inferences, we can infer that
(3) if it is possible for this man to be saved by God, then it is possible for
God to save this man
and, in virtue of contraposition, that
(4) if it is not possible for God to save this man, then it is not possible for
this man to be saved by God.
Because it is the case, in the actual course of history, that this man is in
fact damned, and not saved by God, and because – in virtue of the NAG
argument – it is impossible for God to act otherwise than he actually acts,
we should assume that
(5) it is not possible for God to save this man
and therefore we finally conclude that
(6) it is not possible for this man to be saved by God,
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(7) it is necessary for this man to be damned.81
The damnandus argument moves then from the thesis that God necessarily
does whatever he does to the conclusion that all human beings that are
actually going to be damned are necessarily damned, and consequently they
necessarily commmitted those sins that rendered them worthy of damnation.
As Marenbon correctly points out, Abelard’s solution to the damnandus
problem consists in saying that, even if (1) is true, the inference represented
in (3) is false, because whereas the antecedent “it is possible for this man
to be saved by God” is true, the consequent is false. According to what
Marenbon says, however, it is not entirely clear how Abelard justifies this,
given his acceptance of the transfer of possibility principle stated in (2) and
the evident truth of (1).
Marenbon notes that Abelard includes, as a complement to his answer
to the damnandus problem, a digression concerning the different possible
interpretation of modal claims, saying that modal propositions like “it is
possible for this man to be saved” or “it is possible for God to save this
man” could be understood as being either de rebus or de sensu. How could
the distinction de rebus-de sensu justify Abelard’s idea that (1) and (2) are
true while (3) is false? As Marenbon says, the solution cannot lie in the fact
that the antecedent and consequent of (3) must be understood one as being
de rebus and the other as being de sensu, for Abelard very clearly states that
both propositions must be understood as being de rebus, so that in both of
them the modal term is referred to the thing that is the subject and to what
is compatible or incompatible with its nature. Marenbon then suggests that
the reason Abelard refers to the de rebus-de sensu distinction is because he
wants to make an argument by analogy: just as two equivalent propositions
p and q might have different truth values when they are modalized, for
one can be used de rebus and the other de sensu, similarly there are also
other cases in which the modalization of equivalent propositions results in
assigning the two a different truth value. The two propositions “God saves
this man” and “This man is saved by God”, that are equivalent when non
modalized, could have a different truth value if a modal term is applied
in them, even if they are both de rebus propositions. Generally speaking,
Marenbon suggests that the switch from the active form to the passive form
81Marenbon gives this reconstruction of the damnandus argument in (Marenbon, 2013a,
p. 53-55).
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of a same proposition might result in a change of truth value when a modal
operator is applied in it:
Abelard’s explanation relies [both in the Theologia Sholarium and in
the Theologia Christiana] on the idea that, when the subject of a verb
changes, as it does in the shift from passive to active, then the thing
about which a divided-sense, de re possibility is asserted also changes,
since the possibility is attached to the subject of the verb. The analogy
with sentences interpreted according to divided or composite sense is
merely intended to provide other examples of cases where statements
which have the same meaning and truth values in their simple form di-
verge in meaning and truth value when modalized. (Marenbon, 2013a,
p. 72)
If this is indeed what grounds Abelard’s reply to the damnandus argument,
his justification is a bit obscure and sophistical, and perhaps not entirely
convincing. In particular, it is unclear what this explanation would make of
the “transfer of possibility principle” stated in (2): is it valid only when the
subject term in the antecedent and in the consequent is the same? How can
we decide when the modal operator in antecedent and consequent has the
same force?
I think that, although Marenbon’s interpretation of Abelard’s answer to
the damnandus argument is substantially correct, the justification Abelard
gives for the invalidity of the inference from (1) to (3) could be more eas-
ily and straightforwardly explained. A comparison with what Abelard says
in the glosses on De Interpretatione 9 might shade some light on this. In
the glosses, Abelard argues that although the proposition “If things happen
otherwise than they happen, then things happen otherwise than God fore-
knows them” is true, the proposition “If it is possible for things to happen
otherwise than they happen, then it is possible for things to happen other-
wise than God foreknows them” is false, because its antecedent is true and
the consequent is false (see 4.2.2 above). Also when discussing this case,
Abelard says that the two propositions should be understood de rebus, and
also in this case he claims that one might think that the first proposition en-
tails the second in virtue of what Marenbon calls the “transfer of possibility
principle”. However, Abelard blocks the inference between the two proposi-
tions by saying that the “transfer of possibility” principle is only valid for
de sensu propositions, and not for de rebus ones, i.e. only when the modal
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term is applied to sentences, and not when it is applied to things:
Tunc enim regula praedicta locum habet: cuiuscumque antecedens pos-
sibile est, et consequens, quia tunc “possibile est” ad totas proposi-
tiones, non ad res applicatur. (LI De Int. 266.548-558)82
This argument presented by Abelard in the glosses is entirely analogous
to the case of the damnandus in the Theologia Christiana and Scholarium.
Also in that case, Abelard aims to block the inference from (1) to (3) by
attacking the use of the “transfer of possibility principle”, saying that this
argument is invalid because the principle stated in (2) only applies to de
sensu statements, and is not valid for de rebus ones. This is why Abelard
includes his digression on the distinction de rebus-de sensu while he answers
to the damnandus argument. The structure of the damnandus argument
is very similar to the one of the argument concerning divine foreknowledge
(see 4.2.2 above), and in both cases Abelard is able to block these puzzling
arguments by making reference to the de rebus-de sensu distinction and to
some logical principles that he had stated when developing his modal system,
such as the idea that the “transfer of possibility principle” only works for de
sensu modal claims, not for de rebus ones.
Even if Abelard is able to block the damnandus argument, and therefore
to deny that the necessity of God’s actions implies that a person who is
actually going to be damned is necessarily damned, his ideas about God’s
impossibility to act otherwise than he does might still entail some deter-
ministic implications. Indeed, if we accept that God necessarily does what
he does and at the same time we assume that God not only already knows
everything that is going to happen, but also has established a fixed prov-
idential plan for the world – a plan that could not have been different for
it is necessary as any other divine actions – then every event that happens
in time, including all intentions and decisions of human beings, happens
necessarily and could not be otherwise than it actually is. Abelard could
still maintain that it is possible for human beings not to choose and not to
behave as they actually do, but only in the sense that it is not incompatible
with their nature to do so. But, as Marenbon notes, this idea of possibility
would be purely notional and abstract, for it would not consist in a real and
effective freedom of choice and of action. If this was the case, it would be
82The very same idea is proposed in about the same words in Dial. 219.2-9.
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right to say that it is possible for the damnandus to be saved by God, but
only in the sense that being damned is not something required by the nature
of human beings. There would be however no possible history or possible
alternative course of action in which this same individual is not damned but
saved. If this is the right interpretation of Abelard’s position, would there
be room in Abelard’s philosophy for real contingency and actual freedom of
choice?
Marenbon says that a possible answer to this puzzle, which tries to vin-
dicate both Abelard’s admittance of contingency and his ideas about the
necessity of God’s actions, is to say that God’s providential planning does
not extend to everything that happens in the world, and in particular it is
not extended to all the intentions and the choices of agents, either to their
good intentions and especially to their bad intentions, which lead them to
deserve damnation (Marenbon, 2013a, p. 82-7). Because not everything
that happens is included in God’s providential plan, the necessity of this
plan does not imply that everything that happens is similarly necessary.
To reinforce this interpretation, it might be useful to recall Abelard’s dis-
cussion about the compatibility between contingency and divine foreknowl-
edge in the glosses on De Interpretatione 9. There the logician carefully
distinguishes between God’s providentia, which he takes to be the same as
God’s knowledge of future events, and divine praedestinatio, which coincides
with the plan that God has established for the world and with all events that
are efficiently brought about by God himself. According to what Abelard
says here, although it is right to say that God’s knwledge of events is com-
plete and contains everything that happens, including both good events or
intentions and bad ones, his providential plan only includes good things and
intentions, and excludes all sins or evil actions, of which God could not be
taken responsible for (for this distinction between providentia and praedes-
tinatio, see 4.2.2 on page 256). The distinction drawn by Abelard in his
logical texts between foreknowledge and predestination could be succesfully
applied here, to help us rule out the idea that Abelard’s position on the
modal status of God’s actions and his acceptance of contingency are incon-
sistent to one another. Indeed, what Abelard says is that even if God has a
complete knowledge of everything that happens and that will happen in the
future, and he then also knows that a certain person is going to be damned
because of his sins, this does not mean that the person’s sins are themselves
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necessitated, and this for two reasons. First, because God’s knowledge (i.e.,
his providentia) does not impose necessity on things, as Abelard demon-
strated in his logical texts (see 4.2 above). Second, because the fact that
God knows every sin does not imply that these sins are included in God’s
providential plan (i.e., his praedestinatio), nor that these sins have the same
modal status that God’s providential plan, which is necessary, has.
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